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# INTRODUCTION.

In the second volume of the Marquess Wellesley's Official Papers, it appears that his Lordship had tendered his resignation of the office of Governor-General to the Court of Directors. The motives of that resignation are explained in the letter of the Governor-General to the Right Honourable Henry Addington (then first Lord of the Treasury, &c.), dated 10th of January 1803, an extract of which letter is here published. To that document is annexed the letter of the Court of Directors, requesting his Lordship to continue in the government of India until January 1804. To these letters are added extracts from the Governor-General's Notes relative to the late transactions in the Mahratta Empire, dated Fort William, December 15th, 1803. These extracts will serve to illustrate the nature of the constitution of the Mahratta Empire, and to explain more fully the subject of this volume.

The first letter in the series of despatches published in this volume signifies to the Court of Directors that the Marquess Wellesley had deemed it to be his public duty to continue in India beyond the period fixed by his original letter of resignation, in consequence of the state of affairs in the Mahratta Empire.

The subsequent documents contain a detailed relation of the transactions with the Mahratta States, and of the causes, commencement, progress, and issue of the war, down to the peace with Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar.

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(Extract.)

*The Marquess Wellesley to the Right Honourable Henry Addington.*

My Dear Sir, Cawnpore, Jan. 10, 1802.

In my despatch to the Court of Directors notifying my resignation of this government, I have assigned no other causes for that step than the successful accomplishment of the most essential branches of my general plans for the security of this Empire, the general prosperity of the existing state of our affairs in India, and my expectation of completing in the course of the current year as great a proportion of improvement in various departments of the Company's affairs in India, as I could hope to accomplish within any period of time to which my government could be reasonably protracted. I am however aware that considerable public benefit might be expected in India from the continued operation of the established authority of my administration until the end of the year 1803, or until a peace with France shall take place; and I am not insensible of the advantage which might be derived to my public character by such an extension of my residence in India, as should enable me to bring into more immediate profit to the Company the fruits of my services. But my continuance in India is precluded by powerful causes; and my administration is brought to a premature conclusion by the authority most interested in its extension.

A due consideration of the relation in which I stand towards the Court of Directors, as a servant of the East India Company, and a sense of the propriety of observing a submissive and respectful deportment in all my official communications with the Court, have induced me to abstain from any official record of the real and efficient causes of my resignation.

These causes are reducible to the three following general points:—

First.—That the Court of Directors has manifested a want of confidence in my administration of their affairs.

Secondly.—That the Court of Directors has recently been pleased to interfere directly in several of the most important details of the local executive government of India; in the dismission of persons employed with my full confidence and approbation for the ordinary despatch of business, and in the selection of others, in whom I cannot confide, and whose appointment is entirely contrary to my judgment; and that the Court has plainly disclosed an intention of pursuing a similar system of direct interposition in the future local government of these possessions, and in the choice of persons to be employed in the subordinate executive departments of this Empire.

Thirdly.—That the Court of Directors has positively disapproved various measures of my administration, which I have adopted as being expedient in the ordinary course of business, or as being essentially necessary to the dignity, prosperity, and security of this Empire; and that the Court

has withholden its sanction from other branches of my administration of the highest importance in my estimation, under circumstances which have furnished me with every reason to expect the orders of the Court for the demolition of institutions and arrangements, which, in my conscientious judgment, can neither be demolished nor altered without imminent hazard to the interests of Great Britain in India.

The several acts and proceedings of the Court referable to these general heads have been communicated to me either within the course of the last year, or since the danger from the combination formed against the British Empire in India in 1798 has been effectually removed by the success of the war in Mysore.

For some time past I have perceived the symptoms of an unfavourable disposition arising in the Court of Directors towards the general system of my administration; and private reports and rumours, through authentic channels, have confirmed the opinions which I had formed. But a strong sense of public duty and of gratitude has induced me to remain at my post under much vexation and disgust, until the most recent despatches from the Court to this government, added to those proceedings which have compelled Lord Clive to resign his charge, convinced me, that I could not retain mine with any prospect of private honour, or of public advantage, unless the Court should be pleased to restore to me the advantage of its confidence and support in the most formal and unequivocal terms, and in the most public manner; and unless the Court should also afford me a satisfactory assurance of its intention to revive and confirm in my hands the exercise of those powers which are indispensably requisite to enable me to conduct this arduous government.

Any person acquainted with the tenor of the despatches from the Court of Directors and from the Secret Committee to India during the last eighteen months, will readily anticipate the particular orders to which I have referred in the preceding general statement; but as it may be necessary for your information to enter into a more special detail, I will state the particular orders to which my objections apply.

First.—A peremptory order to reduce the military strength of this Empire, particularly in the peninsula of India; the augmentation of which strength had been made under my express authority, after the fullest deliberation, and after consulting all the most experienced officers in India.

The principle of these augmentations of the army is directly condemned by the Court, the encreased force is stated to be unnecessary, and to have been raised in an objectionable mode, and no option is left to my discretion with regard to the reductions enjoined.

This order cannot admit of any other construction than that the Court of Directors has judged me to have been either ignorant of the extent of the force necessary for the preservation of the empire founded in the Peninsula in the year 1799, or to have negligently or wickedly encreased the army at Madras and Bombay without an adequate necessity.

The peremptory orders for the immediate reduction of the force actually existing in the Peninsula, vests no discretionary power in me, and makes no provision for local exigencies or contingent events. It is therefore a manifest declaration, that the Court reposes as little confidence in my present judgment respecting the means of maintaining the British Empire in the Peninsula, as in my original opinion on that most essential branch of my administration.

The order also subjects me to an unwarrantable and unjust degree of responsibility; it leaves me no option between positive disobedience and the execution of measures which must produce the immediate ruin of many of the most valuable interests of this Empire, and must expose the whole to hazard.

When this order arrived in India the state of affairs in the east (combined with the demands for military force for the invasion of Egypt, and with other pressing exigencies connected with the French war), reduced me to the absolute necessity of incurring the hazard of positive disobedience to the command of the Court. For I could not, without a second reference to Europe, proceed to such a desperate step as the evacuation of all our conquests and acquisitions in the Peninsula; leaving Mysore, the Deccan, Goa, and Canara, to be the prey of rebellion or invasion. I have therefore suspended the order for the reduction of the army; but I feel the terms in which that order is expressed, the neglect or censure of my opinions on so important a question, and the restraints imposed on the exercise of my discretion, to amount to a plain manifestation that the Court of Directors has been pleased to adjudge me to be incompetent to preserve the Empire which my services have contributed to acquire.

I must further remark, that the principal ground stated for the reduction of the army, is also an undeniable proof of the real sentiments of the Court respecting my capacity to serve my country in India.

If the Court had been pleased to repose such a degree of reliance in my discretion as to have given me credit for providing new resources to meet the charges of the augmented force, objections on the ground of economy would not have been prematurely urged against the indispensably necessary augmentations which I had ordered. The period of time is not, I trust, remote, when it will appear that I have effectually provided by various arrangements for the charges of every augmentation which I have ordered. In Bengal I shall be able to effect a great reduction of the expence of the army chargeable to the Company; and in the other presidencies I shall at least provide means of defraying every additional charge by additional resources.

The Court of Directors however has given me no credit for any such system, plainly indicating in this instance, as in many others, that the nature of my incessant exertion for the security and prosperity of these possessions is least appreciated by those who ought to feel it with most sensibility, and to understand it with most accuracy and judgment.

Secondly.—Peremptory orders for the reduction of various salaries and allowances which I granted at Fort St. George at the close of the war, and of other salaries and allowances granted by me, or with my sanction, since that time. These orders imply a distrust either of the judgment or integrity of the arrangements which they rescinded; and here I cannot forbear to remark the disrespectful terms of censure and suspicion in which many of these orders are expressed. If the Court had been pleased to deem me guilty of improvidence or irregularity in the appointment of salaries and rewards for public services rendered to the government in India, the same judgment which pronounced my condemnation ought to have awarded my punishment, and to have removed me from my station. But the vexatious reduction of allowances sanctioned by my authority weakens my power, and casts reflections on my character, without producing the salutary example of a weak or corrupt Governor-General dismissed for weakness or corruption. A most offensive instance of the conduct of the Court under this head is the order for reducing the allowance originally granted by the government of Fort St. George to Colonel Wellesley, for the purpose of defraying the charges of his arduous and extensive command in Mysore.

This allowance, it is true may be considered to have been a branch of the ordinary detail of that government; in which it is known that I do not interfere excepting in cases of peculiar exigency. It cannot, however, have been reasonably supposed, that in the case of an allowance granted to my brother, I should not have exercised my judgment, although I have recorded no opinion on the subject. Can the Court of Directors suppose that I am capable of permitting the government of Fort St. George to grant an extravagant allowance to my brother? and that my brother is capable of accepting such an allowance? If such be the opinion of the Court, it ought to remove Colonel Wellesley from his command, and me from my government. The fact is, that the allowance is scarcely equal to the unavoidable expences of Colonel Wellesley's situation, which is known to be of a very peculiar nature, involving the necessity of a great establishment, and of other charges requisite for the maintenance of our interest in that recently conquered kingdom. Probably that excellent officer (whose high and noble spirit of integrity can only be equalled by his valour and military skill) will spurn the indignity offered to himself and to his family by this act of unwarrantable suspicion, and will resign in disgust the command which he has exercised with such distinguished honour and advantage to his country, and with the affection and admiration of the whole civil and military service on the coast, of the reigning family of Mysore, of the unfortunate family and nobility of the late Sultan, and of every class of our subjects in that country.

It cannot be denied that the Court, by reducing the established allowances of Colonel Wellesley, has offered me the most direct, marked and disgusting personal indignity which could be devised. The effect of this

order must be to inculcate an opinion, that I have suffered my brother to derive emoluments beyond the limits of justice and propriety; and that I have exhibited an example of profusion and extravagance in an allowance granted to my nearest connection. I have already stated that the ground of the order is as unjust and unwarranted in point of fact as its operation is calculated to be injurious and humiliating to my reputation and honour. If the Court of Directors really was of opinion that Colonel Wellesley's allowances were too high, the respectful and decorous course would have been to have referred the question to my consideration; nor can it be imagined that the Court would have omitted so indispensable a precaution of delicacy and justice, unless the Court acted under a strong sense of displeasure and discontent at the general tenor of my administration, and under the influence of an unconquerable jealousy of my intentions.

The salary of the Advocate-General of Bengal was encreased by me for reasons of irresistible justice. The Court of Directors sanctioned the encrease. But even the confirmation of my measures in this instance is made the channel of conveying suspicion and obloquy against my character. The Court accompanies its sanction of the encrease of Mr. Burrough's salary by a disrespectful censure of the measure, and by a positive prohibitory command, enjoining me never to make any augmentation whatever of any salary without the previous consent of the Court of Directors. What is this prohibition, or what is this censure, but another unqualified declaration of confidence withdrawn, and of the most jealous suspicion? If I am unfit to be entrusted with the power of augmenting salaries in cases where I may deem such an augmentation necessary or expedient, I am equally unfit for any branch of trust which I hold. The inference which I draw from this act of the Court, is greatly strengthened by the reflection that the particular case required no censure, since the augmentation of Mr. Burroughs's salary is actually approved and confirmed. It may not be useless to add, that I have actually reduced the charges of the civil establishment in Bengal since my administration, although at the time of my departure from England, they were supposed to have been reduced to the lowest possible scale. It may also be remarked, that in the case of the augmentation of the salary of the private secretary (although the necessity of the augmentation was evident), I would not take any step until the Court of Directors ordered me to do so; because my brother was my private secretary, and I thought it indelicate to add to his salary, even in the most evident case of propriety, without the previous order of the Court; The Court therefore had no just ground to warrant a prohibition, which argues such diffidence of my judgment or integrity.

Thirdly, Repeated instances of orders to the subordinate Presidencies of Fort St. George and of Bombay, directing those governments to carry certain measures into effect, notwithstanding any orders of a contrary tendency, actually received, or which might be received, at either Presidency from the Governor-General in Council.

The necessary result of such an injunction from the Court is to destroy the authority of the supreme government over the subordinate Presidencies. The Court of Directors in all such instances has manifestly supposed the case to exist, of instructions issued by me to the subordinate governments, with full knowledge of every local circumstance, and the Court commands the subordinate governments to disobey such instructions, and thus to counteract me in the legal exercise of my ordinary powers of superintendence and control.

These orders from the Court of Directors cannot be justified on any other ground than that of distrust of my judgment or integrity in the exercise of my superintending powers over the subordinate governments. It is indeed questionable whether orders so framed by the Court be strictly legal. The act of 1793 clearly vests in the Governor-General in Council the power of enforcing his orders at the subordinate Presidencies, although his orders shall be contradictory to express commands actually received by the subordinate Presidencies from the Court of Directors. And this provision of the law is wise and salutary. The supreme authority established in India ought to possess such a power, subject to a severe responsibility in its exercise. The more accurate knowledge of local circumstances, and of the actual state of events and interests, which must be possessed by the government on the spot, must necessarily enable that authority to form the most correct judgment with regard to the application of plans framed at home to the existing condition of affairs in India. A Governor-General capable of abusing his discretionary power is unfit for his station; and here again I must repeat, that if it be necessary to provide against the indiscreet use of my legal powers of general control, by ordering the subordinate governments to disobey me, and by superseding my authority at Madras and Bombay, it is necessary to remove me altogether from all power in India. But it is neither wise nor just to extinguish the general powers of controul in the hands of the supreme government, because an individual Governor-General has abused those powers, or is supposed to be incapable of using them for the public good.

Fourthly.—Orders, positively rescinding my appointment of Lieutenant-Colonel Kirkpatrick to the office of secretary in the political department, an office which vested in him the general conduct of the whole diplomatic system of India under my immediate control.

These orders are grounded on the circumstance of Lieutenant-Colonel Kirkpatrick's military commission, which is stated to be a disqualification for a civil office according to the spirit of the Act of Parliament. But the law was never stated to have disqualified Lieutenant-Colonel Kirkpatrick from holding the civil employment of Resident at the Court of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, at Nepaul and at Hyderabad, nor from holding the important office of commissioner for the affairs of Mysore, in each of which situations he had served his country with the greatest honour and ability.

Lieutenant-Colonel Kirkpatrick's skill in the Oriental languages, his ex-

tensive acquaintance with the manners, customs, and laws of India, are not equalled by any person whom I have met in this country. His perfect knowledge of all the native courts, of their policy, prejudices and interests, as well as of all the leading political characters among the inhabitants of India, is unrivalled in the Company's civil or military service; and his integrity and honour are as universally acknowledged and respected as his eminent talents, extraordinary learning, and political experience.

These qualifications recommended him to my particular confidence. He possessed no other recommendation or introduction to my notice. I fortunately met him at the Cape of Good Hope on my voyage to India, and I have no hesitation in declaring, that to him I am indebted for the seasonable information which enabled me to extinguish the French influence in the Deccan, and to frustrate the vindictive projects of Tippoo Sultaun. He remained at the Cape for some months after my departure for India, and he arrived in India soon after I had concluded the first treaty with the Nizam in 1798. I immediately appointed him to the confidential office of military secretary, in which capacity he attended me to Fort St. George during the war with Tippoo Sultaun; and, after the conquest of Mysore, acted in the delicate and arduous situation of commissioner at Seringapatam. Having in every great political transaction of my administration derived the utmost advantage from his experience and ability, after the settlement of Mysore, when the vast extension of the Empire required a modification of the office of secretary at Fort William, I appointed Lieutenant-Colonel Kirkpatrick to the political department, because I knew him to be not only better qualified for that office than any other man in India, but to be the only man in India from whom I could hope to receive any important assistance in a department to which so large a share of my particular attention had been devoted at every period of my life, that I knew I could expect little additional information from any person whom I could place in the office excepting Lieutenant-Colonel Kirkpatrick. It is not asserted that this appointment was contrary to the letter of the law; the peculiar nature of the new diplomatic department, instituted by my authority, exempts this appointment from the imputation of any contradiction to the spirit of the law. Established practice warranted the appointment of military officers to diplomatic situations, and on extraordinary occasions (such as the settlement of recent conquests or cessions) to various other important civil stations; and in this case the peculiar qualifications of the object of my selection were as generally confessed as the selection was generally known to be founded exclusively in a sense of public duty, of the exigency of the public service (under the great and recent extension of our political relations in India), and of the public merits of the person selected. Lieutenant-Colonel Kirkpatrick held the office for a year; during which time many important political measures were accomplished. His health failing in Bengal, I appointed him resident at Poonah in the month of January 1801; he proceeded as far as Madras on his way to Poonah, but

finding his health still declining, he has been reduced to the necessity of embarking from Madras for Europe. In this interval of time arrived the order of the Court, peremptorily rescinding Lieutenant-Colonel Kirkpatrick's appointment to the political department, in terms which are calculated to convey a most inadequate and unjust estimation of the merits of Lieutenant-Colonel Kirkpatrick in the public service. If this order had arrived according to the evident expectation of the Court, while Lieutenant-Colonel Kirkpatrick was actually holding the principal conduct of political affairs in India, and if he had been dismissed under the Court's order, the instantaneous consequence must have been a violent shock to the whole system of our political relations with the native states, who would not have failed to attribute such a blow to a change of system in the government at home, and to the decline of my authority in England. Every native state would have renounced all confidence in my power, and would have prepared to accelerate the approach, and to profit by the progress of general confusion. In this instance again, therefore, I should have been reduced to the alternative of exposing the public service to great injury, or of incurring the risk of positive disobedience to the order of the Court for the removal of Lieutenant-Colonel Kirkpatrick.

To my personal authority in India (which is an essential public consideration in the discharge of my duty), it is not difficult to state the injury which must have arisen from the abrupt dismission by an act of power from home, of my most confidential secretary in the most important department. Every civil and military officer, and every native in India, must have viewed such an act, proceeding from the Court of Directors, as the strongest possible mark of displeasure, and as a positive disgrace of my authority.

In the case supposed, therefore, (if I had deemed it to be possible to surmount the other public objections already stated against the abrupt removal of Lieutenant-Colonel Kirkpatrick) I must have resigned the government at the same moment in which I obeyed the orders of the Court; nor could I have exercised it for one hour after so signal a disgrace, with the slightest hope of advantage to the public interests.

And here again I must complain of the indelicate and mistrustful spirit in which the Court have acted towards me; if the Court wished Lieutenant-Colonel Kirkpatrick to be removed, and wished to establish a principle of excluding military officers from civil stations, might not both these objects have been effected without injury to my authority or character by an official signification to me of the general principle which the Court was desirous of securing, and by an order to me to carry that principle into effect as speedily and as generally as I might deem compatible with the actual state of the public service in India?*

Such would have been the conduct of the Court had it reposed any de-

* N. B. Edmonstone, Esq., was appointed by the Marquess Wellesley to the office vacated by Col. Kirkpatrick, as the only person who was likely to supply the loss of

gree of confidence in my judgment or intentions, or had it contemplated the propriety of treating me with any degree of consideration or respect.

Fifthly.—The orders for revising the appointment of Lieut.-Col. Scott resident at Lucknow, "*with a view to rescind it*," leave me indeed the option of rescinding that appointment, or of continuing it. But the Court here also has manifested its disposition to view my proceedings in the most unfavourable light. Lieut.-Col. Scott was appointed to the residency at Lucknow in the autumn of 1799, for the express purpose of reforming the Nabob Vizier's *military* establishments; an object of the utmost importance, and which absolutely required considerable military talents and experience. The success of Lieut.-Col. Scott in this arduous work has been repeatedly stated on record. The removal of that officer would be attended with serious danger to our interests in Oude; nor can I attempt such a step (even under all the benefits of the late treaty), until the Vizier's army shall have been completely disbanded, and his new establishment settled. But why has the Court been pleased to cast tardy reflections on Lieut.-Col. Scott's appointment, entirely omitting the reasons for that appointment stated on record at the time, and confirmed by subsequent experience of Lieut.-Col. Scott's eminent success? And in enumerating the appointments of military officers to civil duties, why has the Court omitted all notice of the appointment of Lieut.-Col. Collins to be resident at the court of Scindiah? An appointment made by my immediate predecessor at the moment of his departure.

The evident principle from which these acts are derived is a desire to notify to me and to the world, that I have lost the confidence of the Court of Directors, and that for the remainder of my government I am to expect vexatious counteraction and uncandid censure in the place of honourable support.

The same observations apply to the terms in which the Court has expressed its objections to the appointment of Captain Hook to the office of Secretary to the Government in the military department. Captain Hook had been a subordinate in the office for a long time previously to my arrival in India, and was promoted by me on account of his extraordinary diligence and integrity, and his accurate knowledge of the details of the military department, especially those relating to the expense of the army.

The reflections on the appointment of Captain Hook implied by the Court's orders, furnish another insurmountable proof of the wish of the Court to discover matter of blame against me; for the system of nominating a military officer to duties of this nature was not of my invention, I have pursued the plan I found established, and I have promoted a most

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that most able officer; and to Mr. Edmonstone's profound knowledge of the Eastern languages, laws, manners and customs, and of the state and disposition and interests of the several native Courts, as well as to his excellent temper, and to his judgment and unwearied attention to business, the Governor-General was much indebted in the various important transactions of his Lordship's government.—[Ed.]

deserving and useful public officer in the department in which I found him. It is, therefore, unjust to reflect on me as the author of any innovation in this instance. With respect to the general principle of the Court's order on this subject, I have no hesitation in declaring it to be utterly erroneous and impracticable. The military department of the Council will be a powerful check on the details of the army, particularly on those connected with the expenditure of money in proportion as the Secretary in that department shall be conversant with those details, and it is absolutely impossible to find a civil servant properly qualified in this respect. In the present case, Captain Hook is the person on whom, together with Captain Salmond, Military Auditor-General, I rely principally for the revision of military charges, and it has been through their assistance that I have been enabled to effect most of the recent reductions of those charges in Bengal.

If I am to be deprived of the instruments which I have already found highly useful, and on which I depend for future service in the military department of the Council, it will be impossible for me hereafter to attempt to control the details of the army; to order me to place a civil servant in the office now held by Captain Hook, is to order me to render the military department of the Council an useless sinecure in the hands of a person who could render no service to me or to the public. It would be less injurious to the public service to abolish altogether the office of Secretary to Government in the military department.

Sixthly. The terms in which the Court of Directors has expressed itself respecting a loan made at Madras during my residence there, affords another proof of their entire want of confidence in me. The loan could not have been made on better terms or in any other manner; but the Court is pleased to indicate the strongest suspicion of this transaction. This part of the Court's conduct is highly offensive and disgusting to every sentiment of my mind. The groundless and indecorous insinuations of the Court on this point are the main considerations which have induced me to apprehend that the Court has lost all sense of respect for my character, and that under such circumstances it would become absolutely impossible for me to continue in the service of the Company.

Seventhly. A peremptory order directing me to appoint Mr. Speke to be Acting President of the Board of Trade.

This order merits a detailed examination.

Mr. Speke is removed from the Council as being a superannuated Councillor, and his long services are considered to constitute a sufficient claim to an honourable retreat.

As a member of the Council, he was nominally President of the Board of Trade, but in fact he never sat at that Board, nor participated in its business. Mr. Udny was appointed to the Board of Trade by me (on the departure of Mr. Bebb) in consequence of his high character as an approved commercial servant. The honourable retreat from business assigned to Mr. Speke (a superannuated Councillor) is the post of Acting

President of the Board of Trade; and by the same arrangement Mr. Udny, who for some time past has been the most active member of the Board of Trade, becomes nominal President of the Board, and being now a member of the Council, cannot possibly enter into all the details of the Board of Trade. The effect of this arrangement has been to render the Board of Trade in Bengal utterly inefficient.

In addition to this effect of the orders of the Court it is to be remarked, that Mr. Bristow has long held the office of Acting President to the Board of Trade, and that he is senior in the list of civil servants to Mr. Speke.

The orders of the Court, therefore, enjoin a severe and injurious supercession of Mr. Bristow by a junior servant.

Mr. Bristow has declined to act under Mr. Speke, and I am thus reduced to the necessity of either disobeying the orders of the Court or of dismissing Mr. Bristow, an old servant, who had committed no offence; while in the interval of time the Board of Trade remains entirely useless.

Mr. Speke ought to have received an honourable provision, unaccompanied by any active employment.

I object, however, to this measure principally because it affords a proof of the intention of the Court of Directors to exercise a power of direct nomination to efficient subordinate offices in the local executive government of Bengal.

A stronger instance of the probable result of the exercise of such a power by the Court cannot be furnished; at one blow the order of the Court has utterly annihilated the efficiency of the commercial department in Bengal.

If the general principle contained in this appointment be adopted by the Court of Directors as a rule of control, the local administration of these governments will become absolutely impracticable; the serious attention of his Majesty's ministers and of Parliament must be directed to this point, if the existence of the British empire in India be any object of consideration.

The proper office of the Court of Directors is to superintend and control the local governments of India in the exercise of the power of appointment to the various executive offices of this country, as well as in every other branch of the executive government.

It was not in the contemplation of the legislature, by the act of 1793, to vest in the Court of Directors the direct power of nomination to every office in the local government of India; the power of nomination to such offices, and indeed the whole civil and military government are in distinct terms vested by the act of 1793 in the Governors in Council of the three Presidencies, subject to the local control of the Governor-General in Council, and in Europe to that of the Court of Directors, and of the Board of Commissioners for the affairs of India.

The Court of Directors may certainly issue orders directing the government of India to appoint any particular person to any executive office in

India, but the government on the spot ought to possess and to exercise the same free discretion with regard to the execution of such orders, as it possesses and exercises with regard to any other orders from home. It is, however, highly inexpedient to issue any orders from England for the direct nomination of any person to office below the Councils in India; and it is evident, that, under any modification, such orders, although not peremptory, must greatly restrain the discretion of the local government in the choice of its instruments.

If all such orders are to be considered as of a peremptory nature, the whole local patronage of India will, in fact, be disposed of in Leadenhall Street, and the most attentive consideration is due to the probable effects of such a system.

If the King's Commissioners for India and the Court of Directors should at any time agree to co-operate in filling from home all official vacancies which shall occur in India, it is evident that the result of such a combination might be the transfer of the whole local patronage of India, or of a certain share of it to the Crown.

Whatever share of the patronage of India should be obtained by the Crown in this manner, would be exercised in the most dangerous and objectionable form; for as the appointments to office would be made in an indirect manner, and through several successive channels of authority, no direct responsibility would attach to the ministers of the Crown; and the influence of the Crown might become considerably extended through a secret and unobserved course, and without the possibility of public control.

The direct transfer of the whole local patronage of India to the Crown, under a definite and public responsibility, would be infinitely less objectionable than the exercise of such an indirect and indefinite influence. That share of the local patronage of India which, under the arrangement supposed, would be allotted to the Court of Directors, would tend to establish in their hands a species of influence, which could never be regulated by a due control, and which, in a numerous and fluctuating body, subject to the impulse of various interests, and necessarily exempt from individual responsibility, would not often be governed by the exclusive consideration of the prosperity of the public service in India.

The Governor-General, and each of the Governors in India, acts under a severe personal responsibility in every nomination to office; and while the nominations of the respective local governments shall be superintended and controlled by the Court of Directors and by the Board of Commissioners, (neither authority possessing any private interest directly or indirectly in any such nomination,) the system of control would appear to be so complete, as to secure the public interests at home against the growth of any undue influence, and the public service abroad against any material abuse of the local patronage.

But if the Court, or the Board, or both united, are to be considered as

the direct sources of the local patronage of India, they will possess a private interest in the decision of every question which can arise concerning the nomination to any office in India; they will be interested to rescind appointments made in India for the purpose of exercising their own patronage from home; and they will become utterly disqualified for the exercise of a pure and impartial superintendence and control of the conduct of the Indian government in the important duty of administering the local patronage of this vast empire.

Such a system would be sufficiently objectionable even in its application to the public and constitutional interests in England; its application to the public service in India is however infinitely more perilous.

It must extinguish all local subordination in India, since no public servant would ever respect the local government, after it should have been deprived of the power of regulating official appointments and removals. All emulation to obtain the approbation of the local government would expire; no public servant would esteem the countenance or even the nomination of the local government to be any security for promotion in the service, or would dread the consequences of its disapprobation or censure. The attention of the whole public service would be withdrawn from the Governor on the spot, and would be fixed on schemes of intrigue and cabal, for the purpose of forming and cultivating interests in England, by which the favour of the Court of Directors or of the Board of Control might be approached.

In such a situation the Governor on the spot would be an useless cypher without power, authority or respect. He might be compelled in every branch of the administration to employ instruments in whose capacity, knowledge or integrity he placed no reliance, and to witness the exclusion from office of the most able, intelligent, and honest servants of the public. For it is impossible to suppose that the Government on the spot should not always possess the best means of ascertaining the relative estimation and value of the characters of the public servants and officers in India, and should not always feel the nearest and most urgent interest in the proper selection of the immediate instruments of the local executive power.

In this respect, a remote authority, constituted as the Court of Directors is, can neither possess equal knowledge, nor feel an equally pressing and sensible interest, nor be restrained by equally powerful ties of responsibility and personal character.

If any Governor be supposed incapable or unwilling to make such a proper selection of public servants and officers, let him be removed; but while he shall be suffered to remain in India, the public service absolutely demands that he shall possess and exercise that decisive influence in the distribution of office which may enable him to maintain due subordination, to excite honourable emulation, and to secure the efficient, pure, and regular despatch of the public business in every department, by em-

ploying those in whom he confides, by excluding those whom he distrusts, and by convincing the public servants that his approbation is the certain road to public emoluments and honours, and that his censure is a public disgrace.

All these important objects I have hitherto accomplished, by such a discharge of my duty in the distribution of the patronage committed to my trust, as it will be the happiness and pride of my life to submit to the most severe inspection of Parliament; but I cannot consent to encounter the responsibility of this station, under a system calculated to bind my hands and to frustrate every dictate of my judgment and conscience.

The great and wise object of Parliament in 1793 was, under due control, to impart such a degree of local authority and vigour to the government of India as should enable it to maintain this perilous empire against the hourly vicissitudes which surround it. Where is the security of that object if the government of India shall be thwarted in every subordinate department, deprived of all local influence, and counteracted in every official detail by a remote authority, interfering in the nomination of every public servant and officer? It would be impossible to conduct any government in any part of the world under the weight of such disgraceful chains; but it would be the excess of rashness and insanity to attempt to hold this most arduous charge, in the present crisis, with hands so weakened, and with an authority so embarrassed and impaired.

The instance which I have noticed is so strong (being no less than a direct appointment from home to the first efficient office in the commercial department in Bengal) that it affords singly a sufficient proof of the projected system of utterly destroying the local power of these governments, and of transferring all influence and authority to the Court of Directors. But the proofs of the existence of such a project, as well as the principles by which its execution is likely to be governed, and the effects which its operation is likely to produce will be fully illustrated by referring to the recent proceedings of the Court of Directors towards Lord Clive and towards the government of Fort St. George. These proceedings, indeed, constitute the most immediate causes of my resignation.

Eighthly. Recent orders to the government of Fort St. George.

By these orders the Court of Directors have removed from office Mr. Webbe, the chief Secretary to the government, and have directly appointed Mr. Chamier to that office, have removed a member of the Board of Revenue, and directly appointed two members to that Board, and have granted one of the most important commercial residencies on the coast in reversion on the next vacancy.

Mr. Webbe is a gentleman of the highest character in India. His talents are not inferior to those of any person in this country; nor have I seen in any part of the world many persons of superior capacity. His

general knowledge is considerable, and his particular acquaintance with the affairs of India, especially those of Fort St. George, is comprehensive and accurate; his diligence is indefatigable; he has passed his whole life in laborious business; his zeal and public spirit are distinguished features of his character, and his eminent integrity and honour are universally acknowledged; he possesses Lord Clive's esteem and confidence, together with mine, in the highest degree; he had also enjoyed Lord Hobart's most favourable opinion. My judgment of Mr. Webbe is formed on my personal observation; in addition to the most active, able, and honest discharge of his ordinary duties, he rendered the most important services to his country, under my immediate orders at Fort St. George, during the last war in Mysore; during the settlement of our conquests; in effecting the final arrangement of the public interests in Tanjore; in detecting the whole system of the treachery and intrigues of the late Nabob of the Carnatic; and in accomplishing the long desired and most important object of transferring the civil and military government of the Carnatic to the Company.

Under all these circumstances, I consider Mr. Webbe to be the most distinguished public servant in a subordinate situation in India: and my sentiments respecting him, as well as the impregnable public grounds on which they stand, have long been matter of notoriety.

Without any previous intimation, without any public charge, this most valuable and honest public servant is driven from the most confidential executive office in the State, directly in the face of Lord Clive's most decided countenance, and of my most marked respect and regard.

To aggravate the effect of this measure, at the moment when the notification of Mr. Webbe's removal arrived, he had recently finished the negotiations for the transfer of the Carnatic to the authority of the Company, under my special orders; having received the extraordinary distinction of being called by me to Fort William, and of having remained in the government house for above a month, assisting me in framing the treaty of the Carnatic. Having been the chief instrument in negotiating the treaty, Lord Clive and I proposed to employ him principally in the final settlement of the Carnatic.

In addition to these circumstances, Mr. Webbe's whole public life had marked him as the implacable, indefatigable, and irresistible foe of the corrupt system of intrigue and peculation, which had long pervaded the service at Fort St. George. He was the declared and ardent enemy of every author and abettor of corruption in that service, and the cordial friend and protector of every man of integrity, diligence, knowledge and talents; while his exertion to encourage the progress of honesty and industry was unremitting, his own example had become a model of imitation to the younger branches of the service at Madras; the public disgrace of such a man was, therefore, even when considered separately,

calculated to discourage ability and virtue, and to favour the growth of ignorance and vice.

The mere removal of Mr. Webbe by an act of authority from home, would have been felt both by myself and by Lord Clive to be a severe blow to our respective authorities, and to our means of conducting the public service; but a direct appointment from home to the most confidential and important subordinate office of the government of Fort St. George comprized every degree of personal indignity which could be offered to Lord Clive or to myself, together with every practicable degree of injury to the public trust committed to our joint charge.

I think it necessary to declare, that *I will not separate my character from that of Lord Clive* on this painful occasion; nor can I make any such distinction, consistently with any sentiment of truth, justice or honour, or with those public principles, the maintenance of which I deem essential to the good government of this empire.

Although from considerations of the public service, and with a view to sustain the local influence of a Governor, in whom I reposed the utmost confidence, I have not interfered in the ordinary details of Lord Clive's government, I considered his government as an inseparable branch of my own, and I acknowledge myself to be responsible for the general system of his measures. The intimate cordiality and union which subsisted between me and Lord Clive are matter of public notoriety, and are well known to have been principal causes of the success of many important measures of my administration. Any act, therefore, tending to impair Lord Clive's authority, or to offer indignity to his character or government, must be received by me with the same sensations as if it had been immediately directed against myself.

The removal of the Chief Secretary, and the appointment of another from home, in opposition to Lord Clive's known judgment, is an act of such importance that I must suppose it to have been intended to destroy Lord Clive's power and influence, together with mine, at Fort St. George; and to announce to all India that Lord Clive and I had forfeited the confidence of the Court of Directors.

The direct appointments to the Board of Revenue at Fort St. George manifest the determined pursuit of the same system, in all its principal branches, of a declared distrust of the government in India, a determination to reduce its local power, and a resolution to dispose of the local executive offices of India in Leadenhall Street.

To your discernment and experience in public affairs it is not necessary to offer any comment on the ruinous policy of granting efficient executive offices in reversion. If the mischief of such a general policy could be aggravated, it would be by the remote situation of this empire, and by the encreased probability that the reversion would take effect under circumstances of aggravated injury to the public service. It is enough however to observe, that in Lord Clive's opinion, the person to

whom the Court of Directors have granted the reversion of one of the most important commercial residencies, is utterly unqualified for that charge, and would never have been appointed to it by his Lordship.

I have stated that no public accusation has been preferred against Mr. Webbe to justify his removal. He is indeed accused of having neglected to enter on record a minute of mine respecting Tanjore; but this crime surely could not have required his removal; and at least a previous reference to me might have been expected on such an occasion; if the reference had been made to me, it would have appeared that I am guilty of the sole crime publicly imputed to Mr. Webbe. Being much pressed for time upon the eve of my departure from Fort St. George, I delivered my opinion verbally in Council concerning the settlement of Tanjore, and I directed the Secretary to take notes of my speech, and to forward those notes to me at Fort William, whence I promised to return the substance of them in the shape of a regular minute, to be entered on the proceedings of that day. Mr. Webbe furnished me regularly with the notes which I had required, but the whole business of Tanjore having been substantially concluded previously to my departure from Fort St. George; my speech having been delivered in Council, and the necessary measures founded upon it having been carried into effect, I confess myself to have been guilty of the crime of forgetting Mr. Webbe's notes, and of neglecting to return to Fort St. George a written copy of my speech for record. If, therefore, Mr. Webbe has really been removed for this alleged crime, can a stronger case be adduced to prove the danger of such hasty interposition of the power of a remote authority? For if previous reference had been made to me, Mr. Webbe would have stood fully acquitted: and if a delinquent was still desirable, a more worthy object of disgrace would have been offered to the resentment of the Court.

But a letter from Mr. David Scott to Lord Clive, to which his Lordship has replied by an official despatch, addressed to the Chairman of the Court of Directors, discloses the real cause of Mr. Webbe's removal, and plainly proves that he has not been removed for this offence, or for any offence hitherto stated on public record.

The public records, indeed, abound with the proofs of Mr. Webbe's merit, and with official acknowledgments of his eminent services, under the authority of Lord Hobart, of General Harris, of Lord Clive, and of the present Government General; but it seems that some secret correspondent from Fort St. George has conveyed to the Court of Directors private and confidential intelligence respecting Mr. Webbe, which has countervailed the united public testimony of three successive governments of Fort St. George and of the Governor-General.

The crime alleged against Mr. Webbe, even by this secret informer, appears to consist exclusively in the great influence which Mr. Webbe is stated to possess over Lord Clive's mind, by which influence Mr. Webbe is said to have acquired more power than ought to reside in the hands of

a Secretary. I refer you to Lord Clive's despatch to the Chairman, under date the 15th October 1801, for a full and able view of the nature and foundation of this extraordinary accusation. I shall content myself with remarking that even if Mr. Webbe should be convicted of possessing an extraordinary share of Lord Clive's confidence, such a conviction would appear to convey a presumptive argument of extraordinary merit, and certainly conveys no proof whatever of guilt, unless it be assumed that Lord Clive's confidence has been misplaced in this instance, or has been abused by Mr. Webbe. But neither of those charges can be maintained with any degree of consistency; for the Court, in the same order for Mr. Webbe's removal from the office of Secretary, assents to his employment in any other office suited to his talents; and the sole ground assumed for the appointment of Mr. Chamier, is Mr. Chamier's extraordinary ability and peculiar qualifications for the office of Secretary. It is unnecessary to draw any comparison between the respective qualifications of Mr. Webbe and Mr. Chamier.

But certainly the removal of Mr. Webbe cannot be consistently justified on the ground of his possessing more power than ought to reside in the hands of a Secretary; because the Court has directly granted infinitely more independent power to Mr. Chamier than was ever possessed by Mr. Webbe or by any other Secretary. For the Court has not only appointed Mr. Chamier directly to the office of Secretary, in opposition to Lord Clive's known opinion, (thereby imposing a considerable restraint on Lord Clive's power of removing Mr. Chamier); but the Court has also invested Mr. Chamier with a provisional appointment to the Council upon the next vacancy. The remedy, therefore, adopted by the Court to avert the evils which it apprehended from the overgrown power of the late Secretary at Fort St. George, is to render the office of Secretary nearly independent of the government, and to place the present Secretary next in succession to the Council.

I have dwelt minutely on these inconsistencies, because the examination of them leads immediately to the real object of the Court in the removal of Mr. Webbe, and the appointment of Mr. Chamier.

Mr. Webbe is not removed on account of any deficiency of talents, knowledge, assiduity or integrity, or on account of any excess of his power; but merely because he possesses a large share of the confidence of the Governor of Fort St. George, and because he adds to that crime the accumulated guilt of possessing an equal share of the confidence, respect, and esteem of the Governor-General.

The object therefore of the Court is to impose a restraint on Lord Clive's authority and consequently on mine, by changing the constitution of a subordinate office, and by clothing our secretary with dignity and independence at our expence. That this is the object of the Court is further corroborated by the dissatisfaction which the Court has expressed at the harmony which has hitherto subsisted between Lord Clive and his

council. In recent orders from the Court to Fort St. George, the unanimity of the council at that Presidency is plainly censured as a crime; and the members of council are officially invited (if not positively enjoined) to dissent from the Governor for the better information of the Court of Directors. This suggestion cannot be otherwise understood than as a testimony of the wish of the Court to impose embarrassing restraints on Lord Clive's local authority, and as a rule for the future conduct of the new councillor Mr. Dick, and of the provisional councillor, Mr. Chamier, in the ordinary course of business. The secretary destined for the council under such instructions, cannot fail to consider himself, even now, to be the declared instrument of an additional control over the Governor, rather than a mere subordinate officer subject to the Governor's orders.

I appeal to your wisdom and honour to decide what effects are to be expected at Fort St. George from these acts of the Court; by which it has manifested a systematic purpose of founding its proceedings with respect both to official characters and measures, on secret information, private reports, and vague rumours, in preference to the authentic public records of the government of India, and to the combined and declared sentiments of the Governors on the spot; by which it has endeavoured to arm subordinate officers with independent power, and to provoke discord in councils now unanimous, and by which it has punished public and recorded merit, and has established principles of promotion incompatible with the prosperity of the public service.

The immediate consequence of these acts has been the resignation of that honest, diligent, prudent and able public servant—Lord Clive. To you it is my duty to declare my solemn conviction, that our Empire in the peninsula will be brought to the verge of ruin if this system be pursued at Fort St. George; nor can I imagine any other mode of saving it from the utmost perils of weakness and corruption, than by the immediate restoration of the authority of the local government either in Lord Clive's hands, or in those of some other person of rank, talent and integrity, and by the restoration of Mr. Webbe to the office from which he has been dismissed. Such acts on the part of the Court would be just, wise and honourable, and would tend to secure the due vigour of the local government, and to revive the spirits of all those honest and able servants at Fort St. George, who have witnessed with affliction the decline of their own honourable cause in the disgrace of Mr. Webbe.

But as it is to be supposed that the Court may differ with me in these opinions, and as I am convinced that the pursuit of the system commenced by the Court at Fort St. George, will preclude all prospect of my exercising any degree of beneficial control over that settlement, I must renounce all responsibility concerning its affairs; and as they form a main branch of the general Government, and as they now require a most active and continual superintendence, I deem it to be my duty on this ground alone to resign my office.

Deeply and directly as I feel myself to be involved in the result of these acts of the Court, as they affect Fort St. George, this impression on my judgment is enforced by the more urgent consideration that the system which has appeared in full magnitude at Fort St. George, has already been visible at Fort William, and that its natural progress must accelerate its approach to the council and to the civil and military establishment of this Presidency.

My anxious desire is that my administration should close before such calamity and disgrace shall have fallen upon me; and this motive renders me impatient to be relieved of my charge in sufficient time to save me from the pangs of witnessing the degradation and ruin of the authority of of the Governor-General, and the consequent decline of the public service in Bengal and in all Asia.

If public rumour is to be credited, I am to expect much counteraction and mortification even in the course of the present year. I am menaced with angry orders of various descriptions for the subversion of many of the most important acts and institutions of my administration, and for the entire change of its general tenor and spirit.

In every case it is equally my inclination and duty to manifest a prompt obedience to the orders of the Court of Directors; but it is my primary duty to maintain at all hazards the security of these possessions, and to suspend for the further pleasure of the Court all orders, of which the execution is rendered dangerous by the actual state of local circumstances.

Neither my respect for the Court of Directors, nor the legal relation in which I stand towards its authority, would warrant me in withholding the exercise of that discretion, with which the law has invested me in any instance which appeared to my conscientious judgment to demand such an effort for the safety and welfare of this Empire. For the short period of time therefore during which I shall retain my present charge, I shall exercise my legal powers firmly and freely, with prudence, but without fear; with respectful deference towards the Court of Directors; with a strong sense of gratitude towards the East India Company; but with a constant remembrance, that the law has invested me with a trust for the Company and for the British Empire, as well as for the Court of Directors; that I am responsible not only for the use, but for the suspension of my discretionary power; and that to suffer my discretionary power to remain dormant in any crisis which should evidently demand its active exercise, would not be less criminal than its most active perversion and abuse.

Whoever may be my successor, I most earnestly pray that he may not attempt the vain and fruitless task of governing this Empire without the full power which I have possessed and exercised hitherto, and to the possession and exercise of which, is to be attributed whatever success has attended my administration.

The Court of Directors, in reducing this power, has attacked the very source of that success which it has so often applauded, and has turned its

animosity against the chief bulwark of the Company's sovereignty in India, and the main cause of abundant commerce and revenue.

To the exercise of those powers which the Court would now subvert, I attribute the fall of Tippoo Sultaun; the conquest and settlement of Mysore; the extinction of the French influence in the Deccan; the establishment of the British influence in that quarter on the solid foundations of military strength and territorial possession; the tranfer of Tanjore, of Surat, of the Carnatic, and of Oude, to the British Government; the substitution of a powerful British force on the north-western frontier of Oude in the place of the undisciplined, licentious and disaffected army of the Nabob Vizier; the destruction of the power of Zemaun Shah; the foundation of an intimate alliance with Persia; the means of contributing to the maintenance of Egypt by the army of India; the tranquillity of the Mahrattas, and finally, the seasonable occupation of the Portuguese possessions in the East Indies.

The progressive operation of the same causes would speedily have brought the financial and commercial affairs of the Company in India to a more flourishing state than they have ever yet attained; and at this moment, when I find myself compelled to resign my charge, the able and active exertions of my brother, Mr. Henry Wellesley, aided by the influence of my name and authority, have enabled me to conclude (not only without any struggle, but with the general good will of the whole country, and of the Nabob Vizier himself), the basis of a settlement of revenue for the ceded provinces in Oude, which, in one year, will restore the whole system of the finance and investment of the Company in India.

I cannot close this letter without soliciting your immediate attention to the affairs of India, as connected with the causes of my resignation, and with their probable consequences.

Without a speedy, vigorous and decisive interposition from the highest authority, there is no safety for our Empire in India. I expect therefore that your efforts will be applied with your habitual temper, manly fortitude and perseverance, to secure to the local government of India, by whatever hands administered, that degree of power and authority which (as my last service to this Empire), I solemnly declare to be indispensably necessary to the prosperity of all our local and relative interests, to the vigour and security of the administration, to the welfare and happiness of our subjects, and to the dignity, glory, and stability of the British name in the East.

Believe to be, my dear Sir,
with the most sincere respect and regard your's,
always most faithfully and affectionately,

WELLESLEY.

*Caunpore, January 10th*, 1802.

*From the Honourable Court of Directors to the Governor-General in Council.*

Public Department, 29th September, 1802.

We have received despatches from the Governor-General of the 1st January and 13th March 1802, intimating his Lordship's intention to relinquish his Government, and to return to Europe in the month of January 1803.

Though we have been under the necessity of differing from our Governments abroad in some material points, upon which our sentiments have already been communicated to them, it is impossible for us not to feel and to acknowledge the zeal and ability which the Governor-General has displayed in the general management and superintendence of our affairs, nor can we avoid expressing, in the strongest terms, our conviction, that the interests of the East India Company will be essentially promoted by the continuance of Marquess Wellesley in India for another year, for the purpose of bringing to a conclusion the various arrangements alluded to in his Lordship's despatch of the 13th March; we therefore entertain a confident reliance, that the Governor-General (adverting only to the obligation of superior moment which these considerations impose), will cordially join with us in feeling the importance of his Lordship's stay in India until these objects shall have been accomplished, and that he will, in consequence postpone his departure from thence till the month of January 1804. Beyond this period we shall not feel ourselves justified in calling upon his Lordship to yield to our interest the desire which he may naturally feel of returning to Europe; being persuaded that his Lordship will be enabled in the course of another season to terminate, with honour to himself, and advantage to the Company, every measure of importance connected with our recent acquisitions; to perfect the retrenchments, as well those resulting from peace, as others of which our affairs may be susceptible, and in concert with the government at home, and under the directions which we hope we shall be able at no distant period to forward to you on this subject, to lay the foundation of an efficient system for the progressive liquidation of the Indian debt.

We remain your affectionate friends,

JOHN ROBERTS,
JACOB BOSANQUET,
&c. &c. &c.

*Extract from Notes relative to the late Transactions in the Mahratta Empire, by the Governor-General.*

Fort William, December 15, 1803.

The predatory states composing the Mahratta power, have never been united under any regular form of confederation, or by any system of constitutional laws, or of established treaties, which can be compared to any imperial constitution or general confederation existing in Europe. A vague and indefinite sentiment of common interest however, founded principally upon their common origin and civil and religious usages, and upon their common habits of conquest and depredation, has established a certain degree of union amongst them, from the period of their first success throughout every stage of the decline of the Moghul empire; the same indefinite but acknowledged confederacy has subsisted between the Mahrattas since the entire destruction of the Moghul empire, and together with other causes, has enabled several of these adventurers to erect states of considerable military resource and political power.

The power of the Peishwa, however, for many years past has been acknowledged by all the Mahratta states,* and universally by all the other states of India, to be the constitutional representative of the sovereign executive authority of the Mahratta empire, and the principal chieftains have been considered ostensibly as the subjects and officers of the Peishwa's government.

The British Government, therefore, has concluded its general treaties with the Mahrattas through the authority of the Peishwa, and although in some of those engagements individual chieftains have been admitted to act as guarantees, the independent right of the Peishwa to conclude treaties with any power in India, has never been denied, nor has it ever been attempted to assert a claim on the part of any of the chieftains, to limit the independent right of the Peishwa to form treaties and alliances without the advice or consent of any chieftain of the Mahratta empire.

On the other hand, these chieftains have exercised the right of concluding treaties and alliances, independently of the Peishwa's authority, and without his sanction or concurrence; and the British Government recently concluded a treaty of subsidy with the Guikwar, without the previous sanction of the Peishwa, reserving however, all the Peishwa's rights in the state of the Guikwar.

At the commencement of the war against Tippoo Sultaun, in the year 1789, Lord Cornwallis, in forming a defensive alliance with the Mahratta power against the power of Mysore, resorted to the Peishwa's acknow-

* The Rajah of Berar does not deny the nominal supremacy of the Rajah of Sattarah, whose authority is represented by the Peishwa, nor the sovereign executive powers annexed to the hereditary office of Peishwa, but he claims the office of Peishwa for himself in right of his descent from the family of Sevajee, the ancestor of the Rajah of Sattarah, and the founder of the Mahratta power.

ledged authority as the best security for such an alliance, and accordingly negotiated and concluded on the 1st of June 1790, the treaty of Poonah with the Peishwa, without reference to any of the subordinate chieftains.

In that war, the assistance which Lord Cornwallis derived from the Mahrattas, proceeded exclusively from the Peishwa's authority, aided by the feudal tributaries immediately subject to the state of Poonah. Neither Scindiah nor the Rajah of Berar were parties to that alliance, and it is well known that Mahdajee Scindiah was adverse to its principles and objects; and that at the close of that war in 1792, Mahdajee Scindiah moved his army towards Poonah, with intentions unfavourable to the British interests.

At the conclusion of the war in 1792, the Peishwa was a party to the treaty of peace at Seringapatam, nor was any attempt made at that time to assert a claim on the part of the subordinate chieftains of the Mahratta empire, to be consulted in that important arrangement, which established a new balance of power throughout India, by the reduction of the power of Mysore, by the augmentation of the British territories and of those of the Nizam, and finally, of the separate hereditary territories of the Peishwa.

In the division therefore of Tippoo Sultaun's territory, and of his treasure, which followed the treaty of Seringapatam in 1792, the Peishwa obtained a considerable accession of territory to his hereditary dominions, and a large sum of money, without the advice, consent, or participation of any subordinate chieftain of the Mahratta empire.

When Lord Cornwallis, in the course of the year 1793, proposed a general defensive alliance to the Mahratta power and to the Nizam, his Lordship addressed the proposition to the Peishwa, and received as conclusive, a reply from the Peishwa through the Durbar of Poonah, without any reference to the subordinate chieftains.

The policy of considering the authority of the Peishwa as the legitimate and constitutional representative of the Mahratta power, was wise and just. It is evident that the acknowledged authority of the Peishwa furnished the most secure basis of an amicable alliance between the British Government in India and the Mahratta power, and at the same time afforded the most just and effectual means of controlling the predatory spirit of the subordinate chieftains, and of checking any disposition which might arise amongst them of a tendency adverse to the British interests, or to the general tranquillity of India.

Some of these chieftains, however, appear to have considered the alliance between the British Government and the Peishwa to be adverse to their interests; and although its tendency at all times has been rather to secure than to disturb the feudatory Mahratta states in the possession of their separate territories and distinct rights, their characteristic spirit of habitual rapacity and lawless ambition has inclined them to view with jealousy an alliance, the vigour and efficiency of which must always have

opposed obstacles to any invasion of the legitimate authority of the Peishwa.

During the period of time which elapsed between the conclusion of the peace of Seringapatam in 1792, and the commencement of Lord Wellesley's administration in India in May 1798, the rapacity and ambition of Dowlut Rao Scindiah* had impaired the authority of the Peishwa to such a degree, as to have frustrated every benefit which Lord Cornwallis intended to secure to the British interests, by the alliance with the Peishwa.

Dowlut Rao Scindiah had absolutely usurped the government of Poonah, and had established himself in the vicinity of that city with a powerful army, the regular infantry and artillery of which had been disciplined, and were then commanded principally by French officers.

When Lord Wellesley at the close of the year 1798, required the Peishwa in consequence of Tippoo Sultaun's aggression, to fulfil the conditions of the subsisting defensive alliance against Mysore, the justice of that demand was deemed irresistible, even by the perverse counsels of Poonah, under the undue influence of Dowlut Rao Scindiah. The Peishwa's ministers, therefore, ostensibly acquiesced in the demand, and that experienced statesman, Nana Furnavese, who was then verging to the close of his career, would certainly have fulfilled the conditions of the alliance, had not the wisdom of his advice been overborne by the violence of Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

Under this overbearing influence, notwithstanding the acquiescence of the Court of Poonah in the justice and necessity of the war against Tippoo Sultaun in 1798, and notwithstanding the Peishwa's declaration of his intention to co-operate in that war according to the terms of the subsisting alliance, the Mahrattas not only afforded no assistance to the British Government in the prosecution of the war, which terminated on the 4th of May 1799, but actually maintained a secret and treacherous correspondence with Tippoo Sultaun and his ministers and officers down to the period of the fall of Seringapatam; and even after that memorable event, the emissaries of the Mahratta Government (under the domination of Scindiah, who then governed the Durbar of Poonah,) attempted to excite the family, and remaining officers of the deceased Sultaun, to resist the settlement of Mysore.

Notwithstanding the entire failure of the Peishwa in discharging the

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* Ranojee Scindiah, an officer in the service of Bajee Rao the first Peishwa, had five sons, one of whom died young; the other four were Jye Appa Scindiah, Dutta Jee Puttail, Kiddar Rao Scindiah, and Madhajee Scindiah. Jye Appa Scindiah was killed in Jodepoor; Dutta Jee Puttail was killed in the vicinity of Delhi, in a battle with Nujeeb-oo-Dowlah, the Governor of the district of Seharanpoor. Kiddar Rao Scindiah died a natural death. Madhajee Scindiah died on the 12th February 1794, without male issue, and was succeeded on the 3d of March following by his adopted son Dowlut Rao Scindiah, who is the son of Kiddar Rao Scindiah.

obligations of public faith to the British Government under the alliance concluded by Lord Cornwallis with the Mahratta power, Lord Wellesley in dividing Tippoo Sultaun's dominions in the year 1799, offered a considerable share of territory to the Peishwa. The Governor-General however annexed to this liberal grant conditions calculated to revive the alliance with the Peishwa on a secure basis.* The Peishwa, therefore, was induced by Dowlut Rao Scindiah to reject the proffered grant; and consequently the territory which had been destined for the Mahrattas, was divided between the remaining allies, the Nizam, and the British Government.

Propositions of the most amicable nature were at the same time offered to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, but when it is recollected that the most efficient part of his military power was under the command and influence of French adventurers, his rejection of all friendly overtures from the British Government may be traced to other causes, in addition to that spirit of usurpation and plunder which urged him to seize the government of Poonah, to prohibit the Peishwa from cementing the ties of amity with his Highness's ancient ally the Company, and even to compel that unfortunate Prince to violate his public faith with the Company, at the expense not only of reputation and honour, but of every interest which the Peishwa could be supposed to feel as a Sovereign Prince, in the independence of his own authority, in the security of his own power, and in the extension of his hereditary territory and revenue.

Previously therefore to the commencement of the last war in Mysore, the usurpation of a subordinate chieftain of the Mahratta empire, had in effect dissolved the alliance formed by Lord Cornwallis with the Mahratta power, upon the basis of the Peishwa's authority; and Dowlut Rao Scindiah, the chieftain, by whose usurpation the alliance between the Mahratta power and the British Government had been dissolved, had effected that object by the presence of a powerful army formed under the command of French adventurers, and considerably advanced in discipline, military skill and science, under a system of which the further progress will appear in the narrative of the events of the present war.

The destruction of the hostile power of Mysore, accompanied by the consolidation of our alliances with the Court of Hyderabad, had left no antagonist to the British Government among the native states in India, excepting the Mahratta power.

The Mahratta states, unconnected with any European ally, could never become formidable to the British Government, excepting in the event of an actual union of the feudal chiefs of the empire, under an efficient sovereign power, or in the event of a revolution, which should unite the

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* See vol. ii. of the Marquess Wellesley's Despatches.—[Ed.]

command of the resources of a large portion of the Mahratta territory, in the hands of an active and enterprizing chief. Such events, however to be deprecated, might have been encountered without apprehension by the British Government, in the commanding position of its foreign relations, and in the vigorous condition of its internal resources and concentrated strength.

But it was obviously prudent to employ every endeavour to effect such an arrangement, as should preclude the union of the Mahratta states under any circumstances, which might menace interruption to the tranquillity of our possessions, or of those of our allies. With this view, it appeared to be expedient to receive under the protection of the general defensive system, of which the foundation was laid by the treaty with the Nizam concluded in 1800, such of the Mahratta states as might be disposed to enter into subsidiary engagements with the British Government: on this principle a subsidiary treaty was concluded with the Guikwar in 1802, the operation of which attached that state to the Company, and secured to the Company a valuable and important territorial establishment in the maritime province of Guzerat. The most effectual arrangement, however, for securing the British Government against any danger from the Mahratta states, appeared to be an intimate alliance with the acknowledged sovereign power of the Mahratta empire, founded upon principles, which should render the British influence and military force the main support of that power. Such an arrangement appeared to afford the best security for preserving a due balance between the several states constituting the confederacy of the Mahratta empire, as well as for preventing any dangerous union, or diversion of the resources of that empire.

It has always been a principal object of the British Government to prevent the sovereign power of the Mahratta state, or the power of any great branch of the Mahratta empire, from passing into the hands of France. While the views of the government of France shall be directed to the establishment of its authority within the peninsula of Hindostan, it is manifestly the policy of the British Government to accomplish such a system of alliances with the powers of India, as may preclude the occurrence of those internal convulsions, which would afford to France the most favourable opportunity of effecting her ambitious purpose.

The disturbed state of the Mahratta empire would have afforded an advantageous opportunity to the government of France, for the successful prosecution of its favourite object, of establishing a dominion within the peninsula of Hindostan, by the introduction of a military force, for the purpose of aiding the cause of one of the contending parties; and the views of France would have been materially favoured by the strength and efficiency of Monsieur Perron's force, established with a great territorial dominion extending towards the left bank of the Indus through the

Punjaub,* and comprehending Agra, Delhi, and a large portion of the Dooab of the Jumna and Ganges, on the most vulnerable part of our north-western frontier of Hindostan; and holding the person and nominal authority of the unfortunate Shah Aulum, (the deposed Moghul emperor,) in the most abject and degrading subjection.†

The endeavours of the Governor-General have therefore been employed for some years past to establish between the Peishwa and the British Government, such a connection as might secure the stability and efficiency of the Peishwa's authority, under the protection of the British power, without injury to the rights of the feudatory chieftains of the Mahratta empire.

The efforts of the Governor-General for that purpose were renewed at those seasons of difficulty and danger when the Peishwa's independence was controled, and when the existence of his government was exposed to hazard by the violence, rapacity, and ambition of his feudatory chieftains. Had the Peishwa then assented to the moderate and salutary propositions which were offered to his acceptance, he could not have been exposed to the disastrous event by which (on the 25th of October 1802)

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* Punjaub, (or the country of the five rivers) the country contained between the five branches of the river Indus, from the 30th to the 32d degree of north latitude, and from the 70th to the 75th degree of east longitude.

† The annual revenue of the countries subject to Monsieur Perron derived from the territorial possessions, as well as from other resources, are stated to have amounted to one crore and thirty-five lacs of rupees, or about £1,700,000 sterling.

Although the regular corps in Scindiah's service were first formed by Monsieur De Boigne, it was his practice to admit into the service British as well as French officers; but since his resignation, the object of Monsieur Perron (who succeeded to his authority) has been directed to the exclusion of British officers, and to the establishment of a military power, exclusively commanded by Frenchmen. This plan had been carried into effect with considerable success; and Monsieur Perron, it is supposed, only waited the arrival of French officers to dismiss the whole body of British officers remaining in the service of Scindiah.

Dowlut Rao Scindiah holds the appointment of Deputy to the Vaquel ul Mutuluk, which last is an office similar to that of a Regent or Viceroy, exercising almost independent powers of sovereignty under the Great Moghul.

The office of Vaquel ul Mutuluk being holden by the Peishwa, Scindiah in his quality of Deputy administered the affairs of the nominal Moghul empire, and the fiction was carried to so great a length, that Monsieur Perron called his army the "*Imperial army*," and himself a servant and subject of the Emperor or Great Moghul.

There is every reason to believe that the government of France intended to make the unfortunate Emperor of Hindostan the main instrument of their designs in India, and to avail themselves of the authority of his Majesty's name to re-establish their influence and power. A plan to this effect was actually submitted to the Chief Consul of France in 1801, by an officer who afterwards accompanied General Decaen to India in 1803. A copy of this plan is now in the possession of the Governor-General.

he was expelled from Poonah, by which his authority was subverted, his person endangered, and his country and capital abandoned to devastation and plunder.

Notwithstanding the frequent disappointments which occurred in the accomplishment of his salutary views, the Governor-General determined, in the month of June 1802, to renew his negotiations for the conclusion of an improved system of alliance with the Court of Poonah. The encreased distractions of the Mahratta state, and the successes of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, (an illegitimate son of the late Tuckojee Holkar,) against the forces of Scindiah, appeared to constitute a crisis of affairs favourable to the complete establishment of the interests of the British power in the Mahratta empire, without the hazard of involving it in a contest with any party.

The danger to which Scindiah's separate dominions and hereditary interests had been exposed by the success of Holkar, and the ruin which must have ensued to Scindiah's affairs if Holkar had been able to establish himself in the usurpation of the Peishwa's government, appeared to constitute sufficient motives to counterbalance both Scindiah's jealousy of the British power and his inordinate desire of usurping the same authority at Poonah, which Holkar was prepared to seize. Scindiah's immediate personal safety was endangered, and the restoration of the Peishwa under the British protection at that moment offered the only probable means of affording Scindiah a respite from the violence of Holkar. On the other hand, Holkar being a mere adventurer, and his resources and power altogether precarious, might have been expected to relinquish without regret his pursuits of irregular ambition and temporary rapine at Poonah, for the more secure and substantial benefit of a permanent establishment under the British protection.

In the course of the discussions which ensued between his Highness the Peishwa and the British Resident, in consequence of the Governor-General's instructions of the 23d of June 1802, the Peishwa manifested considerable anxiety to contract engagements with the British Government, but continued (under the terror of that ascendency which Scindiah, although absent, still continued to maintain over the counsels of the Peishwa, and with the habitual irresolution of a Mahratta,) to withhold his consent to any admissible modification of the Governor-General's propositions, until Jeswunt Rao Holkar actually arrived at the head of a large army, in the neighbourhood of Poonah. The combined army of the Peishwa and of Scindiah marched from Poonah under the command of Suddasheo Bhow, for the purpose of encountering Holkar's force. On the 25th of October 1802, the two armies engaged, and on the same day, the Peishwa sent his minister to the British Resident with a paper, desiring the establishment of a subsidiary force of six battalions of Sepoys, with the usual complement of artillery, and conveying a sunnud (or grant) for territory to the annual amount of twenty-five lacs of rupees, proposed

to be ceded in perpetuity to the honourable Company, for the payment of that force. The minister at the same time assured the Resident of the Peishwa's earnest desire, that a general defensive alliance should be concluded and carried into effect, at the earliest practicable period of time, between his Highness and the Company on the principles of the treaty concluded at Hyderabad, in the month of October 1800. No reason existed to warrant a doubt of the Peishwa's sincerity to the extent compatible with the timidity of his character. His Highness might be deemed to be indifferent to the success of either contending party, and to be equally menaced by the usurpation of Scindiah and by that of Holkar. The approach of Holkar, however, relieved the Peishwa from any immediate fear of Scindiah, and left his Highness at liberty to embrace the British protection.

The Governor-General ratified this engagement on the day on which he received it, and signified to the Peishwa his determination to employ every effort of the British power, for the restoration of his Highness's just authority. With a view to include the several branches of the Mahratta empire in the proposed general alliance, the Governor-General availed himself of this opportunity to renew his invitation to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, to partake the benefits of the treaty proposed to be concluded with the Peishwa, and accordingly directed Colonel Collins to proceed from Futty Ghur to Scindiah's camp, for the purpose of proposing the terms on which Scindiah might be admitted to the benefits of the general defensive engagements already concluded with the Peishwa.

The engagement between the combined army of the Peishwa and Scindiah, and that commanded by Holkar, terminated in the total defeat of the former, with considerable loss. After the action, the Peishwa retired with an inconsiderable body of cavalry to a fortress in the vicinity of Poonah, whence he prosecuted his march towards the Cokan.*

The object of Holkar was to obtain possession of the person of his Highness the Peishwa, and to compel his Highness to establish such an administration as might secure Holkar's ascendancy, to the exclusion of Scindiah's power. In the event of the failure of this project, the second plan of Holkar was to invite to Poonah, Amrut Rao, (the adopted son of the late Ragobah,) to place the son of Amrut Rao on the musnud, and invest Amrut Rao with the office of Prime Minister. Holkar himself was to assume the general command of the troops of the state.

Finding that the Peishwa had effected his retreat to Mhar, a fort in the Cokan, situated on the river of Bancoote, Holkar detached a force to Jejoory, a fort about thirty miles south-east of Poonah, and the actual residence of Amrut Rao, and brought that chieftain to Poonah for the

* The narrow tract of country along the western coast of India, contained between the province of Canara and Bombay, and bounded by the Western Ghauts.

purpose of carrying this plan into execution; and although Amrut Rao appears to have been adverse to the arrangement, the affairs of Government were, in conformity to Holkar's plan, conducted at Poonah under the authority of Amrut Rao's name.

In the meanwhile, the Peishwa signified to the Government of Bombay, that it was his Highness's intention to seek refuge at that Presidency, and his Highness actually availed himself of the offer which had been made to him of the ship *Herculean*, for the purpose of conveying him from Mhar to a strong fort in another part of the Cokan, named Savendroog, where his person was likely to be perfectly secure against the attempts of the rebels and usurpers.

In the existing state of the affairs of the Mahratta empire, it would have been a measure of indispensable precaution to have assembled a considerable army of observation upon the frontier of the Mahratta territories, for the purpose of securing our own provinces, and those of our allies the Nizam and the Rajah of Mysore, against the attack of the chiefs at Poonah, as well as of repelling the predatory incursion of any vagrant freebooter, whom the issue of the contest might compel to seek subsistence in the British dominions, or in those of our allies. These important considerations, combined with the application made to the Governor of Fort St. George, by the Resident at Poonah, acting under the orders of the Governor-General, induced Lord Clive early in the month of November 1802, to assemble a considerable force at Hurryhur,* on the north-western frontier of Mysore, without waiting the arrival of direct instructions from the Governor-General for that purpose. The Governor of Bombay pursued the same wise and salutary course of vigilance and precaution, by preparing for immediate service the disposable force at that Presidency. A considerable detachment of the subsidiary force at Hyderabad was also ordered by the Resident at that Court to be prepared for eventual service in the field, in conformity to a requisition for that purpose from the Resident at Poonah.

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* Force assembled at Hurryhur under the command of Lieut.-General Stuart.

| Cavalry. | Eur. | Nat. | Total. |
|---|---|---|---|
| H. M. 19th Dragoons, H. M. 25th do. | 975 | 2,606 | 3,581 |
| Artillery, | 390 | — | 390 |
| Gun Lascars, | | 563 | |
| **Infantry.** | | | |
| 5 Companies of H. M. 33d Regiment. H. M. 73d do. H. M. 74th do. H. M. Scotch Brigade, | | 2,845 | |
| 12 Battalions of Sepoys, | | 12,182 | |
| | | | 15,027 |
| | | Total - | 18,998 |

| Abstract. | |
|---|---|
| Cavalry, | 3,581 |
| Artillery, | 390 |
| European Infantry, | 2,845 |
| Native Infantry, | 12,182 |
| | 18,998 |

With 800 Pioneers, and 563 Gun Lascars; with 4 Iron twelve and 4 Iron eighteen Pounders; 4 Brass 12 Pounders; 40 Field Pieces, 12 Galloper Guns, and 4 Howitzers.

During these transactions, several conferences were holden at Poonah, between the Resident Lieut.-Col. Close, Holkar and Amrut Rao, in which both these chieftains expressed their solicitude for the preservation of the friendship of the British Government, and directly and earnestly applied to the Resident for his advice and mediation in effecting an accommodation with the Peishwa. About the same time, the Governor-General also received a letter from Dowlut Rao Scindiah, under date the 24th November, soliciting the continuance of the friendship of the British Government towards his state, and that of the Peishwa, and containing a request, that the Governor-General would act in concert with Scindiah during the existing crisis of affairs at Poonah.

Having with difficulty obtained permission to quit Poonah, Lieut.-Col. Close, the British Resident, left that capital on the 28th of November, and reached Bombay on the 3d of December. The capital of the Mahratta empire remained in the possession of the rebels and usurpers. Towards the end of the month of November the Peishwa embarked from Savendroog, under convoy of the *Herculean*, and arrived at Bassein on the 16th of December, attended by a small escort of about one hundred and thirty followers. His Highness was immediately waited upon by Lieut.-Col. Close, and the 18th of December was fixed for the day on which the Peishwa would enter on the discussion of the definitive treaty with the British Government. Accordingly, early in the morning of the 18th December 1802, Lieut.-Col. Close attended the Peishwa at his Highness's place of residence on the Island of Bassein, and submitted to his Highness's consideration a draft of the definitive treaty of alliance proposed to be concluded. The discussion lasted until sunset, by which time the Peishwa and his ministers agreed to the draft with some alterations which were admitted by Colonel Close. The treaty was signed, sealed, and delivered on the 31st December 1802 at Bassein, and on the 18th of March 1803, the Peishwa received the counterpart of the treaty, ratified by the Governor-General in Council, with demonstrations of the highest satisfaction.

In conformity to the plan of operations which the Governor-General had directed to be adopted for the restoration of the Peishwa to the musnud at Poonah, the whole of the subsidiary force* stationed with his Highness the Nizam, amounting to about 8,368 men, marched from Hyderabad at the close of the month of February, and on the 25th of March reached the Town of Paraindah, a station on the western frontier of the Nizam's dominions, situated at the distance of one hundred and sixteen miles from Poonah. The subsidiary force was accompanied by 6,000 of the Nizam's disciplined infantry, and about 9,000 cavalry, under leaders of approved valour and attachment.

Under instructions from the Governor-General of the 2d February 1803,

* Subsidiary Force: Two regiments of Native Cavalry, six battalions of Sepoys, and two companies of Artillery.

Lord Clive, aided by the judgment of Lieut.-Gen. Stuart, was empowered to determine the time at which it might be proper for the British troops to advance into the Mahratta territories, and the amount of the force to be detached from the main army assembled on the frontier of Mysore for that purpose.

Adverting to the importance and expediency of securing the early arrival of the British troops at Poonah, Lord Clive on the 27th February instructed Lieut.-General Stuart, then present with the army on the frontier of Mysore, to adopt the necessary measures for the march of the British troops into the Mahratta territory, leaving it to the judgment of Lieut.-General Stuart to determine the amount of the force necessary to be detached from the main body of the army.

The command of the advanced detachment necessarily required the united exertion of considerable military skill, and of great political experience and discretion; and Lord Clive was therefore of opinion, that it could not be confided with equal prospects of advantage to any other person than the honourable Major-General Wellesley, whose extensive local knowledge and personal influence among the Mahratta chieftains, (acquired by his conduct in the command of Mysore, and by his victories over Doondiah and other refractory chiefs) were peculiarly calculated to ensure success to the intended operations. Lord Clive accordingly desired that General Wellesley might be appointed to the command of the advanced detachment, under instructions to be furnished to him by Lieut.-General Stuart, according to the spirit of the Governor-General's orders of the 2d of February 1803.

In conformity to those instructions, Lieut.-General Stuart directed a detachment from the main army assembled at Hurryhur, to be formed under the command of Major-General Wellesley for the purpose of advancing into the Mahratta territory. The detachment consisted of one regiment of European, and three regiments of native cavalry, two regiments of European and six battalions of native infantry, with a due proportion of artillery, amounting all together to about 9,707 men, and to this force was added 2,500 of the Rajah of Mysore's horse.*

Major-General Wellesley commenced his march from Hurryhur on the 9th of March, and crossed the Tumbudra river on the 12th. The progress of the British troops through the Mahratta territories was most successful. They were every where received as friends, and almost all the

* Here it may be observed that the power and resources of Mysore which had hitherto been opposed to us in every contest with the native states of India, were now in consequence of the conquest of Seringapatam in 1799, applied to the aid of the British Government, and afforded essential assistance. By the subsidiary treaty of Seringapatam concluded in 1799, the Rajah of Mysore is bound to cooperate in the most effectual manner with the British Government when engaged in hostilities.

chiefs in the vicinity of the route of the detachment, joined with their forces, and accompanied the British army to Poonah. The amicable conduct of the Jagheerdars, and of the inhabitants (arising principally from the fame which the British arms had acquired in the campaign under Major-General Wellesley's command against Doondiah Waugh,) contributed to enable our army to perform this long march at a most unfavourable season of the year, without loss or distress. Great merit is also to be ascribed to the ability, temper, activity, and skill of Major-General Wellesley in directing the system of the supply and movement of the troops, in preventing plunder and all excess, and in conciliating the inhabitants of the districts through which his route was directed.

The Nizam's subsidiary force under Colonel Stevenson, arrived within a short distance of Major-General Wellesley's force at Aklooss, a town within eight miles of the Neera river, on the 15th of April, and was the next day reinforced from Major-General Wellesley's army by his Majesty's Scotch brigade. Jeswunt Rao Holkar had left Poonah some time previous to this period, and the native officers who commanded the corps which he had detached to the southward, retreated with precipitation as General Wellesley advanced. On the 15th of April Holkar had reached Chandore, (about one hundred and thirty miles N. N. E. from Poonah,) and Amrut Rao alone remained at Poonah with about 1,500 men.

Under these circumstances, it appeared to Major-General Wellesley unnecessary to advance to Poonah all the troops destined to effect the restoration of the Peishwa; and as the country was much exhausted, and a general deficiency of forage prevailed, General Wellesley determined to dispose of the troops in such situations, that the whole might procure forage and subsistence, and might easily form a junction, in case that measure should appear to be advisable. Accordingly, General Wellesley ordered Colonel Stevenson to march from his position near Aklooss to Gardoon, to leave near that place, within the Nizam's dominions, all his Highness's troops, and to place himself with the British subsidiary troops in a position on the Beemah river towards Poonah, near its junction with the Mota Mola river.

After having completed these arrangements, General Wellesley continued his march towards Poonah by the road of Baramooty. The General had received repeated intimations from Colonel Close, that Amrut Rao, who still remained at Poonah, intended to plunder and burn that city on the approach of the British troops, and at last Major-General Wellesley received an urgent request from the Peishwa then at Bassein, to detach some of his Highness's troops in order to provide for the safety of his Highness's family still remaining at Poonah. It was obvious that even if General Wellesley could have prevailed on the officers of the Peishwa's troops to march to Poonah, the force was not of a description or strength to prevent the execution of Amrut Rao's design; and General Wellesley determined therefore to move forward with the British cavalry and the

Mahratta troops belonging to the Peishwa, as soon as the British army should arrive within the distance of a forced march from Poonah. In the mean time, intelligence was received that Amrut Rao was still in the neighbourhood of Poonah on the 18th of April, and that he had removed the Peishwa's family to the fortress of Saoghur, a measure, which was generally supposed to be preparatory to the destruction of the city. Major-General Wellesley therefore marched on the 19th April 1803, at night, over a most rugged country, and through a difficult pass (the Little Bhoorghaut,) about forty miles to Poonah, which city he reached at the head of the cavalry on the 20th, making the total distance marched by the cavalry with Major-General Wellesley in person at their head since the morning of the 19th (thirty-two hours,) about sixty miles.

Amrut Rao heard of the march of the British troops early on the morning of the 20th, and retired with precipitation, leaving the city in safety. Major-General Wellesley and the British troops were welcomed, as the deliverers of the city, by the few inhabitants who remained, and those who deserted their habitations, and had fled to the adjoining hills during the usurpation of Holkar, afforded a proof of their confidence in the British Government, by immediately returning to their houses, and by resuming their different occupations. It is a circumstance equally honourable to the British character, and propitious to the British interests in that quarter of India, that the first effects of the British influence in the Mahratta dominions should have been displayed in rescuing the capital of the empire from impending ruin, and its inhabitants from violence and rapine.

During the progress of these transactions, arrangements were made at Bombay for the march of the Peishwa towards Poonah. A detachment,* consisting of his Majesty's 78th regiment (which the Governor-General embarked from Fort William on the 7th of February, and which arrived at Bombay on the 5th of April 1803,) five companies of his Majesty's 84th regiment, a proportion of artillery, and 1,035 Sepoys, was formed and placed under the command of Colonel Murray of his Majesty's 84th regiment, as an escort to his Highness, who left Bassein, attended by the Resident Lieut.-Col. Close, on the 27th of April 1803.

On the 6th of May the Peishwa passed Major-General Wellesley's camp near Poonah, and on the 13th of the same month his Highness, attended by his brother Chimnajee Appa, and by a numerous train of the principal chiefs of the Mahratta empire, proceeded towards the city of Poonah; having entered his palace, his Highness resumed his seat upon the musnud, and received presents from his principal servants.

During the procession, the British Resident Lieut.-Col. Close, accompanied by his suite, paid his compliments to his Highness, when a salute

* Detachment forming the Peishwa's escort under the command of Colonel Murray, of his Majesty's 84th regiment:—Europeans, 1,170; Natives, 1,035; Artillery, 93; Total, 2,298. With 177 Gun Lascars.

was fired by the British troops encamped in the vicinity of Poonah, under the command of Major-General Wellesley; this salute was immediately answered from the fortress of Saoghur.

While the procession passed the bridge leading into the city, a second salute was fired from the British camp, and as the Peishwa approached the palace, salutes were fired from the several posts of the Mahratta troops. At sun-set salutes were fired from all the hill forts in the vicinity of Poonah.

While these transactions passed at Poonah, Dowlut Rao Scindiah had collected a large force at Ougein* with the professed view of opposing Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and having commenced his march from that capital towards Poonah, crossed the Nerbudda river on the 4th of February 1803, and arrived in the vicinity of Boorhanpoor on the 23d of that month.

Colonel Collins, the British Resident, despatched by the Governor-General from Futty-Ghur, arrived at the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah on the 27th February 1803. The advices which the Governor-General had received from Colonel Collins, and from other quarters, induced his Lordship to entertain suspicions, that Scindiah, notwithstanding his specious professions, being now delivered by the interposition of the British power, from the immediate fear of the superiority of Holkar, meditated an accommodation with Holkar, and a confederacy with that chieftain and with the Rajah of Berar, for the purpose of subverting the treaty concluded by the British Government with the Peishwa at Bassein. This suspicion was corroborated by the artifices practised at the camp of Scindiah, upon the arrival of Colonel Collins, with a view of eluding the communication of the propositions with which Colonel Collins was charged under the authority of the Governor-General. The intricacy, perverse policy, and treachery of such an intrigue, however contrary to every principle of true wisdom and justice, are habitual to the low cunning and captious jealousy of the Mahrattas. Colonel Collins therefore, on the 24th March 1803, demanded and obtained an audience of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, for the purpose of requiring an explanation of the suspected intrigue, when that chieftain, in the presence of all his principal ministers, positively assured Colonel Collins, that he had no intention whatever to obstruct the completion of the arrangements concluded between the Peishwa and the British Government, and that it was his wish to improve the friendship then subsisting between the Peishwa, the British Government, and his own state.

Notwithstanding this amicable declaration, the Governor-General had great cause to doubt the sincerity of Scindiah's professions, while the encreasing rumours of the supposed confederacy between that chieftain, Jes-

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* Ougein is Scindiah's capital, situated near the ancient city of Mundu, the capital of the Chilingi Kings of Malwa. Ougein is about forty miles north or north-west of Indore, Holkar's capital. These two cities are situated in the province of Malwa, which is divided between the Peishwa, Scindiah, and Holkar.

wunt Rao Holkar, and the Rajah of Berar, rendered it absolutely necessary for the British Government to bring the question of the supposed confederacy to a determination, and in the event of the actual formation of such a confederacy, to prepare the British Government and its allies for a contest with the confederated chieftains.

Colonel Collins therefore, in a conference on the 28th of May, communicated to Scindiah the representations which he had been directed to make in conformity to instructions from the Governor-General under date the 5th May; by which Colonel Collins was desired to require the immediate return to Hindostan of Scindiah with his army, because Dowlut Rao Scindiah possessed no right to impede the accomplishment of the treaty of Bassein, unless his own security was endangered by that arrangement, because the advance of his army must necessarily have prevented the due execution of that treaty, and because Scindiah (having on the 24th of March, formally disavowed an intention of obstructing the engagements concluded between the Peishwa and the British Government,) his march to Poonah, or his continuance south of the Nerbudda river* were incompatible with that declaration, and could not be reconciled to any other policy than a determined intention to disturb those engagements, and to re-establish his former usurped ascendency in the government of Poonah.

Colonel Collins at the same time delivered to Scindiah a copy of the treaty of Bassein: Scindiah, after having considered the articles of the treaty, declared, that it contained no stipulations injurious to his just rights. In conformity to the Governor-General's instructions, Colonel Collins required Scindiah to state the nature of his late negotiations with the Rajah of Berar, and with Jeswunt Rao Holkar, intimating also to Scindiah the resolution of the Governor-General, to resist any attempt on the part of any state or power to obstruct the complete execution of the treaty of Bassein.

The Resident (Colonel Collins) also apprized Dowlut Rao Scindiah, that, in the event of his refusing to afford the just and reasonable explanations and assurances which the Resident demanded, and of his continuing to prosecute military operations in opposition to the Resident's remonstrances, the British Government would be compelled to adopt measures of precaution on every boundary of that chieftain's dominions: The Resident added, agreeably to the Governor-General's instructions, that certain intelligence of the accession of Dowlut Rao Scindiah to any confederacy against the British power would produce immediate hostility on all parts of his frontier.

In reply, Scindiah repeatedly declared, in public Durbar, that he could not afford the satisfaction demanded, until a meeting should have taken place between him and the Rajah of Berar, when the British Resident should be informed "whether it would be peace or war."

* The Nerbudda river forms the southern boundary of Hindostan proper.

It is impossible not to contrast this unprovoked menace of hostility with the temperate declaration of the Governor-General, intimating a conditional intention to adopt measures of precaution on every boundary of Scindiah's dominions, in the event only of that chieftain continuing to prosecute military operations, in opposition to the remonstrances of the Resident, and refusing to afford the reasonable explanations which the Resident had demanded. In the sequel of the Governor-General's declaration, which adverted to the extreme case of ultimate hostility, that eventual case is stated to have been contemplated by the Governor-General in the single event of Scindiah having actually acceded to a confederacy against the British power, which act, on the part of Scindiah, would alone have constituted a positive aggression. The insult offered to the British Government by a reference of the question of peace or war to the result of a conference with the Rajah of Berar, who, at the head of a considerable army, had reached the vicinity of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's camp at Eidalabad, together with the indication which Scindiah's abrupt declaration, and the approaching junction of his army with that of the Rajah of Berar afforded, of a disposition on the part of those chieftains, to prosecute the supposed objects of their confederacy, rendered it the duty of the British Government to adopt without delay, the most effectual measures for the vindication of its dignity, and for the security of its rights and interests, and those of its allies, against any attempt on the part of the confederates to injure or invade them.

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*** A Map is given with this Volume, in order that the extensive plan of military operations may more readily be comprehended. The interesting letter from General Lake to the Duke of York, describing the short and brilliant campaign in *Hindostan*, appears in the Appendix.

Two private letters to Mr. Addington illustrative of the transactions relative to the Carnatic, and other subjects treated of in this Volume, are also given in the Appendix.

In consequence of the size of the present Volume, several documents intended for the Appendix will appear in the 4th and last Volume of the Marquess Wellesley's Indian Despatches.—[Ed.]

## ERRATA.

p. 52—note at the bottom, for *Appendix* read *Introduction.*
p. 72—(No. XX.) after *Secret Committee* read " *of the Court of*".
p. 153—at top, for *order* read *orders.*
p. 254—l. 12 from top, dele " *on*".
p. 323—note at bottom, for *Rolica* read *Roleia.*
p. 567—l. 4 from bottom, for *condition* read *conditions.*
p. 528—note, for *Introduction* read *Appendix.*
p. 619—l. 12 from top, for " *the wide extent of one short campaign*" read " *throughout the wide extent of Hindostan and the Deccan, in one short campaign*".

# CONTENTS OF VOL. III.


| No. | From | To | Date. | Page. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 184 | Abbott, Right Hon. Charles | Marquess Wellesley | 4 May 1804 | 618 |
| 46 | Barlow, Hon. G. H. Esq. | Do. | 12 July 1803 | 185 |
| 177 | Benares, Addresses | Do. | 24 Mar. 1804 | 601 |
| 81 | Bentinck, Rt. Hon. Ld. W. | Do. | 9 Sept. 1803 | 298 |
| 150 | Do. | Do. | 14 Dec. — | 516 |
| 172 | Do. | Do. | 2 May 1804 | 586 |
| 175 | Bhaugulpore, Inhabitants' Address | Do. | 15 Mar. — | 598 |
| | Bombay, Inhabitants' Address, and Reply | Do. | 22 Mar. — | 593 |
| 171 | Calcutta, Inhabitants' Address, and Reply | Do. | | 579 |
| 180 | Calcutta, Native Address | Do. | | 609 |
| 111 | Calcutta Gazette, | Extract from | 13 Oct. 1803 | 398 |
| 170 | Camden, Lord | Marquess Wellesley | 30 Aug. 1804 | 578 |
| 6 | Castlereagh, Lord | Do. | 10 Aug. 1802 | 31 |
| 7 | Do. | Do. | 10 Sept. — | 33 |
| 9 | Do. | Do. | 27 Sept. — | 36 |
| 22 | Do. | Do. | 16 Oct. — | 85 |
| 24 | Do. | Do. | 15 Nov. — | 91 |
| 26 | Do. | Do. | 17 Dec. — | 92 |
| 42 | Do. | Do. | 14 Feb. 1803 | 176 |
| 43 | Do. | Do. | 16 Mar. — | 179 |
| 74 | Do. | Do. | 16 Mar. — | 288 |
| 82 | Do. | Do. | 14 May — | 300 |
| 101 | Do. | Do. | 28 April — | 379 |
| 152 | Do. | Do. | 23 June — | 521 |
| 166 | Do. | Do. | 18 May 1804 | 570 |
| 167 | Do. | Do. | 19 May — | 572 |
| 168 | Do. | Do. | 21 May — | 576 |
| 169 | Do. | Do. | 24 May — | 577 |
| 5 | Lord Clive | Do. | 14 Jan. 1803 | 31 |
| 36 | Collins, Lieutenant-Col. | Do. | 29 May 1803 | 159 |
| 38 | Do. | Do. | 12 June — | 170 |
| 41 | Do. | Do. | 14 June — | 175 |
| 53 | Do. | Do. | 6 July — | 236 |
| 18 | College at Fort William, | Examinations at | 29 Mar. — | 64 |
| 164 | Cornwallis, Marquess | Marquess Wellesley | 30 April 1804 | 568 |
| *Int.* | Court of Directors | Gov.-Gen. in Council | 29 Sept. 1802 | xxv |
| 179 | Cuttack, Inhabitants Address | Do. | 30 Mar. 1804 | 607 |
| 57 | Dowlut Rao Scindia | Do. | 31 July 1803 | 250 |
| 173 | Duncan, Hon. Jonathan | Do. | 14 April 1804 | 592 |
| 25 | Edmonstone, N. B. Esq. | Colonel Collins | 5 May 1803 | 93 |
| 30 | Do. | Lieut.-Colonel Close | 30 May — | 106 |
| 34 | Do. | Colonel Collins | 3 June — | 120 |
| 40 | Do. | Do. | 6 July — | 174 |
| 183 | Eldon, Rt. Hon. Lord | Marquess Wellesley | 3 May — | 615 |
| 60 | Gov.-General in Council. | The Secret Committee | 1 Aug. — | 255 |
| 67 | Do. | (General Orders) | 29 Aug. — | 282 |
| 72 | Do. | (Do.) | 31 Aug. — | 286 |
| 79 | Do. | (Do. No. 1.) | 8 Sept. — | 296 |
| 80 | Do. | (Do. No. 2.) | 8 Sept. — | 297 |

| No. | From | To | Date. | Page. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 89 | Gov.-General in Council | General Orders | 15 Sept. 1803 | 314 |
| 100 | Do. | The Secret Committee | 25 Sept. — | 330 |
| 105 | Do. | (General Orders) | 1 Oct. — | 386 |
| 114 | Do. | (Do.) | 14 Oct. — | 403 |
| 119 | Do. | (Do.) | 22 Oct. — | 411 |
| 125 | Do. | (Do.) | 30 Oct. — | 421 |
| 126 | Do. | The Secret Committtee | 31 Oct. — | 421 |
| 128 | Do. | (Minute by the) | 1 Nov. — | 438 |
| 158 | Do. | The Secret Committee | 28 Dec. — | 546 |
| 174 | Do. | Hon. Jonathan Duncan | 6 July 1804 | 597 |
| 91 | Harcourt, Lieut.-Colonel | Captain Armstrong | 16 Sept. 1803 | 317 |
| 94 | Do. | Do. | 18 Sept. — | 321 |
| 115 | Do. | Do. | 25 Oct. — | 405 |
| Note | Hawksbury, Lord | M. Otto | 10 Oct. 1802 | 86 |
| 19 | Hobart, Lord | Marquess Wellesley | 17 Oct. — | 72 |
| 27 | Do. | Do. | 16 Nov. — | 98 |
| 83 | Do. | Do. | 16 May 1803 | 305 |
| 97 | Do. | Do. | 2 May — | 326 |
| 165 | Do. | Do. | 4 May 1804 | 569 |
| 68 | Lake, Lieut.-General | Do. | 29 Aug. 1803 | 283 |
| 69 | Do. | Do. | 29 Aug. — | 284 |
| 70 | Do. | Do. | 30 Aug. — | 285 |
| 71 | Do. | Do. | 30 Aug. — | 286 |
| 73 | Do. | Do. | 1 Sept. — | 287 |
| 75 | Do. | Do. | 4 Sept. — | 291 |
| 76 | Do. | Do. | 4 Sept. — | 293 |
| 78 | Do. | Do. | 8 Sept. — | 296 |
| 84 | Do. | Do. | 11 Sept. — | 307 |
| 85 | Do. | Do. | 12 Sept. — | 308 |
| 86 | Do. | Do. | 12 Sept. — | 310 |
| 87 | Do. | Do. | 13 Sept. — | 312 |
| 88 | Do. | Do. | 14 Sept. — | 313 |
| 90 | Do. | Do. | 15 Sept. — | 316 |
| 92 | Do. | Do. | 17 Sept. 1803 | 318 |
| 93 | Do. | Do. | 17 Sept. — | 318 |
| 95 | Do. | Do. | 23 Sept. — | 322 |
| 102 | Do. | Do. | 29 Sept. — | 381 |
| 106 | Do. | Do. | 1 Oct. — | 390 |
| 108 | Do. | Do. | 10 Oct. — | 393 |
| 109 | Do | Do. | 10 Oct. — | 395 |
| 110 | Do. | Do. | 11 Oct. — | 397 |
| 112 | Do. | Do. | 13 Oct. — | 400 |
| 113 | Do. | Do. | 14 Oct. — | 401 |
| 116 | Do. | Do. | 18 Oct. — | 407 |
| 117 | Do. | Do. | Oct. — | 408 |
| 120 | Do. | Do. | 22 Oct. — | 414 |
| 123 | Do. | Do. | 28 Oct. — | 418 |
| 129 | Do. | Do. | 1 Nov. — | 439 |
| 130 | Do. | Do. | 2 Nov. — | 441 |
| 131 | Do. | Do. | 2 Nov. — | 445 |
| 133 | Do. | Do. | 3 Nov. — | 449 |
| 136 | Do. | Do. | 14 Nov. — | 453 |
| 142 | Do. | Do. | 24 Nov. — | 470 |
| 146 | Do. | Do. | 3 Dec. — | 494 |
| 147 | Do. | Do. | 8 Dec. — | 495 |
| 149 | Do. | Do. | 28 Dec. — | 556 |
| 149 | Leycester, W. Esq. | Do. | 26 July — | 203 |
| | Madras, Inhabitants' Address, and Reply | Do. | | 587 |
| 176 | Moorshedabad Address | Do. | 22 Feb. 1804 | 600 |
| 122 | Nicholls, Major-General | Hon. Jonathan Duncan | 27 Sept. 1803 | 416 |

| No. | From | To | Date. | Page. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 77 | Paget, Hon. A. | Marquess Wellesley | 3 June 1803 | 294 |
| 178 | Patna Address | Peter Speke, Esq. | 12 Mar. 1804 | 606 |
| 181 | Seton, Archibald, Esq. | Marquess Wellesley | 16 July 1804 | 611 |
| 8 | Stuart, Lieutenant-General | Do. | 24 Jan. 1803 | 35 |
| 16 | Do. | Do. | 25 Mar. — | 60 |
| | Thanks of the House of Lords | Do. | 3 May 1804 | 616 |
| | Thanks of the House of Commons | Do. | 3 May — | 619 |
| 185 | Thanks of the Court of Directors | Do. | 18 May — | 621 |
| 186 | Thanks of the Court of Proprietors | Do. | 22 May — | 622 |
| | Thanks of the Court of Directors | General Lake and the Army | 18 Oct. — | 622 |
| *Int.* | Marquess Wellesley | Rt. Hon. H. Addington | 10 Jan. 1802 | iv |
| 1 | Do. | Hon. Court of Directors | 24 Dec. — | 1 |
| 2 | Do. | The Secret Committee | 24 Dec. — | 3 |
| 3 | Do. | Right Hon. Lord Clive | 7 Jan. 1803 | 27 |
| 4 | Do. | Lieut.-General Lake | 7 Jan. — | 28 |
| 10 | Do. | Right Hon. Lord Clive | 2 Feb. — | 41 |
| 11 | Do. | Do. | 3 Feb. — | 46 |
| 12 | Do. | Lieut.-General Stuart | 8 Feb. — | 48 |
| 13 | Do. | The Secret Committee | 10 Feb. — | 49 |
| 14 | Do. | Hon. Court of Directors | 11 Feb. — | 52 |
| 15 | Do. | Rt. Hon. Ld. Castlereagh | 12 Feb. — | 54 |
| 17 | Do. | Lieutenant-General Lake | 27 Mar. — | 62 |
| 20 | Do. | The Secret Committee | 19 April — | 72 |
| 21 | Do. | Right Hon. Lord Hobart | 20 April — | 84 |
| 23 | Do. | Rt. Hon. Ld. Castlereagh | 20 April — | 88 |
| 28 | Do. | Rajah Ragojee Bhooslah | 13 May — | 99 |
| 29 | Do. | Do. | 22 May — | 104 |
| 32 | Do. | His Highness the Peishwa | 9 June — | 135 |
| 33 | Do. | The Secret Committee | 20 June — | 142 |
| 34 | Do. | Maj.-Gen. Wellesley | 26 June — | 149 |
| 35 | Do. | Do. | 27 June — | 153 |
| 37 | Do. | Lieutenant-Gen. Lake. | 28 June — | 164 |
| 39 | Do. | Do. | 5 July — | 174 |
| 44 | Do. | Do. | 8 July — | 182 |
| 45 | Do. | Right Hon. Lord Clive | 9 July — | 183 |
| 47 | Do. | Lieutenant-Gen. Lake | 18 July — | 188 |
| 48 | Do. | Rt. Hon. Ld. Castlereagh | 25 July — | 193 |
| 50 | Do. | Lieutenant-Gen. Lake | 27 July — | 208 |
| 51 | Do. | Do. | 27 July — | 230 |
| 52 | Do. | Do. | 27 July — | 234 |
| 54 | Do. | Do. | 28 July — | 240 |
| 55 | Do. | Do. | 30 July — | 245 |
| 56 | Do. | Lieutenant-Gen. Stuart | 30 July — | 248 |
| 58 | Do. | Rt. Hon. Ld. Castlereagh | 1 Aug. — | 252 |
| 59 | Do. | Rt. Hon. Ld. W. Bentinck | 1 Aug. — | 254 |
| 61 | Do. | Lieutenant-Gen. Lake | 2 Aug. — | 264 |
| 62 | Do. | Lieut.-Colonel Campbell | 3 Aug. — | 268 |
| 64 | Do. | Lieut.-General Lake | 22 Aug. — | 278 |
| 65 | Do. | Do. | 24 Aug. — | 280 |
| 66 | Do. | Do. | 26 Aug. — | 281 |
| 98 | Do. | Lord Hobart | 25 Sept. — | 327 |
| 99 | Do. | Do. | 25 Sept. — | 327 |
| 103 | Do. | Lieutenant-Gen. Lake | 30 Sept. — | 382 |
| 107 | Do. | Do. | 8 Oct. — | 390 |
| 118 | Do. | Do. | 19 Oct. — | 409 |
| 124 | Do. | Do. | 29 Oct. — | 419 |
| 127 | Do. | Lord Hobart | 1 Nov. — | 436 |

| No. | From | To | Date. | Page |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 135 | Wellesley, Marquess | H. R. H. Prince of Wales | 9 Nov. 1803 | 1[illegible] |
| 137 | Do. | Lord Hobart | 15 Nov. — | 15[illegible] |
| 138 | Do. | Lieutenant-Gen. Lake | 18 Nov. — | 1[illegible] |
| 139 | Do. | Do. | 18 Nov. — | 1[illegible] |
| 140 | Do. | Lord William Bentinck | 19 Nov. — | [illegible] |
| 141 | Do. | Lord Hobart | 20 Nov. — | 161 |
| 145 | Do. | Do. | 30 Nov. — | 176 |
| 148 | Do. | Lord William Bentinck | 9 Dec. — | 196 |
| 149 | Do. | Hon. Maj.-Gen. Wellesley | 11 Dec. — | 197 |
| 153 | Do. | Lord Castlereagh | 15 Dec. — | 5[illegible] |
| 155 | Do. | Do. | 20 Dec. — | 5[illegible] |
| 156 | Do. | The King's most Excellent Majesty | 22 Dec. — | 511 |
| 157 | Do. | Rt. Hon. H. Addington | 23 Dec. — | 542 |
| 160 | Do. | Court of Directors | 30 Dec. — | 557 |
| 162 | Do. | Lord Castlereagh | 31 Dec. — | 563 |
| 163 | Do. | The Secret Committee | 21 Feb. 1803 | 565 |
| 182 | Do. | Lieutenant-Gen. Lake | 9 Mar. 1804 | 613 |
| | Do. | Right Hon. Lord Eldon | 30 May 1805 | 617 |
| | Do. | Right Hon. C. Abbott | 30 May — | 621 |
| | Do. | The Court of Directors | 23 Mar. — | 623 |
| 63 | Wellesley, Hon. Maj.-Gen. | Marquess Wellesley | 6 Aug. 1803 | 273 |
| 96 | Do. | Do. | 24 Sept. — | 323 |
| 104 | Do. | Do. | 30 Sept. — | 385 |
| 121 | Do. | Do. | 24 Oct. — | 415 |
| 132 | Do. | Do. | 2 Nov. — | 447 |
| 134 | Do. | Do. | 6 Nov. — | 450 |
| 143 | Do. | Do. | 30 Nov. — | 472 |
| 144 | Do. | Do. | 30 Nov. — | 472 |
| 151 | Do. | Do. | 15 Dec. — | 517 |
| 154 | Do. | Do. | 17 Dec. — | 531 |
| 161 | Do. | Do. | 30 Dec. — | 557 |


## APPENDIX.


A.—Treaty of Bassein, Supplemental Articles, &c. . . . 627
B.—Treaty with Rajah Ragojee Bhouslah, 17 Dec. 1803 . . . 633
C.—Treaty with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, 30th Dec. 1803 . . . 634
D.—Additional Article of Hyderabad Treaty, 9th Jan. 1834 . . 636
E.—Treaty with the Rajah of Bhurrutpore, 29 Sept. 1803 . . 636
F.—Treaty with the Rajah of Macherry, 14 Nov. 1803 . . . 637
G.—Treaty with the Rajah of Jyepoor, 12 Dec. 1803 . . . 637
H.—List of Sirdars, Zemindars, under Rajah Ragojee Bhouslah, with whom engagements were entered into . . . . 638
I.—Lieut.-Gen Lake to H. R. H. the Duke of York, 20 Oct. 1803 . . 638
K.—Marquess Wellesley to Lord Hobart, 20 June, 1803 . . . 644
L.— Do. 1 Aug. 1803 . . . 658
M.—Rajah Ragojee Bhooslah to Marquess Wellesley, May 15, 1803 . 661
N.—General Orders, dated Nov. 1803; Nov. 13, 1803, Dec. 23, 1803 . 662
O.—Enclosures in Letter from the Acting Resident at Poonah, 20 Feb. 1804 . . . . . 663
P.—Military Returns, &c. . . . . 665-674
Q.—List of Chiefs and States with whom Treaties have been concluded . 674
R.—Letters from the Marquess Wellesley to the Right Hon. H. Addington, Feb. 12, 1803. . . . . 675

# DESPATCHES,

## MINUTES, AND CORRESPONDENCE,

*&c. &c. &c.*

## INDIA.

### No. I.

*The Marquess Wellesley to the Honourable Court of Directors.*

HONOURABLE SIRS, Fort William, Dec. 24, 1802.

In the separate letters which I had the honour to address to your honourable Court, under date the 1st of January, and 13th of March, 1802, I solicited your permission to resign the service of the honourable Company, and to embark for England in the month of January, 1803; and I apprized your honourable Court, that under all the circumstances of the case, I should deem myself at liberty to embark for Europe in the last week of January, 1803, although your express permission for that purpose should not have reached me, provided I should have received, previously to that time, the notification of your pleasure respecting the appointment of my provisional successor in this Government.

2. I received with great satisfaction the notification of your appointment of Mr. Barlow to take charge of this Government in the event of my death, resignation, or departure from India, and I should accordingly have considered myself to be authorized to embark for England in the approaching month of January, if an important crisis had not arisen in the state of political affairs in India since the date of my despatches of the 1st of January, and 13th of March, 1802.

3. The recent distractions in the Mahratta empire have occasioned a combination of circumstances of the utmost im-

portance to the stability of the British power in India. In my judgment, the confusion now prevailing among the Mahratta powers cannot terminate in any event unfavourable to the security of the honourable Company, or of its allies. But I cannot behold without considerable solicitude, a conjuncture of affairs which appears to present the most advantageous opportunity that has ever occurred, of improving the British interests in that quarter on solid and durable foundations.

4. In my despatch of this date to the Secret Committee of your honourable Court, I have stated a general view of the events which have taken place in the Mahratta empire, as well as of the system of measures which I have adopted for the purpose of deriving every practicable benefit to your interests from the issue of the present crisis; and I have the satisfaction to assure your honourable Court, that I entertain no apprehension of any interruption of the prosperity of your affairs in India; or of any occurrence which can involve the British power in hostilities with any of the contending parties at Poonah.

5. My public duty, and the service of the honourable Company, appear to me, however, to require, that I should be prepared to continue in charge of this Government, until the general state of our political relations in India shall assume a more settled aspect. I have, therefore, determined not to embark for England during the present season, unless a change of circumstances should render my departure expedient or necessary.

6. Your honourable Court may be assured that I will avail myself of every practicable opportunity to afford you the most seasonable information of any such change of circumstances as may affect the period of my departure.

I have the honour to be, Sirs, &c.

WELLESLEY.

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See p. 3.

## No. II.

*The Marquess Wellesley to the Secret Committee of the Honourable Court of Directors.*

HONOURABLE SIRS, Fort William, Dec. 24, 1802.

1. Your honourable Committee will receive by the ships which remain to be despatched to England from Bengal in the course of the present season, a detailed narrative of the events and transactions in the Mahratta empire, which have terminated in a crisis of affairs among the Mahratta powers, highly interesting to the political relations of the British power in India. The same conveyance will furnish you with a detail of the negotiations conducted by the resident at Poonah, under my authority, with a view to the accomplishment of the important object of comprehending the Mahratta states in the general system of defensive alliance with the honourable Company and its allies, on the basis of the treaty concluded with his Highness the Nizam, in the month of October, 1800. * Your honourable Committee will also receive by the same channel every document relative to the system of measures which I have deemed it necessary to adopt for the security and promotion of the British interests in the present crisis of the affairs of the Mahratta empire.

2. I am anxious, however, to submit to your honourable Committee, at the earliest practicable period of time, a summary view of these important occurrences, of the principles by which I have been governed in the course of policy which I have pursued, and of my expectations with regard to the final result of the actual crisis of affairs in India.

3. The annexed copy of the instructions of the Governor-General in council, to the resident at Poonah, under date June 23, 1802, (A.†) contains a review of the conduct and disposition of the State of Poonah towards the British Government, since the commencement of my administration, down to that period of time.

4. Under those instructions, the resident at Poonah renewed the negotiations for the conclusion of an improved system of alliance with that Court. The increased distrac-

* See vol. ii. Appendix, p. 709. † See p. 12.

tions in the Mahratta state, the rebellion of Jeswunt Row Holkar (illegitimate son and successor of the late Tuckojee Holkar) against the combined forces of the Peishwa and Scindiah, appeared to constitute a crisis of affairs favourable to the success of our negotiations at Poonah.

5. In the course of the discussions which ensued between the Resident and the court of Poonah, the Peishwa manifested a solicitude to contract defensive engagements with the honourable Company, under circumstances of more apparent sincerity than had marked his conduct on any former occasion. The Peishwa, however, continued to withhold his consent to any admissible modification of the Governor-General's propositions, until Jeswunt Row Holkar, at the head of a formidable army, actually arrived in the vicinity of Poonah. The superiority of Jeswunt Row Holkar's troops in number and discipline to those of the Peishwa and Dowlut Row Scindiah, rendered the issue of any contest nearly certain. The Peishwa, however, anticipated equal difficulty and hazard, and equal disgrace to his authority, in the success of either party. Nor was the menaced usurpation of Jeswunt Row Holkar more formidable to the Peishwa than the alternative, of the revival and confirmation of the ascendancy of Scindiah; whose troops composed the greater proportion of the army destined to oppose the progress of Jeswunt Row Holkar.

6. Under these circumstances the Peishwa, on the 14th of October, despatched his principal minister to the British Resident, charged with definitive proposals for the conclusion of defensive and subsidiary engagements with the British Government. Those proposals are detailed in the annexed memorial marked B.* During the discussions which ensued on the basis of those propositions, the evasive conduct of the Peishwa excited considerable doubts of his sincerity, even at that stage of the negotiation; and on the 24th of October, when the army of Jeswunt Row Holkar had arrived within a few miles of Poonah, the Peishwa despatched a deputation to that chieftain with distinct proposals for an accommodation, which Jeswunt Row Holkar rejected. At the instance of the Peishwa, Suddasheo Bhow, the commander of the combined forces of the Peishwa and Scindiah, had previously marched

* See p. 25.

with the army under his command from Poonah, and had occupied a position in the vicinity of Jeswunt Row Holkar's camp. On the morning of the 25th the two armies engaged, and on the same day, with a view to be prepared for every event, the Peishwa moved from Poonah at the head of his remaining troops; and at the moment of marching sent his minister to the British Resident with a paper, of which a translation is annexed to this despatch (C).* The minister Ragonath Row offered to the British Resident the fullest assurances of the Peishwa's intention and meaning, that a general definitive alliance should be concluded and carried into effect at the earliest practicable period of time, between his Highness and the honourable Company, on the fundamental principles, and in conformity to the system of operation detailed in the paper to which this paragraph † refers.

7. In consequence of this transaction, the British Resident judged it to be expedient to suggest to the Right Honourable the Governor of Fort St. George, and to the Honourable the Governor of Bombay, the necessity of preparing a body of troops, under the authority of those presidencies respectively, for the eventual support of the Peishwa's government, and for the protection of his person. The Resident at Poonah transmitted a similar application to the Resident at Hyderabad, for the eventual services of a considerable detachment from the subsidiary force stationed with his Highness the Nizam.

8. The engagement between the combined army of the Peishwa and Scindiah, and that commanded by Jeswunt Row Holkar terminated in the total defeat of the combined army, with great loss. At the close of the action, the Peishwa retired with a small body of cavalry to a fortress in the vicinity of Poonah, whence he prosecuted his march towards the Concan. The city of Poonah remained in the charge of an officer in the service of the Peishwa, while Jeswunt Row Holkar continued to occupy a camp at the distance of four miles from Poonah. The primary object of Jeswunt Row Holkar was to obtain possession of the Peishwa's person, and to compel his Highness to establish such an administration as might secure Jes-

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* See p. 26. † No. 6.

wunt Row Holkar's ascendancy in the state, to the exclusion of Dowlut Row Scindiah's influence. If this plan should fail, the next project of Jeswunt Row Holkar was to invite to Poonah, Amrut Row (son of the late Rugghoonaut Row, or Ragobah,*) to place the son of Amrut Row on the musnud, and to invest Amrut Row with the office of prime minister, while Jeswunt Row Holkar should assume the general command of the troops of the state.

9. This crisis of affairs appeared to me to afford the most favourable opportunity for the complete establishment of the interests of the British power in the Mahratta empire, without the hazard of involving us in a contest with any party. The power of Jeswunt Row Holkar possessed no solid foundation in the justice of his cause, in popular opinion, or in the extent of political or military resource. It could not be doubted that Scindiah would employ every effort to retrieve the disgrace, and to avert the danger of his recent defeat. The continuation of the contest between those chieftains would probably weaken the power, and impair the resources of both, and would afford to the British Government an opportunity of interposing its influence and mediation for the restoration of the Peishwa's just authority, under terms calculated to secure our relations with the Mahratta empire, on the basis of a general defensive alliance and reciprocal guarantee, both with the Peishwa and with Dowlut Row Scindiah, according to the principles of the treaty of Hyderabad, concluded in October, 1800,† no reasonable apprehension existed that the progress of this system of policy would be obstructed, either by the union of the contending parties, or by the decisive success of either chieftain; nor indeed could I apprehend any combined or separate opposition from either in the prosecution of my views.

10. Under these considerations, I confirmed the engagement concluded between the Peishwa and the Resident at Poonah, on the day on which I received it, and I accordingly instructed the Resident to signify to his Highness my ratification of that engagement, and my resolution to employ every effort of the British power for the restoration of his authority.

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* A corruption of *Rugghoo-bhye.*

† See vol. ii. Appendix, p. 709.

The British Resident was also instructed to direct his attention to the improvement of the terms of the proposed alliance, by endeavouring to obtain the Peishwa's consent to those stipulations, which his Highness had hitherto rejected, and to such additional concessions as appeared to be expedient for the better security and improvement of the British interests in that quarter of India; and the Resident was further directed to avail himself of the earliest opportunity of reducing the proposed conditions of alliance to the form of a definitive treaty. At the same time I transmitted instructions to the Governor of Fort St. George and Bombay, and to the resident at Hyderabad, confirming the requisition of the Resident at Poonah, for assembling troops at the proposed stations, with a view to fulfil the engagements concluded with the Peishwa. Desirous of comprehending the principal branches of the Mahratta empire in a general system of defensive alliance and guarantee, on the basis of the engagements so happily concluded with his Highness the Nizam, in October, 1800, I determined to combine with the measures to be adopted for the restoration of the Peishwa, the renewal of my invitation to Dowlut Row Scindiah to partake the benefits of the defensive alliance; and I accordingly instructed the Resident at Scindiah's Court to proceed from Futtehgur to that chieftain's camp with the utmost practicable expedition, for the purpose of concerting with Scindiah the means of restoring the Peishwa to the musnud, and of proposing to Scindiah the terms under which that chieftain might be admitted to the benefit of the general defensive engagements concluded with the Peishwa.

11. The detail of the measures to be adopted for the completion of our engagements to the Peishwa were necessarily confided to the direction and judgment of the Resident at Poonah; but that officer was instructed to adopt every practicable precaution to preclude every risk of hostilities between the British troops and those of Jeswunt Row Holkar, and to endeavour to secure the accomplishment of our views by the means of amicable negotiation.

12. In the actual state of the affairs of the Mahratta empire, it would have been a measure of indispensable precaution to have assembled a considerable army of observation upon the frontier of the Mahratta territories. This important

consideration, combined with the communication which the right honourable the Governor of Fort St. George had received from the Resident at Poonah, of the progress of our negotiation with the Peishwa, had induced his Lordship to issue orders for assembling a considerable army within the ceded districts, without awaiting the arrival of my instructions for that purpose. The honourable the Governor of Bombay pursued the same wise and salutary course of vigilance and prudence, by placing in a state of preparation, for immediate service, the disposable force at that Presidency. A considerable detachment of the subsidiary force at Hyderabad was also directed by the Resident at Hyderabad to be prepared for eventual service in the field in conformity to the requisition of the Resident at Poonah.

13. By advices received subsequently to the despatch of my instructions to the Resident at Poonah, and to the Governors of Fort St. George and Bombay, I was informed that the Peishwa had effected his retreat to Mhar, a fort situated on the river of Bancoote in the Concan; and that Holkar now despaired of the success of his endeavours either to obtain the Peishwa's voluntary return to Poonah, or to seize his Highness's person, that Holkar had detached a force to Jejoory (a fort situated in the vicinity of Poonah, and being the actual residence of Amrut Row), and had brought Amrut Row to Poonah with the intention of investing Amrut Row with the general administration of affairs, and of placing the son of Amrut Row on the musnud, while Jeswunt Row Holkar proposed to assume the general command of the army of the state. To this arrangement I was further informed that Amrut Row was not disposed to accede; I also received advice that the Peishwa had signified to the Government of Bombay, through the officers stationed at Bancoote, a desire of eventually seeking an asylum at Bombay, and that his Highness had solicited the Government of Bombay to direct a ship to be prepared at Bancoote for his Highness's conveyance to Bombay or to Bassein, if such a measure should appear to be necessary for the safety of his person. The honourable the Governor of Bombay complied with the latter application, by directing the ship *Herculan* to proceed to Bancoote, and to be prepared for the Peishwa's eventual accommodation. The Resident at Poonah being apprized of

these circumstances suggested to the Governor of Bombay the expediency of discouraging the Peishwa from seeking an asylum within the British territory, until my sentiments and intentions with respect to the affairs of the Peishwa should be made known, and the Resident recommended that the Peishwa should be advised to maintain his position at Mhar to the latest possible period of time consistently with the safety of his Highness's person.

14. Under the determination which I had adopted of employing every effort for the restoration of the Peishwa's authority, and in the actual situation of the Peishwa's affairs, it appeared to me to be extremely desirable that the Peishwa should immediately place himself under the protection of the British power by retiring to Bombay. I considered that this measure would preclude all hazard of precipitating hostilities with Jeswunt Row Holkar, by any advance of the British troops for the protection of the Peishwa's person, and would enable the British Government to open a negotiation with Jeswunt Row Holkar for the restoration of the Peishwa to the musnud of Poonah, under every circumstance of advantage. This event would also enable us to combine with our other measures, under great advantage, the proposed negotiation with Scindiah for the conclusion of defensive arrangements. It was obvious, also, that the Peishwa's arrival at Bombay would afford the most favourable opportunity for the adjustment of the terms of the definitive alliance with the Peishwa on the basis of my original propositions, with the addition of such stipulations as might appear to be expedient with reference to the actual crisis of affairs.

15. With these sentiments, I transmitted instructions to the Government of Bombay for the reception and accommodation of the Peishwa at that Presidency, and for regulating the conduct of that government in conformity to the measures which I had resolved to adopt.

16. Since the despatch of those instructions, I have received advices from Poonah stating, that, although Amrut Row continues to be adverse to the arrangement proposed by Jeswunt Row Holkar, the affairs of government are conducted under the authority of Amrut Row's name, and that a considerable force had been detached to the Concan with a view to seize the person of the Peishwa. By advices from

Bombay it appeared that the Peishwa had availed himself of the offer of the ship *Herculean*, and had proceeded on that ship to a strong fort in the Concan, named Severndroog, where his person might probably be secure against the attempts of the usurper.

17. The despatches from Bombay further state that the Peishwa had formally recognized the engagements concluded between him and the British Resident, and had applied for a detachment of British troops in part of the stipulated subsidiary force, for the immediate protection of his person.

18. By the latest accounts it appears that Dowlut Row Scindiah is collecting his forces with a view of opposing Jeswunt Row Holkar, and that Scindiah has actually commenced his march from his capital of Ougein towards Poonah.

19. Both Jeswunt Row Holkar and Amrut Row have employed every endeavour to induce the Resident at Poonah to continue at that city, manifestly with the view to obtain the countenance of the British Government in sanctioning the projected revolution in the government of the Mahratta empire. The Resident has prudently rejected every advance of this nature, and has persisted in his resolution to retire to Bombay, for which presidency he with difficulty obtained permission to depart on the 28th ultimo.

20. At the conferences holden by the Resident with Amrut Row and Jeswunt Row Holkar, on the eve of the Resident's departure from Poonah, both those chieftains expressed their solicitude for the preservation of the friendship of the British Government, and directly and earnestly appealed to the Resident for his advice in the present situation of affairs. Jeswunt Row Holkar expressly intimated a wish for the mediation of the Resident, for the express purpose of effecting an accommodation with the Peishwa. The Resident informed Jeswunt Row Holkar that for this purpose it was indispensably necessary that both parties should consent to refer their differences to the mediation of the British Government: but that the Resident could not undertake such mediation without the orders of the Governor-General. The Resident at the same time advised Amrut Row and Jeswunt Row Holkar to explain their views by a direct application to the Governor-General. At the Resident's final interview with Amrut Row, that chieftain delivered three letters to my address, one from

himself, and the others from the persons who at present exercise the functions of ministers of the State, the purport of those letters is to solicit the countenance and support of the British Government by the appointment of a Resident in the place of Colonel Close, whose departure from Poonah to Bombay is represented by Amrut Row and his Ministers to be an abdication of his station of representative of the British Government at the Court of Poonah.

21. I have also had the satisfaction to receive from Dowlut Row Scindiah a letter soliciting the continuance of the friendship of this Government towards his state and that of the Peishwa, and containing a request that I will act in concert with him in the present crisis of affairs at Poonah.

22. This appeal to the British power from all parties concerned in the actual commotions of the Mahratta states, affords the most favourable opportunity for our successful and pacific mediation.

23. In the present conjuncture of the affairs of the Mahratta empire, your honourable Committee will remark that the British Government must either persevere in its pacific and equitable efforts for the restoration of the Peishwa's authority, or must abandon all hope consistently with our faith, honour, or permanent interests of concluding with any of the Mahratta states, those defensive engagements, which are essential to the complete consolidation of the British empire in India, and to the future tranquillity of Hindostan.

24. Reviewing the general state of affairs in the Mahratta empire, I entertain a confident expectation of the complete accomplishment of all our views, and of the restoration of tranquillity within the Mahratta dominions, by the means of amicable negotiation. It appears probable that Scindiah will cordially co-operate with the British Government in the restoration of the Peishwa's authority, and will consent in the actual state of his own affairs to become a party in the proposed system of defensive engagement, it cannot be supposed that Jeswunt Row Holkar will reject any reasonable proposals of accommodation supported by the combined power and influence of the British Government and Scindiah. The intentions of the Rajah of Berar appear to be uncertain. That chieftain now ostensibly favours the cause of Jeswunt Row Holkar; but I have every reason to believe that the

Rajah of Berar is actuated entirely by the cautious policy of apparently favouring the cause of the successful party. His Highness the Nizam is disposed to concur in any course of measures which the British Government may adopt for the success of our mutual views of defensive alliance with the Mahratta states.

25. Since the commencement of this despatch I have received advices from Bombay, notifying the embarkation of the Peishwa, under convoy of the ship *Herculean* from Severndroog for Bassein, and the arrival of Colonel Close from Poonah at Bombay on the 3rd instant.

26. These events will probably accelerate the conclusion of defensive engagements with the Peishwa, and will enable Colonel Close immediately to open a negotiation with Amrut Row and Jeswunt Row Holkar.

27. I have directed Colonel Close and the Governor of Bombay to apprize your honourable Committee of the existing state of affairs at the time when this despatch shall pass through Bombay.

I have the honour to be,
with the greatest respect,
honourable Sirs,
your most obedient and faithful servant,
WELLESLEY.

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[Enclosure A. referred to at p. 3.]

*N. B. Edmonstone, Esq. Secretary to Government, to Lieut.-Colonel Close, Resident at Poonah.*

SIR, Fort William, 23d June, 1802.

1. In obedience to the commands of his Excellency the most noble the Governor-General in council, I have now the honour to address you for the purpose of communicating to you his Excellency's sentiments, on the propositions of the Peishwa detailed in Colonel Palmer's letter, No. 295, dated the 30th of November, 1801, and of conveying to you his Excellency's instructions for your guidance, in conducting a negotiation for the conclusion of subsidiary engagements with the Court of Poonah; and I am directed to take this opportunity to acknowledge the receipt of your despatches, noted in the margin.

2. The observations and instructions which I am ordered to communicate to you are as follow.

3. The negotiations at Poonah have assumed such different aspects at

various periods of time, during Colonel Palmer's residence, and have been involved in such intricacy and difficulty, that it is become necessary to revise with accuracy the whole course of our transactions at that Court for some time past, in order to draw just conclusions with regard to the general disposition of the State of Poonah towards the British Government.

4. A review of the transactions which have passed between the British Government, and that of Poonah, and of the conduct and policy of the latter with respect to the British Government since his Excellency's arrival in India, will be sufficient to demonstrate that the Peishwa (notwithstanding the general tenor of his professions, and the various artifices employed by his Highness to conceal from the British Government the real purport of those intrigues, which were disclosed by the records of the late Tippoo Sultaun) has not only been uniformly and progressively jealous of the power of the British nation in India, but actively hostile to our prosperity, to the utmost practicable extent, consistently with the security of his government, and with the irresolution and timidity of his character.

5. In the year 1798, the authority of Baajy Row was reduced to a state of extreme weakness by the imbecility of his counsels, by the instability and treachery of his disposition, and by the prevalence of internal discord, and in that crisis, his government was menaced with destruction by the overbearing power of Scindiah. It was evident that the Peishwa could not expect to be relieved from the oppressive controul of Scindiah, and to be restored to a due degree of authority within his own dominions, by any other means than by the aid of the British power; and the Peishwa himself appears to have been sensible of this truth; for at an early period of the year he earnestly and repeatedly solicited the Governor-General's assistance; but even under these circumstances, Baajy Row was ultimately induced to withhold his consent to the just and reasonable conditions which his Excellency the Governor-General proposed to require from him in consideration of affording him the aid of the British power. He deliberately preferred a situation of degradation and danger with nominal independance, to a more intimate connection with the British power, which could not be formed on principles calculated to secure to the Peishwa the constant protection of our arms, without at the same time establishing our ascendancy in the Mahratta empire. Subsequent events justify a conclusion, that the long and systematic course of deceitful and evasive policy pursued by the Peishwa, on this occasion, was not less the result of a determined spirit of hostility, than of his characteristic jealousy and irresolution.

6. The Court of Poonah now viewed the rapid approach of a severe contest between the British power and Tippoo Sultaun. This crisis presented various advantages to the faithless and sordid policy of the Peishwa, in the pursuit of which, he would have been embarrassed by a more close alliance with the Company. The events of the war might have offered occasions of profit to the Court of Poonah, at the expense of either, or of all the Belligerent powers. In this state of affairs, the Peishwa adopted a system of measures by which he hoped to secure every contingent benefit which could be derived either from our failure or from our success. His

Highness therefore endeavoured to frame his councils on so complicated a basis as to deceive every state concerned in the war, and ultimately to reserve to himself every pretension which could be founded, either on the observance of equitable neutrality, or on the discharge of the duties of active alliance.

7. In the spirit of these councils, on the Governor-General's first application to the Peishwa for his co-operation against Tippoo Sultaun, in the event of a contest with that prince, the Peishwa endeavoured to justify an ostensible neutrality, and to evade the obligation of the triple alliance, under the pretext, that the defensive engagements concluded at the termination of the war with Tippoo Sultaun in 1792, were binding only on his predecessor. Being compelled to abandon this absurd pretext, the Peishwa professed a cordial disposition to co-operate with the British arms against the common enemy in conformity to his engagements; but by a course of studied evasion and systematic deceit, he avoided all active interference in the contest with Tippoo Sultaun, and actually maintained an amicable intercourse with the enemy through the channel of Tippoo Sultaun's Vakeels whom the Peishwa persisted in detaining at his court, in opposition to the repeated and earnest remonstrances of the Governor-General. On the conclusion of the war, the Peishwa endeavoured to justify this violation of his faith, and to establish his claim to a participation in the profits of the war, by arguments founded on the embarrassed condition of his government, and on the inoffensive nature of his intercourse with Tippoo Sultaun.

8. The amicable professions of the Peishwa, and his apparent disposition to co-operate in the common cause to the extent that might be practicable under the distractions which prevailed in the Government of Poonah, had impressed the mind of the Governor-General with a favourable opinion of the Peishwa's intentions, and accordingly, his Excellency in a letter addressed to the honourable the Court of Directors, under date the 20th of March, 1799, expressed his conviction that the disposition of the Court of Poonah, continued perfectly favourable to the British interests, and that want of power would be the sole cause of its inaction in the event of a war with Tippoo Sultaun. The equivocal and evasive conduct of the Peishwa however, subsequently to that period of time, suggested considerable doubts of the sincerity of his attachment to the cause of the allies, and at the conclusion of the war, those doubts were corroborated by the correspondence between Tippoo Sultaun and his agents at Poonah, and by letters from Nana Furnaveese, and other Mahratta chieftains, to Tippoo Sultaun, which were discovered among the records of Seringapatam. The combined evidence of those documents, and the Peishwa's conduct during the war, afford unequivocal proofs of the hostility of his disposition towards the British power, and justify a conclusion that if fortune had appeared to favour the enemy, the Peishwa would openly have espoused his cause.

9. Although the faithless conduct of the Peishwa not only deprived him of all title to participate in the advantages of the war, but exposed him to the just resentment of the allies, the Governor-General determined to refrain from any measures of a vindictive nature, and to adopt the more liberal policy of conciliating the Peishwa's interests, and of providing for

the security of the allies and for the general tranquillity of India, by repeating his invitation to the Peishwa to accede to the proposal of general defensive alliance and mutual guarantee which his Excellency had before unsuccessfully offered to the Peishwa's acceptance. Accordingly at the close of the war in 1799, the propositions for the conclusion of defensive and subsidiary engagements with the Peishwa were renewed under circumstances of peculiar advantage to the latter, who, by acceding to those propositions, would not only have been emancipated from the oppressive control of Scindiah, and have been re-instated in the due exercise of his authority, but would have been admitted to a participation in the conquered territory of Mysore; but after a vexatious and illusory discussion of the proposition during a period of several months, the negotiation was closed by the Peishwa's rejection of the conditions of defensive alliance under any admissible modification of them. The circumstances of that negotiation afford the strongest reason to believe that the Peishwa never seriously intended to enter into any engagements on the basis of those propositions, and that he had no other intention from the commencement of the negotiation, than to avoid the consequences of an unqualified refusal to treat; to deceive the public, and the Governor-General, by appearances of a disposition to concur in the views of the British Government for the tranquillity of India, and to deter Scindiah from the prosecution of his ambitious designs, by persuading that chieftain that the Peishwa had it in his power, and in his contemplation, to avail himself of the protection of the British arms.

10. The negotiations which followed the renewal of the Governor-General's propositions in the month of April, 1800, were conducted on the part of the Peishwa in the same spirit of temporizing policy, and studied evasion, which characterized his conduct in every previous discussion. His long and degrading subjection to the power of Scindiah, his repeated experience of the perfidy and violence of that unprincipled chieftain, the internal distractions which prevailed in his government, and the consciousness of his inability to relieve himself from the pressure of his accumulated difficulties, and to secure the efficient exercise of his authority were insufficient to subdue the emotions of his jealous fears, and to induce him to rely with confidence on the protection of that state, which alone possessed the power and the will to extricate him from his embarrassments, and to place him in a situation of comparative dignity and security.

11. Those negotiations were closed in the month of September 1800, (when various unprecedented acts of violence and extortion on the part of Scindiah had aggravated the pressure of the Peishwa's affairs and virtually annihilated his authority,) by the Peishwa's absolute rejection of the principal articles of the Governor-General's propositions; and he may be considered to have rejected those propositions again, by his refusal to become a party in the treaty of general defensive alliance concluded with the Nizam in October 1800, which was tendered to his acceptance.

12. While these several negotiations were depending, the Peishwa was at different times employed in carrying on intrigues, for the purpose of detaching the Nizam from his connexion with the Company, with a view to the subversion of the British power and influence in the Deccan. Little

doubt exists in his Excellency the Governor-General's mind, of the authenticity of Kaudir Hoossaine's mission towards the close of the year 1800, and of the Peishwa's participation with Scindiah in the objects of that mission; and although his Excellency is by no means convinced of the existence of the confederacy ascribed to the Mahratta State, in the paper of intelligence transmitted in the despatch from the Resident at Hyderabad, under date the 28th of November, last, the Governor-General is satisfied, that the object of Suddasheo Row Munkaiser's intrigue at the Court of Hyderabad was, to effect the dissolution of the alliance between the Company and the Nizam, and to engage his Highness to unite with the Mahrattas at any future favourable opportunity, for the subversion of the British power. On this subject his Excellency inclines to the opinion which you have expressed in your letter of the 13th of February, last, that the object of Munkaisir's mission was, "if possible, to shake our alliance with the Nizam, and thus extinguish our power and influence in the Decan; but without comprehending any settled or projected plan for the co-operation of the French, a means of support however, which might have been eventually resorted to."

13. The inference to be deduced from these considerations, is, that until irresistibly compelled by the exigency of his affairs to have recourse to the assistance of the Company, the Peishwa will never be induced to enter into any engagements, which in his apprehension would afford to the British Government the means of acquiring an ascendancy in the Mahratta empire. If at a time when his authority was reduced to the lowest state of degradation, and when his government was menaced with destruction by the immediate presence of Scindiah at the head of a powerful army in the vicinity of Poonah, and when no apparent means existed for the relief of the Peishwa from the violence and usurpation of that ambitious chieftain, but the acceptance of the proffered aid of the British Goverment, the Peishwa deemed it to be his wisest policy to refuse his assent to the liberal and advantageous propositions of the British Government, there is still less reason to expect his acquiescence in those propositions, or in any modification of them, by which in his opinion, the authority of his government would in any degree be subjected to the control of the British power, at a season when the exigency of his affairs is diminished by the absence of his rival.

14. But whatever degree of jealousy the Peishwa may entertain of the ascendancy of the British state in the political scale of India, and however solicitous he may be to effect its subversion, he is sensible that in the present condition of the British power, the preservation of our friendship is necessary to his security, and the Peishwa is aware that in the present distracted state of the Mahratta empire, and the weak condition of his government, he is hourly exposed to dangers which cannot be averted, otherwise than by the aid of the British power, or by the belief of his refractory chieftains, that he can resort to that aid whenever he may think fit.

15. To the operation of this principle are to be ascribed the frequent applications which the Peishwa has made for the aid of British troops, and the illusory negotiations which he has maintained for the improve-

ment of his connection with the Company. And upon the same principle, the Peishwa's jealous fears, and the prosecution of secret intrigues for purposes hostile to the British interests, are perfectly reconcileable with the proposals which he has lately made for subsidizing a body of British troops.

16. From the view which has thus been taken of the disposition and conduct of the Peishwa towards the British power, and from a consideration of the actual condition of his government with reference both to its internal weakness and to the state of its external relations, it is to be inferred that in the actual situation of affairs, no expectation can reasonably be entertained of the Peishwa's acquiescence in any arrangement founded on the basis of the Governor-General's original propositions, and that in making the proposals described in your predecessor's letter of the 30th of November last, the Peishwa is influenced either by views and intentions similar to those which regulated his conduct during the negotiations of 1799 and 1800, or if he be sincere in those proposals by the hope of obtaining the aid of the British power for the re-establishment and security of his authority, without hazarding the introduction of that degree of control and ascendancy which it must be our interest to establish in the Mahratta states, and which it is his object to avoid. Admitting that the Peishwa is sincere in his proposals, it is proper with the view to determine the course of measures which it is expedient to adopt on the present occasion, to consider upon what grounds the Peishwa may expect to limit the operation of the proposed engagements to the object above described, and whether the British interests would be promoted in any degree by acceding to those engagements, or to any other modification of them.

17. The Peishwa is aware that the permanent establishment of a British force in the vicinity of Poonah, would immediately place him in some degree in a state of dependance upon the British power, and therefore he has stipulated that the subsidiary force shall be retained within the Company's dominions at all times except when he shall require its actual services. If he should ever conclude subsidiary engagements on these terms he would never apply for the aid of the stipulated force, except in cases of the utmost emergency, and his expectation probably is, that the knowledge of his ability to command so powerful a body of troops as that which he proposes to subsidize, would alone be sufficient to give due weight to his authority, and to preclude any attempt which might otherwise be made for the subversion of it. The occurrence of any emergency which should require the actual services of the subsidiary force, would be rendered still more improbable, by the local situation of the territory which the Peishwa proposes to assign for the charges of the troops. The Peishwa has not specified the territory which he proposes to assign in Hindostan for that purpose; but if by Hindostan be meant (as must be inferred) the country north of the Nurbudda, the Peishwa possesses merely a nominal authority in that quarter. He would probably make a selection of the districts to be ceded, with the insidious view either of reducing the territorial possessions of Scindiah or Holkar, or of relieving himself from the burthen of Scindiah's control, and from the dread of his power, by involving him in

a contest with the British Government, or by rendering it necessary for Scindiah to keep the main body of his army within his own territories for the purpose of guarding them against the effects of those hostile measures which the British Government might be expected to adopt under the obligation of the proposed engagements, in the event of Scindiah being hereafter disposed to resume the same position in the vicinity of Poonah, which he so long occupied at the head of a numerous body of his forces.

18. Moreover, as the Peishwa probably derives no revenue from the territory which he proposes to assign for the charges of the subsidiary force, and his authority in it is merely nominal, his power and resources would not in any degree be reduced by the cession, and the situation of the ceded districts would be too distant and distinct from those territories in which the Peishwa's authority is established and acknowledged, to excite in his mind any apprehension of being overawed or controlled by the proximity of the Company's territorial power and resources. In his Excellency's judgment therefore, the cession of the proposed territory in Hindostan would not in any degree contribute to render the Peishwa dependant on the support of the British power, whilst the possession of a territory insulated by the dominions of other chieftains, would be productive of a degree of embarrassment and inconvenience to the Company, far overbalancing any advantages which might be derived from the resources of such a territory. It is probable also that it would be found impracticable even to obtain possession of such ceded territory without a contest. At all events it would be necessary to maintain a considerable force in those distant possessions. By this arrangement the Peishwa would derive the benefit of our support without becoming subject to our control; his jealousy would not be alarmed by the establishment of a British force within his dominions, and his pride would probably be gratified by entertaining British auxiliaries in his service without any sacrifice of his authority, or any diminution of his resources. He would derive security not from the presence of a protecting British force, but by acquiring a title to command the aid of the Company's troops in cases of emergency, and by a cession of territory in a distant quarter of his nominal dominions, which would either involve his rival in a contest with the British arms, or diminish the territorial resources of that rival; or would establish the British authority in a position calculated to restrain Scindiah from any attempt to subvert the Peishwa's independence.

19. The Peishwa's consent to submit his differences with the Nizam, ultimately to the arbitration of the Company, combined with the proposals above stated, would be little more than nugatory with reference to the accomplishment of any of the objects in the contemplation of the British Government. The Peishwa would endeavour to embarrass and impede the negotiation for the adjustment of existing differences by chicane and evasion, and to protract its arrival at that stage at which the British Government should be required to interfere. It seems to be the policy of the Mahrattas at all times to reserve unadjusted grounds of claim upon the states with which they are connected. The sincerity, therefore, of the Peishwa's desire to effect a final adjustment of all his differ-

ences with the Nizam may reasonably be doubted The guarded manner in which the Peishwa has expressed his acquiescence in the arbitration of the British Government, partakes of the same spirit of jealousy and distrust which regulates his conduct with respect to the other conditions of the proposed connection, and is by no means calculated to meet the comprehensive views which dictated the original proposition for the equitable adjustment of subsisting differences between the Courts of Hyderabad and Poonah. In his Excellency's judgment, this article of the Peishwa's propositions, concedes to us no privilege which, under the circumstances of our intimate connection with the Nizam, we do not already possess. The Nizam might justly insist on an equitable adjustment of subsidiary claims, and the Company as his ally, might properly support him in exacting the fulfilment of the terms of that adjustment, if he should appear to possess any just claims on the Peishwa, or in resisting any other demands on the part of the latter, than such as upon due investigation may be deemed to be just and equitable. Of the remaining articles of the Peishwa's propositions, some are exclusively connected with the permanent admission of a British subsidiary force within the Peishwa's territories, and the remainder are rendered inapplicable to present circumstances by the conclusion of peace between Great Britain and France; but are susceptible of the modification described in a subsequent part of these instructions.

20. Under all these circumstances his Excellency is decidedly of opinion that an unqualified concurrence in the Peishwa's propositions would produce more injury than benefit to the British interests in India. The cession of a territory so circumstanced and so situated as that which the Peishwa proposes to assign for the discharge of the subsidy, would be productive of serious embarrassments to the Company's affairs, and would tend to counteract even the partial and prospective benefits which we might expect to derive from his consent to subsidize a British force under the stipulated limitations, if combined with conditions more consistent with the interests of the Company. His Excellency has no hesitation, therefore, in resolving to reject the Peishwa's proposals in their present form. Some considerations, however, connected with the present situation of affairs in Europe and in India dispose the Governor-General to relax in the conditions which his Excellency has hitherto considered and declared to be indispensable in the conclusion of any engagements of a subsidiary and defensive nature with the Peishwa, and rather than abandon the hope of establishing a further connection with the state of Poonah, to acquiesce in the limitation which the Peishwa has proposed with respect to the subsidiary force, provided the Peishwa will consent to an arrangement for the discharge of the subsidy, more favourable to our views and interests than that which his Highness has offered to our acceptance.

21. Under the impression of that jealousy and apprehension with which every member of the Mahratta empire regards the power and ascendancy of the British nation in India, and under the existence of those political barriers which at present separate our interests from those of the Mahratta state, a general sense of danger might possibly induce the several chief-

tains who compose the Mahratta confederacy to endeavour to compromise their mutual differences and dissensions, to reconcile their discordant interests, and to combine their respective powers and resources for the purposes of general security. The possibility of this conjuncture is supported by the circumstances detailed in your despatch of the 11th of April, 1802. The Mahrattas might take advantage of any favourable opportunity to undermine or to subvert the British power, and circumstances might occur to render the opposition of the united power of the Mahratta empire formidable. They might avail themselves of the pacification between Great Britain and France to form a connection with the latter nation by cultivating the French interests through the officers of that nation established in the service of Scindiah and of other Mahratta powers; by encouraging French subjects to settle in the country; by entertaining officers of that nation in their service for the purpose of disciplining their troops, or even by admitting bodies of French troops as auxiliaries. It is, however, to be remarked, that the habitual jealousy entertained by the Mahrattas of every European power in India, would probably render them averse to an intimate connection with the French Government; nor can it be supposed consistently with the character of the Mahratta nation, that any of the confederate states would enter into an alliance with France under any circumstances less urgent than the pressure of absolute necessity and self-preservation. It might, indeed, become the policy of the Mahratta state to foment and exasperate dissensions between the French and British power in India, and occasionally to aid the weaker party in the hope of ultimately weakening or destroying both. But it appears more probable that the established character and maxims of the Mahrattas would incline them rather to abstain from any close connection with any European power in India than to seek the destruction of any such power by forming an union of interests with a power of a similar description. The discordant interests of the several branches of the Mahratta empire will always form an obstacle to embarrass the measure of a general combination, and the difficulty would certainly be increased if the proposed object of such an union was in any degree connected with an European alliance. The Peishwa may, however, be induced to endeavour to establish an exclusive connection with the French for the maintenance of his separate authority, and for the future security of his dominions, although his prejudices and character would certainly be adverse to such a connection. While peace continues between Great Britain and France, we can have no pretence to oppose such a connection; the danger, therefore, of this occurrence augments in a great degree the policy of concluding some engagements of a defensive nature with the Peishwa, however inadequate they may be to the complete accomplishment of our views. The conclusion of such engagements with the Peishwa would preclude the practicability of a general confederacy among the Mahratta states, and would remove the inducements which the Peishwa might otherwise have to form a close connection with France, as well as enable us to impede the execution of any such project. This separate connection with one of the branches of the Mah-

ratta empire would not only contribute to our security, but would tend to produce a crisis of affairs which may compel the remaining states of the empire to accede to the alliance.

22. The measure of subsidizing a British force, even under the limitations which the Peishwa has annexed to that proposal, must immediately place him in some degree in a state of dependence upon the British power, provided that measure be uncombined with any other arrangement calculated to defeat its operation. The dependence of a state in any degree upon the power of another naturally tends to increase. A sense of security derived from the support of a foreign power, produces a relaxation of vigilance and caution, and the operation of natural causes in augmenting the dependence of the Peishwa on the British power under the operation of the proposed engagements, would be accelerated by the effect which those engagements would produce of detaching the state of Poonah from the other members of the Mahratta empire. It is, however, essential to the efficacy of the proposed subsidiary engagements with reference to the views of the British Government, that the funds for the discharge of the subsidy should be derived from the actual pecuniary or territorial resources of the Peishwa.

23. It remains to consider the policy of such an arrangement with reference to the interests of the Nizam, and whether we are warranted by our engagements with the Court of Hyderabad in concluding any subsidiary engagements with the Court of Poonah on any other terms than those which are specified in the separate articles of the treaty of the 12th of October, 1800.

24. With regard to the first point, in the actual state of our connection with the Nizam any engagements contracted by the Company, which are calculated to place the Peishwa in a degree of dependence on the British Government, and to promote the security of the British empire in India, must be considered to be beneficial to the interests of the Nizam. The probability of our establishing a commanding influence in the councils of the Peishwa, affords the only prospect of effecting an equitable adjustment of the differences subsisting between the Peishwa and the Nizam, and of obtaining for the latter a dereliction of the Peishwa's claim to the Choute of Bedr; the proposed arrangement, therefore, as far as it tends to produce that ascendancy in the state of Poonah, is calculated to promote the Nizam's particular views, as well as to secure the general interests of the alliance.

25. With respect to the second point, the 1st article of the separate and secret articles annexed to the treaty of Hyderabad, stipulates that the Peishwa shall not be admitted to the benefits of the general defensive alliance unless he shall accede to certain conditions therein specified. Under the arrangement now proposed the Peishwa will not be admitted to the benefits of the general defensive alliance. By the provisions of the treaty of Hyderabad the Nizam is entitled to the eventual employment of the whole military strength and resources of the Company for the defence of his dominions; the aid which the Peishwa will be entitled to demand from

the Company under the proposed engagements, is limited to the extent of the force which he may consent to subsidize; the Nizam is prohibited by the 15th article of the treaty from forming any connection with a foreign state without the consent of the British Government; but this prohibition is not reciprocal. His Excellency the Governor-General, therefore, is satisfied that no obstacle founded on our engagements with the Court of Hyderabad exists, to the conclusion of engagements with the Peishwa of the nature of those now under discussion.

26. It is not, however, his Excellency's intention that these terms should be offered to the Peishwa's acceptance until every endeavour to obtain his concurrence, in terms more favourable to the British interests, shall have proved to be ineffectual. In the latter event, his Excellency authorizes and directs you to accede to the Peishwa's proposals of subsidizing six battalions of British troops under the condition which the Peishwa has annexed to that proposal, that the subsidiary force shall be retained within the Company's dominions at all times, except when he shall require its actual services, provided that the territory to be assigned for the discharge of the subsidy be selected from a part of the Peishwa's dominions which is really subject to his authority, and situated more conveniently for us than any territory which could be ceded to us in Hindostan. The territory which would be most advantageous to us, is the northern part of the Concan; if, however, the Peishwa's disinclination to cede that or any other part of the Concan should be insuperable, the Governor-General will be disposed to accept of territory in any other part of his dominions which may not be so situated or circumstanced as to render the possession of it a source rather of embarrassment than advantage to the interests of the Company.

27. If it should be found impracticable to obtain the cession of this description of territory to an extent sufficient for the discharge of the subsidy, his Excellency will have no objection to receive a portion of the subsidy in money from the Peishwa's treasury, or if the Peishwa should be insuperably averse to the cession of any territory which our interests would permit us to accept, his Excellency will be willing to receive the whole amount of the subsidy by fixed instalments in money. In the event however of the Peishwa's engaging to pay the whole or any part of the subsidy from his treasury, it will be necessary to obtain the security of responsible bankers or other valid security for the regular payment of it.

28. The annual amount of the subsidy to be provided for the charges of the specified force, is understood to be 25 lacs, the sum proposed by the Peishwa; any diminution of that amount of subsidy, must be accompanied by a proportionate reduction of the extent of the subsidiary force.

29. The same restrictions with respect to the employment of the subsidiary force must be imposed as exist with regard to the force subsidized by the Nizam, and it may perhaps be necessary to guard particularly against the possibility of the Peishwa's establishing a claim to the services of the subsidiary force in the prosecution of any hostile measures which he may at any time meditate against the Nizam under any pretence whatever. The nature of the obligations subsisting between the Company and the

Nizam, obviously precludes the admission of any engagement with the Peishwa involving a right on his part to demand the aid of the subsidiary force for the purpose above described. In concluding subsidiary engagements, therefore, with the Peishwa, either he should be required to recognize this principle, or an express provision should be introduced, declaring that the Peishwa shall in no case be entitled to claim the services of the British troops for the prosecution of hostilities, or for enforcing demands against the Nizam.

30. It must be distinctly understood by the Peishwa that under the obligation of engagements concluded on the basis of his late propositions, he will not be entitled in any case to receive from the Company military aid exceeding the extent of the force which he may consent to subsidize. Under this limitation of the engagement, no question can arise with respect to the admission of the Rajah of Berar to be a party to it. That question is exclusively connected with the case of our contracting defensive engagements with the Peishwa on the basis of the treaty of Hyderabad, concluded on the 12th of October, 1800.

31. If no hope can be entertained of the Peishwa's consent to the Company's arbitration of differences between him and the Nizam in the manner originally proposed, that branch of the engagement may be concluded on the terms specified by Gopal Rao on the occasion of his communication with you upon the subject of the Peishwa's propositions, as detailed in your letter of the 21st of December last

32. Although the conclusion of peace between Great Britain and France precludes any engagements for the exclusion or expulsion of subjects of France from the Peishwa's dominions, it would not be inconsistent with the amicable relations subsisting between his Majesty and France, to require from the Peishwa an obligation to dismiss from his service, and to expel from his dominions the subjects of any European state with which we may hereafter be engaged in war.

33. In the event of the Peishwa's consent to enter into engagements with the Company on the basis of the foregoing propositions, his Excellency the Governor-General authorizes you to conclude a treaty with him in the name of the Company under the prescribed conditions subject to the confirmation of the Governor-General in Council.

34. Although the course of argument contained in the former part of this despatch tends to discourage all expectation of the Peishwa's consent to admit the permanent residence of any part of the subsidiary force within his dominions under any conditions whatever, his Excellency directs that you will nevertheless exert your utmost endeavours for that purpose.

35. There is still less reason to expect that in the present state of the Peishwa's affairs he will be induced to conclude any engagements with the Company, upon the principles of the treaty of general defensive alliance subsisting with the Nizam; his Excellency however, relies on your zeal and judgment to avail yourself of any circumstances which may afford a prospect of the successful accomplishment of this important object, and with a view to provide for the possible occurrence of such circumstances, I am directed to state to you the modification which, under the present state of

affairs in Europe and in India, his Excellency will be disposed to admit in the propositions which have already been offered to the Peishwa's acceptance.

36. It appears from your despatches, and from those of your predecessor, that the Peishwa is insuperably averse to the admission of the Rajah of Berar to be a party in any treaty of defensive alliance with the Company, and to the Company's arbitration of the differences between the Nizam and the Peishwa, on the basis of the treaty of Mhar, and of the claim of the Nizam to a total exemption from the payment of Chout, but that he is disposed to consent to the introduction of the Rajah of Berar's name in terms similar to those in which he is mentioned in the treaty of Salbhye. Important as these two points must be considered to be, his Excellency will nevertheless be disposed to concede them, and to admit the Peishwa to the benefits of the defensive alliance, provided he will consent to the permanent stationing in his dominions of a part of the force which he now proposes to subsidize, and will provide for the discharge of the subsidy in either of the modes specified in the 26th and 27th paragraphs of this letter; and also provided the Peishwa will admit the Company's arbitration of the Mahratta claims upon the Nizam, under the terms specified by Gopal Rao.

37. It will however, be previously necessary to obtain the concurrence of the Nizam, in such an arrangement as, by the stipulations of the separate and secret articles annexed to the treaty of Hyderabad, the Peishwa's consent to admit the Company's arbitration of differences between the Nizam and him, on the basis of the treaty of Mhar, and of the Nizam's claim to a total exemption from the payment of Chout, is rendered an indispensable condition of the Peishwa's admission to the benefits of the defensive alliance.

38. His Excellency the Governor-General entertains a confident expectation that the Nizam may be induced by considerations connected with his own interests to concur in such an arrangement, and it is his Excellency's intention to furnish the Resident at Hyderabad, with instructions for the eventual agitation of this point. If you should have reason to expect the Peishwa's consent to these modified propositions his Excellency directs that you will immediately transmit the necessary information upon the subject to the Resident at Hyderabad, who will be prepared to open a negotiation with the Nizam, for the abrogation of the prohibitory clause in the 1st article of the separate and secret articles above referred to, and on receipt of information from the Resident at Hyderabad, that the Nizam has signified his concurrence in the proposed arrangement you will proceed to adjust with the Peishwa the details of that engagement.

39. It is not however, necessary that you should postpone a negotiation with the Peishwa for the conclusion of defensive engagements, upon the basis of the foregoing propositions, until you shall have received information of the Nizam's concurrence in them. On the contrary, it will be proper that you should open the negotiation which you are authorized by these instructions to undertake, by proposing the prescribed concessions. Although you are authorized to offer the foregoing limited propositions to

the Peishwa's acceptance his Excellency observes, that it will of course be the object of your endeavours to obtain his consent to terms more favorable to the views, and interests of the Company, and the Nizam, and particularly to the permanent station of the whole of the subsidiary force within the Peishwa's dominions, and you will be regulated in the relaxation of your demands by the temper and disposition of the Peishwa, and by the apparent exigency of his affairs.

40. If it shall appear that the Peishwa has been insincere in the proposals which he made to your predecessors in November last, or if your endeavours to obtain his consent to those conditions, which his Excellency the Governor-General considers to be indispensable to the conclusion of any subsidiary or defensive engagements with the Peishwa should prove ineffectual, on receipt of such information his Excellency will be prepared to determine what course of measures it will be expedient to adopt for the security of the British interests in India, under such a state of circumstances.

41. Copies of these instructions will be transmitted to the Residents at Hyderabad, and with Dowlut Row Scindiah.

I have the honour to be, &c.

N. B. EDMONSTONE,
Secretary to the Government.

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[Enclosure B. referred to at p. 4.]

*Extract from a letter from the Resident at Poonah, dated the 14th October, 1802, to his Excellency the most noble the Governor-General.*

3. A general defensive alliance to be formed between the two States. Existing treaties to hold good, and the friends and enemies of either to be the friends and enemies of both. The Peishwa to subsidize a corps of British troops, consisting of six native battalions, with their proportion of artillerymen, ordnance, and stores, and his Highness to grant a Jaidad for the subsistence of this corps from his territories bordering on the Toombuddra. This corps to be permanently stationed in his Highness's territories, and to be employed only on defensive principles of action, and his Highness will not commit any act of aggression against any of the Honourable Company's allies, or dependants. His Highness to grant immediately a Sunnud for the Jaidad, and on this voucher the British Government to proceed to take possession of the Jaidad lands and posts, without making it known that the assumption is made by authority from the Peishwa.

The assumption completed, the British troops are to advance to Poonah, without publishing that they do so by authority from the Peishwa, acting in an amicable manner on the march towards those who manifest a friendly disposition, and opposing and defeating those who may offer any resistance. In order to give full effect to this plan, his Highness the Nizam to be solicited to co-operate in such a manner as that a powerful corps of his troops shall advance in concert from Hyderabad to Poonah, on the same principles of march as those observed by the British troops; subsisting differences

between the Peishwa's Court, and that of Hyderabad, to be adjusted on the basis of the treaty of the 11th Zehedje, 1208, Fussilee; any differences that may arise in regard to the true intent and meaning of this instrument, to be arbitrated by the British Government, and both Sircars to abide by such arbitration. The Sircar of his Highness the Nizam, shall have credit for the sums expended in the co-operation afforded by his troops. The Guickwar Sircar to be required to co-operate agreeably to the relations and practice which have long held between that Sircar and the Poonah State; while the succouring armies approach towards Poonah, his Highness the Peishwa will attend to his personal safety, and in case of necessity, will retire to Basseen; in the Kocun he will be ready to join the British troops at such point as may be deemed secure and proper. Inasmuch as it will be his Highness's aim at all times to conduct his political measures in union with those of the Honourable Company, it is accordingly agreed on the other hand, that the subsidiary force will be permitted to be employed for the purpose of chastising such of his dependants, as are engaged in an obstinate rebellion against his authority; and it is further agreed, that the Honourable Company's Government will take no concern with any of his relations, servants, or subjects, with respect to whom his Highness is considered as absolute. It is further declared by the contracting parties, that this defensive alliance which is meant for the preservation, permanent prosperity, and honour of the Peishwa's Government, shall last and hold good, as long as the sun and moon shall endure.

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[Enclosure C. referred to at p. 5.]

*Here is placed His Highness's Seal.*

In order that the Honourable East India Company Behaudur may essentially assist and support the Sircar of his Highness Bajee Rao Ragonaut Pundit Purdhaun Behaudur, and defend his person, his said Highness hereby subsidizes from the Honourable Company aforesaid, a corps of British troops consisting of six native battalions, with their proportion of artillery, and his said Highness, for the purpose of subsisting and bearing the charge of the said corps, doth hereby cede to the Honourable Company aforesaid, a territory yielding an annual revenue of twenty-five lacs of rupees, to be furnished in part from the province of Guzzerat, and part from the Carnatic, or the whole from either of these quarters.

Given under the seals of his said Highness at his Court in Poonah, this twenty-seventh day of the month Jemaudy ool Aukher, 1217 Hejira, agreeing with the 25th of October, A. D. 1802.

Here is placed his Highness's signet.

RAGONAUT RAO.

(A true Copy.) B. CLOSE,
Resident at Poonah.

## No. III.

*The Marquess Wellesley to the Right Honourable Lord Clive.*

(Private.)

MY DEAR LORD, Barrackpore, 7th January, 1803.

I have derived the greatest pleasure from receiving the accounts of the alacrity and judgment with which your Lordship has acted during the existing crisis of the affairs of the Mahratta empire. The exertions which you have made for the early assembling of the army on the frontier of Mysore, were extremely seasonable and judicious; and I anticipate the greatest advantages in the course of our negotiations from this wise precaution. My views are anxiously directed to the object of avoiding hostilities, and I request your Lordship to bear this principle in mind throughout every contingency which may call for your decision. I entertain a sanguine hope of accomplishing the great arrangement of establishing a British subsidiary force at Poonah, without proceeding to extremities with any party. Indeed, all the most important powers concerned in the contest, have already directly solicited our mediation, or manifested a disposition to accept it. The pacific conclusion, however, of these extraordinary commotions, may depend so essentially on the degree of despatch with which questions may be decided of a nature exclusively and necessarily reserved for the personal decision of the Governor-General, that I am desirous of proceeding with all practical expedition to some point from which I can easily reach the principal scene of negotiation, and direct the daily course of measures according to the variation of circumstances and events.

With this view I propose to embark for Madras towards the close of this month; from Madras I can proceed into Mysore or to Bombay, or to any quarter which may require my presence. I shall most happily embrace this occasion of again expressing to your Lordship in person, my unalterable attachment, regard, and esteem, and I do not feel it to be necessary to suggest any apprehension that my arrival at the seat of your Lordship's government can produce any other effect than to manifest to the world additional proofs of our indissoluble union in the public service, and of our mutual

contempt of the clamour of faction, and of the low arts and intrigues of disappointed corruption.

The extraordinary crisis which has occurred at Poonah, has determined me to remain in India for another year, under any event which can arise, excepting the actual appointment of a successor to me from home, and the probability of his speedy arrival in India. My despatches by Colonel Harcourt, are not yet answered. The reply to those despatches may however, be hourly expected; and it must solve all doubts respecting my continuance in India. In the meanwhile I have apprized the Court of Directors of my resolution to remain another year, unless circumstances should change. My wish is that your Lordship should pursue a similar course of policy; it appears to me to be the conduct most suitable to the public exigency.

Ever my dear Lord,
with the most sincere attachment and esteem,
Your's most faithfully and affectionately,
WELLESLEY.

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## No. IV.

*The Marquess Wellesley to His Excellency Lieut.-General Lake, the Commander-in-Chief.*

(Most Secret and Confidential.)

MY DEAR SIR, Barrackpore, January, 7th, 1803.

I have been desirous for some time past to communicate to you the interesting state of affairs in the Mahratta empire, and the course of policy which I have adopted, with a view to derive every attainable advantage from this singular crisis. But the hourly fluctuation of circumstances, and the great uncertainty of the final result of the various changes, which have so rapidly passed in succession at Poonah, rendered it impracticable to convey to you from this distance any clear or definite notion of the real condition of affairs. The crisis is now such, as to enable me to afford a sufficiently distinct view of my objects, and of the means by which I hope to attain them; and I have accordingly directed my private secretary to forward for your perusal, copies of several secret docu-

ments, with observations upon their contents, which I trust will convey full information upon the most material branches of our late negotiations, and upon the probable issue of this extraordinary transaction.

In the mean while, I wish to submit to you in the most perspicuous manner in my power, my wishes and expectations with regard to the operations of our military force during the present crisis. The Government of Fort St. George, partly from its own view of circumstances, and partly under my orders, has directed a considerable force to assemble on the frontier of Mysore and Hurryhaul. The objects of this movement are; first, '*to provide an effectual defence for our frontier under any emergency;*' this measure appeared absolutely necessary while such numerous hordes of banditti were collected at Poonah, with a prospect of further confusion, and with a hazard that (even if the contending parties should concur in an intention to avoid any violation of the British territory, or of the Nizam's dominions) the progress or issue of the contest might compel many predatory adventurers with their respective bands of robbers, to seek subsistence in our countries or in those of our allies. Secondly, '*To afford eventual aid to the Peishwa in the restoration of his authority, and to establish a British subsidiary force at Poonah under the conditions of the general defensive alliance concluded with the Nizam in October* 1800.'

My wish and expectation is, that this army may never find occasion for active operations, with a view to any of its proposed objects. Its presence on the frontier, in my opinion, will deter the invasion of any party, and even of any vagrant freebooter of important strength; and the general aspect of affairs leads me to believe, that we shall be enabled to conclude our alliance with the Peishwa, under the pacific acquiescence, if not with the cordial consent, and to the general satisfaction of all parties. The power, whose views might be most apprehended, and whom it is most important to hold in check, is certainly Scindiah. No serious or alarming opposition is to be feared from any other quarter, and I am inclined to believe that even Scindiah will act a neutral, at least, if not an amicable part.

Under these circumstances, I think it necessary to leave to your discretion without reserve, to determine whether you

will remain in the ceded districts in Oude, or will proceed to the army at Hurryhaul; at the same time, it is my duty on every ground both public and private, to apprize you in the most explicit terms, of my sentiments with regard to your destination. My belief is, that the army at Hurryhaul, will never be called upon to act either offensively or defensively; it may possibly march to Poonah, and after having established the subsidiary force, return to its stations, or it may furnish the subsidiary force, without moving its main body beyond our frontier. In either event, I expect no attack or opposition from the chiefs now at Poonah, nor from any other quarter, unless Scindiah upon arriving in the Deccan should endeavour to obstruct our views. This case I deem improbable, but if it should occur, our most effectual mode of controlling Scindiah must be an irruption into his dominions in Hindostan, from the ceded provinces of Oude; and in that case, the main and most critical effort must be made from the quarter where you are now present.

The result of this reasoning is, that if any serious contest should arise, (which, however, I do not expect) the most important operations will be directed against Scindiah's possessions to the destruction of his power in Hindostan; and that no probability exists of any important contest in the Deccan.

Indeed my determination is so fixed to employ every effort for the purpose of avoiding hostilities, that I think it scarcely possible that I can be disappointed in my hope of preserving peace. And my plan is, therefore, rather to form such arrangements as may present the most powerful and menacing aspect to every branch of the Mahratta empire, on every point of their frontier, than to prepare any separate army with a view to one distinct operation.

It is, therefore, my decided opinion, that you would be more probably in the road to efficient service, in the event of hostilities, by remaining with the army in Oude, than by proceeding to Hurryhaul; and that during the period of negotiations, if hostilities should be suspended, your presence in Oude would contribute more to the terror of the most important state in the Mahratta empire, and, therefore, would prove more advantageous to the public interests, than your presence on the frontier of Mysore.

Having thus, my dear Sir, submitted my views and sentiments to you without disguise, I refer the whole question to your own judgment, assuring you most sincerely, that you will receive my most cordial support in any determination which you may form.

Ever my dear Sir,
with sincere respect and esteem,
Yours most faithfully,
WELLESLEY.

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## No. V.

*Lord Clive to the Marquess Wellesley.*

(Private.)

MY DEAR LORD, Fort St. George, 14th January, 1803.

I have just received the accompanying packets to your Lordship's address from Col. Harcourt, and I lose not a moment in forwarding them to your Lordship. I have not by this conveyance any news of a public nature, excepting the approval of the treaty of the Carnatic by the Court of Directors, upon which I have the honour to offer to your Lordship my cordial congratulations. I have no communication respecting the succession to the government of Fort St. George.

I am always my Dear Lord,
With the greatest esteem and regard,
Most faithfully your's,
CLIVE.

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## No. VI.

*The Right Hon. Lord Castlereagh to the Marquess Wellesley.*

(Private.)

Doneira, August 10th, 1802.
MY DEAR LORD, [Received January 17th, 1803.]

The few days that have elapsed since my appointment to the Presidency of the Board of Controul have been passed among my constituents in Ireland, and on the road to this

place—I avail myself of the first tranquil day I have had to address myself to your Lordship, and to express the very particular satisfaction I derive from feeling myself placed in a situation, which connects me in close official habits with your Lordship, from which I promise myself not less advantage in my public capacity, than the gratification to my individual feelings from former intercourse, from common connections, and from the zeal which we shall both feel in the same object, I venture to flatter myself that I shall have the good fortune to possess, as I shall endeavour to deserve, your unqualified and unreserved confidence, and I trust it is unnecessary to assure you, that my utmost exertions shall be employed to give stability to your administration, and to co-operate with you in the conduct of Indian affairs, with that cordiality which can alone render our united exertions successful.

I propose returning to London, taking Lord Cornwallis in my way, so as to arrive there about the 25th. I shall reserve till I have had some communications with the India House, troubling your Lordship with any observations on the detail of business, but I hope very soon after my arrival, that I shall be enabled to write fully on the three principal points, which call for immediate attention—namely, the settlement of the Carnatic—the military establishment, and the system to be pursued with a view to the reduction of the Indian debt. I shall press these several points on my return to an immediate decision, and your Lordship shall be apprized without delay of the result, which is likely to reach you through the regular despatches.

Whatever circumstances may have occurred in the course of your official intercourse with this country, not altogether satisfactory, and however your Lordship may feel many strong motives inclining you to return to Europe, yet I am led to hope that nothing will induce you to deliver up the government to other hands, till you have fully completed all those arrangements, equally connected with the most important and brilliant features of your own administration, as with the conclusion which has been put to the late war—in whatever degree the pecuniary affairs of the Company may have felt the pressure of the contest, it is connected with your Lordship's distinguished reputation, in which every friend of yours, and of the country must feel a deep interest, that you

should be the individual to lay the foundation of that system, and of those measures, which is in peace to accomplish the prosperity of those possessions, which you have so successfully preserved, and improved in war; and I feel the strongest persuasion, that the same energy of mind, which led you so happily to conceive, and so effectually to execute the many arduous measures connected with the late contest, will, when applied to another state of things, be as fruitful in drawing from peace, the resources of which it is susceptible, as you have proved yourself in war, competent to direct those resources to their true and legitimate purpose; your Lordship's reputation as a statesman during a period of war, has been established on the most solid foundation, it only remains to exhibit the qualifications which belong to less arduous times, to perfect in result, as well as in the estimation of those who are inclined to watch your progress with a critical eye, the character of your administration.

I have the honour to be,
My dear Lord,
with great regard very sincerely yours,
CASTLEREAGH.

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## No. VII.

*The Right Hon. Lord Castlereagh to the Marquess Wellesley.*

(Private and Secret.)

London, September 10th, 1802.
[Received January 17th, 1803.]

MY DEAR LORD,

Mr. Addington has communicated to me the private letters he has lately received from you by Col. Monson and Col. Harcourt, my short letter from Doneira, which reached town just in time to catch the Devaynes in the Downs, will have apprized your Lordship of the deep importance I personally attach to your administering the government of India, till you have concluded all the arrangements resulting from peace, amongst which I reckon the management of the French interests, as connected with the restitutions, not to be the least important, as also till you have brought the settlement of the

Carnatic, and of the cessions in Oude to a final, and I doubt not a most satisfactory conclusion.

However anxious I may feel on this subject, on public grounds, I owe it to your Lordship not to urge your continuance, unless I can assure you not only of my own cordial support, leaving it to Mr. Addington to answer for that of his colleagues, but also, till I can state upon the authority of the body themselves, that I have every reason to hope and to believe, that the Court of Directors will contribute fairly and honestly, to render your continuance for another year in the change of their dominions, satisfactory to your public and private feelings.

Mr. Addington fully participates in all my sentiments upon this subject. We both regret, that any interval should occur in writing to you conclusively, but you know how difficult it is to assemble the King's ministers at this season of the year, or even to bring the Court of Directors together; and however, entirely prepared we both are, explicitly to express our own impressions, and wishes on the whole of the case, we conceive it indispensable to convey to your Lordship a more comprehensive explanation of the opinion of the King's confidential servants, than it is possible to do without a cabinet being assembled for the purpose, which cannot, I understand, take place till some day in the ensuing week.

We are unwilling, however, to leave your Lordship during the intervening period, however short, without receiving a communication from hence; we have therefore determined to send an express overland to apprize you, that we hope in the course of a very few days to write fully, and I trust in a satisfactory manner to your Lordship, in reply to your last private despatches. In the meantime we feel assured, that no consideration will induce you to embark for Europe, whilst there is a prospect that you may have it in your power to render a great additional service to the public, without being exposed during the remainder of your government, to any thing that can seriously wound your private feelings.

As I shall so soon have an opportunity of writing to you more at large, not only upon the point in question, but upon others of a more general nature, and as I have not more than time to prepare this letter, previous to the departure of the

mail, I shall only assure your Lordship, that I feel a very particular interest in the successful issue of this transaction, and I beg that you will

Believe me to be,
With great truth and regard, ever
Your Lordship's
sincere and faithful servant,
CASTLEREAGH.

## No. VIII.

*Lieut.-General Stuart to the Marquess Wellesley.*

My Lord, Head Quarters, Choultry Plain, 24 January, 1803.

The sincere satisfaction which I have received from the communication of your Excellency's decision to proceed without delay to Madras, is tempered with no ordinary degree of regret, that the period necessarily fixed for my departure deprives me of the eminent advantages I should have derived from a personal communication of your Lordship's commands.

Under these circumstances it will be my chief care, until I may be honoured with your Excellency's further orders, to regulate my conduct by the comprehensive view of the principles to be observed in the present crisis of affairs in the Mahratta empire, contained in the extracts from your Excellency's letter to the Commander-in-Chief* which you have done me the honour to transmit, and I shall proceed to the delicate and important charge I am about to assume with a confidence proportioned to the exalted sense which I entertain of your Lordship's illustrious character; and of the advantages which I shall immediately derive from the wisdom and energy of your Lordship's councils.

The high approbation which your Excellency has condescended to bestow on the manner in which my devotion to the cause of public virtue, and to the principles of your Excellency's Administration, has enabled me to perform my official duties, constitutes an abundant reward for the labours of a most anxious interval, and would of itself prove a noble incitement to persevere in the same honourable course during

* See p. 29.

the short remaining period of my public life, if at this advanced stage I could require additional excitements to continue a line of conduct which has procured me such inestimable commendation, and been attended with the purest personal gratification.

The kind assurance of your Excellency's cordial support in every situation is grateful to my proudest feelings. It enables me to look forward with confidence and with pleasure to the services which it may still be possible that I should render to my country, and to the last and most precious enjoyments of life, the approbation of those, from whom it is of the highest value.

I have the honour to remain,

With the most grateful and faithful attachment,

My Lord,

Your Excellency's most obliged,

Obedient, and devoted servant,

J. STUART.

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## No. IX.

*The Right Hon. Lord Castlereagh to the Marquess Wellesley.*

East Sheene, September 27, 1802.

[Received January 29, 1803.]

MY DEAR LORD,

No exertion has been omitted by Mr. Addington, or myself, which could accelerate our final communications, in answer to your Lordship's despatches by Colonel Harcourt, and although the preliminary steps have necessarily been productive of some delay, I trust our letters of the 10th instant, by the overland express, will have prepared your Lordship for this interval, which was inseparable from the transaction.

I am now enabled to convey to your Lordship, the result of what has passed; and I do it in the full confidence, that when your Lordship takes into your consideration, the whole of the circumstances, you will not hesitate to accede to the desire, which has been so strongly and unequivocally expressed by the Court of Directors, as well as by his Majesty's ministers.

So soon as I was informed of your Lordship's sentiments, as explained in your private letter to Mr. Addington, I lost no time in communicating to the Chairman and Deputy-Chair-

man the anxious solicitude we both felt, that your Lordship might be induced to remain in the Government of India for another season. I also apprized them, in confidence, of the impressions under which your Lordship's resignation was signified to the Court, and the opening which yet presented itself of securing for this additional period your farther services, if your continuance could be made satisfactory to your public and private feelings, by some distinct testimony of the good will and confidence of the Court.

It is due to the Chairs to state, that they entered with cordiality into these sentiments, and testified the utmost readiness to bring the subject under the consideration of the Court. They did not disguise from me, that much jealousy and dissatisfaction existed in that body with respect to certain measures of your government, which the late appointment of Mr. Henry Wellesley had considerably increased. They did not however doubt, when the Court recalled to their recollection the eminent services your Lordship had rendered to the Company, and reflected on the important advantages that must result to their affairs, from your being induced to remain in India, during the ensuing year, that minor considerations and collateral impressions would give way, and that their ultimate decision would be such as was due to your Lordship's distinguished merits, and to their own immediate interests.

The sentiments of the Court of Directors will be conveyed to the Government of Bengal in a public despatch, and I cannot but indulge a confident hope, that the great public considerations therein stated, as the particular grounds upon which their request to your Lordship is founded, will not suffer your Lordship to hesitate in retaining a situation, which, in the judgment of his Majesty's ministers, as well as of the Court of Directors, will enable your Lordship, during the remainder of your government, to render the most essential services, both to the Company and to the empire.

The strong wish which the Court has publicly expressed on this subject, is the best proof your Lordship can receive of their confidence, and in testifying at this moment, the value they attach to your Lordship's services, they must be considered, as assuring your Lordship of their disposition to give your administration a cordial and honourable support.

In calling upon your Lordship to postpone your intentions of returning immediately to Europe, we felt it absolutely due to your Lordship, as well as important to the interests of the Company, to obtain a decision upon the late proceedings in the Carnatic, the consideration of which had been postponed by his Majesty's ministers, in expectation of receiving further information on this important arrangement, which your Lordship intimated your intention of transmitting by the *Mornington Packet.*

The *Mornington* not having brought the expected papers, and the substance of the transaction appearing to be contained in the documents already received, a strong desire to relieve your Lordship from further suspense on this subject, has induced his Majesty's ministers no longer to postpone their decision, and Mr. Addington will inform your Lordship, that they are prepared, on the case as it stands explained in the papers already received, to give the measures adopted by the Government of Fort St. George, under your Lordship's directions, their decided support, and a despatch approving of the late settlement and treaty with the Nabob Azeem ul Dowlah will be forwarded through the Secret Committee, by the present conveyance.

At the same time, it is necessary your Lordship should know that considerable doubts and difficulties have, and do exist in the minds of many persons in this country on this question, which I trust, upon further reflection and discussion will be removed. It is likely to make a prominent feature in the proceedings of the ensuing session, and no pains are spared, not only to impress the public mind, with the harshness and injustice of the transaction in itself, but also coupling it with the cessions in Oude, as also those in the neighbourhood of Surat obtained from the Guicowar Rajah, to prove that a systematic plan of territorial acquisition, inconsistent with the policy professed in the act of 1793, has manifested itself in the late measures.

As far as my own opinion is concerned, I have no hesitation in stating, that your Lordship would have been inexcusable upon the case made out, (however, the transaction may furnish plausible grounds of statement in debate) had you suffered our interests in the Carnatic to rest on their former footing, and that such a procedure would have not only left

our security in that quarter, as imperfect as probable treachery could well make it, but would have shewn a weakness and facility in our councils, after the disclosures had taken place, which could not fail to have encouraged every other ally to trifle with our forbearance. I shall therefore feel no difficulty in giving the measure my full support; but, beyond this, I entertain a strong conviction, that the transaction in itself will bear discussion, and ultimately establish itself, as equally just and politic, in the opinion of Parliament.

Before I quit this subject, I cannot avoid mentioning to your Lordship, that considerable anxiety is entertained here relative to the floating debts of the late Nabob. Their amount is supposed to be very great, from the extent of the embarrassment, in which his Highness was known to be involved; and some doubts have been suggested, whether the Company as a Corporation, in taking the territories, do not make themselves liable to its incumbrances, and may not be sued for the same; at least in the case of an individual taking a property, whatever his own claims may be, he is precluded from paying himself, till all other claims are satisfied.

I hope this doubt may not be well founded. I should conceive, even taking the case, as being between individual and individual, instead of (as in the present instance) being in spirit at least, between state and state, that military charges, as well as expenses of collection would be deemed to be necessary outgoings to render the estate productive, and that no Court of Justice would give private debts precedence of the usual claims; for furnishing the degree of protection to the Carnatic, which must be necessary to obtain from it any revenue at all. At all events, I think we may look with confidence to Parliament for securing the pecuniary interests of the Company, at least to the extent of their former claims, either in debt or subsidy; and that their would be little hesitation on the part of the legislature in denying to the creditors any other remedy, than an appropriation of the surplus revenues; the rather, as their security, even then would stand much improved under the treaty, by the prospect there is of an augmentation of the revenues, when administered by the Company's officers.

The question, however, of recognizing the validity of these debts, in any degree, is one, which will require the maturest

consideration, and I am happy to observe the prudent caution, which has been observed by the Government of Madras on this subject. I am aware that the principles adopted, in respect to the debts affecting the Tanjore country, seem to establish a precedent bearing upon this question. I am not prepared however, to consider any former precedent, as so far binding in the present instance, as to preclude the Company from acting on such principles, as shall ultimately appear wise in themselves, upon a full knowledge of the extent and nature of those claims.

Upon the late important events in Oude, I shall not at present detain your Lordship. The pecuniary and political importance of the treaty is manifest, and from the accounts given, both by Colonel Harcourt, and Colonel Monson, of the cordial manner in which this settlement has been agreed to by the Vizier, there appears every reason to be highly satisfied with the circumstance under which it has been concluded; I cannot therefore but entertain a sanguine hope, that your Lordship will receive the approbation of the Court on this subject, so soon as they are in possession of the details, which your Lordship has signified your intention of transmitting.

I cannot omit availing myself of this occasion of congratulating your Lordship, on the distinguished ability Mr. Henry Wellesley has displayed, both in the conduct of the treaty, and in the superintendance of the commission appointed for the settlement of the country. Your Lordship will not be surprized that the Court of Directors should feel considerable jealousy on the subject of his appointment, I trust, however, it has been allayed; and I entertain a sanguine hope, that any observations, which the Court may hereafter feel themselves called upon to make on this subject, will be, to notice it in the manner which I am persuaded, is not less due to the wisdom, than it indisputably is to the purity of the measure, and solely with the view of guarding against any improper inference, which might hereafter result from the relaxation of a general principle in this particular instance.

In adverting to the general measures, which will engross your Lordship's attention, during the remainder of your stay in India, I feel it altogether unnecessary to offer many suggestions. The local opportunities you have had, enable your Lordship to form a much more comprehensive judgment on

the extended scale of our interests in that quarter, than either my experience or means will admit of.

I can truly assure your Lordship, I look with confidence to the winding up of your government, being marked with as much solidity, as its progress has been brilliant and commanding; and in the two great features of retrenchment of expense, and conduct towards the native powers, I am satisfied, when the government passes from your Lordship's hands, that we shall have as little to desire as to regret; for, however earnest your Lordship may feel to place our interests and authority in that quarter, before you leave India, upon the surest and most lasting foundation, your mind is too much alive to the true principles of British policy, to purchase any advantage at too high a price.

I have now only to renew my assurances to your Lordship of sincere and cordial co-operation, and to repeat my conviction, that your Lordship's decision upon the arrival of these despatches, will correspond with that high sense of public duty, which has invariably distinguished your Lordship's conduct.

I have the honour to be,
My dear Lord,
Your very sincere and faithful servant,
CASTLEREAGH.

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## No. X.

*The Marquess Wellesley to Lord Clive.*

(Secret—official.)

MY LORD, Fort William, February 2, 1803.

I have received from the Resident at Poonah the intimation of his intention to recommend the advance of the British Army assembled at Hurryhaul into the Mahratta territory at the earliest practicable period of time.*

The length of time required for the complete equipment of the force which your Lordship had directed to be assembled

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* The assembling of this force under the command of Major-General Wellesley, is fully detailed in the Duke of Wellington's despatches, Vol. I.—[ED.]

on the frontier of the Mahratta territory, precluded the necessity of any immediate instructions with regard to the ultimate destination of that army. The transactions in the Deccan and the situation and views of the several contending parties having now assumed a more distinct form, I am enabled to apply the general principles by which I propose to regulate the proceedings of the British Government in the actual crisis of affairs.

The objects of assembling the British troops on the frontier of Mysore were, the effectual defence of our possessions during the convulsed state of the Mahratta empire, and the eventual establishment of a subsidiary force at Poonah, under the operation of the general defensive alliance concluded with the Peishwa.*

Your Lordship is apprized of my intention (in conformity to the system of alliance founded by the treaty of Hyderabad, in 1800†), to exert the British influence and power for the restoration of the Peishwa to the musnud of Poonah, on the basis of the subsidiary treaty recently concluded by Colonel Close. ‡ In pursuing this intention, it is, however, absolutely necessary to attend to the leading principles of policy by which my conduct has been governed :—

1st. The maintenance of peace with the Mahratta states.

2nd. The preservation of the internal tranquillity of the British possessions. Our proceedings in the present crisis of affairs must be strictly conformable to these leading principles.

The stipulations of treaty on which I found my intention to facilitate the restoration of the Peishwa's authority, originated in a supposition that the majority of the Mahratta Jageerdars, and the body of the Peishwa's subjects entertained a desire of co-operating in that measure. Justice and wisdom would forbid any attempt to impose upon the Mahrattas a ruler, whose restoration to authority was adverse to the wishes of every class of his subjects. The spirit of our recent engagements with the Peishwa, involved no obligation of such an extent. Whatever might be the success of our arms, the ultimate object of those engagements could not be attained by

* See subsequent letters.

† See vol. ii. p. 275, and appendix, p. 709.

‡ See appendix.

a course of policy so violent and extreme. If, therefore, it should appear that a decided opposition to the restoration of the Peishwa is to be expected from the majority of the Mahratta Jageerdars, and from the body of the Peishwa's subjects, I should instantly relinquish every attempt to restore the Peishwa to the musnud of Poonah.

Even under an assurance of a decided support and co-operation from the Jageerdars, it is, however, advisable that such a detachment of the British force should advance into the Mahratta territory, as shall not endanger the internal tranquillity of the Company's territories. The advance of the whole of the British army assembled at Hurryhaul into the Mahratta territory would greatly diminish the internal security of the Company's possessions in that quarter of India. Such a movement would therefore be inconsistent with a principal object of that armament.

Under all the circumstances of the case, therefore, I consider the advance of the whole of the British army assembled at Hurryhaul to Poonah to be a measure of such hazard to the tranquillity of the British possessions, as could not be justified by any probable expectation of a more speedy and complete accomplishment of our views at that court.

With the view of fulfilling our engagements with the Peishwa without deviating from the principles stated in this despatch, it is my intention,

1st. That the whole of the subsidiary force serving with his Highness the Nizam, together with the regiment of Europeans, and the regiment of cavalry, to be furnished for the service of his Highness, under the orders of the Governor-General in council, of the 31st of December, 1802, shall proceed to join the troops of the Nizam assembled in his Highness's western frontier, and that the whole of that force shall occupy within his Highness's territory the station nearest to Poonah, and shall be prepared, at a proper season, to advance to that capital.

2ndly. That as large a proportion of the British army assembled at Hurryhaul as can be detached, consistently with the internal security of the British territories, shall advance in concert and co-operation with such of the Mahratta chiefs and Jageerdars occupying the southern frontier of the Mahratta territory as are attached to the Peishwa's cause; and

that the remainder of the British army shall maintain its position on the frontier of Mysore, for the combined purpose of eventually supporting the advanced detachment, and of preserving the internal tranquillity of the Company's territory.

3rdly. That the advanced detachment shall proceed from Hurryhaul, together with such of the Mahratta forces as may unite with it, either to Meritch, or to any other station where the Peishwa may be enabled to join that force, or that the detachment from Hurryhaul shall form a junction with the combined army of the Nizam, and with the British subsidiary troops on the frontier of his Highness's dominions. The immediate destination of the advancing army must necessarily be regulated by contingent events. The extent of the force to be thus detached from the main body of the British army at Hurryhaul must be decided by the discretion of your Lordship in council, aided by the judgment of the commander-in-chief, and strictly regulated by the principles stated in the preceding parts of this despatch.

Such detachment of British troops, supported by the co-operation of the majority of the southern Jageerdars, or by the force united with the army of the Nizam, will be sufficient to preclude the opposition of any individual chieftain who may consider the restoration of the Peishwa to the musnud of Poonah to be incompatible with his separate interest, and who might be disposed to resist or embarrass the progress of that measure.

The actual period of the advance of the proposed detachment from Hurryhaul must be regulated by the information which your Lordship may receive of the progress of the subsidiary force from Hyderabad, and of the Nizam's troops, and also by the tenor of the advices which may be transmitted to your Lordship by the resident at Poonah.

The co-operation of the majority of the Mahratta Jageerdars for the restoration of the Peishwa to the due exercise of his authority being considered to form an indispensable part of the arrangement for the accomplishment of that object, it is necessary that your Lordship should be apprised of my sentiments with regard to the conduct to be observed in encouraging those Jageerdars to co-operate with the British troops.

It may be expected that those Jageerdars will require, as the condition of their support, assurances from the British Government of security for their respective rights and interests in the general settlement of affairs. Without an accurate knowledge of the respective rights of the Jageerdars, and of the Peishwa, we cannot justly pledge the faith of the British Government to any special engagement on this subject.

Every practicable means should be employed to conciliate the good will of those chieftains, and to obtain their co-operation in the general object of restoring the Peishwa to the due exercise of his authority, and for that purpose it will be proper to afford to the Jageerdars every assurance that the utmost influence of the British Government will be employed after the successful restoration of Baajy Rao, to provide for the security of each chieftain to the extent which may be practicable, consistently with the just rights of the Peishwa. Any engagements of a more definite nature might involve obligations inconsistent with public faith.

In framing any arrangements with the Mahratta Jageerdars occupying the frontier of Mysore for the purpose of securing their aid and co-operation on the present occasion, your Lordship may be disposed to avail yourself of the services of Major Malcolm, whose extensive information with regard to the general political system of India, and whose intimate knowledge of my sentiments on this particular branch of policy will furnish peculiar advantages in accomplishing the measures which your Lordship may pursue for the purpose of securing the support of the Mahratta feudatories.

Your Lordship will issue such instructions to the commanding officer of the detachment as may be proper with the view to conciliate the good will of the inhabitants of the country through which the detachment may have occasion to pass in the Mahratta territory.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

## No. XI.

*The Marquess Wellesley to Lord Clive.*

(Secret.)

My Lord, Fort William, February 3, 1803.

In the present situation of the affairs of the Mahratta empire, and under the circumstances of our recent engagements with the Peishwa, it is desirable that an officer of approved talent and experience in the political interests of the Government in India should be appointed to reside at the court of the Rajah Raggojee Bhooslah the Rajah of Berar, and should be directed to proceed with the least practicable delay to Nagpore.

Adverting to the power and influence of Raggojee Bhooslah, as a branch of the Mahratta state, it is expedient that we should possess the means of obtaining timely knowledge of that chieftain's views in the present crisis. It is my duty to avail myself of the favourable opportunity which the actual state of the affairs of the Mahratta empire may be expected to afford for the accomplishment of the important object of comprehending the Rajah of Berar in the system of defensive alliance lately concluded with the Peishwa.

These objects cannot be effectually secured, otherwise than by the presence of an able and active resident on the part of the British Government at the court of Nagpore.

Your Lordship will concur in opinion with me, that the talents, knowledge, and activity of Mr. Webbe qualify him in an eminent degree for that station. Mr. Webbe's skill in the principal languages of India, and particularly the Mahratta language, render him more particularly able to serve the Company in the situation of resident at the court of Nagpore.

I trust that the purposes of the commission of which Mr. Webbe was appointed a member, under the authority of your Lordship, in council, have now been so far accomplished, as to admit of Mr. Webbe's employment at Nagpore without the hazard of injury to the public service; and I have formed an arrangement for supplying the place of Mr. Webbe in his capacity of resident in Mysore, which will be communicated to your Lordship in the sequel of this despatch.

Adverting, however, to the peculiar nature of our connection with the state of Mysore, and to the local circumstances of that important branch of our political relations, I am convinced that the security of the British interests in that quarter of India indispensably requires the permanent continuance of an able and experienced political resident at the court of Mysore. I have hitherto reluctantly submitted to the necessity which has occasioned the absence of Mr. Webbe from his station in Mysore, I therefore deem it to be essentially necessary that a person duly qualified should be immediately and permanently appointed to succeed to that office which will be vacated by the nomination of Mr. Webbe to the residency of Nagpore.

The critical state of the British interests as connected with the affairs of the Mahratta empire, and the nature of our recent engagements with the Peishwa, render the presence of the British resident at the court of Mysore at this period of time of still more urgent importance to the public interests. With reference either to the permanent duties or the immediate object of that appointment, it is indispensably necessary that the person who may be nominated to that situation, should be intimately acquainted with the condition and interests of the several states and chieftains composing the Mahratta empire, with the whole course of the late transactions in the Deccan, and with my views and sentiments with regard to the whole system of our political arrangements in that quarter of India.

The complete information possessed by Major John Malcolm on all those important points, added to the zeal, judgment, and ability, which have distinguished the conduct of that officer in various important political stations, qualify him, in a peculiar degree, for the situation of resident at Mysore.

The knowledge which I possess of the sentiments of your Lordship with respect to Major Malcolm's qualifications leaves no doubt in my mind of your Lordship's entire concurrence in the selection of that officer for the situation of resident in Mysore. I therefore request that your Lordship in council will be pleased to issue Major Malcolm's appointment to that office on the date of Mr. Webbe's nomination to the residency of Nagpore.

Major Malcolm will immediately proceed to Fort St. George for the purpose of taking charge of his appointment. Your Lordship has been apprized, by private advices from me, of the intention which I had formed of proceeding to Fort St. George for the express purpose of regulating, with more facility and effect, the course of the military and political proceedings connected with the actual state of the Mahratta empire. The tenor of the advices recently received from Colonel Close, and from Hyderabad, appearing, however, to render the expediency of my departure less urgent, and the exigencies of the public service in this quarter of the British dominions requiring my immediate attention, I trust that the inconvenience of my absence from Fort St. George in the present crisis may be supplied by the communications of Major Malcolm, whose instructions from me will enable him to state to your Lordship distinctly my sentiments and intentions with regard to the present state of affairs at Poonah. I accordingly request your Lordship to receive from Major Malcolm the communication of my sentiments on such questions connected with the state of the Mahratta empire, as may not have been determined by my recent instructions to your Lordship.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

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## No. XII.

*The Marquess Wellesley to His Excellency Lieut.-General Stuart.*

(Private and Confidential.)

MY DEAR SIR, Fort William, February 8th, 1803.

The favourable appearance of affairs at Poonah, combined with the pressure of various circumstances in our situation at this Presidency, has induced me to relinquish my intention of proceeding to Fort St. George in the present season. I have sent Major Malcolm to Madras with an appointment to Mysore, and as he is fully acquainted with every sentiment of my mind respecting the actual crisis of affairs in the Mahratta empire, I have referred Lord Clive to him on every point which may appear doubtful or deficient in my instructions. You will also find Major Malcolm completely apprized of the

views which I entertain with regard to the operations of the army, and I request that you will accordingly admit him to your confidence, and receive through him such communications from me, as it is not practicable to commit to paper. The general principle of my present proceedings is to avoid hostilities, and I request you to bear this principle in mind as the rule of our conduct in every emergency which may arise. I entertain the firmest reliance, that with the aid of your prudence and temper, we shall attain every object of the armament without war.

Believe me to be,
With the greatest regard and respect, dear Sir,
Your most faithful and obliged servant,
WELLESLEY.

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## No. XIII.

*The Marquess Wellesley to the Honourable the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors.*

HONOURABLE SIRS, Fort William, February 10, 1803.

In my despatch to your Honourable Committee dated 24th December, 1802,* forwarded overland, I had the honour to submit to you a statement of the late transactions in the Mahratta empire, and to explain to your Honourable Committee the system of policy which I considered it to be my duty to pursue for the security and improvement of the British interests in India, in the actual crisis of affairs at Poonah.

I am apprized by the Honourable the Governor of Bombay that in conformity to my instructions, it was his intention to forward to your Honourable Committee with that despatch a continuation of the narrative of events and proceedings in that quarter to the latest period of time. That narrative will comprehend the occurrences of a date subsequent to my last advices from Bombay; I shall therefore confine the present despatch to a statement of my general sentiments on the actual situation of affairs in the Mahratta empire, and of the course of policy which I propose to pursue.

Your Honourable Committee will be apprized by that despatch of the Honourable the Governor of Bombay to which the preceding paragraph refers, of the actual conclu-

* See p. 3.

sion of a definitive treaty of defensive alliance between the British Government and his Highness the Peishwa.

The terms of that treaty being strictly conformable to the tenor of my original propositions to his Highness, and to the spirit of my subsequent instructions to the Resident at Poonah, I have not hesitated to ratify and confirm the treaty. A copy of the treaty is annexed to this despatch.* The conclusion of this important arrangement promises to establish the British interests in the Mahratta empire on the most solid and durable foundation, and to afford additional security for the permanent tranquillity and prosperity of the British dominions in India.

The complete operation of this beneficial arrangement is however still subject to doubt.

It has always been sufficiently manifest that the principal branches of the Mahratta state, are averse to an alliance between the British Government and the sovereign power of the Mahratta empire. The distractions prevailing among the feudatory chieftains afforded the most favourable prospect for the conclusion of such an alliance. It is also evident that His Highness the Peishwa has been induced to conclude the treaty with the British Government by his conviction that no other means existed of recovering any portion of his just authority, or of securing the tranquillity of his dominions.

The knowledge of our arrangements with the Peishwa may induce Dowlut Row Scindiah and Holkar, to compromise their differences and to offer to the Peishwa proposals for restoring His Highness to the Musnud of Poonah, which His Highness may be disposed to accept, notwithstanding the actual conclusion of engagements for that purpose with the British Government. In such an event it is not my intention to attempt to compel the Peishwa to adhere to the faith of his engagements, at the hazard of involving the Company in a war with the combined Mahratta States.

If however the Peishwa should adhere to the faith of His engagements, and if the majority of the Mahratta Jageerdars and Chieftains subject to His Highness's authority, should concur in the restoration of the Peishwa's authority under the treaty with the Company, I shall consider it to be my duty to proceed, without regard to any partial opposition on the part of Scindiah, or of Holkar, either singly or united.

* See Appendix.

No reason, however, exists to justify an apprehension that in the event supposed, Scindiah would proceed to such an extremity; nor is any such desperate course of proceeding to be apprehended from the Rajah of Berar. Uncombined with the power of Scindiah, Holkar will not probably venture to resist the Peishwa. Holkar has also anxiously solicited the arbitration of the British Government with respect to his claims.

Your honourable Committee will be apprised by the Government of Bombay of the state of affairs in Guzerat, where, I trust, an establishment is now formed, from which great advantages may be derived to the political, military, and commercial interests of the Company, in that quarter of India.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

Feb. 14, 1803.

P.S.—Since the date of this letter I have received advices from the resident at Poonah to the 23rd ultimo, the general tenor of these advices appears to me to be of the most favourable description.

His Highness the Peishwa has despatched two of his principal officers to Dowlut Row Scindiah for the express purpose of reconciling that chieftain to the arrangement which his Highness has concluded with the British Government.

His Highness the Peishwa has addressed letters to the several Mahratta chieftains subject to his Highness's authority, who occupy the districts situated between Poonah and the river Kistna, apprising them of his alliance with the British Government, and directing them to join and co-operate with the British forces. These circumstances have considerably diminished my apprehensions with regard to the possibility of the Peishwa's departure from the faith of his engagements.

Dissensions have arisen between Amrut Row and Jeswunt Row Holkar, which may be expected to produce a separation of interests between those chieftains. Jeswunt Row Holkar is extremely embarrassed by the want of money for the payment of his troops, and is endeavouring to supply the failure of his resources by levying oppressive contributions from the inhabitants of Poonah. That chieftain has repeated his propositions in a modified form to the Resident, for an accommo-

dation with the Peishwa, and has solicited the mediation of the Resident, and of the Peishwa, for the satisfaction of his demands upon Dowlut Rao Scindiah. As a proof of his sincerity, Jeswunt Rao Holkar has signified his intention of sending the females of the Peishwa's family to his Highness at Bassein. Jeswunt Rao Holkar has been equally earnest in soliciting the mediation of his Highness the Nizam.

The situation of affairs justifies a confident expectation of the speedy and happy conclusion of the late arrangements with his Highness the Peishwa, and of the amicable adjustment of the differences existing among the Mahratta chieftains, through the mediation and influence of the British power.

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## No. XIV.

*The Marquess Wellesley to the Honourable Court of Directors.*

HONOURABLE SIRS, Fort William, February 11th, 1803.

On the 29th of January, the Governor-General in council in the public department had the honour to receive a letter from your honourable Court, under date Sept. 29, 1802,* in which you are pleased to notice the receipt of the despatches of January 1st, and March 13th, 1802, from me, submitting to your honourable Court my desire to relinquish this Government, and return to Europe in the month of January, 1803.

The letter from your honourable Court of Sept. 29 will be acknowledged in the regular course of correspondence by the Governor-General in council, but as the general tenor of that despatch refers exclusively to my public services, and to my personal sentiments, my respect for your honourable Court induces me to address this separate letter to you upon the subject of my continuance in India.

By my letter to your honourable Court under date Dec. 24, 1802,† you will have been informed that my anxious desire to derive every practicable advantage from the existing state of affairs in the Mahratta empire, had determined me to prolong the period of my government in India, and to sacrifice

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* See Appendix. † See p. 1.

to my sense of your interests my earnest solicitude to return to Europe in the present season. This circumstance will, I trust, satisfy your honourable Court that no consideration is of equal moment in my estimation to my sense of duty towards the public interests, or to the solemn obligations of my arduous public trust.

The sentiments of disapprobation which your honourable Court has deemed it necessary to signify to your governments in India on various occasions during the course of my administration, have been received by me with a degree of concern and regret proportioned to the satisfaction with which I have the honour respectfully to acknowledge your honourable Court's recent approbation of my conduct in the general management and superintendance of your affairs.

The expectations of public advantage which your honourable Court is pleased to found upon my continuance in your service, are sufficient to determine me to sacrifice every private consideration to the important duty of obeying your commands.

Impressed with these sentiments, I have the honour to submit to your honourable Court this respectful notification of my intention to postpone my departure from India until the month of January, 1804.

Your honourable Court has been apprized by various communications from this Government, in the course of the last year, of the progressive introduction of the system of finance which I have been enabled to frame, with a view of accelerating the success of any arrangement which may be adopted in England for the liquidation of the Indian debt. I entertain a confident hope of meeting the expectations of your honourable Court on this important subject.

I am also satisfied that the settlement of your recent acquisitions will prove highly advantageous to your interests, and will furnish a valuable accession to your resources of every description.

During my continuance in this laborious and difficult station, your honourable Court may be assured of my most cordial, zealous, and assiduous attention to every object to which you may be pleased to direct my services, or which may appear to me to require them.

I have the honour to be, Honourable Sirs,
with the greatest respect,
your most obedient, obliged, and faithful servant,
WELLESLEY.

## No. XV.

*Marquess Wellesley to the Right Hon. Lord Castlereagh*, (Extract).

(No. 1, Private and most Secret.)

MY DEAR LORD, Barrackpore, 12th February, 1803.

Your Lordship will have been apprized by my letter of the 24th December 1802, to the Court of Directors, of the motives of public duty, which had induced me to determine to remain in India for another season previously to the receipt of the reply from His Majesty's ministers, and from the Company, to my despatches by Colonels Monson and Harcourt.

I am deeply sensible of your kindness in having communicated to me so early as the 10th of September, the general sentiments of the Government at home, upon the subject of my continuance in India; and it will be satisfactory to your Lordship to learn, that your early attention on that occasion, effectually relieved my mind from a state of the most painful anxiety and embarrassing doubt.

I assure your Lordship sincerely, that notwithstanding my respect and regard for Lord Dartmouth, I derived great confidence and satisfaction from your appointment to the general superintendance of Indian affairs. My intimate knowledge of your character and talents, induces me to anticipate from that appointment, an administration of the interests of Great Britain in India, equally honourable to you, and advantageous to the public.

The communications conveyed by your letter of the 27th September, have completely removed every trace of apprehension from my mind with regard to my personal situation during the continuance of my administration in India.

In the suggestions which your Lordship has communicated with regard to the exercise of my discretionary authority during the remainder of my government, I conceive that you refer more particularly to the question of the private trade, on which you will have learnt that I have conformed implicitly to the instructions which I received, although my sentiments upon that question remain unaltered.

The question of the private trade never appeared to me to be of the magnitude or importance described by either of the contending parties. My conduct was regulated by a calm

and deliberate view of the comparative political and commercial advantages to the Company and the nation, of promoting or of destroying that branch of trade; and your Lordship may, perhaps, be inclined to consider the alarm and anger of the Court of Directors on this subject, with no other disposition than the indulgence which true wisdom extends to the infirmities of prejudice, ignorance and passion, when you shall have observed, by adverting to the recorded proceedings of the Government for the last two years, that I had actually suspended all encouragement to the private trade of India during that period of time, in anxious expectation of receiving a precise rule of conduct from the Court of Directors, whose definite commands for nearly three years previously to that time, I had solicited with an anxiety equally assiduous, and fruitless; and that in the year 1801-2, instead of having permitted the whole private tonnage employed on the Egyptian expedition to proceed with cargoes on account of individual merchants to England, I had restricted that indulgence to the limited number of *three* ships, the services of which were absolutely necessary to the success of the expedition, and could not have been obtained on any other conditions.

When, therefore, the Court was pleased to accuse me of having lavished my indulgence upon upwards of 30,000 tons of private shipping to the hazard of the Company's monopoly, the fact was, that I had restricted that permission within the limits of 3,000 tons, under an irresistible exigency of the public service at the most critical period of the war. Under these circumstances your Lordship will judge whether the long silence of the Court, together with the state of the trade and shipping during the years 1800, 1801, and the commencement of 1802, would not have afforded ample means of favouring the private trade of India, if I had harboured the unworthy design imputed to me by the Court; and whether my inaction at the juncture most favourable and most critical to the interests, which I am supposed to esteem beyond my public trust, does not furnish an incontrovertible proof of my utter indifference to any other considerations than those of my public duty; you will also, I trust, remark my invariable observance of respect even for the errors of any branch of the authority of the East India Company. Their own re-

cords will, however, save me the labour of a detailed defence. I have adverted particularly to the question of the private trade, because I apprehend that my conduct on that question has been the main source of the virulence which has been betrayed by the Court on various other topics. Whatever may be the final judgment of the Court on that question, it is a matter of public notoriety in India, that no subject of any importance since the commencement of my administration has engaged so inconsiderable a portion of my solicitude, and that in many instances I have offended nearly to an equal extent against the prejudices and passions of both parties at issue respecting the private trade.

It is extremely difficult to define the precise boundaries of the discretionary authority vested in the Governor-General. On the due and firm exercise of that discretion, however, the stability of this empire must principally depend. On the other hand, the abuse or licentious extension of the discretionary powers of the Governor-General would endanger the efficacy of the controlling power in England. This question must be decided in common with every practical question of government by reference to the particular circumstances of each special case. On this subject, therefore, I can only assure your Lordship that my disposition must always be to conform to the instructions received from England, without deviation or delay, and that my practice will always correspond with this principle, subject, however, to such modifications as the peculiar nature of this government, and the actual state of local circumstances may absolutely demand.

I return you many thanks for the communication of the paragraph proposed by the Court of Directors, and of the answer returned by the Board of Commissioners respecting the appointment of Mr. Henry Wellesley to preside over the temporary commission for the provisional government and settlement of Oude. The letter of the Board of Control is so entirely conformable to my sentiments, and contains so just and accurate a representation of the principles and motives which induced me to appoint Mr. Wellesley, that I feel it to be unnecessary to offer any remark upon its contents, I will, therefore, only add my sincere satisfaction to perceive so distinct and correct a view of my conduct as that which your

Lordship has taken on an occasion so interesting to my character and honour.

No consideration inferior to the most urgent demand of the public service would have induced me to withdraw my brother from the management of my personal and domestic arrangements, in the conduct of which it must be perfectly evident, that the loss of his services must have been irreparable to my private interests. His own private interests could derive no other advantage from the appointment than that which might result from the honourable discharge of his public duty, and from the prosperity of the public interests committed to his hands. The principles on which this appointment was founded were precisely similar to those which governed my conduct in constituting the commission for the affairs of Mysore after the reduction of Seringapatam. Any difference in the duration or nature of the two commissions arose necessarily from the nature of each respective case. The real objects of this appointment were so obvious, that I confess myself to have viewed the disapprobation of the Directors merely as an additional symptom of their disordered temper. The transaction in all its relations, so far from having been injurious to the civil service in Bengal, offers, perhaps, the most considerable advantages which have been conferred on that service since the acquisition of the Dewanny of Bengal. The immediate effect of the arrangements in Oude will open thirty new offices of considerable emolument and honour to the civil service, and the ultimate consequence must be to accelerate by nearly ten years the general succession throughout the junior branches of the departments of judicature and revenue. No competition could exist between my brother and any civil servant respecting the station of Lieut.-Governor, nor could any supersession be involved in an appointment which never would have existed if my brother had not been on the spot, and for which no civil servant could be qualified, because no gentleman of that description possesses the natural authority which my brother derives from his birth and rank, from the place which he holds in my confidence, and from the consequent respect of the native princes, chiefs, and people. It would have been impossible to have settled our recent acquisition without my presence upon the spot, if I had not been enabled to substi-

tute my brother; and as my continuance for an entire season in Oude would have been highly injurious to many other important branches of the public service, I selected the only person in India who could represent me on such an occasion.

Your Lordship will learn by these despatches the happy result of that appointment. You will also perceive that, at an early period of the year, Mr. Wellesley signified to me the probability of his being enabled to resign his office at this season, and obtained my permission to proceed to Calcutta as soon as the settlement of revenue actually in progress should be completed. He accordingly arrived at Calcutta on the 18th of January, 1803, and he has resigned the station of Lieut.-Governor of the ceded provinces having delivered to this government a report upon the result of the settlement of those provinces, which accompanies the despatch to the Secret Committee by this conveyance.

Although the state of the ceded provinces is at present perfectly tranquil and flourishing, I have no hesitation in declaring to your Lordship my positive conviction that the public service in Oude will be exposed to hazard by Mr. Wellesley's retirement at this time.

The prosperous condition of the ceded provinces is principally to be ascribed to Mr. Wellesley's personal influence and authority, and to the uniform exertion on his part of considerable ability and indefatigable industry, combined with extraordinary temper and discretion; I should, therefore, have felt a stronger sense of security and confidence in the final settlement of affairs in Oude, if Mr. Wellesley's commission could have been renewed for another season. The information which I have received from Mr. Wellesley since his arrival at Calcutta, and the result of the various authentic documents which he has brought under my consideration, would certainly have induced me to have prolonged his continuance in the superintendence of affairs in Oude for another season, if I had not found myself precluded from the exercise of my judgment with respect to his appointment by the declared opinion of the Court of Directors. My assiduous attention will be directed to prevent the evils which I apprehend from Mr. Wellesley's premature resignation of his government; if, however, I should unfortunately prove unsuccessful, your Lordship will ascribe any embarrassment,

which the public service may suffer, to the interposition of the Court of Directors.

As Mr. Wellesley cannot with propriety return to the office of private secretary, I have thought that his talents and knowledge might be rendered most useful to the public service at this moment by his immediate return to England; his health also, which has suffered by his laborious employment in Oude, will receive benefit from the voyage. He will, therefore, embark in a few days for England on board the *Swallow* packet, which is now in the river Hooghly ready to receive him.

Much as I regret my brother's early departure, I derive great satisfaction from reflecting on the advantage which his seasonable arrival in England will afford to your Lordship, particularly in considering the affairs of Oude. Your Lordship will also find Mr. Wellesley intimately acquainted with the general state of affairs in every part of India, and with my sentiments on every important topic relating to this empire.

I request you to accept my most cordial acknowledgements for your Lordship's highly satisfactory statement of Mr. Addington's conduct, in consequence of receiving my despatches by Colonels Monson and Harcourt. So honourable a testimony of the public approbation and private attachment of such a character, is truly grateful to every sentiment of my heart.

I return you my sincere thanks for the early intimation, which your Lordship has been pleased to communicate to me, with regard to the designation of my successor in the difficult and important station which I now have the honour to hold.

Your Lordship will be sensible of the motives of delicacy which must restrain me from offering any opinion upon the qualifications of any person to whom his Majesty's ministers may be disposed to confide this trust. You will, however, anticipate my unfeigned solicitude, that any successor who may arrive from England to receive charge either of this government, or of that of Fort St. George, should meet the most cordial reception, and the most sincere, honourable, and zealous obedience and support. At a proper season I shall not fail to impress this most anxious wish of my heart upon the minds of all persons in India whose conduct can be af-

fected by my influence or example. Without reference to the character of any individual, I deem it to be proper to assure your Lordship that I will omit no effort to strengthen the hands of those to whom this perilous charge may devolve after my departure, and that I will faithfully deliver to my successor whatever portion I can bequeath to him of the activity, vigour, and dignity of this government.

I cannot conclude without repeating to your Lordship, with the warmest cordiality, my most sincere thanks for the honourable spirit of friendship and kindness which pervades every part of the letters to which I now reply. In me you will find a similar disposition to promote the prosperity of this empire under your Lordship's control, and to associate your interests and honour with my own, to the last moment of my continuance in India; and I trust that my departure will be marked by every circumstance which can contribute to the future facility of your Lordship's administration.

I am, my dear Lord,
with great truth and regard,
your's most faithfully and sincerely,
WELLESLEY.

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## No. XVI.

*Lieut.-General Stuart to the Marquess Wellesley.*

Camp near Nowly, on the banks of the Toombudra,
March 25th, 1803.

MY LORD,

I experience the greatest satisfaction in acquainting your Lordship with the favourable state of affairs at present in this quarter. The detachment which proceeded into the Mahratta territory pursuant to your Lordship's instructions has continued to advance with expedition, and to be received in the most friendly manner by the chieftains and people of the Mahratta state. The Killadar of Darwar, whose intentions were suspected in consequence of his former connections, has manifested a disposition entirely favourable to our views, and has sent his son with a party of horse to accompany the movements of the advancing detachment. The presence of the main body of the army upon the frontier

affords a considerable degree of protection to the communications of the advancing detachment, secures the tranquillity of the British possessions, and contributes to confirm the sentiments of attachment to his Highness the Peishwa's cause, professed by the southern Jageerdars. The movement of the troops has hitherto been attended with the most favourable circumstances; and I trust that the final success of the present measures, which are so eminently calculated to extend the resources and strengthen the power of the British nation in the peninsula, will correspond with the wisdom and ability with which those measures have been planned and directed.

It afforded me particular satisfaction to find, on the arrival of Major Malcolm at Hurryhur, that the instructions which I had furnished to the honourable Major-General Wellesley, on proceeding in command of the advancing detachment entirely corresponded with your Excellency's views. It is fortunate that a service of so important and delicate a nature has been confided to an officer who is so highly qualified by his superior talents and military knowledge to conduct it with ability and success. Major Malcolm has joined the advancing detachment, and intends to accompany it to Meritch; his acquaintance with Mahratta affairs, and his conciliating manner, will contribute to engage the active co-operation of the Mahratta chieftains, and to assist the measures of Major-General Wellesley.

I have been highly gratified by the expressions of confidence conveyed in your Excellency's letter of the 8th ultimo, and it will afford me still higher satisfaction to learn that the present service has been conducted in a manner so as to merit your Lordship's approbation.

Captain Salmond arrived in camp yesterday, and delivered to me a letter from your Excellency. I am happy in having an opportunity of paying to that officer the attention which is due to his character, and the place which he possesses in your Lordship's esteem.

I have the honour to remain, my Lord,
with the greatest respect and regard,
your Lordship's most faithful, obliged,
and devoted servant,
J. STUART.

## No. XVII.

*The Marquess Wellesley to his Excellency Lieut.-General Lake, the Commander-in-Chief, &c.*

(Private.)

MY DEAR SIR, Barrackpoor, March 27th, 1803.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 11th instant from Cutchoura, which reached me on the 25th.*

I wish you to afford every encouragement and facility to General Perron in his return to Europe through our provinces, and with this view, I am ready to consent, (and I authorize you to communicate with General Perron accordingly) to the following propositions.

1st. That General Perron shall proceed to Lucknow, accompanied by a body of his cavalry not exceeding two hundred, and of his infantry not exceeding four hundred men.

2nd. That previously to his entering our territories, he shall notify his approach to the officer commanding the nearest station, who will be authorized by you to give him a passport, without which passport he shall not pass our frontier. The passport must describe the number and rank of his suite civil and military; and copies of it must be transmitted to the officers of the several stations, and to the civil magistrates of the districts through which he shall pass.

3rd. A military officer to be named by you, and a civil servant to be named by Mr. Seton will accompany Mr. Perron from his entrance into our provinces to Lucknow. You will also be pleased to name a military officer to attend him from Lucknow to Calcutta, and I will direct a gentleman of the civil service to meet him at Lucknow for the same purpose.

4th. Previously to General Perron's entrance into the Vizier's reserved territory, he must obtain a passport from the Nawaub. Colonel Scott will receive directions to this effect.

5th. While General Perron shall remain at Lucknow, he must consider himself to be subject to the authority, and

* This letter referred to a solicitation from General Perron (a Frenchman in Scindiah's service) to obtain permission to proceed to Calcutta via Oude with a military escort, for the purpose of proceeding to Europe.—[ED.]

under the immediate protection of the British Resident, who will be ordered to receive and to treat him with every mark of respect and consideration.

6th. As soon after General Perron's arrival at Lucknow as the British Resident shall think fit, General Perron's military suite shall return to Coel, under proper passports. Every degree of attention and civility shall be manifested towards his troops upon their returning march. If General Perron shall desire it, the Resident at Lucknow will furnish him with a proper guard of sepoys, after the return of his own troops.

7th. From Lucknow Mr. Perron will proceed, under a proper passport, to Calcutta, where I will receive him in a manner conformable to his wishes, and will use every means to facilitate his voyage to Europe.

8th. I shall inform Scindiah of Mr. Perron's request, and I shall state that I have complied with it from motives of respect for Scindiah. The letter to Colonel Collins authorizing him to communicate General Perron's application to Scindiah, shall be sent to you, and shall be despatched by you, when you think fit. A duplicate shall be sent from Calcutta as soon as I shall have learnt from you that your copy has been despatched.

You will observe that I am strongly disposed to accelerate Mr. Perron's departure from Scindiah's service; conceiving it to be an event which promises much advantage to our interests in India.

I have not delayed my answer to your letter beyond the time necessary for consulting the records on some points connected with this subject, but I think it would be proper that General Perron's application to you, with your opinion upon it, should be converted into an official form in the Secret Department; in which I will also record my answer, with the regulations proposed for the conduct of General Perron during his journey from Coel to Calcutta.

Believe me, dear Sir,
always with the greatest respect and regard,
your most faithful and affectionate servant,
WELLESLEY.

## No. XVIII.

*Examinations at the College of Fort William, dated 29th March,* 1803.*

On Tuesday, the 29th of March, being the day appointed by his Excellency the visitor for the public disputations in the oriental languages, the governors, officers, professors and students of the College assembled at nine o'clock at the New Government House.

At a little before ten, his Excellency the visitor, accompanied by the honourable the Chief Justice, the members of the Supreme Council, the members of the Council of the College, and the officers of his Excellency's suite, entered the southern Room on the marble floor, and took his seat at the west end of the Room.

In front of his Excellency, seats were placed for the professors, and for such students as were to maintain the disputations, or to receive prizes and honorary rewards.

As soon as his Excellency had taken his seat, the disputation commenced in the following order:

*Disputations in the Persian language.*

Position—"The natives of India under the British Government, enjoy a greater degree of tranquillity, security, and happiness, than under any former government."

Defended by Mr. R. Jenkins, Bombay.—Chief opponent, Mr. T. Hamilton, Madras.—Second opponent, Mr. J. Wauchope.—Moderator, Lieutenant J. Baillie, Professor.

*Disputation in the Hindostanee language.*

Position.—"The suicide of Hindoo widows by burning themselves with the bodies of their deceased husbands, is a practice repugnant to the natural feelings, and inconsistent with moral duty."

Defended by Mr. W. Chaplin, Madras.—Chief opponent,

* I am induced to give the details of this public collegiate examination in full from the Calcutta Gazette, as it was the first time of the Governor-General's personal attendance at the public exercises in the College of Fort William. The names of the successful competitors will be found in the Appendix.—[Ed.]

Mr. R. T. Goodwin, Bombay.—Second opponent, Mr. R. C. Ross, Madras.—Moderator, John Gilchrist, Esq. Professor.

*Disputation in the Bengalee language.*

Position.—"The distribution of Hindoos into casts, retards their progress in improvement."

Defended by Mr. J. Hunter—Chief opponent, Mr. W. B. Martin.*—Second opponent, Mr. W. Morton.—Moderator, W. C. Blaquiere, Esq.

*Declamations in the Arabic languages,* were pronounced by Mr. R. Jenkins† and Mr. E. Wood.

At the conclusion of the disputations in the Persian, Hindoostanee, and Bengalee languages, an appropriate speech in the language of the disputation was made by the respective Moderators.

At the conclusion of the declamations in the Arabic language, Lieutenant Baillie, the professor of Arabic, delivered a speech in that language.

When the disputations and the Arabic declamations and speeches were concluded, his Excellency signified to the officers of the College his directions, that the prizes and honorary rewards should be distributed in his presence on the ensuing day. His Excellency also notified his intention to confer the degree of honour established by the statutes on several students, whom he had directed the Council of the College to present to him, for that purpose.

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On Wednesday the 30th March, his Excellency the visitor, entered the Room about half-past eleven o'clock, accompanied by the honourable the Chief Justice, the members of the Supreme Council, the members of the Council of the College, and the officers of his Excellency's suite.

As soon as the Visitor had taken his seat, the Vice-Provost proceeded to present to his Excellency, those students who were entitled under statute 8th, to receive degrees of honour,

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* Was appointed a provisional member of the Supreme Council of India in 1835, which appointment, however, (he being in England) domestic circumstances led him to decline.

† Now a member of the Court of Directors, and for a considerable time Resident at Nagpore, where he was greatly distinguished by his ability, firmness, and prudence, under circumstances of peculiar difficulty, danger, and responsibility.

and whose presentation had been previously directed by his Excellency. The Vice-Provost publicly read the certificate granted by the Council of the College to each student respectively, specifying the high proficiency which he had made in the oriental languages, and also the regularity of his conduct during his residence at College. When the certificate had been read, his Excellency the Visitor presented to each student the honorary diploma inscribed on vellum in the oriental character; purporting that the Committee of Public Examination having declared that the student had made such proficiency in certain of the oriental languages as entitled him to a degree of honour in the same, his Excellency was pleased to confer the said degree, in conformity to the statute.

The students now leaving college, on whom his Excellency was pleased to confer a degree of honour on this occasion, were—

Mr. William Butterworth Bayley,* of Bengal; Mr. Richard Jenkins, of Bombay; Mr. William Byam Martin, of Bengal; Mr. Terrick Hamilton, of Fort St. George; Mr. William Chaplin, of Fort St. George; Mr. Edward Wood, of Fort St. George; and Mr. Richard Thomas Goodwin,† of Bombay.

At the same time a degree of honour was conferred on the following students of last year:

Mr. Jonathan Henry Lovett, of Bombay; and Mr. Charles Lloyd, of Bengal.

After the degrees of honour had been conferred, the prizes, medals, and honorary rewards adjudged at the late public examination were distributed by the provost, in presence of the visitor, to the following students:

Messrs. Jenkins, Martin, Chaplin, Hamilton, Wood, Goodwin, Hunter, Wauchope, Ross, Mcrton, Romer, Gowan, Newnham, Sprott, Bourchier, Sparrow, Elliott, Cole, Fuller, Walker, Plowden, and Turnbull.

The particular prizes adjudged to each will be found in the annexed reports.

After the prizes and honorary rewards had been distributed,

* Appointed a member of the Supreme Council in 1825. Succeeded to the office of Governor-General in 1827, between the departure of Lord Amherst and the arrival of Lord W. Bentinck, and now a member of the Court of Directors.

† Appointed member of Council at Bombay, 1823.

his Excellency the Visitor was pleased to deliver the following speech.

Gentlemen of the College of Fort William,

From the foundation of this college to the present time, the state of political affairs has not permitted me to discharge the grateful duty of presiding at your public exercises. My attention, however, has not been withdrawn from the progress, interests, and conduct of this institution. The principles on which this institution is founded, the spirit which it is designed to diffuse, and the purposes which it is calculated to accomplish, must enhance the importance of its success, in proportion to the exigency of every public crisis, and to the progressive magnitude, power, and glory of this empire.

In the difficulties and dangers of successive wars, in the most critical juncture of arduous negotiations, in the settlement of conquered and ceded provinces, in the time of returning peace, attended by the extension of our trade, by the augmentation of our revenue, and by the restoration of public credit, I have contemplated this institution with conscious satisfaction, and with confident hope. Observing your auspicious progress under the salutary operation of the statutes and rules of the college, I have anticipated the stability of all our acquisitions, and the security and improvement of every advantage which we possess.

From this source the service may now derive an abundant and regular supply of public officers, duly qualified to become the successful instruments of administering this government in all its extensive and complicated branches; of promoting its energy in war; of cultivating and enlarging its resources in peace; of maintaining in honour and respect its external relations with the native powers; and of establishing (under a just and benignant system of internal administration) the prosperity of our finances and commerce, on the solid foundations of the affluence, happiness, and confidence of a contented and grateful people.*

These were the original purposes of this foundation, which was destined to aid and animate the efforts of diligence and natural genius, contending with the defects of existing esta-

* The truth of this prediction has been signally manifested by the eminent services and brilliant career of many of those gentlemen who enjoyed the advantages and derived the full benefit of this admirable Institution.—[Ed.]

blishments; to remove every obstacle to the progress of the public servants in attaining the qualifications requisite for their respective stations; to enlarge and to facilitate the means of acquiring useful knowledge; and to secure by systematic education, fixed regulation, and efficient discipline, that attention to a due course of study, which had hitherto depended on individual disposition, or accidental advantage.

The necessity of providing such a system of education was not diminished by the numerous instances existing in the Company's service of eminent oriental learning, and of high qualification for public duty. A wise and provident government will not rest the public security for the due administration of affairs, on the merits of any number or description of its public officers at any period of time. It is the duty of Government to endeavour to perpetuate the prosperity of the state by an uniform system of public institution; and by permanent and established law to transmit to future times whatever benefits can be derived from present examples of wisdom, virtue, and learning. The supposition of an universal deficiency in that knowledge which this college is calculated to extend, has never constituted a fundamental principle of the institution. Far from resting on such foundations, this institution could not have endured for an hour; it could not have commenced; without the active aid of learning, talents, and virtues, furnished from the bosom of this service.

The origin of this college, its present prosperity, and its beneficial effects, are to be ascribed in a great degree to the assistance which I have derived from those respectable characters in the higher branches, and in various departments of the service, who, by contributing their zealous exertions to promote the success of the institution, have endeavoured to extend the benefit of their useful acquisitions and of their salutary example, and to continue in the public service a succession of merit similar to that which has distinguished their conduct in their respective stations.

With these sentiments, during my absence from the presidency, it was highly satisfactory to me that my authority in this college should have been represented by a gentleman who is peculiarly qualified to appreciate the advantages of the institution, and to accelerate its success; and whose eminent character, and honourable progress in the service, furnish at once the most perfect example which can be proposed for

your imitation, and the most powerful incitement which can be offered to your ambition.

The report which I received from Mr. Barlow,* of the progress of the institution during the first year of its operation, satisfied me that many of the students had been considerably distinguished, not only by proficiency in the oriental languages and literature, but by a laudable observance of the statutes and rules of the college; that the officers, professors, and teachers, had manifested an uniform zeal and attention in the discharge of their respective duties; that the public examinations had been conducted with great knowledge and ability, and had proved highly creditable to the general character of the students; while the disputations in the Persian, Bengalee, and Hindoostanee languages, had afforded an extraordinary example of the progress of the students, who had maintained public arguments in those languages on the 6th of Feb. 1802.

The result of the examination holden in January last, at the conclusion of the fourth term of the year 1802, and the public disputations which have been maintained in my presence, have afforded me the cordial satisfaction of witnessing the progressive improvement of the students in every branch of oriental language and literature in which lectures have been opened. I am happy to observe, that in the Persian, Hindoostanee, and Arabic classes, the comparative proficiency at the last examination exceeds that which appeared on the 6th of February, 1802. In the Bengalee language a considerable proficiency has been manifested. In the course of the last year a commencement has been made in the study of the Tamul and Shanscrit languages, and the great improvement of the students in the Arabic language, has been rendered particularly conspicuous by the declamations in that language holden for the first time on this occasion.

The degrees of honor which I have conferred this day on Messrs. William Butterworth Bayley, Richard Jenkins, William Byam Martin, Terrick Hamilton, William Chaplin, Edward Wood, Richard Thomas Goodwin, Jonathan Henry Lovett, and Charles Lloyd, sufficiently indicate that the proficiency which has been made in oriental literature, has been intimately connected with other liberal attainments, and has

* Now Sir George Hilaro Barlow, Bart., G.C.B., having been Governor-General, and also Governor of Madras.

been united to a correct observance of the statutes and rules of the college.

Considerable force and animation have been derived to the principles of the institution, from the honourable emulation which has existed between the students of the different establishments assembled at Fort William.

I have experienced sincere pleasure in witnessing the examples of merit which have appeared among the students from Fort St. George and Bombay, as well as among those of this establishment. Not only the students of this establishment, but those of Fort St. George and Bombay, have furnished numerous instances of extensive knowledge and useful talents, of the most laudable industry, and of the purest principles of integrity and honour, acquired, formed, or confirmed under this institution. I entertain a confident hope, that their future course in the public service will justify my present approbation, and will confirm the happy promises of their education. The conduct of the gentlemen now departing for Fort St. George and Bombay merits my most cordial commendation. They will communicate to their respective presidencies the full benefit of those useful and honourable qualifications which must for ever render their names respectable in this settlement, and must inspire this service with a peculiar interest in their future progress and success.

It has been a principal object of my attention to consolidate the interests and resources of the three presidencies; to promote in each of them a common spirit of attachment to their mutual prosperity and honour; to assimilate their principles, views, and systems of government; and to unite the co-operation of their respective powers in the common cause, by such means as might facilitate the administration of this extensive empire in the hands of the Supreme Government. May those gentlemen now departing for the subordinate presidencies, accompanied by the applause and affections of this society, remember with reverence and attachment the source whence they have derived the first principles of instruction in the duties of that service, which they are qualified to adorn!

My most sincere acknowledgments are offered to the learned gentlemen, who have assisted at the examinations, and who have discharged the duty of professors and teachers in the several departments.

Their knowledge, talents, and skill, can be equalled only by

the indefatigable zeal, industry, and happy success with which they have promoted the objects of this institution. The assiduity and learning of these gentlemen have produced many able and useful works in oriental languages and literature which have been published since the commencement of the institution, and which have accelerated its beneficial effects. Continuations of these works are now in a state of considerable progress; and many additional works of a similar description are actually prepared for publication. The professors and teachers of the Persian, Arabic, Hindostanee, Bengalee, Shanscrit, and Tamul languages, are now diligently employed in composing grammars and dictionaries, and in preparing translations and compilations for the use of the students in their respective departments. The operation of these useful labours, will not be confined to the limits of this Institution, or of this empire. Such works tend to promote the general diffusion of oriental literature and knowledge in every quarter of the globe, by facilitating the means of access to the elementary study of the principle languages of the East. The exertions of the professors have received considerable aid from the numerous body of learned natives attached to the Institution; and the labours of those learned persons have also contributed to encrease the general stock of oriental knowledge.

Reviewing all these circumstances, and considering the industry and ability manifested by the professors and teachers; the successful advancement which has already been effected in the general extension of the most useful practical and necessary branches of oriental learning; the progressive improvement manifested by the students in every class of their prescribed studies; the frequent instances attested by the public certificates, of laudable and exemplary attention to the discipline, statutes, and rules of the College; and the supply of highly qualified public officers, which the service has actually received from this Institution, added to the number of those, who proceed on this day to apply the attainments acquired in this College to the benefit of the Company and of the nation; it is my duty to declare in the most public and solemn manner, that this Institution has answered my most sanguine hopes and expectations; that its beneficial operation has justified the principles of its original foundation; and that the administration and discipline of the College have been

conducted with honour and credit to the character and spirit of the Institution, and with great advantage to the public service.*

## No. XIX.

*The Right Hon. Lord Hobart to Marquess Wellesley.*

(Most Secret.)

Downing Street, Oct. 17, 1802.
[Received March 30, 1803.]

My Lord,

Circumstances having occurred which render it advisable to delay the restitution of the several possessions in the East Indies, which in conformity to the provisions of the treaty of Amiens were to be restored to the Government of France, and Holland, I am to signify to your Lordship, his Majesty's commands, that such of them as may be occupied by his forces at the time of your receiving this letter, should not be evacuated until further orders; and that you do assign such reasons for the delay as may be least calculated to excite jealousy, or to create an apprehension of its arising from an hostile motive.

I have the honour to be,
My Lord,
Your Lordship's most obedient,
and humble Servant,
Hobart.

## No. XX.

*The Marquess Wellesley to the Secret Committee of Directors.*

Honourable Sirs,

Fort William, April 19, 1803.

On the 10th of February, 1803,† I had the honour to submit to your honourable Committee, my sentiments respecting the situation of affairs in the Mahratta empire, and the course of policy by which I expected to accomplish the objects of the treaty lately concluded with his Highness the Peishwa, without the hazard of involving the British Government in a war with the Mahratta power; and your honourable

* See Appendix for list of students, prizes, &c. † See p. 49.

Committee has been apprized by a despatch from the Government of Bombay, transmitted in conformity to my directions, of the occurrences in the Mahratta state to the 19th of January last.

Colonel Close will receive my directions to transmit to your honourable Committee, a narrative of the events which have occurred since the date of my last advices from the Peninsula, and he will relate to you the actual state of affairs at the time when this despatch shall reach Poonah and Bombay.

No event of importance has occurred at Bassein since the date of the latest communications to your honourable Committee from that quarter. The Peishwa has uniformly continued to manifest unequivocal proofs of his disposition to adhere to the faith of the engagements which he has contracted with the British Government. His Highness has demonstrated the most implicit confidence in the protection of the British power, and has not appeared to entertain any disposition to accept the invitation of Scindiah to proceed to that chieftain's camp. On the 18th of March, his Highness received the treaty of Bassein, ratified by the Governor-General in-council, with demonstrations of the highest satisfaction.

Your honourable Committee has been informed, that Dowlut Rao Scindiah had arrived at Indore with a considerable body of his forces; having prosecuted his march from that station, Dowlut Rao Scindiah crossed the Nerbuddah, on the 4th of February, and arrived in the vicinity of Burhaunpoor, on the 23d of that month.

Colonel Collins arrived at the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, on the 27th of February. The advices which I received from that officer, and from other quarters, induced me to entertain suspicions, that Dowlut Rao Scindiah (notwithstanding his original application for the aid of the British Government in restoring order to the Mahratta empire) meditated an accommodation with Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and a confederacy with that Chieftain, and with the Rajah of Berar, for the purpose of frustrating the success of the arrangements concluded between the British Government, and the Peishwa, without however intending to proceed to the desperate extremity of provoking a contest with the British arms. This suspicion was corroborated by the artifices prac-

tised at the camp of Scindiah upon the arrival of Colonel Collins, with a view of eluding the communication of the propositions, with which Colonel Collins was charged under my authority, and the appearance of Scindiah's intentions became still more unsatisfactory from the evasive and indirect, or vexatious replies which Colonel Collins received to my propositions, after he had at length obtained access to Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

Your honourable Committee will not fail to contrast these systematic delays and evasions, with the solicitude previously expressed by Scindiah for the early arrival of Colonel Collins, and for a full communication of my views and intentions in the present crisis. This perverse course of policy, habitual to all the states of India is the favourite practice of the Mahratta powers. The most effectual mode of frustrating the objects of such a system of artifice and deceit, is to pursue a direct and steady course with firmness and temper, avoiding every deviation which can tend to divert the counsels or arms of the British Government, from their destined purposes either of peace or war. This principle constitutes the spirit and tenor of all my instructions to the British Residents at the courts of the several native powers; experience has proved that a direct and steady course of policy is not less advantageous to our interests, than it is manifestly consistent with our dignity and honour. With the greatest satisfaction, I request the attention of your honourable Committee to a recent instance of the distinguished success of this system of proceeding at the Court of Scindiah.

Colonel Collins having endeavoured, without success, to obtain from Dowlut Rao Scindiah's ministers explicit replies to the propositions which he had offered to that Chieftain's acceptance in my name, at length demanded a private audience of Scindiah.

By the judgment, firmness, and ability, which Colonel Collins exerted on that occasion, an explicit declaration was obtained from Scindiah himself, disclosing in the most distinct and direct terms the views of that Chieftain.

Scindiah plainly declared to Colonel Collins, that, until the communications of the agent despatched to his Court, by his Highness the Peishwa, (for the purpose of explaining the nature and extent of the engagements concluded between his Highness, and the British Government) should be received,

Scindiah could not return a decided answer to the propositions which had been stated to him on the part of the British Government, with regard to his accession to the treaty of Bassein as a contracting party. Scindiah accompanied this declaration with a positive assurance, that he had no intention whatever to obstruct the completion of the arrangements concluded between the Peishwa and the British Government, and that it was his wish to improve the friendship at present subsisting between the Peishwa, the British Government, and his own State.

Of the sincerity of Scindiah's declaration, I entertain no doubt, because the course of policy which he has signified his intention of pursuing is manifestly the most consistent with his interests.

The security of Scindiah's dominions, and of his state among the powers of India, cannot be placed on a permanent basis, unless it shall be connected with the restoration of order in the Mahratta empire, under the sanction and defence of the British Government. The interposition of our influence and protection has already rescued Scindiah from destruction, has prevented the accumulation of the whole force of the Mahratta empire in the hands of a desperate and needy adventurer, and has preserved the balance of power between the respective feudal States, by maintaining the paramount authority of the Peishwa. The extreme hazard to which Scindiah's power has been recently exposed by the success of the insurgents at Poonah, may have opened a more distinct view of his real interests, which are entirely consistent with those of the British Government in the present crisis. Scindiah however, may have been desirous of recovering the exorbitant ascendancy which he had acquired at Poonah, and may apprehend a permanent diminution of his influence in the Peishwa's counsels, under the operation of the treaty of Bassein. But the influence of Scindiah at Poonah had actually been subverted, by the success of the insurgents previously to the interposition of the British mediation, and the existence of Scindiah's Government had been greatly endangered by the same event. In this situation therefore, the regret with which he may view the probable diminution of his influence at Poonah, may be sufficiently counterbalanced by his confidence in the security of his dominions, under the

protection of the British Government. On the other hand, from the moment that the intentions of the British Government had been avowed, it became the interest of Scindiah to avoid every measure tending to expose him to the jealousy of a power, which commands the frontier of the most valuable portion of his dominions.

The sincerity of Scindiah's declaration is further confirmed by his continuance at Burhaunpoor, in a state of inaction until the season, together with the progress of our forces had advanced so far, that no exertion on his part could have enabled him to occupy Poonah, previously to the arrival of the British troops at that capital.

This view of the subject is not inconsistent with Scindiah's desire to delay his accession to the treaty of Bassein, and to the propositions immediately affecting his separate interests, until he shall have received a direct communication from the Peishwa. Scindiah may wisely and justly withhold his assent to any new system of engagement, until he shall have ascertained the real sentiments of the Peishwa on the subject of the late treaty, together with the precise extent of the stipulations which that instrument contains.

Nor is the sincerity of Scindiah's declaration incompatible with the project of a confederacy between Scindiah, Holkar, and the Rajah of Berar for purposes of a defensive nature, which I consider to be the extreme object of Scindiah, in negotiating such a confederacy, without any views whatever of hostility towards the British power.

Jeswunt Rao Holkar has continued to manifest an anxious desire for the accommodation of his differences with the Peishwa and with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, by repeated applications to Lieut.-Colonel Close for the arbitration of the British Government, and by the despatch of an agent of rank to Hyderabad, charged with a statement of the demands of Jeswunt Rao Holkar and of Amrut Rao, and vested with authority to negotiate, through the combined mediation of his Highness the Nizam and of the British Government, the adjustment of his demands on the Peishwa and on Dowlut Rao Scindiah. The demands of Holkar, however, have not been materially abated.

Colonel Close has endeavoured to persuade his Highness the Peishwa to offer to Holkar such concessions as might

induce Holkar to compromise the subsisting differences, and to admit his Highness's peaceable return to his capital. His Highness, however, manifested an insuperable aversion to offer any concessions to Holkar, whom he considered to be a rebel against the legitimate authority of the sovereign power of the Mahratta empire.

Colonel Close, therefore, deemed it advisable to address a letter to Jeswunt Rao Holkar, communicating to that chieftain my sentiments on the subject of his demands, assuring him that the influence of the British Government would be exerted for the satisfactory adjustment of his claims on Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and that the British Government would guarantee any adjustment which Holkar might be able to effect of his demands on the Peishwa, and expressing an expectation that Holkar would refrain from any opposition to the establishment of a British force within the Peishwa's dominions.

A negotiation appears to have been opened directly between Holkar and Scindiah for the accommodation of their differences, but no certain accounts have hitherto been received of its conclusion or progress.

Holkar has continued to exercise the utmost degree of violence and outrage upon the inhabitants of Poonah, for the purpose of extorting money for the relief of his exigencies. This proceeding appears to have excited universal disgust, and to have confirmed the resolution of the majority of the Jageerdars and inhabitants of the Peishwa's dominions to support his Highness's cause.

Considerable bodies of Holkar's army have moved in different directions without any other apparent objects than those of observing the movement of the troops assembled on the several frontiers of the Peishwa's dominions, and of facilitating the subsistence of the soldiers and followers of Holkar's camps.

By the latest advices it appears that Holkar has actually evacuated Poonah, and has marched with the main body of his army in a northerly direction towards Burhaunpoor. The probable object of that movement is, either to accelerate the issue of his negotiations with Scindiah, or to facilitate the means of acting offensively against Scindiah, and at the same time to avoid the hazard of hostilities with the united arms

of the British Government, the Nizam, and the Peishwa, and to maintain a position favourable to an amicable negotiation with the allied powers.

This movement admits the uninterrupted march of the combined forces of the allies to Poonah. Holkar must, therefore, have abandoned his hopes of effecting a revolution in the government of Poonah, and of seizing a share in the administration. The force of Holkar is stated to amount to 40,000 cavalry and 30,000 infantry, with 180 guns.

The intelligence which I have received from the Court of the Rajah of Berar, indicates that chieftain's dissatisfaction at the conclusion of defensive engagements between the British Government and his Highness the Peishwa.

Whatever may be the aversion of the Rajah of Berar to the interposition of the British Government in the affairs of the Mahratta empire, any attempt on the part of that chieftain to obstruct the execution of the treaty of Bassein, would be inconsistent with the systematic caution of his character and imprudent in the actual state of his military power, and in the exposed situation of his territories. His just rights cannot be endangered, and may receive additional security by the restoration of a regular authority at Poonah, under the protection of the Company.

In conformity to the plan of operations which I determined to adopt for the restoration of his Highness the Peishwa to the musnud of Poonah, the whole of the subsidiary force stationed with his Highness the Nizam marched from Hyderabad towards the western frontier of his Highness's dominions at the close of the month of February. The troops of his Highness assembled for the purpose of co-operating with the subsidiary force, consist of nearly 6,000 infantry and 9,000 cavalry. The subsidiary force under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Stevenson consists of six battalions of native infantry or 6,000 men, two regiments of native cavalry, and sixteen field pieces.

These combined forces reached Paraindah, a station on the western frontier of the Nizam's dominions, situated at the distance of 116 miles from Poonah, on the 25th of March.

I have great satisfaction in stating to your honourable Committee that the conduct of his Highness the Nizam, during the whole course of the late transactions in the Mah-

ratta state, has been uniformly consistent with the obligations of his alliance with the British Government, and that his Highness has manifested a sincere desire to co-operate with the British Government in the measures adopted for the restoration of order in the Mahratta state. His Highness has rejected every overture of the ruling authority at Poonah, and of the Rajah of Berar, for the adjustment of the affairs of the Mahratta empire through any other channel than that of the British Government.

By my instructions of the 2nd of February,* Lord Clive (aided by the judgment of Lieut.-General Stuart, and regulated by contingent events) was empowered to determine the actual period of time at which it might be proper for the British troops to advance into the Mahratta territory, and the amount of the force to be detached from the main body of the army for that purpose.

Adverting to the expediency of securing the early arrival of the British troops at Poonah, and of confirming the favourable disposition which had been manifested by the Jageerdars in the southern territories of his Highness the Peishwa, as well as to the actual march of the subsidiary force towards the Nizam's western frontier, and to the necessity of terminating the depending negotiations at the earliest practicable period of time, Lord Clive was of opinion that the time was actually arrived at which it was necessary for the British troops to enter the Mahratta territory, and his Lordship accordingly, on the 27th February, instructed his Excellency Lieut.-General Stuart (then present with the army on the frontier of Mysore) to adopt the necessary measures for that purpose.

In consequence of the absence of Lieut.-General Stuart from the presidency of Fort St. George, Lord Clive deemed it to be necessary that the extent of the force to be detached from the main body of the army should be determined exclusively by the judgment of Lieut.-General Stuart, and his Lordship accordingly referred that point to Lieut.-General Stuart's discretion, under an additional reference to the general spirit of my instructions of the 2nd of February.

The extensive local knowledge and influence possessed by

* See p. 41.

the honourable Major-General Wellesley, the personal intercourse established between Major-General Wellesley and the Mahratta chieftains on the frontier of Mysore, and the confidence reposed by those chieftains in the approved talents, firmness, temper, and integrity of that officer, rendered him peculiarly qualified to discharge the complicated duties of the command of the detachment destined to proceed to Poonah. That important command required the united exertion of considerable military skill, and of great political experience and discretion, Lord Clive accordingly desired that Major-General Wellesley might be appointed to the command of the advancing detachment, and requested his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to furnish Major-General Wellesley with instructions for the regulation of his conduct according to the spirit of my instructions to his Lordship of the 2nd of February.

In conformity to the foregoing directions, the Commander-in-Chief appointed a detachment from the main body of the army assembled at Hurryhur for the purpose of advancing into the Mahratta territory. The detachment consists of one regiment of European and three regiments of native cavalry, two regiments of European and six battalions of native infantry, with a due proportion of artillery, amounting altogether to 1500 cavalry and 6,800 infantry; and to that force was added 2,500 of his Highness the Rajah of Mysore's horse. Lieut.-General Stuart appointed the honourable Major-General Wellesley to the command of that detachment, in conformity to Lord Clive's suggestion.

Lieut.-General Stuart directed the Honourable Major-General Wellesley—

1st. To encourage the southern Jageerdars to declare in favor of the Peishwa's cause; to employ every means to reconcile their mutual animosities, and to induce them to unite their forces with the advancing detachment for the purpose of re-establishing his Highness's government.

2dly. To proceed to Meritch and form a junction with the Peishwa, or if the Peishwa's march to that station should be deemed unadvisable or impracticable, to unite with such of his Highness's chieftains and troops as might be there assembled.

3dly. To open a communication and to form a junction

with the subsidiary force advancing from Hyderabad, and with the contingent of his Highness the Nizam.

4thly. To proceed eventually to Poonah, and to establish an order of things in that capital favourable to the return of the Peishwa, and to the accomplishment of the objects of the treaty lately concluded between his Highness and the British Government.

It is a most grateful part of my duty to express to your Honourable Committee in the strongest terms, my entire approbation of the zeal, alacrity, and ability, with which the right Honourable Lord Clive and Lieut.-General Stuart have commenced the execution of my orders. I entertain the highest estimation of the judgment, skill, and promptitude manifested by his Lordship and by Lieut.-General Stuart, in regulating the details of the arrangements for the successful accomplishment of the objects to which my instructions were directed.

The conduct of Lord Clive on this occasion, corresponds with the uniform tenor of that exemplary spirit, public zeal, and honourable co-operation with the supreme authority in India, which have animated every act of his Lordship's administration. Repeated experience has inspired me with a deliberate confidence in the prosperous issue of every important measure entrusted to his Lordship's immediate execution. In the exigency of every public crisis, and in various and extraordinary difficulties and dangers, the exertions of Lord Clive in the service of the Company, under my orders, have been employed with hereditary energy and success. My gratitude, respect, and affection, must ever attend his character and fame; and it would be a desertion of the most sacred duty of my station to omit any opportunity of recommending Lord Clive's eminent public services to the deserved gratitude of the East India Company, and to the justice and favor of his Sovereign and of his country.

A long course of useful and honourable services has repeatedly obtained my public testimony to the distinguished merits of Lieut.-General Stuart, and has established the reputation of that revered and respectable officer with great lustre in the high esteem of the Company and of the nation. On all occasions of service, I have derived the utmost possible advantage from the zealous application of the numerous

qualifications which Lieut.-General Stuart possesses. In the present instance, his extraordinary solicitude to execute my orders according to their true spirit, the judgment, skill, and temper which have marked all his proceedings and operations, and the ardent zeal which he has displayed for the success of the service entrusted to his discretion, demand my most cordial approbation.

If the important arrangements now in progress should terminate with success, you will be indebted in a great degree to Lieut.-General Stuart for the happy accomplishment of a plan, which promises a most powerful augmentation to the security of the British possessions in India, nor can I conceive a more glorious termination of a long and illustrious career of public service.

The detachment under the command of Major-General Wellesley commenced its march from Hurryhur on the 9th ultimo. By the latest accounts it appears that the detachment had advanced to a station near Meritch, with the cordial support and co-operation of the majority of the southern Jageerdars, and with every appearance of general satisfaction among the inhabitants of the Mahratta territory. It was expected that the detachment would arrive at Meritch on the 3rd of April.

The Honourable the Governor of Bombay will communicate to your honourable committee the progress of events in the province of Guzzerat to the period of time when this despatch shall reach Bombay.

By the latest accounts from that quarter it appears that the rebels, after having sustained several defeats by the combined army of the British Government and the Guicowar, had evacuated Guzzerat under circumstances which justify a confident expectation of future permanent tranquillity in that province.

This situation of affairs in Guzzerat is highly favourable to the successful issue of the measures now in a course of operation for the restoration of the Peishwa to the musnud of Poonah. The arrival, at Bombay, of his Majesty's 78th regiment, which embarked from Fort William for that presidency, on the 10th of February, has probably coincided with the period of time when it might be expedient that his Highness the Peishwa should commence his march towards Poonah.

Reviewing all the circumstances connected with the state of the Mahratta empire, I trust that your honourable committee will receive by this despatch intelligence from Poonah and Bombay, of the pacific settlement of affairs in the state of Poonah, and of the establishment of a British subsidiary force in the service of the Peishwa.

Your honourable committee will appreciate the importance of the successful accomplishment of the proposed arrangements at Poonah in its relation to the maintenance of peace, and to the general security of our interests in India, and in its particular reference to the exclusion of the interests and influence of France from the Mahratta empire.

The importance of this object is considerable, with a view to the contingency either of peace or war between Great Britain and France, in India. In order to improve our relations with the Peishwa, and to oppose in the present crisis every attainable barrier to the progress of France in India, I deemed it necessary to issue instructions to Lieut.-Colonel Close, directing his attention to the improvement of that article of the late treaty * with the Peishwa, which provides for the eventual exclusion of Europeans, subjects of any state which may be at war with Great Britain, from the territories of the Peishwa.

I have the honour to be,
with respect,
Honourable Sirs,
your most obedient and faithful servant,
WELLESLEY.

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* See treaty in Appendix, 11th article, which the Governor-General was desirous of being altered to terms similar to those expressed in the 6th article of the Hyderabad treaty, of the 1st of September, 1798, [vol. i.] namely, providing for the exclusion of Frenchmen from the Peishwa's dominions, or of any Europeans in the service of France.—[*Ed.*]

## No. XXI.

*The Marquess Wellesley to the Right Honourable Lord Hobart.*

(Most Secret.)

My Lord, Fort William, April 20th, 1803.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of his Majesty's commands signified to me in your Lordship's "Most Secret" letter of the 17th of October, 1802,* directing, that such of the possessions of the Governments of France and Holland in India as might be occupied by his Majesty's forces at the time of the receipt of your Lordship's letter, should not be evacuated until further orders, and that I should assign such reasons for the delay as might be the least calculated to excite jealousy, or to create an apprehension of its arising from an hostile nature.

It will be satisfactory to your Lordship to be informed that previously to the time of receiving your lordship's letter, no possession of the Governments of France or of Holland in India had been evacuated by the British troops; that all the possessions in India conquered from those powers respectively still remain in the occupation of his Majesty's, or of the honourable Company's forces; and that no person has yet arrived in India with authority to receive any of the restitutions stipulated by the treaty of Amiens.

Under these circumstances, I trust that I shall be enabled to execute, without difficulty, his Majesty's commands signified in your Lordship's letter of the 17th of October, unless any regular demand for the restitution of any of the possessions in question should be supported by the presence of ships of war or troops. Your Lordship's orders have not specified the precise rule by which you would require my conduct to be governed in such a case; but adverting to the general spirit of your Lordship's despatch, it is my intention, in the event of the arrival of any armed force in India, under the circumstances supposed, to endeavour to avoid hostilities

* Page 72. The original reached Calcutta on the 30th of April; the despatch overland, which brought the duplicate, left England on the 19th of October, and reached Calcutta 30th March, 1803.

by every conciliatory measure, until I shall be honoured with your Lordship's further orders; but to resist by force, if that extremity should become necessary, previously to the receipt of further orders from your Lordship, any attempt of the troops or ships, either of the French or Batavian republics, to seize any post now occupied by his Majesty's or by the honourable Company's troops. I trust, however, that the necessity of resorting to such an extremity may be precluded by the early arrival of further commands from his Majesty.

In conformity to the tenor of the last paragraph of your Lordship's letter, I deemed it advisable to proceed to nominate the British Commissioners for the purpose of conducting the several restitutions; and my general conduct has been directed to prevent any disclosure of the precise nature and extent of your Lordship's orders of the 17th of October, 1802.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

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## No. XXII.

*The Right Honourable Lord Castlereagh to the Marquess Wellesley.*

(Most Secret.)

East Sheen, Oct. 16th, 1802.

MY DEAR LORD, [Received April 30th, 1803.]

You will receive by the *St. Fiorenzo* a despatch from Lord Hobart, containing instructions with reference to the present state of affairs in Europe. His Lordship being much engaged in forwarding the necessary orders to other quarters, relies upon me for apprizing your Lordship in more detail of the circumstances under which these directions are given, which it is necessary your Lordship should be fully acquainted with, in order that you may clearly perceive the tone and spirit in which his Lordship's instructions can best be executed, for the retention of such of the French and Dutch possessions in the East Indies as have not yet been delivered up.

The several circumstances which have occurred subsequent to the signature of the preliminary articles of peace, denoting a systematic spirit of aggrandizement on the part of France,

but more particularly the recent proclamation of the First Consul to the Swiss people, have rendered it indispensable in the judgment of his Majesty's ministers for this country to interpose, as effectually as circumstances will permit, to check the ambitious projects of France, and if possible, to save this brave and interesting nation, struggling for their independence.

A remonstrance has accordingly been transmitted to the French Government, through M. Otto, a copy of which I have the honour to enclose,* and a confidential person has been

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* The following is a copy of Lord Hawkesbury's Memorial; it is here inserted, as it influenced, to a certain extent, Lord Wellesley's views with respect to the continuance of peace between England and France.

*Lord Hawkesbury to M. Otto.*

Downing-street, Oct. 10, 1802.

Lord Hawkesbury has received his Majesty's commands to communicate through M. Otto, to the French Government, the sentiments of deep regret which have been excited in his Majesty's mind, by the address of the First Consul to the Helvetic people, which was published by authority in the *Moniteur* of the 1st instant, and by the representations which have been made to his Majesty on this subject, on behalf of the nation whose interests are so immediately affected by it. His Majesty most sincerely laments the convulsions to which the Swiss Cantons have for some time past been exposed; but he can consider their late exertions in no other light than as the lawful efforts of a brave and generous people to recover their ancient laws and government, and to procure the re-establishment of a system which experience has demonstrated, not only to be favourable to the maintenance of their domestic happiness, but to be perfectly consistent with the tranquillity and security of other powers.

The Cantons of Switzerland unquestionably possess, in the same degree as every other independent state, the right of regulating their own internal concerns, and this right has, moreover, in the present instance, been formally and explicitly guaranteed to the Swiss nation by the French Government, in the treaty of Luneville, conjointly with the other powers who were parties to that engagement.

His Majesty has no other desire than that the people of Switzerland, who now appear to be so generally united, should be left at liberty to settle their own internal government without the interposition of any foreign powers; and with whatever regret his Majesty may have perused the late proclamation of the French Government, he is yet unwilling to believe that they will farther attempt to controul that independent nation in the exercise of their undoubted rights. His Majesty thinks himself called upon by his regard for the general interests of Europe, and by his

despatched to Switzerland, with full authority to advance pecuniary succours to the Swiss, if upon his arrival he should find, regard being had to their strength and disposition to resist, that an aid of this description is likely to contribute materially to their means of self defence against this most unjust attempt upon the part of France to impose upon them a government equally repugnant to their feelings and habits.

The accounts hitherto received describe those who wish to restore the ancient form of government, as in possession of nearly the whole country, and to have assembled in the neighbourhood of Berne a force of above 30,000 men, which they expected to increase, but that their army was ill provided with arms and money.

The troops of the late Government had fled, in inconsiderable force, to Lausanne, where they waited for support from France. An aid-de-camp, charged with the proclamation of the First Consul, it appears from this day's mail, had reached Berne, and this haughty summons had been referred to the Diet assembled at Schwietz. The result is yet uncertain, but it is impossible to feel confident in the means of the Swiss singly to resist the military power of France, unless Austria should find herself enabled to interpose in their support.

Under the uncertainty to what extremity these circumstances may lead, it has been thought advisable to direct such of our conquests as have not yet passed from our hands, to be retained till further orders, and I am happy to acquaint you, (exclusive of some of the Dutch settlements on the coast of South America,) that Malta and the Cape are yet within our reach. We have every reason to fear that Martinique, St. Lucie, and Tobago, will have been restored, before instructions can reach our officers on that station.

Although there is but too much reason to apprehend that the temper and system of the First Consul may again involve us in war, yet your Lordship will feel the importance in acting upon orders sent from hence, under the present circumstances, to guard as much as possible, in suspending the res-

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peculiar solicitude for the happiness and welfare of the Swiss nation, to express these his sentiments with a frankness and sincerity which he feels to be due to his character, and to the good understanding which he is desirous of preserving with the Government of France.

titutions, till you hear farther from Europe, against any thing in the mode of doing it, which might constitute a separate and additional awkwardness between France and this country hereafter, should the present discussions terminate otherwise than hostilely.

Should the present discussions terminate in war, I shall have the honour of communicating with your Lordship, in detail, with reference to the financial as well as the military arrangements with which we should be prepared in India to encounter this new struggle.

I have the honour to remain,
with great truth and regard,
My dear Lord,
your most faithful,
humble servant,
CASTLEREAGH.

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## No. XXIII.

*The Marquess Wellesley to the Right Hon. Lord Castlereagh.*

(Private and most Secret.)

MY DEAR LORD, Barrackpore, 20th April, 1803.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's letter dated 16th of October, 1802. The *St. Fiorenzo* has not reached India. I return your Lordship many thanks for the full and able view, with which you have been pleased to furnish me, of the circumstances under which Lord Hobart's instructions of the 17th of October were issued, and I trust that my despatch to Lord Hobart of this date * will satisfy your Lordship that I have employed every endeavour to execute those instructions according to their true tenor and spirit.

Having received no official or authentic advices from England of a later date than your Lordship's postscript (Oct. 19, 1802,) you will conceive with what anxiety I have observed (in the French papers, which have reached me,) the unfavour-

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* See p. 84.

able issue of affairs in Switzerland, and the extravagant spirit of ambition and arrogance which marks the language of the gazettes of the Government of France in discussing the representations contained in the memorial from Lord Hawkesbury, of which you transmitted me a copy.

From the intelligence contained in the French papers, I should be inclined to apprehend the renewal of hostilities, if the silence of his Majesty's ministers had not induced a strong hope of a contrary tendency.

In the event of a renewal of the war with France, I trust that your Lordship will have taken early measures to increase the effective strength of the European force in India. The first object will necessarily be to complete the great deficiencies in the present establishment, and especially in the Company's artillery, which in Bengal is reduced to a state of absolute inefficiency, from the want of a regular supply of recruits. I also request your Lordship, in the event of a renewal of hostilities, to direct your serious attention to the weakness which must result from the abolition of the controlling power of the Supreme Government in India, over the island of Ceylon, and consequently over the military force stationed in that important possession.

In a subsequent despatch I propose to enter without reserve into a discussion of the existing defects in the constitution of the government of Ceylon, and of the necessary operation of those defects upon the general strength of our empire in India. In the mean while, as your Lordship is pleased to repose your confidence in me, I take the liberty of recommending to you in the most earnest manner, to issue, without a moment of delay, a commission to the Governor-General in council, (whoever he may be,) vesting him with the same powers of control over the government of Ceylon, which are now exercised by the Governor-General in council over the presidencies of Fort St. George and Bombay.

I am not aware that such an arrangement would necessarily require the transfer of Ceylon to the Company, or even the restoration of that system of government which has recently been changed. It appears to me, that a commission from the crown to the Governor-General in council would be sufficient to convey the authority necessary to enable him to control

the expenses of the establishment of Ceylon, and to consolidate its resources and power with the general strength of the British empire in India. In time of peace, such an union of powers is scarcely less requisite than in war; and I have no hesitation in declaring to your Lordship, that without such an union of powers in the event of war, I should feel considerable apprehension for the security of this empire.

I request your Lordship also to converse with Mr. Dundas and with Mr. Wellesley upon the necessity of vesting in the supreme executive authority in India, an efficient control over the fleet stationed in these seas. Without such a control, it is in my opinion impossible for any Governor-General to meet the exigencies of a renewal of war with France.

The financial documents transmitted by Mr. Wellesley, and by this despatch, must prove satisfactory to your Lordship. I am happy to be able to concur with your Lordship in a decided opinion, that if the Court of Directors shall pursue the salutary system of supplying from the treasury at home the prime cost of investment in India, the operations commenced for the gradual reduction of the Indian debt, will not be essentially retarded, even by the renewal of hostilities with France.

The state of our relations with the Mahratta powers is fully communicated to the Secret Committee by this despatch. I am satisfied that your Lordship will consider the blow which has been struck against the French interests in the Mahratta empire, to be a seasonable augmentation of our security in that quarter.

The financial operation of the new subsidies from the Guicowar and the Peishwa has not yet been stated in any account, but I trust it will form an addition to our resources in the course of the year 1803-4. It may possibly become necessary to add, in some degree, to the native infantry upon each of the establishments, with a view to furnish the new subsidiary forces in Guzzerat and at Poonah; but after having provided the utmost augmentation which can be requisite for that purpose, a considerable balance of military funds will remain to the Company on account of this transaction.

A renewal of hostilities with France would open in India a

scene so interesting and important, that I should not deem myself to be justified in relinquishing my share in the duties of such a crisis, without the express permission of the Government at home, issued with a full knowledge of the existing state of affairs in India, and in Europe. If, therefore, the war should be renewed, your Lordship may be assured that I will not abandon my present post, unless the state of my health should drive me from it, or unless the Government at home should have provided a successor, who may be deemed adequate to the charge of this government in the exigency of war. I think it necessary to make the earliest communication to your Lordship of my sentiments on this subject, in order to enable you to make your arrangements for the government of India, with a confident reliance on the continuance of my services, while the situation of affairs shall appear to demand them, and while my health shall enable me to contribute any effort towards the security of these possessions.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

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## No. XXIV.

*Lord Castlereagh to the Marquess Wellesley.*

(Most Secret.)

East Sheen, Nov. 15th, 1802.

MY DEAR LORD, [Received May 4th, 1803.]

I have written in detail to your Lordship, of this date, by a King's ship, with reference to the orders transmitted overland on the 16th ultimo. As my observations are by no means essential to the execution of your instructions, I forbear repeating them by the present conveyance, the person entrusted with the cypher in my office being too much hurried to transcribe them.

I acquainted your Lordship in my letter of the 28th of September, that it was probable Mr. Yorke would be appointed to Madras, with a view of succeeding ultimately to Bengal. Various difficulties, principally of a domestic na-

ture, have prevented him from undertaking the service. Under a full impression of the difficulty of filling the situation from hence with the degree of ability and experience in business which it requires, and strongly convinced that it can only be committed with safety to hands really efficient, I have been induced, with the concurrence of the King's Government, to recommend Mr. Barlow for the Supreme Government, whenever we may have the misfortune to be deprived of your Lordship's services.

I am aware that there is the strongest objection on general principles to the Governments abroad being filled by the Company's servants, but there is no rule which is universal; and I am led to believe, from the high opinion so generally entertained of Mr. Barlow's merits, but principally from the confidence both your Lordship and Lord Cornwallis have invariably reposed in him, that he has abilities and a sense of character, which will justify the exception being made in his person. I enclose a private letter on the subject of his appointment, for him, which I am sure he will receive with peculiar satisfaction from your hands; and I have told him how much he is indebted, in point of reputation, the best grounds of advancement, to your marked approbation of his conduct.

We have thought it expedient to decide upon the succession to the Government of Bengal, before any steps were taken for filling up the appointment to Madras. No time, however, will be lost in fixing upon a successor to Lord Clive, and your Lordship may expect to hear from me very soon upon that subject.

I have little further to trouble your Lordship with at present. I have not yet been able to bring the Court to a decision on the plan for the liquidation of the debt. Some further communications have passed between the chairs and myself, and I trust the subject is now nearly brought to a point, though I cannot yet acquaint you that I have altogether conquered their repugnance to adopt any plan which may oblige them to have recourse to extraordinary resources.

Your Lordship is aware how difficult and delicate a task it is for the person who fills my situation (particularly when strong feelings have once been excited) to manage such a body as the Court of Directors, so as to shield the person in yours from any unpleasant interference on their part. I am

sanguine in hoping that those impressions, which never should have led them for a moment to forget your substantial services, will pass away, and the remainder of your Government be rendered perfectly satisfactory both to your Lordship and to them.

I am, my dear Lord,
with great truth,
very sincerely and faithfully yours,
CASTLEREAGH.

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## No. XXV.

*N. B. Edmonstone, Esq. Secretary to Government to Colonel Collins, Resident at the Court of Dowlut Rao Scindiah.*

SIR, Fort William, May 5th, 1803.

1. I am directed by his Excellency the Governor-General to transmit to you the enclosed notes, which are intended to form the basis of detailed instructions for the regulation of your conduct in the actual crisis of affairs.

2. Those instructions will be prepared and transmitted to you at the earliest practicable period of time. In the mean while his Excellency directs you to act under the authority of the enclosed document, which your knowledge and discernment will enable you to apply to actual circumstances in the manner best calculated to promote the views and interests of the British Government.

I have the honour to be, &c.
N. B. EDMONSTONE,
Sec. to Government.

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[Enclosure in the preceding letter.]

*Notes of Instructions to Colonel Collins.*

May 5th, 1803.

The necessity of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's immediately crossing the Nerbuddah, and returning to Hindostan, to be fully stated.

The real object of a resolution on the part of Scindiah to proceed to Poonah, or to remain south of the Nerbuddah, can only be to subvert the arrangement between the British Government and the Peishwa, and to re-establish his own ascendancy in the Government of Poonah.

The following arguments and observations to be stated to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, for the purpose of preventing his proceeding to Poonah.

1. Treaty of Bassein to be fully communicated to Scindiah, without a moment of delay, and explained to Scindiah; a copy of the treaty to be given to him, if desired.

2. The Peishwa possessed a full right to avail himself of the aid of the British power for his restoration, and to contract his present engagements with that power, independently of the consent of the feudal chiefs of the Mahratta empire.

3. Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the other chiefs were unable to afford the Peishwa the necessary aid for the restoration of his authority after the success of the rebellion of Holkar; and the assistance which the Peishwa solicited and has received from us, was the only possible mode of recovering his authority.

4. The treaty of Bassein not only offers no injury to the independence of the feudatory Mahratta chiefs, but expressly provides additional security for it.

5. Dowlut Rao Scindiah himself invited the co-qperation of the British power, for the purpose of restoring the Peishwa.

6. Dowlut Rao Scindiah's own power and dominions have been saved from ruin by the interference of the British power, which has checked the progress of Holkar's arms.

7. Dowlut Rao Scindiah has admitted the expediency and wisdom of our engagements with the Peishwa, and has formally disavowed any intention of obstructing the completion of the arrangement.

8. Under all these circumstances, we have a right to expect that Dowlut Rao Scindiah shall not adopt any measures which we deem to be calculated to impede the accomplishment of that arrangement; unless such measures be absolutely necessary for Dowlut Rao Scindiah's security.

9. Dowlut Rao Scindiah's march to Poonah, or his continuance south of the Nerbuddah, can have no other view than to disturb our arrangements with the Peishwa; neither Scindiah's march to Poonah, nor his continuance to the south of the Nerbuddah, is necessary to his security.

10. An attempt on the part of any power to oppose or counteract that which another power is strictly authorized by the law of nations to perform, may justly be considered as an act of hostility.

11. In communicating the whole of the treaty of Bassein to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, point out to him particularly that it provides against any molestation being offered to his Government, unless he should place himself in the situation of an enemy to the Peishwa, or to the British Government.

12. Dowlut Rao Scindiah must therefore retire, or must expect to expose to hazard, all the advantages which the treaty offers to him.

13. If Dowlut Rao Scindiah should be disposed to accede to the treaty as a contracting party, the British Government is ready to negotiate the terms with him.

14. The British Government will not be offended if Dowlut Rao Scindiah should object to acceding to the treaty as a contracting party; he is

at liberty to remain, if he thinks fit, utterly unconnected with us, but the disadvantages of such a separation to him are evident.

15. We cannot, however, suffer him in any degree to obstruct the execution or operation of the treaty with the Peishwa, and the Governor-General is resolved not to admit the slightest opposition on the part of any power to the execution of a treaty, founded on principles of undeniable justice, equity, and moderation.

16. Dowlut Rao Scindiah must, therefore, instantly explain himself without reserve, and must return into his own dominions north of the Nerbuddah. The first pledge required of his amicable intentions, even if he should chuse to accede to the treaty, is, that he should immediately cross the Nerbuddah.

17. Offer to arbitrate any demands Dowlut Rao Scindiah may have on the Peishwa, or on Holkar.

18. Offer a subsidiary treaty and guarantee.

19. Positive declaration of friendship, and of a determination to abstain from any attempt whatever upon the independence of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, unless he should provoke hostility.

20. Inform Scindiah that his military operations, conducted in opposition to our remonstrances, will compel measures of precaution on our part, and on every boundary of his dominions, and that certain intelligence of his accession to any confederacy against the British power will produce immediate hostility on all parts of his frontier, and will justify the destruction of his power.

21. Inform Scindiah that similar representations have been addressed to the Rajah of Berar, for whom the British Government feels an equal regard, with an equal resolution to anticipate any sinister project by promptitude and alacrity.

22. Intelligence from various quarters has excited a just apprehension, that negotiations have been commenced between the Rajah of Berar and Scindiah, of a nature injurious to the connection established between the Peishwa and the British Government. Scindiah must be required to state explicitly the nature of his negotiations with the Rajah of Berar, and the propositions of that chief.

23. The same requisition to be urged respecting the propositions of Holkar to Scindiah, and the recent negotiations which have passed between those chiefs.

24. Inform Scindiah that any attack upon the territories of his Highness the Nizam will be considered as an act of hostility against the British Government.

## No. XXVI.

*Lord Castlereagh to the Marquess Wellesley.*

London, December 17th, 1802.

MY DEAR LORD, [Received May 6th, 1803.]

Since I last wrote, little has passed on the Continent worth acquainting you with. Switzerland has yielded to the presence of a French force, and her deputies attend at Paris to learn their future destiny.

Our parliament has been assembled for three weeks, during which period we have had some animated discussions. Although we have not yet had a division, it is not difficult to perceive that the complexion of the house is highly favourable to Government. We have voted very strong naval and military establishments, with only a slight opposition to the latter from Mr. Fox; and Mr. Addington has opened the most prosperous budget this country has witnessed, not even excepting that of 1792. The revenue has risen above three millions, and the export of British manufactures has increased to an equal amount upon the rated value, which makes the real increase, upon the true value, between six and seven millions. The effect of this statement has been to raise the funds above four per cent.

It will be satisfactory to you to learn that we have provided for 50,000 seamen for the ensuing year, and 110,000 regulars, exclusive of India. The King's troops destined for the peace establishment of India, exclusive of 2,000 for Ceylon, are to consist of three regiments of cavalry, of 640 rank and file each, and 15 regiments of infantry, at an establishment of 1,000 rank and file each.

With a view of keeping this force as complete as possible, a relief of a full regiment will proceed annually from Europe. This, with a regular supply of 1,200 recruits, and the men to be procured from the battalions to be brought home in each year, will, it is hoped, accomplish this important purpose. If any material deficiency should at any time be observable, the Duke of York has promised me to allot two regiments, instead of one, for that particular season. I trust your Lordship will feel satisfied with this arrangement. A proposition

had been made by the late Chairman to reduce the King's troops serving in India to two regiments of cavalry, and seven of infantry, of 1,200 men each. I felt myself bound to resist so improvident a reduction upon every principle, and I am happy to acquaint you that the present Chairs have consented, and I have no doubt the Court will acquiesce in the proposed establishment.

I have now to acquaint your Lordship with the arrangements which have been made for replacing my Lord Clive in the Government of Fort St. George.

Lord William Bentinck has been appointed to that important situation, and will embark, in the month of February, to take charge of that Government. The character his Lordship bears for honour, integrity, and diligence, and the excellent understanding which he undoubtedly possesses, lead me to form very sanguine expectations of his success. The Council will remain constituted as before, with the substitution of Mr. Chamier in the room of Mr. Dick.

The high estimation in which Mr. Webbe's services and character are held by your Lordship, as well as the strong opinion, which I cannot but entertain, that he has been harshly treated, make me very desirous of doing him early justice.

I shall send your Lordship, by the first ship, some further papers that have passed between me and the Chairs, on the subject of the Indian debt. They will serve to shew your Lordship the degree of difficulty which is opposed to the measure, whilst I trust they will only add to your impatience to learn that they have been overcome. I have the pleasure so far to relieve your anxiety on this point, as to acquaint you that the Chairs have adopted the draft of a despatch, which I have prepared on this subject, only limiting the orders, in respect to drawing the bills necessary to complete the two millions sinking fund to the two next years. I have advised that no limitation should be expressed, but I shall not contend this point, being well convinced, if I can succeed in having my plan acted upon for two years, that I shall have no difficulty in having the instructions renewed, when increased facilities will have grown out of the operation of the measure itself. Your Lordship will, I trust, receive instructions on this subject very shortly from the Court. In the

mean time, I have only to express an earnest hope that you may feel yourself enabled, upon the arrival of the troops from the Cape, to carry into full effect the reductions of the army on the coast, as it is upon the amount of surplus revenue that all our brilliant prospects must depend for their accomplishment, and I cannot but indulge a confident hope, the grounds of which your Lordship will find stated in the papers alluded to, that our Indian surplus may at no distant period, with the expected improvement in the revenues of Oude and of the Carnatic, amount to £1,500,000, exclusive of any savings from reduction of interest

I am ever, my dear Lord,
your most sincere and faithful,
humble servant,
CASTLEREAGH.

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## No. XXVII.

*Lord Hobart to the Marquess Wellesley.*

(Most Secret.)

Downing Street, Nov. 16th, 1802.
[Received May 8th, 1803.]

MY LORD,

I have the honour to acquaint your Lordship, that, notwithstanding the orders which, by the King's commands, I communicated to you on the 17th ultimo,* it is his Majesty's pleasure, that you should give directions for the immediate execution of the instructions that you have already received, for the restitution of the several possessions in the East Indies which, in conformity to the provisions of the treaty of Amiens, were to be restored to the governments of France and Holland.

As it is of importance that any delay, which may have arisen in the evacuation of those possessions, should not be productive of any misunderstanding between his Majesty's Government and those of France and Holland, you will conduct yourself in all your proceedings with their respective officers, in the most conciliatory manner.

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* See p. 72.

I am further to acquaint you, that there being some reason to apprehend that the French Government, either by intimidation or otherwise, may endeavour to obtain possession of the Portuguese settlements in the East Indies, or of Macao; by which the safety of the British possessions in India, and the security of the commerce of his Majesty's subjects with China, would be greatly endangered; it is the King's pleasure, that, in concert with the officer commanding his naval forces in the East Indies, you do take the most effectual measures for preventing the French from possessing themselves of those settlements; and that, on no account whatever, you allow them to be occupied by the troops belonging to the Government of France.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,
your Lordship's most obedient
and humble servant,
HOBART.

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## No. XXVIII.

*The Marquess Wellesley to Rajah Ragojee Bhooslah, Rajah of Berar.*

Fort William, May 13th, 1803.

The intimate friendship and alliance which have long subsisted between the British Government and the state of Berar, induce me to communicate to you, without reserve, the engagements recently concluded between the Honourable Company and his Highness the Peishwa; to explain to you the principles on which those engagements are founded, and to demonstrate to you that the treaty of Bassein is formed with a sincere regard for the integrity of the Mahratta empire, and for the security of the separate rights and privileges of the constituent branches of that respectable power.

When his Highness the Peishwa was compelled by the violence and usurpation of Jeswunt Rao Holkar to abandon the seat of Government at Poonah, and to retire into the Concan, his Highness earnestly solicited the aid of the British power for the protection of his person against the outrages of his rebellious subject, and for the restoration of his just authority in the Mahratta state. At the same time Maha Rajah

Dowlut Rao Scindiah, alarmed at the successful progress of Jeswunt Rao Holkar's rebellion, solicited the co-operation of the British arms for the accomplishment of the same important object. His Highness the Peishwa and Dowlut Rao Scindiah were sensible that the active interposition of the British power in that arduous crisis of affairs afforded the only means of preserving the fabric of the Mahratta empire from disorder and confusion.

The British Government entertained a sincere disposition to fulfil the obligations of friendship towards his Highness the Peishwa in the hour of adversity, and an anxious solicitude to preserve the Mahratta empire from a condition of anarchy, which must have proved highly dangerous to all the contiguous states of India, I, therefore, readily consented to the united wishes of the Peishwa and Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and his Highness the Peishwa accordingly proceeded, under the protection of the British power, to Bassein. His Highness subsequently concluded engagements with the British Government on principles calculated to secure the stability of his just authority in the Mahratta empire; the rights and privileges of the several subordinate chieftains of that empire; and the future tranquillity and prosperity of the state.

For the accomplishment of this arrangement, a considerable detachment of British troops, which had been stationed on the frontier of Mysore, with a view to the protection and defence of the British dominions, was directed to march from the frontier of Mysore to Poonah, and the British subsidiary force serving with his Highness the Nizam, joined by a considerable body of the Nizam's forces, was assembled on the frontier of the Nizam's dominions for the same purpose. At the same time amicable remonstrances were addressed to Jeswunt Rao Holkar; and assurances were conveyed to him by the British Resident at Poonah, of the sincere disposition of the British Government to mediate between him and the Peishwa and Dowlut Rao Scindiah on just and reasonable terms, with the consent and knowledge of all parties.

The object of these proceedings was to restore order and tranquillity, and to conciliate the concurrence of the contending chiefs in such a system of mutual justice, reason, and moderation, as might secure the continuance of peace.

These measures have induced Jeswunt Rao Holkar to

withdraw his troops from the city of Poonah, and have removed every obstacle to the return of his Highness the Peishwa to his capital in the full exercise of his authority. The attention of the British Government will now be directed to the efficient accomplishment of the arrangements concluded by the treaty of Bassein. For your information, with regard to the engagements contracted by his Highness the Peishwa, I transmit to you, enclosed, a copy of the treaty of Bassein,* containing every article and stipulation of that engagement. This explicit communication will afford you an additional proof of my friendship and respect. You will be enabled by the copy of the treaty, and by this letter, to ascertain the full extent of all my views and intentions with regard to the Mahratta power.

An examination of the enclosed copy of the treaty will demonstrate the justice, moderation, and honourable policy of that engagement; and a review of the late transactions in the Mahratta empire will be sufficient to convince you that the interposition of the aid of the British Government, for the restoration of his Highness the Peishwa to the musnud of Poonah, far from having a tendency to subvert the order of the Mahratta state, afforded the only means of averting confusion, and of providing for the future security and tranquillity of every branch of the Mahratta power.

Experience has already manifested the inability of Dowlut Rao Scindiah to resist the attacks of Jeswunt Rao Holkar; and the views of Jeswunt Rao Holkar have been demonstrated by his attempt to destroy the Peishwa's Government, and to assume the entire authority of the Mahratta empire.

Great danger must have menaced the several states under such circumstances. From the hazard of this calamity, the Mahratta empire has been preserved by the seasonable interposition of the British Government, which has provided for the restoration and stability of the Peishwa's just authority, and has afforded additional security for the legitimate and separate rights of the feudatory chieftains of the empire. Under the treaty of Bassein (particularly by the 9th article) those chieftains are effectually protected against any molestation either on the part of his Highness the Peishwa, or of

* See Appendix.

the British Government, unless any chief should place himself in the condition of a public enemy to the state. At the same time an option is afforded to all the principal chieftains of participating in the benefits of the defensive alliance. The constitution of the Mahratta state, and the authority of various precedents, have established the independent right of his Highness the Peishwa to contract with foreign powers all such engagements as shall not affect the separate rights and interests of his feudatory chieftains; that right is inherent in the supreme executive authority of the Mahratta state.

Under these circumstances, therefore, I deem it necessary to signify to you my intention of establishing the provisions of the treaty now concluded with his Highness the Peishwa. Any attempt on the part of any state or power to obstruct the operation of that treaty, must be deemed an act of hostility against the combined interests of the Peishwa and the British Government.

My objects are to secure the British dominions and those of our ally the Nizam from the dangers of contiguous anarchy and confusion; to fulfil the duties of friendship towards our ally the Peishwa; and to provide at the same time for the safety of the several branches of the Mahratta empire without disturbing the constitutional form of the state, and without affecting the legitimate independence of its feudatory chieftains. This course of policy must tend to strengthen the bonds of amity and alliance with the state of Berar, as well as with every other branch of the Mahratta power.

If a just regard to the real interests and prosperity of your Government should dispose you to conclude defensive engagements with the Honourable Company similar to those which have been contracted by his Highness the Peishwa, I shall be ready to enter into a negotiation with you for that purpose. The ties of friendship, however, will not be relaxed by any declaration of your disposition to remain unconnected with the powers now allied by the treaties of Hyderabad and Bassein; whatever may be your determination with regard to this part of my present proposal, I shall continue to maintain with cordial solicitude the relations of amity and peace which have subsisted between the British Government and the state of Berar.

It has been reported to me that you have viewed the con-

duct of the British Government in the restoration of the Peishwa, with jealousy and suspicion, and that you are assiduously employed in endeavouring to form a confederacy for the purpose of frustrating the beneficial operation of the treaty of Bassein.

The acknowledged prudence and discretion of your character; your wisdom and experience, your approved friendship, combined with the conscious sense of my just regard for your rights and independence, preclude any suspicion in my mind of your intentions and conduct. I, therefore, conclude that you will continue to regard the British power with that confidence and esteem which our uniform conduct towards you justly demands.

To this candid declaration of my sentiments, it may, however, be proper to add a distinct view of my future intentions. Any military preparations on your part, any combination of your power with that of any other state, directed to the subversion of the arrangement lately concluded with the Peishwa will be followed by corresponding measures of precaution and security on the part of the British Government.

Unavoidable circumstances have hitherto prevented the departure of Mr. Webbe, whom I have selected to be the representative of this Government at your Court. Mr. Webbe, however, will proceed to Nagpore, and on his arrival, will be prepared to enter upon the discussion of all questions depending between you and the British Government.

In the mean while I trust that you will return a speedy and amicable reply to this friendly letter.

WELLESLEY.

## No. XXIX.

*The Marquess Wellesley to Rajah Raggojee Bhooslah, Rajah of Berar.*

Fort William, May 22nd, 1803.

I have had the pleasure to receive your letter* in reply to mine.

I derived particular satisfaction from the assurances contained in that letter; in which you have declared, "that the relations of sincere friendship, harmony and concord have, during a long period of time, subsisted between the two states, so firmly as to have admitted of no differences of interest between them, and that no separation of them will occur." These amicable assurances confirmed my conviction that no measures would be adopted by you, of a nature to disturb the harmony and good understanding so happily subsisting between your government and that of the Honourable Company. My surprize and disappointment have, therefore, been proportionably excited by the communication which I have received of a letter from you to Azim ul Omrah, in which you had distinctly declared your intention of proceeding to meet Dowlut Rao Scindiah for the express purpose of forming a confederacy with that chieftain and Jeswunt Rao Holkar, directed to the subversion of the arrangement concluded between his Highness the Peishwa and the British Government, for the restoration of his Highness to the musnud of Poonah.

I enclose a copy of your letter to Azim ul Omrah,† for the purpose of satisfying you that I have not proceeded to act without a full knowledge of your conduct and intentions.

I have also received intelligence that you have entered your tents, and you have commenced your march with the main body of your army in the direction of his Highness the Nizam's territory.

My letter of the 13th‡ instant will apprize you of my determined resolution to resist the execution of any design on the part of any of the Mahratta chieftains, to impede the accomplishment of the arrangements lately concluded between the

* See Appendix. † See Appendix. ‡ See p. 99.

British Government and his Highness the Peishwa. These arrangements have been concluded in concert with his Highness the Nizam, the ally of the British state, and under the engagements subsisting between his Highness the Nizam and the British Government, the march of your troops into the territory of the Nizam will be considered to be an act of aggression, on your part, both against his Highness the Nizam and the British power.

Under the obligations of existing engagements it will, therefore, be my duty to retaliate on your possessions the unjustifiable violation of the territory of the friend and ally of the Company, unless you shall immediately retire with your army within the limits of your own dominions.

I, therefore, earnestly exhort you to return peaceably into your territories, and to rest satisfied with the full communication which I have made to you of the treaty concluded with the Peishwa and of the ulterior views of the British Government. It is my earnest desire to maintain the relations of amity and concord between you and the British Government, but the state of your military preparations and the intelligence of your march towards the territory of his Highness the Nizam have compelled me to assemble a considerable body of British forces on the frontier of your dominions as a measure of necessary precaution.

It will depend on your conduct whether the ties of friendship between the two states shall remain inviolate, or shall be dissolved.

My wish is to preserve peace, but I will not suffer the just rights of the British Government to be violated with impunity. You will attend to this friendly admonition, and hereafter you will receive with cordiality the communications which will be made to you by a respectable person, whom I propose to despatch to you, with the most explicit assurances of my regard and esteem.

WELLESLEY.

## No. XXX.

*N. B. Edmonstone, Esq., Secretary to Government, to Lieut.-Colonel Close, Resident at Poonah.*

SIR, Fort William, 30th May, 1803.

With a view to furnish you, at the earliest moment, with the instructions of the Governor-General for your guidance upon the expected return of his Highness the Peishwa to Poonah, I forwarded to you on the 7th instant by his Excellency's command, a note containing the general tenor of the measures proposed to be pursued in the present posture of affairs in the Mahratta empire. * The Governor-General is satisfied that the early circulation of that note will have enabled you and all the subordinate authorities to which it was communicated, to act in concert under the proposed plan; and I am now commanded by his Excellency to state to you, in detail, the directions necessary for the further regulation of your conduct, and for the guidance of the Honourable Major-General Wellesley.

His Excellency concludes that the Peishwa's restoration to the musnud of Poonah will have been accompanied by the most public demonstrations of ceremony and respect on the part of the British authorities at that station, and the Governor-General has issued orders, which will afford to the Peishwa an ample testimony of the cordiality and zeal with which the British Government has entered into this happy alliance with the Mahratta power.

The Governor-General intends at a future period of time to review, in a more particular manner, the principles on which the treaty of Bassein is founded, the objects to which it is directed, and the means by which the stability of our alliance with the Mahrattas is to be maintained.

I am commanded, however, by his Excellency, to apprize you at this early season, of the general scope of his intentions and views in concluding this important arrangement.

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* The note referred to has not been printed, as it is incorporated in the present despatch, and would therefore be an unnecessary repetition.—[*Ed.*]

The destruction of the hostile power of Mysore, accompanied by the consolidation of our alliance with the Court of Hyderabad, left no possible antagonist to the British Government among the native states in India, excepting the Mahratta power.

The Mahratta states unconnected with any European ally, could never become formidable to the British Government, excepting in the event of an actual union of the feudal chiefs under an efficient sovereign power; or in the event of a revolution, which should unite the command of the resources of a large portion of the Mahratta territory in the hands of an active and enterprising chief. Such events (however desirable it might be to avert them) might have been encountered without apprehension by the British Government in the present commanding posture of its foreign relations, and in the vigorous condition of its internal resources and concentrated strength.

But it was obviously prudent to employ every endeavour to effect such an arrangement as should preclude the union of the Mahratta states under any circumstances which might menace interruption to the tranquillity of our possessions, or of those of our allies and dependents, especially of the Nizam, and the Rajah of Mysore.

The most effectual arrangement with a view to this important object, appeared to be an intimate alliance with the acknowledged sovereign power of the Mahratta empire, founded upon principles which should render the British influence and military force the main support of that power. Such an arrangement appears to afford the best security for preserving a due balance between the several states constituting the confederacy of the Mahratta empire, as well as for preventing any dangerous union or diversion of the resources of that empire. You will, therefore, understand that the principal object to be accomplished by the operation of the treaty of Bassein, is the prevention of any hostile union of the Mahratta states, under the sovereign power of the empire, against the British Government or its allies.

The same policy required that the operation of the treaty should be so directed as to prevent the aggrandizement of any individual chief, or the combination of any number of chiefs, under circumstances adverse to the authority of the

Peishwa, or to the tranquillity of the territories of the Company, its dependants, and allies.

The treaty restores the legitimate power of the Peishwa on the foundation of our support, and establishes our influence as the channel of mediation and protection for the maintenance of the separate rights and interests of the confederated chiefs.

Your discretion and experience will sufficiently indicate to you the real nature of our situation in regard to the operation of the treaty on these points. You will observe that it is neither consistent with the principle, nor necessary to the objects of the treaty, to exercise any influence in the internal affairs of the Peishwa's immediate government of a nature injurious to his dignity and independence, or offensive to his prejudices, or pride. You will endeavour to satisfy his Highness that his real and legitimate power is effectually secured by this alliance, and that he may confidently expect, under the operation of his engagements with the British Government, to enjoy that tranquillity and security, accompanied by respect and honour, which he has never experienced under the degrading influence of his own subjects, servants, and feudatory chieftains, and which he could never have attained under the protection of Scindiah, or of the Rajah of Berar, or under any pacification with the rebel Holkar, or with the traitor Amrut Rao.

In demonstrating to the Peishwa the benefits of his new alliance, you will not fail to advert to the advantages which have been enjoyed by the Nizam, since the conclusion of similar engagements with the British power. You will describe the uniform disposition which the British Government has manifested to maintain inviolate the dignity and honour of the Nizam, and to abstain from any infringement of his Highness's just authority within his own dominions.

It must be evident to the Peishwa, that while the independent authority of the Nizam over his own subjects, and the internal order of his dominions and government have been considerably improved, the power and importance of the Court of Hyderabad among the states of India have been greatly augmented by the Nizam's connection with the British Government. The continued security of the Nizam's domi-

nions (under the protection of the Company) from the encroaching spirit of the neighbouring powers, must have been remarked by the Peishwa in the course of the various transactions which have passed between the Mahratta states and the Nizam since the year 1798.

The Peishwa must have remarked that the protection of the British Government has preserved the Nizam from the rapacity, ambition, and treachery of Scindiah, and of other Mahratta powers; and that every sinister project of the Mahratta states against the Nizam has been frustrated by the vigilance and strength of the British Government. If the death of the Nizam should happen, and the succession of Secunder Jah should take place, you will direct the Peishwa's particular attention to the justice, moderation, and honourable spirit of public faith, which the British Government will have displayed in the unconditional establishment of Secunder Jah on the musnud of Hyderabad; and you will contrast the order and regularity of the established system of affairs at Hyderabad with the confusions which have distracted the state of Poonah, and which must have endangered its existence, if the Peishwa had not solicited and obtained the powerful and seasonable protection of the Company.

In reviewing the probable effect of the stipulations of the treaty of Bassein, you will observe, that while they are calculated to protect the authority of the Peishwa from the encroachment of the great feudatory chiefs, the most effectual security is also provided for the preservation of the respective interests and possessions of those chiefs within the just limits of their separate dominions and authorities.

It is a principal object of the treaty of Bassein, to prevent the sovereign power of the Mahratta states, or the power of any great branch of the Mahratta empire from passing into the hands of France.

To this object, in all its relations, your constant and unremitting vigilance must be directed. The Governor-General trusts that the operation of the treaty must immediately exclude the French from the counsels and armies of the Peishwa, and gradually from those of every Mahratta power, which shall resort to the British protection for the preservation of its separate station in the Mahratta empire.

It may be reasonably expected that all the Mahratta states

will speedily discover the advantages of resorting to that protection which offers the best attainable security for the preservation of their respective possessions and interests, with the least possible sacrifice of prejudice or pride.

Beyond the limits of the principles and views stated in the preceding paragraphs, the Governor-General wishes that the British Government should abstain from all interference in the external affairs of the Mahratta states.

In stating to you the detailed instructions of the Governor-General for the execution of the treaty of Bassein, the following objects appear to require special attention.

1st. The restoration of his Highness the Peishwa to the due exercise of his regular authority in the Mahratta empire.

2ndly. The effectual exercise of the rights of mediation and guarantee acquired by the British Government under the treaty of Bassein, or originating in the measures adopted by the British Government for the restoration of his Highness the Peishwa to the musnud of Poonah, without exciting the jealousy, or offending the pride of the Peishwa, or of other Mahratta chieftains.

Under this head may be classed the exertion of your endeavours to mitigate the resentment of his Highness against Amrut Rao and Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and to obtain from his Highness such concessions in favour of each of those chieftains as may be calculated to conciliate their submission to his Highness's authority.

3rdly. To establish the subsidiary force in exact conformity to the treaty, and to provide for the return of the remainder of the forces employed in the restoration of the Peishwa to their respective stations, or for the disposal of such part of those forces as it may be necessary to employ for the completion and security of the arrangement concluded with his Highness the Peishwa.

4thly. To provide for the security of his Highness the Nizam's dominions against any attack on the part of Scindiah or of Holkar.

5thly. To provide for the complete occupation by the Company's officers of the districts ceded by his Highness the Peishwa.

It may be expected that the Peishwa will be solicitous

to provide for the effectual re-establishment of his authority, by proceeding to appoint proper officers for conducting the details of his administration. But it may be proper that you should afford to his Highness the benefit of your advice in framing the arrangements necessary for that purpose; at the same time you will employ your utmost endeavours to satisfy his Highness's mind of the resolution of the British Government to abstain from all interference in the details of his administration, and to maintain his dignity and independence. This object, however, may be difficult of attainment, when combined with the absolute necessity of securing the effectual mediation of the British Government in the manner described under the second head, especially in favour of the several Jaggeerdars who have manifested a disposition to co-operate with the British troops in the restoration of the Peishwa to the musnud of Poonah, and to whom the faith of the British Government may have been pledged for the exertion of its influence with the Peishwa for the attainment of any concessions in their favour, or for the future security of their just and acknowledged rights.

The Peishwa must be aware that the complete consolidation of his power will depend in a considerable degree on the successful exertion of his endeavours to conciliate the allegiance and attachment of the Jaggeerdars, who occupy so large a portion of his territory; and this consideration may induce his Highness to admit the mediation of the British Government in favour of such of the Jaggeerdars as have established a claim to it by their attachment to the Peishwa's cause.

Considerations connected with the consolidation of his Highness's power may also favour the success of your endeavours to obtain from the Peishwa such concessions as may induce Amrut Rao and Jeswunt Rao Holkar to submit to his authority.

The Governor-General does not possess the means of suggesting the nature and extent of the concessions which it may be expedient to solicit from the Peishwa in favour of Amrut Rao and Jeswunt Rao Holkar; that point must necessarily be regulated by the expectations and the disposition of both parties, and by the relative rank and reasonable pretensions of those chieftains.

The characteristic insincerity of Bajy Rao will, however, preclude all confidence in his offers and engagements, unless they shall be secured by the mediation and guarantee of the British Government.

The effectual and equitable exercise of our mediation and guarantee between the Peishwa and his subordinate chieftains is, therefore, equally necessary for the consolidation of his Highness's authority, and for the stability of the arrangements concluded under the treaty of Bassein, and both must depend upon the address with which the British Government shall assume the protection of all the contending parties, without exciting the jealousy of any one of them.

All unnecessary interference, therefore, in the affairs of the Mahratta state, should be carefully avoided, and every act of necessary interposition on our part should be accompanied with a distinct and demonstrative explanation of the equitable principles on which it is founded, and of the just and salutary objects to which it is directed.

If any of the Peishwa's immediate dependents, or Aumils, should refuse to submit to his authority, even under the faith of the British guarantee, measures must be adopted to compel their submission.

The subsidiary force to be permanently stationed at Poonah for the protection of the Peishwa's person and government, should be established as soon as possible, in exact conformity to the stipulation of the treaty of Bassein. It would certainly be desirable to extend, and to compose it in a manner precisely similar to the subsidiary force at Hyderabad; but this object must be pursued with a careful regard to the general principle of suppressing all emotions of jealousy in the minds either of the Peishwa or of any of the Mahratta chieftains.

Any state of affairs in the Mahratta empire affecting the stability of the Peishwa's authority may induce his Highness to desire the extension of the subsidiary force, and may appear to the Mahratta chieftains to afford a sufficient motive for the adoption of that measure without exciting in their minds a suspicion that it is dictated by any other views than those really entertained by the British Government, and distinctly declared in the treaty of Bassein.

The agitation of this question is left to the exercise of your judgment and discretion.

The honourable Major-General Wellesley will for the present appoint the officer to command the subsidiary force. The command of the subsidiary force at Poonah and Hyderabad respectively, will hereafter be filled directly under the authority of the Governor-General in council.

It is extremely desirable that the British troops employed for the restoration of the Peishwa to the musnud of Poonah, (with the exception of the subsidiary force,) should quit the Mahratta territories, and repair to their allotted stations at the earliest practicable period of time, consistent with the complete accomplishment and security of the arrangement concluded under the treaty of Bassein. Independently of the important object of enabling the British Government to apply that portion of its military establishment which has been employed for the Peishwa's restoration to other eventual exigencies of the public service, the early adoption of this measure would tend to satisfy the Mahratta chieftains and Jageerdars that the British Government entertains no views beyond the express stipulations of the treaty of Bassein.

The separation and disposal of the troops must, however, depend on the proceedings of Scindiah and Holkar, and on the degree in which his Highness the Peishwa's authority shall be recognized and established throughout the territories subject to his dominion.

It will not be prudent to separate the army, unless Scindiah shall either have recrossed the Nerbuddah, with his troops, or shall have afforded some unequivocal proof of his intention to refrain from any attempt to disturb the arrangement concluded between the British Government and his Highness the Peishwa.

The proceedings of the honourable Major-General Wellesley must be regulated in a great measure by the information which he may receive from the Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, with regard to the effect produced on Scindiah by the representations which Colonel Collins has been instructed to make to that chieftain.

If those representations should not have the effect of deterring Dowlut Rao Scindiah from the prosecution of his intended march with the whole body of his army to Poonah,

Major-General Wellesley must adopt hostile operations against that chieftain.

Every amicable endeavour must, however, be employed to dissuade Dowlut Rao Scindiah from the prosecution of his march to Poonah. His Excellency the Governor-General is anxious that no hostile operations against Scindiah should be commenced on the part of the British troops, until the last extremity. But if you and Major-General Wellesley should be convinced of the hostile intentions of Scindiah, the army must be actually employed in compelling Scindiah to retreat across the Nerbuddah. In that event, or if any probability of such an event should appear, the earliest information should be transmitted to his Excellency General Lake, who will be prepared at a proper season to employ the troops under his immediate command in military operations within the possessions of Scindiah in the north-western quarter of Hindostan.

It is scarcely possible that Scindiah should incur the hazard of hostilities with the British power, unless assured of the co-operation of the Rajah of Berar, and of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, nor that Scindiah should proceed to Poonah for hostile purposes, without being joined by the forces of one or both of those chieftains. Notwithstanding the repeated reports of the actual combination of those chieftains for purposes hostile to the British interests, his Excellency the Governor-General continues to discredit the truth of such rumours. Many of the circumstances related for the purpose of accrediting these rumours are manifest fabrications; and the object of the Mahrattas in circulating the report of the existence of a general confederacy of such a description, being evidently to intimidate the British Government and its allies, it is the duty of every British officer, civil and military, to employ his utmost efforts for the purpose of checking the dissemination of opinions calculated to impair the interests of our country in India, to encourage our enemies, and to depress the spirit of our friends. The terror of the British name will preclude such combinations, if the confidence of our allies be not shaken by the manifest decline of our own fortitude and decision in the season of our utmost glory and power. A premature disposition on our part to credit the possibility of the supposed confederacy may create the evil,

of which it supposes the existence, and may animate the counsels of our secret enemies with a spirit of audacity and rashness, which may demand an effort of our superior strength. It is, therefore, the positive order of the Governor-General, that you use the most active exertions to discountenance the rumours (which have been so assiduously circulated,) of the existence of an hostile confederacy between Scindiah, Ragogee Booslah, and Holkar, against the British power. If you should obtain authentic intelligence of such an event, the Governor-General directs you to communicate it to the secretary in the secret department at Fort William, and to Major-General Wellesley; but his Excellency trusts that your discretion and prudence, combined with your zeal for the public service, will induce you to discourage the belief of such an event in every other quarter.

Even if such a combination should take place, no danger can be apprehended from it to the British interests; indeed, it is not credible, that even with such a combination, the Mahratta chiefs would venture to encounter the British power. His Excellency, however, adverting to every means of preventing such a conspiracy, or of restraining its operation, has addressed a remonstrance to the Rajah of Berar in terms corresponding with the representations which the Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah has been instructed to make to Scindiah, and has directed the post of Midnapore to be strengthened, with a view to alarm the Rajah of Berar for the safety of the province of Cuttack.

The practicability of impeding the junction of Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, if those chieftains should actually march for that purpose, is a question of a military nature, the decision of which must either have been determined already by the judgment of the honourable Major-General Wellesley, or must now remain for his decision. If Scindiah, however, in conjunction with the Rajah of Berar, should seriously meditate hostilities, the operations of their combined forces will probably be directed, in the first instance, against the possessions of his Highness the Nizam. It will be necessary, in that event, to adopt such measures as may be practicable, to provide both for the defence of his Highness's dominions, and for the protection of Poonah, which in the absence of the main body of the British troops, may be exposed to the

attempts of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, acting in that direction, either singly, or in concert with Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar.

His Excellency deems it necessary to state the various possible plans of military operations which in the supposed event of an hostile confederacy among those chieftains, they may resolve to undertake. His Excellency is satisfied that the vigilance and discernment of Major-General Wellesley will secure the earliest information with regard to the nature of such plans, and that his judgment and military skill will enable him to adopt the most effectual measures to render them abortive.

In the event of Scindiah's return to the northward of the Nerbuddah, it may still be necessary to retain the army in the field for the purpose of preventing the return of Holkar's troops to Poonah, and of enforcing the complete acknowledgment of the Peishwa's authority throughout his immediate possessions, and of precluding any attempt of the adherents of Scindiah and Holkar to obtain possession of his Highness's person.

If no accommodation shall take place between Scindiah and Holkar, the dissension of those chiefs may afford sufficient security to the Peishwa to admit of the separation of the British army in the field. If, however, the disputes of Scindiah and Holkar should be amicably adjusted, it may be expected that Holkar will disband a great part of his army (which he is now unable to pay,) unless he should meditate offensive measures against the Peishwa, or should prosecute his predatory operations within the Nizam's dominions; provision must accordingly be made to defeat any such views on the part of Holkar.

Whenever the state of affairs shall admit of the separation of the troops, they should be so posted as to possess the power of effecting a speedy junction (if necessary) with the subsidiary forces of Poonah and Hyderabad. For this purpose, the north-western frontier of Mysore, the southern districts ceded by the Peishwa, and the north-western frontier of his Highness the Nizam, ought to be maintained in the utmost practicable degree of strength. A considerable body of Europeans, and a sufficient train of ordnance should remain at Bombay, in order to secure the eventual junction of

a body of troops from that presidency with the subsidiary force at Poonah.

The honourable Major-General Wellesley will state to his Excellency Lieut.-General Stuart his opinion with regard to the particular positions in the southern ceded districts, and in Mysore, at which it may be advisable to station British forces, and to the extent of such forces, for the purpose above stated; and Major-General Wellesley will also communicate his sentiments to Lieut.-Colonel Stevenson, and to the Resident at Hyderabad, with regard to the disposal of the subsidiary force of Hyderabad, and of his Highness the Nizam's troops, with a view to the same purpose. Of the detachment from his Excellency Lieut.-General Stuart's army at present under the command of the honourable Major-General Wellesley, six battalions of native infantry, with a due proportion of artillery, are to be stationed at Poonah, to form the subsidiary force, in conformity to the stipulations of the treaty. The European infantry and the remainder of the ordnance attached to Major-General Wellesley's army should be directed to proceed to Bombay, and the British cavalry should retire to the ceded districts, or to such a position as may enable it to join the subsidiary force of Hyderabad, if circumstances should appear to render a junction advisable.

The body of cavalry belonging to the Rajah of Mysore, and serving under the command of Major-General Wellesley, may either be remanded to Mysore, or employed in such direction as to Major-General Wellesley may appear most advisable.

His Excellency, however, leaves to Major-General Wellesley a discretionary authority to deviate from the disposition of the British forces herein stated, according to the suggestions of his judgment, regulated by events and circumstances.

His Excellency confidently expects that when the nature of our connection with the Peishwa, and the justice and moderation of our views with relation to the Mahratta empire shall have been sufficiently understood by the Mahratta chieftains, the necessity of any extraordinary precautions for the security of the late arrangements will cease; and that the system of our alliance under the treaty of Bassein will be permanently maintained by the operation of those principles which have secured the stability of our present connection with the state of Hyderabad.

The army under the immediate command of his Excellency Lieut.-General Stuart will separate as soon as Major-General Wellesley shall have signified to Lieut.-General Stuart, that the state of affairs in the Mahratta territories will admit of that measure, without hazard to the public interests.

The detachment under the command of Major Irton will return into the Company's territories to such station as the Government of Fort St. George shall direct, unless the state of affairs in his Highness's dominions should render the continuance of that detachment at Hyderabad, or its employment in other parts of his Highness's territories, or elsewhere, expedient, in the opinion of Major-General Wellesley.

Measures should be adopted at the earliest practicable period of time for the occupation of the districts, ceded by his Highness the Peishwa, to the British Government in Guzerat, and in the southern division of his territories.

A force should be detached from the British troops, serving in the province of Guzerat, for the purpose of occupying the districts ceded to the Company in that province. If the condition of Guzerat should not permit the adoption of that arrangement, a sufficient force should be detached either from Surat or Bombay, to be replaced by a part of the force under the honourable Major-General Wellesley, or Colonel Stevenson.

The ceded districts southward of Poonah may be occupied by a portion of the troops under the command of Major General Wellesley, on their return to the southward. In the event of the whole of Major General Wellesley's detachment being necessarily employed in other directions, a detachment from the army under the immediate command of Lieutenant General Stuart must be appointed for that service.

It will be necessary that the detachments appointed to occupy the ceded districts in Guzerat, and to the southward respectively, should be of sufficient strength to overcome any opposition on the part of the Peishwa's officers, who, in the present inefficient state of the Peishwa's authority may refuse to obey his Highness's orders for the cession of the territories under their immediate controul; but the commanding officers of those detachments should be instructed to employ every effort to obtain the peaceable surrender of the districts from the persons in charge of them.

The Government of Bombay will be directed, in concert with you and the honourable Major-General Wellesley, to appoint the proper officers of collection in the ceded districts in Guzerat, and the Government of Fort St. George will be directed to pursue the same course with respect to the districts ceded to the southward of Poonah.

Although these instructions are now stated, the Governor-General is aware of the motives which have precluded the Government of Fort St. George from taking possession of the districts ceded by the Peishwa to the southward of Poonah, and his Excellency entirely approves the proceedings of the Government of Fort St. George in that respect.

I am directed to suggest to you the expediency of considering the means of inducing the Peishwa to compensate to the British Government for the loss incurred by the delay of the proposed cessions to the southward of Poonah. It may, indeed, be questionable whether the Peishwa might not now be induced to substitute in place of the cessions (to the southward of Poonah) contained in the treaty of Bassein, territories more conveniently situated, and more easy of occupation. You will direct your particular attention in concert with General Wellesley to this point, and you will advert to the possibility of obtaining a cession of territory for this purpose, either in the Kokun or in Bundlecund.*

You will be pleased to communicate this despatch to the honourable Major-General Wellesley. His Excellency the Governor-General desires that Major-General Wellesley will consider this despatch to convey to him instructions on those arrangements described in it, which depend upon him for their accomplishment.

Copies of this despatch will also be transmitted to the Governments of Fort St. George and Bombay, to his Excellency Lieut.-General Stuart, and to the Residents at Hyderabad, and with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, for their information and guidance.

I have the honour to be, Sir,
your most obedient, humble servant,
N. B. EDMONSTONE,
Sec. to Government.

* A territory in Bundlecund estimated at the value of 36,10,000 Rs. was ultimately given in exchange agreeably to this suggestion.

## No. XXXI.

*N. B. Edmonstone, Esq. Secretary to Government, to Colonel Collins, Resident at the Court of Dowlut Rao Scindiah.*

SIR, Fort William, June 3rd, 1803.

In my letter of the 5th of May I had the honour to transmit to you, by the orders of his Excellency the most noble the Governor-General, a document containing the general heads of his Excellency's instructions on the subject of a representation to be made to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, for the purpose of inducing that chieftain to re-cross the Nerbudda, and to return to his dominions in Hindostan. I am now directed to communicate to you the following detailed observations and instructions for the regulation of your conduct in the present crisis of affairs.

While Jeswunt Rao Holkar continued at the head of a powerful army in the vicinity of Poonah, and maintained in the Mahratta state the ascendancy which he had acquired by his successful rebellion against the authority of the Peishwa, and while the result of the measures adopted by the British Government, at the solicitation of the Peishwa, for his Highness's restoration to the musnud of Poonah continued in suspense, Dowlut Rao Scindiah would have discharged his duty as a feudatory chieftain of the Mahratta empire, in directing the exertion of his power to the extinction of Jeswunt Rao Holkar's rebellion, and to the support of the supreme executive authority of the state, and the co-operation of his army with the British troops might have been eventually necessary for that purpose. But Scindiah having in fact made no effort against the power of Holkar, and the approach of the British army towards Poonah having induced Jeswunt Rao Holkar to abandon his design of effecting a revolution in the Peishwa's government, and to retire with his troops from that capital, and the promptitude and energy of our operations having secured the restoration of the Peishwa to his legitimate authority without the aid of Scindiah, the prosecution of that chieftain's march to Poonah, for the purpose either of supporting the cause of the Peishwa, or of providing for the security of his own power and dominions

against the ambitious projects of Jeswunt Rao Holkar is now become unnecessary, and under these circumstances, the perseverance of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, in his intention of marching with his army to Poonah, can have no other object than the subversion of the arrangements lately concluded between his Highness the Peishwa and the British Government, and the re-establishment of his own usurped ascendancy in the state of Poonah.

His Excellency bears in mind the formal declaration of Scindiah in his conference with you on the 24th of March, 1803, after being apprized of the conclusion of a treaty of defensive alliance between the Peishwa and the British Government, that he had no intention to obstruct the completion of that arrangement, but the subsequent conduct of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and the information which his Excellency has received from your despatches, and from various other quarters of a projected confederacy between that chieftain, the Rajah of Berar and Jeswunt Rao Holkar afford reason to doubt the sincerity of that declaration. His Excellency, therefore, deems it necessary to endeavour to preclude the adoption of any designs on the part of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, of a nature hostile to the British interests, by requiring Scindiah either to return with his troops to the northward of the Nerbudda, or to afford some other unequivocal proof of his intention to refrain from any attempt to disturb the arrangement concluded between the British Government and his Highness; and I am accordingly directed to communicate to you the following observations and instructions for the regulation of your conduct on this occasion conformably to the note which you have already received, under date the 5th ultimo.

Any design on the part of Scindiah to aim at the subversion of the late arrangement, must be supposed to originate either in an apprehension that it is directed to objects injurious to his just rights and independence, and to the general interests of the Mahratta empire, or in an impatience of that effectual control to which his ambitious and unwarrantable projects are subjected by the provisions of the alliance concluded with his Highness the Peishwa. With a view to remove from Scindiah's mind any erroneous impression with regard to the real objects of that alliance, and to convince

him of the justice and moderation of our views, his Excellency directed you in my note of the 5th ultimo to communicate to Scindiah the whole of the treaty of Bassein, and explain to that chief, in the fullest manner, the general principles on which it is founded, and the just and moderate views to which it is directed. You were authorized at the same time, if Scindiah should desire it, to furnish him with a copy of the treaty. You will state to Scindiah that the uniform object of the endeavours of the Governor-General has been to establish a permanent foundation of general tranquillity in India, by securing to every state the free enjoyment of its just rights and independence, and by frustrating every project calculated to disturb the possessions, or to violate the rights of the established powers of Hindostan or of the Deccan. You will observe to Scindiah that the treaty of Bassein is founded on the application of this general principle to the circumstances of his Highness the Peishwa's situation and government, and you will particularly explain to Scindiah that, while the treaty of Bassein established his Highness the Peishwa in the full and independent exercise of his legitimate authority in the Mahratta state, it provides the most effectual security for the preservation of the respective interests and possessions of all the Mahratta chieftains within the limits of their separate dominions and authorities; that the treaty being exclusively of a defensive nature, imposes no restraint upon any state or power which shall respect the rights and possessions of the British Government and of its allies, and that no right or power to interfere in the internal concerns of any of the Mahratta chiefs can be derived from the stipulations of that treaty beyond the limits of the Peishwa's legitimate authority, to maintain which is equally the duty of his Highness's subjects, feudatories, and allies. Finally, you will endeavour to convince Dowlut Rao Scindiah, that in concluding the late alliance with his Highness the Peishwa, the objects of the Governor-General are to secure the British dominions and those of our ally the Nizam from the dangers of contiguous anarchy and confusion, to fulfil the duties of friendship towards our ally the Peishwa, and to provide at the same time for the safety of the several branches of the Mahratta empire, without disturbing the constitutional form of the state, and without

affecting the legitimate independence of its feudatory chieftains; and that this course of policy must tend to strengthen the bonds of amity and alliance with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, as well as with every other branch of the Mahratta power.

It will be proper that you should point out to Dowlut Rao Scindiah those stipulations of the treaty of Bassein which contain an explicit disavowal of any intention on the part either of his Highness the Peishwa, or of the British Government, to molest any of the Mahratta chieftains who shall not place himself in the condition of a public enemy by the adoption of measures hostile to the rights and interests of the British Government and its allies.

Although it may not be difficult to convince Dowlut Rao Scindiah of the justice and moderation of our views in concluding the late alliance with the Peishwa, and to remove from his mind all apprehension of danger to the security of his legitimate rights and independence from the operation of the treaty of Bassein, it is not to be expected that he will be immediately disposed to subscribe cordially to an arrangement by which the prosecution of his known projects of ambition will be effectually controlled, and his ascendancy in the state of Poonah will be permanently excluded. You will observe to Scindiah, however, that his ascendancy at Poonah had, in fact, been annihilated by the success of Holkar before Scindiah applied for the interposition of the British power, and that the success of Holkar had at the same time greatly endangered the existence of Scindiah as a power in India. If, therefore, in the restoration of the Peishwa to his Highness's legitimate authority, a due restraint has been imposed on the usurpations of Scindiah, as well as on those of Holkar, upon the established supreme power of the Mahratta empire; Scindiah should be taught to reflect that by submitting to this sacrifice he will acquire additional security to his own legitimate power, and that he has already derived the preservation of a considerable part of his dominions from the check which has been opposed to the progress of Holkar's arms.

You will be prepared to oppose any arguments founded on Scindiah's alleged rights and privileges, as a branch of the Mahratta empire, by which Scindiah may contest the right of the Peishwa to conclude political engagements with the Bri-

tish Government, or with any foreign power, without the previous consent and concurrence of the feudatory chieftains, or may endeavour to justify his interference in the late arrangements, or assert a right to participation in the future administration of the Peishwa's affairs.

Under the instructions of his Excellency the Governor-General you have already successfully combated the principle assumed by Dowlut Rao Scindiah that, as guarantee to the treaty of Salbye,* his previous consent to the engagements between the British Government and the Peishwa should have been obtained. No such principle can, in his Excellency's judgment, be maintained by any arguments derived either from the original constitution of the Mahratta empire, or from the actual practice of the several chieftains composing the Mahratta confederacy. The exclusive right of concluding treaties and engagements with foreign states, not of a nature to compromise the separate rights and interests of the feudatory chieftains of the empire, must be considered to be inherent in the supreme executive authority of the Mahratta state, and it may be a question whether the Peishwa, acting in the name and under the ostensible sanction of the nominal head of the empire, might not conclude treaties which shall be obligatory upon the subordinate chiefs and feudatories without their concurrence. But even under a contrary supposition, it would be absurd to regulate any political question by the standard of a constitution which time and events have entirely altered or dissolved. The late Mahajee Scindiah and his successor Dowlut Rao have uniformly exercised the powers of independent dominion by making war on the neighbouring states, by concluding engagements with them, and by regulating the whole system of their internal administration without the participation or previous consent of the Peishwa, whose supremacy, however, both Mahajee Scindiah and Dowlut Rao Scindiah have uniformly acknowledged.

Dowlut Rao Scindiah, therefore, cannot, even on the sup-

* Treaty of peace, friendship, and alliance, concluded with the Peishwa, Madhou Row, through the mediation and under the guarantee of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's predecessor Mahajee Scindiah at Salbye in 1782. Neither the treaty nor the guarantee *was*, or, from the nature of the stipulations, *could* be hereditary; moreover, the state of things to which those stipulations refer had long been obsolete.

posed principles of the original constitution, deny the right of the Peishwa to conclude his late engagements with the British Government independently of his concurrence, without impeaching the validity of his own proceedings and those of his predecessor; nor can he, according to the more admissible rules derived from practice and prescription, justly refuse to admit the exercise of those independent rights of dominion on the part of the Peishwa, which both Scindiah and his predecessor assumed in a condition of acknowledged subordination to his Highness's permanent authority.

The Rajah of Berar is known to entertain pretensions to the authority of the Sahoo Rajah,* and on the accession of a Peishwa, he is admitted to the privilege of investing the Peishwa with a khelaut. Under these circumstances, the Rajah of Berar's acknowledgement of subordination to the paramount authority of the Peishwa may be doubted. But while the Peishwa continues to exercise that authority in his capacity of representative of the Sahoo Rajah, the Rajah of Berar, cannot possess the right of controlling the Peishwa's actions.

In proportion as the Rajah of Berar disclaims the supremacy of the Peishwa, he has less right to interfere in any degree in the Peishwa's concerns. The Peishwa must be considered by the Rajah of Berar, either as the representative of the Rajah of Berar's paramount Sovereign, or as an independent state, in amity with the Rajah of Berar, or as a power acknowledged by every other state in India, but which it is the secret design of the Rajah of Berar to subvert, with a view to supersede its authority for his own aggrandizement. In any of these cases, and more especially in the last, the other powers of India cannot admit the right of the Rajah of Berar to control the Peishwa's intercourse with other states, unless the Peishwa shall attempt to injure the independence of the Rajah of Berar.

The arguments stated in the preceding paragraphs are equally applicable to Dowlut Rao Scindiah's assumption of

* The nominal head of the Mahratta empire, kept in close confinement, although treated with all the outward forms of sovereignty. At the close of the war of 1817-18 he was invested by the British Government with the sovereignty of an extensive territory in the ancient capital of Sattarah, the place of his anterior confinement.

a right to interfere in any manner in the arrangement concluded between the British Government and the Peishwa, or in the future administration of his Highness's affairs; such interference is incompatible with the complete and effectual operation of our engagements with his Highness, and the right to secure their due operation, is necessarily combined with the right to contract them.

Scindiah cannot justly deny the right of the Peishwa and of the British Government to conclude the terms of a defensive alliance without his previous consent, nor claim the right of interfering in the arrangement or in the future administration of the Peishwa's affairs on the grounds of his having employed his arms and resources in the support of the Peishwa's cause.

Scindiah did not originally take up arms for the defence of the Peishwa. He had long been engaged in a contest with Jeswunt Rao Holkar, whose frequent successes and increasing power menaced the security of Scindiah's dominion, and the unsuccessful resistance which the forces of Dowlut Rao Scindiah opposed to those of Holkar in the vicinity of Poonah was merely a continuation of the contest. The efforts of Scindiah to check the progress of Holkar's arms were necessary for the preservation of his own power, and the object of his exertions was not changed by the danger to which the state of Poonah was exposed by the approach of Holkar to that capital. The preservation of Scindiah's usurped ascendancy in the state of Poonah, and the security of his own dominion, which would have been more than ever endangered by the establishment of Holkar at the capital of Poonah, rendered the protection of the person and government of the Peishwa an object of individual interest to Scindiah, and the same motives must be supposed to have influenced his subsequent operations. His exertions, however, have not contributed in any degree to the Peishwa's restoration. Aware of the doubtful issue of a further contest with the arms of Holkar, Scindiah solicited the co-operation of the British power, and continued in a state of inactivity at a considerable distance from the scene of action. The energy, promptitude, and power of the British Government were the exclusive causes which compelled Jeswunt Rao Holkar to abandon his design of subverting the dominion of the Peishwa

and of establishing his own authority upon its ruins, and to retire from Poonah; deprived him of the means of supporting his military power, and secured the restoration of the Peishwa to his capital and government; and to these seasonable and arduous exertions of the British power, Scindiah is absolutely indebted for the present secure possession of his dominion.

The combined result of all these facts and arguments is, that the interposition of the British power for the restoration of the Peishwa, and the conclusion of the late alliance with the State of Poonah, is not only warrantable upon every principle of justice, and the law of nations, but indispensably necessary for the preservation of the integrity of the Mahratta empire, and to the security of the legitimate rights and interests of its respective branches, and especially of Scindiah. That those rights and interests are effectually secured by the terms of the alliance, and consequently that any attempt on the part of any state or chieftain, to disturb the operation of the treaty of Bassein, may justly be considered to be an act of hostility against the British Government.

Under all these circumstances we possess an undoubted right to require that Dowlut Rao Scindiah should afford the most unequivocal proofs of his resolution to abstain from the adoption of any measures, which we may deem to be calculated to impede the accomplishment of the late arrangements in the Mahratta state.

The most satisfactory evidence of that intention would be the immediate return of Scindiah to his dominions, north of the Nerbuddah, and if the report of an accommodation of differences between that chieftain, and Jeswunt Rao Holkar, be well founded, Scindiah cannot reasonably object to comply with your requisition for that purpose. Scindiah may however maintain, that his continuance to the southward of that river is necessary for the purpose of opposing the hostile designs of Holkar, or for adjusting the terms of an accommodation with that chieftain. In either of those events, your own judgment, and the knowledge which you will possess of the actual state of affairs in the Mahratta territory to the southward of the Nerbuddah, will enable you in concert with Major-General Wellesley, and with Colonel Close, to determine whether this objection is well founded, or whether it is stated merely as a pretext for Scindiah's refusal to comply

with your requisition. In the latter case, you will distinctly explain to Scindiah, that his continuance in that position without any other apparent motive connected with the security of his just rights, and with the exigency of his affairs, can only be considered to indicate designs injurious to the combined interests of the British Government, and its allies, and will render necessary the immediate adoption of the most active measures to compel his return within the limits of his northern dominions.

If Scindiah should be sincerely desirous of effecting an accommodation with Jeswunt Rao Holkar, you will offer the mediation of the British Government for that purpose, consulting with Major-General Wellesley, and with Colonel Close, respecting the terms of any such accommodation.

If it should appear to you that any important interests of Dowlut Rao Scindiah would be exposed to hazard by his immediate return towards Hindostan, you are at liberty to recede from this requisition, provided that Scindiah shall afford some other unequivocal proof of his determination to refrain from any attempt to obstruct the complete operation of the treaty of Bassein, and that proof shall be satisfactory to Major-General Wellesley, and to Colonel Close, with whom you will communicate fully on this subject; but it will be proper to apprize Scindiah that his proceeding to Poonah under any pretext whatever, excepting the express permission of his Highness the Peishwa approved by the British Government, will infallibly involve him in hostilities with the British power. If Scindiah should be permitted by the Peishwa, Major-General Wellesley and Colonel Close, to proceed to Poonah, Scindiah must not be accompanied by any number of troops exceeding the strength of a reasonable escort of state. If Scindiah should urge the necessity of his proceeding to Poonah, for the purpose of adjusting any demands which he may have on the Peishwa, you will inform him that the British Government is ready to arbitrate such demands on principles of justice and equity, and that under that proffered security for the equitable adjustment of his claims, his proceeding to Poonah in person for that purpose, is neither necessary nor admissible.

The repeated information which his Excellency the Governor-General has received of a projected confederacy between

Scindiah, the Rajah of Berar, and Jeswunt Rao Holkar, renders it necessary in his Excellency's judgment, that Scindiah should be required either to disavow such intended confederacy, or distinctly to declare the object of it.

If Scindiah should avow that design, or should declare his intention to march for the purpose of meeting the Rajah, of Berar, without affording a satisfactory explanation with regard to the object of that proceeding, or if you should obtain authentic intelligence of any such design on the part of Scindiah, and if he should not afford you a satisfactory explanation according to the spirit of these instructions, you will intimate to Scindiah, that in the actual situation of affairs the British Government will be justified in considering that proceeding to be directed to purposes hostile to its interests, and those of its allies, and will be compelled to adopt corresponding measures of precaution and defence; and you will signify to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, that his intended interview with Ragojee Bhoousla will not be considered as a sufficient plea for postponing his return to Hindostan, unless preceded by the most satisfactory proofs of the pacific designs of those chieftains. You will inform Scindiah, that his Excellency the Governor-General has addressed a representation in the spirit of these instructions to the Rajah of Berar, and has expressed to that chieftain his resolution to anticipate any sinister project on his part, with the utmost degree of promptitude and alacrity.

You will also require from Scindiah an explanation with regard to the object of any confederacy meditated, or concluded between him and Jeswunt Rao Holkar.

You are already in possession of the instructions of the Governor-General for the eventual negotiation of the terms of a defensive alliance with Dowlut Rao Scindiah. It will be proper on this occasion to renew the Governor-General's propositions to Scindiah for that purpose, informing him, that his Excellency is disposed either to admit him as a contracting party to the treaty of Bassein, or to conclude a separate subsidiary alliance with him, and stating to him the manifest advantages to the stability of his government, and to the prosperity of his affairs, which the proposed connection is calculated to secure. But if the dictates of an erroneous policy should induce Scindiah to

reject those proposals, you will assure him that the British Government will not be offended at his refusal, that he is at liberty to remain entirely unconnected with the British power, and that this government will continue to maintain the relations of amity and peace, which have so long subsisted between the two states, and to abstain from any attempt to injure his rights, or control his independence, unless the circumstances of his conduct should compel the British Government to pursue an opposite course of measures. You will at the same time apprize Scindiah of the determined resolution of the Governor-General to resist with the full force and energy of the British power, any attempt on his part, or on that of any other power, or state, to obstruct the operation of the treaty of Bassein, or to injure the interests of the British Government, or of its allies, and that the formation of any confederacy or the prosecution of any military operations on the part of Scindiah, in opposition to the repeated remonstrances of the British Government, will compel the adoption of measures of precaution on our part on every boundary of Scindiah's dominions.

The first pledge of Scindiah's amicable intention, even if he should be disposed to accede to the treaty of Bassein, must be his immediate return to the northward of the Nurbuddah, excepting under the circumstances stated in the first paragraph of this despatch; you will however, be particularly cautious in regulating your conduct by the tenor of any of those exceptions, which have been admitted by the Governor-General, rather for the purpose of removing any undue obstacle to the exercise of your discretion under any local exigency which may arise, than from any expectation that Scindiah can afford the British Government any satisfactory security for his pacific disposition, while he shall remain with an army to the southward of the Nurbuddah. The expediency of Scindiah's return to the northward may be enforced by an exposition of the danger to which Scindiah's dominion and possessions will be exposed, by his perseverance in a system of policy which must be considered to be hostile to the British Government and its allies.

The nature of the existing connection between the honourable Company, and his Highness the Nizam, is so well known to Scindiah, that he must be aware of the consequences of any

aggression against that ally of the British Government, but it may be proper to remind Scindiah on this occasion, that any attack on the territories of his Highness will be considered to be an act of hostility against the British Government, and will be resented with the whole force of the British power.

His Excellency the Governor-General confidently expects, that the amicable representations which you are instructed to make to Scindiah, will convince that chief of the justice and moderation of our views in concluding the late alliance with his Highness the Peishwa, and will induce him to refrain from the adoption of any measure directed to the subversion of that alliance, and injurious to the rights and interests of the British Government and its allies.

Scindiah must be sensible of the peculiar disadvantages under which he would enter upon a contest with the British arms, although supported by the combined power of the Rajah of Berar, and of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and must be aware that his temerity in provoking the resentment of the British Government must expose to imminent hazard the existence of his own power.

You have already been furnished with a copy of his Excellency the Governor-General's detailed instructions to the resident at Poonah, and you will have been apprized by those instructions of the precautionary measures which have been adopted with a view to eventual hostilities with Scindiah, Holkar, or the Rajah of Berar.

Copies of these instructions will be transmitted to the Honourable Major-General Wellesley, and to the Residents at Poonah, and Hyderabad, you will be careful to apprize his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief at Cawnpore, from time to time, of the temper and disposition of Scindiah, and of the effect of the remonstrances which you have been directed to address to that chief.

You will receive by this despatch from the Persian department, a letter which his Excellency the Governor-General has thought proper to address to Dowlut Rao Scindiah on the present occasion, you will deliver that letter to Dowlut Rao Scindiah at such time as you may judge most advisable.

I have the honour to be, &c.

N. B. EDMONSTONE,
Sec. to Government.

(Enclosure.)

*The Marquess Wellesley to Dowlut Rao Scindiah.*

Fort William, June 3, 1803

I have received the satisfactory intelligence of his Highness the Peishwa's actual restoration to the musnud of Poonah, under the protection of the British power, and in conformity to the treaty of defensive alliance concluded at Bassein between his Highness and the British Government.

You have long since been apprized of the general nature of the engagements concluded with his Highness the Peishwa; and I received with great satisfaction from Colonel Collins the information of your entire concurrence in the expediency and wisdom of the measures undertaken by the British Government for his Highness's restoration, accompanied by a declared intention on your part to abstain from any measures calculated to obstruct the completion of the arrangements established under the treaty of Bassein.

This resolution manifested your wisdom as well as your good faith. And your declaration to Colonel Collins was conformable to the principles of prudence and policy which dictated your direct application contained in your letter, received 13th of December, 1802, for the co-operation of the British power for the purpose of restoring his Highness the Peishwa to the musnud.

With this experience of your public declarations, and in possession of your authentic letters under your signature and seal, I am disposed to discredit the reports which have reached me, of the formation of a confederacy between you, the Rajah of Berar, and Jeswunt Rao Holkar, directed to the subversion of the arrangements concluded at Bassein; nor can I credit the rumour of your supposed intention to meet the Rajah of Berar on the frontier of his Highness the Nizam's dominions, in order to concert, with that chieftain, the measures to be adopted for the purpose of defeating the treaty lately concluded between the British Government and his Highness the Peishwa. The credit of these reports is, however, in some degree sustained by the information which I have received of your having actually marched in the direction of the Nizam's frontier, and of the Rajah of Berar having entered his tents with a design of meeting you.

Compelled reluctantly to direct my attention to reports, of which I still hope that you will enable me to detect the falsehood, the obligations of friendship, as well as the laws of prudence and precaution require, that I should declare to you, without reserve, my sentiments and resolutions in the event of your actually entertaining the design of interfering between the British Government and any of its allies, especially the Nizam or the Peishwa, or of violating the rights or possessions of the Company, or of any state connected with it by alliance or friendship. The interposition of the British power for the restoration of his Highness the Peishwa to the musnud, and the arrangements concluded between his Highness and the British Government, in no degree disturb your just rights and authority, or the general interests and prosperity of the Mahratta empire. Before

this despatch can reach you, you will have been apprized of the full extent of the engagements concluded between his Highness the Peishwa and the British Government, by the treaty of Bassein. An examination of the articles of the treaty will demonstrate the justice, moderation, and honourable policy of those engagements; and a review of the late transactions on the Mahratta empire will be sufficient to convince you that the interposition of the aid of the British Government for the restoration of his Highness the Peishwa to the musnud of Poonah, far from having a tendency to subvert the order of the Mahratta state, afforded the only means of averting confusion, and of providing for the future security and tranquillity of every branch of the Mahratta power.

The success of Jeswunt Rao Holkar had completely established the ascendency of his power in the Mahratta state; and his views have been demonstrated by his attempt to destroy the Peishwa's government, and to assume the entire authority of the Mahratta empire. You must acknowledge the danger to which your interests and those of the other Mahratta chieftains were exposed by the extraordinary success of Jeswunt Rao Holkar. In the moment of his victory your prudence and wisdom foresaw the approaching ruin of your own power; and in the persuasion that the progress of his success must destroy your dominions, you solicited and obtained the powerful and seasonable aid of the British Government. The Mahratta empire and your power have been preserved by the timely interposition of the British Government, at a moment when the distance of your army from the scene of action precluded the possibility of any effectual aid from you.

The arrangements connected with the interposition of the British Government have effected the restoration, and provided for the future stability of the Peishwa's just authority, and have afforded additional security for the legitimate and separate rights of the feudatory chieftains of the empire.

Under the treaty of Bassein those chieftains are effectually protected against any molestation, either on the part of his Highness the Peishwa or the British Government, unless any chief should place himself in the condition of a public enemy to the state; at the same time an option is afforded to all the principal chieftains of participating in the defensive alliance.

The constitution of the Mahratta state, and the authority of various precedents have established the independent right of his Highness the Peishwa to contract with foreign powers, all such engagements as shall not affect the separate rights and interests of his feudatory chieftains. That right is inherent in the supreme executive authority of the Mahratta state.

The objects of the treaty of Bassein are to secure the British dominions and those of our ally the Nizam from the dangers of contiguous anarchy and confusion, to fulfil the duties of friendship towards our ally the Peishwa; and to provide at the same time for the safety of the several branches of the Mahratta empire, without disturbing the constitutional form of the state, and without affecting the legitimate independence of its feudatory

chieftains. This course of policy is calculated to strengthen the bonds of amity and alliance with your Government, as well as with every other branch of the Mahratta power.

Under these circumstances, therefore, I deem it necessary to signify to you my determined resolution to accomplish the provisions of the treaty now concluded with his Highness the Peishwa; any attempt on the part of any state or power to obstruct the operation of that treaty, any combinations among the Mahratta chieftains directed to that purpose, must be deemed an act of hostile aggression against the Peishwa and the British Government.

I have been informed by Colonel Collins that it is your intention to proceed with your army to Poonah. The original object of your march towards that capital having been completely accomplished by the exertions of the British power, the prosecution of your march to Poonah is obviously unnecessary for any purpose connected either with your own security, or with the interests of his Highness the Peishwa. I shall, therefore, be justified in considering that measure to be an unequivocal indication of your resolution to attempt the subversion of the late arrangement concluded between his Highness and the British Government, and in that event the British Government will be compelled to adopt measures calculated to counteract such unwarrantable designs.

For the same reason, your continuance to the southward of the Nurbuddah, at the head of a powerful body of your forces, is equally unnecessary, and is calculated to excite apprehensions with regard to the nature of your designs. I confidently expect, therefore, to receive early intelligence of your having commenced your return to the northward of that river.

The British Government is disposed to arbitrate, on principles of equity and justice, any demands which you may have on his Highness the Peishwa. The settlement of such demands, therefore, cannot be considered to be a justifiable plea for your proceeding to Poonah. The British Government is also willing to arbitrate any differences which may subsist between you and Jeswunt Rao Holkar, with whom it is my wish to maintain peace, provided he shall manifest a disposition to relinquish every inordinate pretension, and to accept reasonable terms of accommodation with the Peishwa, and with the other powers whose dominions he has invaded, and whose rights he has violated.

If the reports of your intention to enter into a confederacy with the Rajah of Berar should be well founded, the British Government has a right to expect that you will explain the motives and objects of such a confederacy, with the same degree of candour which I have manifested in communicating to you the views and intentions of the British Government, in concluding the late arrangements with his Highness the Peishwa. I deem it necessary to apprize you that I have addressed to the Rajah of Berar representations similar to those contained in this letter. I have expressed to that chieftain my solicitude to maintain with him, unimpaired, the relations of peace and amity; and I have at the same time communicated to him my resolution to resist any attempt, on his part, either singly, or com-

bined with any other state, to obstruct the full accomplishment of the treaty of Bassein.

I further deem it to be necessary to remind you, that in conformity to defensive engagements subsisting between the British Government and his Highness the Nizam, any attack upon his Highness's territories must be considered to be an act of aggression against the British Government.

It is my earnest desire to maintain with you the relations of amity and peace: but at the same time it is my determined resolution to resist any attempt on your part to violate the rights, or to injure the interests of the British Government, or of its allies.

If a just regard to the real interests and prosperity of your Government should dispose you to conclude defensive engagements with the honourable Company, similar to those which have been contracted with his Highness the Peishwa, I shall be ready to enter into a negociation with you for that purpose. The ties of friendship, however, will not be relaxed by your resolution to remain unconnected with the powers allied by the treaties of Hyderabad and Bassein.

Whatever may be your determination with regard to this proposal, I shall continue to maintain, with cordial solicitude, the relations of amity and peace which have so long subsisted between the British Government and you, unless you shall compel me to pursue a contrary course. I trust to your wisdom and good faith, that you will rather endeavour to strengthen the ties of amity and good will, than to favour the evil designs of the enemies of both states, by listening to any counsels adverse to the stability of the friendship which now happily subsists between us.

I have instructed Colonel Collins to communicate fully with you on all the points stated in this letter, to which I shall anxiously expect to receive a speedy and amicable reply.

(Signed.) WELLESLEY.

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## No. XXXII.

*The Marquess Wellesley to his Highness the Peishwa.*

Fort William, 9th June, 1803.

I have received with sentiments of the most cordial satisfaction, the happy intelligence of your Highness's return to Poonah, and of your restoration to your dominions and government, to the free exercise of your independent authority, and to the secure enjoyment of your dignity and honour. On this prosperous result of your auspicious alliance with the British Government, I offer to your Highness my sincere congratulations. The happy event of your Highness's res-

toration was proclaimed at this capital by every distinction of military honour, and of public rejoicing on the same day, on which the intelligence of your return to the city of Poonah reached me; and I have ordered similar demonstrations of joy to be manifested at all the principal stations throughout the British possessions in India.

Your Highness has been restored to the musnud of Poonah under every circumstance which could tend to provide for the efficient exercise of your authority, to secure your dignity and independence, and to preclude the return of evils similar to those from which your Highness has been happily relieved, by the good faith, energy, valour, and power of the British councils, and of the British army.

The situation in which your Highness has been placed since your departure from Poonah, has afforded sufficient experience of the conduct of your ally, to enable you to form a correct judgment of the character and views of the British Government, and of the real advantages which must be derived from the treaty of Bassein. Your Highness is therefore prepared to receive with the confidence of established friendship, a full explanation of the nature and extent of my views and expectations, in concluding the late arrangements with your Highness, and of the principles which will uniformly regulate the conduct of the British Government towards your Highness, and towards every branch of the Mahratta State. My endeavours have been anxiously employed for some years past, to establish between your Highness, and the British Government, such a connexion as might secure the stability and efficiency of your Highness's authority, without injury to the rights of your Highness, or to those of the confederate chieftains of the Mahratta empire. My efforts for that purpose were renewed at those seasons of difficulty and danger, when your independence was controlled, and when the existence of your government was exposed to hazard, by the violence, rapacity and ambition of your feudatory chieftains. Had your Highness then assented to the moderate and salutary proposition which I offered to your acceptance, you could not have been exposed to the disastrous event by which your Highness was expelled from Poonah, by which your authority was subverted, your person endangered, and your country, and your capital abandoned to devastation and

plunder. Your Highness is now convinced, that the powerful alliance, which, if seasonably formed, would have averted that calamity, afforded the only means of repairing its injurious consequences, by restoring your Highness to the free exercise of your authority in the state, and to the full enjoyment of your rights, dignity and independence.

Maha Rajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah could not easily have subdued Jeswunt Rao Holkar, whose troops had recently defeated the united armies of your Highness, and of Scindiah, and your Highness's experience of the control exercised over your authority by Dowlut Rao Scindiah must have convinced you, that even the success of Scindiah's arms against the rebel, and your Highness's return to the musnud of Poonah, under the protection of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, would have been followed by an humiliating subjection of your dignity and power, to the control of one of your Highness's feudatories and servants.

In the most desperate crisis of your Highness's affairs, I renewed my former proposition to your Highness, with the same limited views and equitable intentions to which it was originally directed. Without awaiting your Highness's assent to the articles of the proposed alliance, I immediately adopted the most active measures for the protection of your Highness's person, and for the restoration of your authority; and your Highness has remarked with satisfaction, the rapid and judicious movement of the British army under Major-General Wellesley, and the extraordinary effort by which that gallant and skilful officer saved your capital from destruction. The conduct of the British Government on this occasion, manifests the sincerity of my regard for your Highness's welfare, as well as the justice and moderation of my views. Reflecting on these circumstances, your Highness will rely on the stability of the alliance which you have wisely formed, and on the good faith, equity, and magnanimity of the powerful government which I represent.

My object is to establish a permanent foundation of general tranquillity in India, by securing to every state the free enjoyment of its just rights and independence, and by frustrating every project calculated to disturb the possessions, or to violate the rights of the established powers of Hindostan, or of the Deccan.

My propositions to your Highness were founded on the application of this general principle to the circumstances of your Highness's situation and government, and the stipulations of the treaty of Bassein have been framed exclusively with a view to maintain the general tranquillity of India, by preventing the destruction of your power, and by securing your just rights from violence and usurpation.

Under the treaty of Bassein, your Highness is restored to the exercise of your legitimate power, on the foundation of the support of the British Government; the Company is pledged to protect your Highness's dominions from any encroachment, either on the part of your feudatory chieftains, or of any foreign power, at the same time the most effectual security is provided for the preservation of the respective interests and possessions of all the Mahratta chieftains, within the limits of their separate dominions and authorities. The late treaty being exclusively of a defensive nature, imposes no restraint upon any state or power, which shall respect the rights and possessions of the British Government and its allies, nor can any right or power to interfere in the internal concerns of any of the Mahratta chiefs be derived from the stipulations of that treaty, beyond the limits of your Highness's legitimate authority, to maintain which is equally the duty of your subjects, feudatories, and allies.

The presence of the subsidiary force at Poonah will enable your Highness to enforce a due submission to your authority within your immediate dominions, and your Highness is entitled to command the exertion of the whole British power, in the event of any emergency, which may require the aid of the Company, for the protection and defence of your government and possessions.

It is neither consistent with the principle, nor necessary to the objects of the treaty, that the British Government should exercise any interference in the internal affairs of your Highness's immediate government of a nature injurious to your dignity and independence. The amicable right of mediation which the British Government derives from the treaty of Bassein, is manifestly necessary to the effectual operation of that general guarantee which constitutes a fundamental principle of the alliance, and which is equally essential to the preservation of your Highness's legitimate authority, and to

the security of the just rights and interests of other states. It is not the intention of the British Government to claim the exercise of the right of mediation, excepting in cases expressly warranted by the treaty of Bassein, or in those cases in which the British mediation has been rendered necessary by the measures adopted for the restoration of your Highness to the musnud of Poonah. Your Highness has justly appreciated the zeal, ability and success of the honourable Major-General Wellesley, in obtaining the co-operation of several of your Highness's southern Jageerdars for the support of your Highness's cause, and in securing their future attachment to your Highness's Government.

I received with great satisfaction from Lieut.-Colonel Close, the information of your Highness's declared resolution to distinguish by your favour, those among your Jageerdars, who on the faith of Major-General Wellesley's assurances have manifested their attachment to your Highness's cause, and I am happy to learn that your Highness had adopted measures for conciliating the general body of your subordinate Chiefs and Jageerdars,—your Highness must be sensible that the complete consolidation of your authority, must depend in a considerable degree upon the success of the measures which you may adopt, for the purpose of securing the attachment and duty of your subordinate Chiefs and Jageerdars. On this consideration I found a confident expectation that your Highness will readily admit the advice and mediation of the British Government in fulfilling the equitable claims, and in establishing the just rights and privileges of that class of your subjects.

The stipulation of the treaty which requires that your Highness should neither commence nor pursue any negotiations with any other state whatever without previous communication with the British Government, is obviously essential to the consolidation of the friendship of the two states; and it is a necessary consequence of the identity of interests established between your Highness and the British Government by the late alliance.

I have now stated to your Highness the utmost limit of my views and intentions in concluding the treaty of Bassein, and I trust that your Highness will be satisfied that the alliance is calculated to secure your Highness's just authority, dig-

nity, and independence, to preserve your dominions from internal anarchy and external danger, and to promote the happiness and tranquillity of your subjects, and the general prosperity of your government.

Your Highness cannot fail to have remarked the advantages enjoyed by his Highness the Nizam since the conclusion of engagements with the British Government, similar to those which have now been contracted with your Highness. While the independent authority of the Nizam over his subjects, and the internal order of his dominions and government have been considerably improved, the power and importance of the Court of Hyderabad among the states of India have been greatly augmented by the Nizam's connection with the British Government.

The vigilance and exertions of the British power, under the obligations of the treaty of Hyderabad, have been, on various occasions, successfully employed in suppressing the evils of internal commotion, and in protecting the Nizam's dominions from the encroachments and ambitious projects of external enemies; under the protection of the British power, the government of his Highness the Nizam has enjoyed uninterrupted security amidst the distractions and disorders which have disturbed the surrounding states of the Deccan, and which, if the British protection had been withdrawn must have agitated the Nizam's dominions. Your Highness will not fail to contrast the comparative order and regularity of the Nizam's government, under the protecting influence of the British power, with the confusions which have distracted the state of Poonah, and which must have endangered its existence, if your Highness had not solicited and obtained the powerful and seasonable protection of the British Government.

Your Highness will also contrast the condition of your authority and government, under the oppressive control and unwarrantable usurpation of your own chiefs or servants, with the freedom and independence of his Highness the Nizam's authority, under the operation of his defensive engagements with the Honourable Company.

Faithful to the fundamental principles of the treaties subsisting with the Nizam, the British Government has invariably limited the exertion of its power to the protection of

his Highness's person and government, and has manifested an uniform disposition to maintain inviolate the dignity and power of the Nizam, and to abstain from any infringement of his Highness's just authority within his own dominions.

Your Highness will, therefore, be satisfied by an attentive observation of the conduct of the British Government towards your Highness, towards the Nizam, and towards all our allies, that in concluding the late alliance with your Highness, my views and intentions have been just, amicable, and moderate, that your real and legitimate power is effectually secured by this alliance; and that under the operation of your engagements with the British Government, you may confidently expect to enjoy that tranquillity and security, accompanied by respect and honour, which you have never experienced under the oppressive influence of your own subjects, servants, or feudatory chieftains, and which you could never have attained by the aid of any other state or power.

My anxious exertions will be employed to maintain the alliance between the two states in the spirit of its original formation, and to cultivate your Highness's confidence and friendship by every demonstration of zeal for your prosperity and happiness, and of respect for your dignity, authority, and honour.

May these sentiments ever continue reciprocal, and may the bonds of amity between your Highness and the British Government be perpetuated by the mutual experience of an united interest, and by the confirmed sense of a common benefit to the allies, and to every state interested in the preservation of general tranquillity, or in the maintenance of a just system of harmony and order between the respective powers of India!

WELLESLEY.

For further particulars, I refer your Highness to the verbal communications of the Resident, Lieut.-Colonel Close.

## No. XXXIII.

*The Marquess Wellesley to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors.*

HONOURABLE SIRS, Fort William, June 20th, 1803.

In my despatch of the 19th of April, 1803,* forwarded overland, I had the honour to communicate to your honourable Committee the progress of transactions on the western side of the peninsula, to the period of my latest advices, and to state my sentiments respecting the situation of affairs in the Mahratta empire. The Resident at Poonah, in conformity to my instructions, has transmitted to your honourable Committee a narrative of occurrences in the Mahratta state to the 15th of May.

The intelligence of the important event of his Highness the Peishwa's restoration to the exercise of his just authority in the Mahratta state, under the protection of the British power, must have afforded great satisfaction to your honourable Committee. Every circumstance connected with that prosperous event justifies a confident expectation of the complete and pacific accomplishment of the beneficial objects of the late alliance with the Peishwa.

It is my duty, on this occasion, to express to your honourable Committee the high sense which I entertain of the distinguished ability manifested by the honourable Major-General Wellesley in conducting the British detachment, under his command, from the frontier of Mysore to Poonah.

The documents forming the enclosures to this despatch,† and transmitted by the *Devaynes*, will afford to your honourable Committee a full view of the considerable military skill with which Major-General Wellesley surmounted the difficulties of his long and arduous march; and combined the various arrangements requisite to secure the supply and movement of his army, and the co-operation and junction of the troops from Hyderabad and Bombay. Your honourable Committee will also observe with pleasure the prudence,

* See p. 72.

† Extracts of correspondence with Lord Clive, General Stuart, General Wellesley, Major Malcolm. [These documents are too voluminous to be published; their general contents are, however, sufficiently explained by the Governor-General in this letter.—ED.]

address, and temper with which Major-General Wellesley conciliated the Mahratta states occupying the countries through which he passed, and you will approve the signal success with which he composed the various animosities and dissensions of the several Mahratta chiefs, and united that discordant and turbulent race in the common cause of the Peishwa and of the British Government.

The particular attention of your honourable Committee will be directed to the judgment, humanity, and activity manifested by Major-General Wellesley in saving the city of Poonah from destruction by the rapid march and seasonable arrival of the British troops. This happy event impressed the inhabitants of that city with the most favourable opinion of the British power. It is a circumstance equally honourable to our character, and propitious to our interests in that quarter of India, that the first effects of the British influence in the Mahratta dominions should have been displayed in rescuing the capital of the empire from impending ruin, and its inhabitants from violence and rapine.

It will be satisfactory to your honourable Committee to be informed that his Highness the Peishwa has expressed the utmost degree of admiration in observing the promptitude, energy, and success of those exertions to which his Highness is indebted for his restoration to his government and dominions; and that the conduct of Major-General Wellesley, and of Lieut.-Colonel Close, on this occasion, has apparently established in his Highness's mind the most implicit confidence in the good faith, justice, and power of the British Government, and in the valour, skill, and integrity of its officers, with a high sense of the benefits which his Highness must derive from the operation of the late alliance on every branch of his interests and affairs.

From the enclosed copy of my latest advices from the Resident at Poonah,* your honourable Committee will observe the disposition of the Peishwa to conform to the advice and recommendation of the British Government, in the adoption of

* Letter from the Resident at Poonah, under date 21st of May, 1803. [It would require several volumes to give the whole of the enclosures referred to by the Governor-General in his correspondence, and transmitted by his Lordship to England; their contents, purport, and tenor, are sufficiently detailed in the letters commenting on them.—*Ed.*]

every measure necessary to consolidate his Highness's authority, and to accomplish the objects of the treaty of Bassein; and you will find that his Highness's confidence in the British Government has been increased, and has received additional confirmation by every event which has occurred since his Highness has resorted to our protection for the recovery of his rights.

Although the information contained in Lieut.-Colonel Close's address to your honourable Committee, and the tenor of my latest advices from the courts of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar tend to countenance the rumours of a projected confederacy between those chieftains and Jeswunt Rao Holkar, the existence of any such confederacy is still a subject of considerable doubt. If any such combination has been formed, its object is probably restricted to purposes of a defensive nature, without involving any views of hostility towards the British power. The local situation and comparative power and resources of Scindiah and Ragojee Bhoousla preclude the apprehension of any attempt of those chiefs to subvert the Peishwa's government, or the treaty of Bassein, at the desperate hazard of a war with the British power. The situation of Holkar is precarious and accidental; the instability of the resources of that adventurer reduces the continuance of his power to the utmost degree of uncertainty, and absolutely deprives him of the means of opposing any systematic or formidable resistance to the operation of our alliance with the state of Poonah. With a view, however, to anticipate every possible contingency, I have framed and despatched the instructions and letters which are annexed to this despatch, and are noted in the margin.*

Anxious to furnish the Resident at Poonah and Major-General Wellesley with instructions for the regulation of their conduct immediately after the return of the Peishwa to Poonah, I have transmitted directions to those officers, in a despatch to the former of which a copy is enclosed.†

That despatch contained a general statement of the prin-

* 1. Notes of instructions to Colonel Collins, and letter of 5th of May; 2. Instructions to ditto, 3rd of June, see p. 120; 3. Letter to Scindiah, 3rd of June; 4. Letter to the Rajah of Berar, 13th of May, see p. 99.

† See p. 106.

ciples on which the late treaty with the Peishwa is founded, of the objects to which it is directed, and of the measures necessary to be pursued for securing the complete operation and stability of the alliance between the Company and the Mahrattas, I, therefore, deem it sufficient to refer your honourable Committee to that document for information on those important points.

With a view to aid the effect of the representations which Lieut.-Colonel Close was instructed in that despatch to address to his Highness the Peishwa, I deemed it to be expedient to address a letter to his Highness,* a copy of that letter is also annexed to this despatch for the information of your honourable Committee.

Your honourable Committee was informed by Lieut.-Col. Close of the exactions levied by Jeswunt Rao Holkar upon his Highness the Nizam's city of Aurungabad, no reason exists to countenance an apprehension that these depredations on the Nizam's territory are connected with the supposed confederacy between Holkar and Scindiah. Destitute of any permanent resources, Holkar is compelled to supply his exigencies by indiscriminate plunder. It is probable that Holkar has been induced to levy contributions from Aurungabad by the treacherous suggestions of the Nizam's officer commanding at that station, who is believed to have participated in the booty.

Major-General Wellesley, however, deemed it to be proper to direct Lieut.-Colonel Stevenson to advance with the whole of the Nizam's subsidiary force towards Aurungabad for the eventual protection of his Highness's dominions. I have lately received information that Holkar has retired with his army from the Nizam's frontier towards the northward.

The judicious arrangements which Major-General Wellesley has effected for the disposition of the troops under his command is calculated to meet every exigency of affairs, even under the improbable supposition that Scindiah, the Rajah of Berar, and Jeswunt Rao Holkar have really entertained designs of a hostile nature against the British Government or its allies. Our early state of preparation, and the formidable force which Major-General Wellesley has opposed to every

* Letter to the Peishwa, dated 9th of June, p. 135.

possible operation on the part of any or of all those chieftains, must effectually deter them from the prosecution of war. In the same spirit of seasonable precaution Lieut.-General Stuart has judged it to be expedient to advance the army under his immediate command to a position which may enable him to co-operate with the troops under Major-General Wellesley and Colonel Stevenson.

My instructions to Colonel Collins, of the 5th of May,* and to Lieut.-Colonel Close, of the 7th of May,† together with my letter of the 15th of May, to the Rajah of Berar,‡ have probably already produced an arrangement of a pacific nature with all the chiefs of the Mahratta empire, whose formal accession to the treaty of Bassein has not yet been signified to me. The Peishwa having actually resumed his government, the stipulations of the treaty have been notified to Scindiah, and to the Rajah of Berar. The terms of the treaty must also have been known to Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and as the articles of the treaty provide a more effectual security for the possessions of Holkar and Scindiah than either could have attained under any other arrangement compatible with the existence of the Peishwa's power, it may be expected that a sense of their own interests will induce those chiefs to acquiesce in the settlement which has been effected at Poonah.

The depredations which have been committed by Holkar on the territories of the Nizam, unquestionably would furnish a just ground of war against that adventurer, if he were to be considered in the situation of an established power in India. But as the exactions at Aurungabad appear to have been levied with the concurrence of the Nizam's officers, whose faith had been long suspected, and as no principle of justice or policy requires the acknowledgment of Holkar among the states of India, I propose to view this transaction as the combined offence of two unfaithful servants of the states of Poonah and Hyderabad; and I shall not attempt to prosecute hostilities against Holkar, unless he shall endeavour by force to obstruct the operation of the treaty of Bassein. It will not be difficult to obtain sufficient satisfaction for the Nizam by pacific accommodation with Holkar, after the latter shall have submitted, formally, to the legitimate authority of the Peishwa.

* See p. 93, also p. 120. † See note in p. 106. ‡ See p. 99.

At the date of my latest advices from the Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, that chieftain had not proceeded beyond the frontier of his own territory. The Resident describes Dowlut Rao Scindiah to be personally disposed to pursue measures of an amicable nature towards the British Government, although it is possible that Scindiah may have been induced to signify a reluctant consent to the formation of the projected conspiracy by the urgency of his principal ministers.

This circumstance is confirmed by the communications which Colonel Collins has received from Ballajee Koonjur, the officer despatched by his Highness the Peishwa to Scindiah, for the purpose of explaining to that chieftain the detail of the engagements concluded by his Highness with the British Government.

I have received intelligence that the Rajah of Berar had entered his tents with a view of commencing his march from Nagpore, for the purpose of meeting Scindiah, but that the information of the arrival of the British troops at Poonah, which reached the Rajah of Berar soon after he entered his tents, would probably deter that chieftain from advancing.

Under all these circumstances, any opposition from the Mahratta chieftains to the complete accomplishment of the stipulations of the treaty of Bassein, appears to be improbable, and I entertain a firm hope that the British Government will be speedily relieved from the danger which menaced our possessions in the Peninsula during the recent commotion in the Mahratta empire, and that tranquillity will be permanently established on our frontier by the operation of the alliance happily concluded with his Highness the Peishwa.

By the annexed extract of a letter from Major-General Wellesley,* your honourable Committee will be enabled to form a competent judgment of the danger to which the tranquillity of Mysore, and of the Deccan, would have been exposed by the uninterrupted progress of disorder and confusion in the Mahratta empire; and you will estimate the advantages which have been derived from the success of the

* Extracts from letters from Major-General Wellesley to the Governor-General, Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4. See Appendix.

measures adopted by the British Government for removing the scene of war from our frontier, and for restoring the foundations of peace and good order.

By the despatch overland which will convey this letter, I have directed Lieut.-Colonel Close to submit to your honourable Committee the latest advices which may have reached him from the camps of Scindiah, Holkar, and the Rajah of Berar, with such further observations as may be necessary for your information.

It would be injustice to Lieut.-Colonel Close to suffer this despatch to depart, without adding my earnest request, that your honourable Committee may be pleased to direct your particular attention to the zeal, ability, and industry which have distinguished the eminent services of that valuable public officer during the late important crisis in the Mahratta empire.

In adverting to the conduct of Lieut.-Colonel Close at the Peishwa's court, your honourable Committee will remark with satisfaction the unabated continuance of those able, honest, and indefatigable exertions which furnished the most essential aid in the conquest and settlement of Mysore, and which have since contributed to establish through the Rajah's government a system of internal administration calculated to augment and secure the happiness and prosperity of the inhabitants of that flourishing country.

Reviewing the general state of affairs, your honourable Committee will concur in the sentiments of confidence and satisfaction with which I reflect that the final accomplishment of the arrangements happily commenced at Poonah, is entrusted to the approved abilities of Major-General Wellesley and Lieut.-Colonel Close.

In closing this despatch, it will be satisfactory to your honourable Committee, that I should add my expectation that the necessary expense of the late military operations in the Peninsula is not likely to occasion any derangement in the general prosperity of the finances of the Company in India, or in the accounts or services of the present year.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

## No. XXXIV.

*The Marquess Wellesley to the Honourable Major-General Wellesley.*

(Secret.)

SIR, Fort William, June 26th, 1803.

The present state of affairs in the Mahratta empire, and the security of the alliance lately concluded between his Highness the Peishwa and the British Government require, that a temporary authority should be constituted at the least possible distance from the scene of eventual negotiation or hostilities, with full powers to conclude upon the spot whatever arrangements may become necessary either for the final settlement of peace, or for the active prosecution of war. In such a crisis, various questions may arise of which the precise tendency cannot be foreseen, and which may demand a prompt decision. The issue of these questions may involve the result of war or peace, and in either alternative the delay of reference to my authority might endanger the seasonable despatch and the ultimate prosperity of the public service.

The success of the military operations now placed under your directions may depend on the timely decision of various political questions which may occur with relation to the interests and views of the several Mahratta Chiefs and Jaggeerdars, and of their Highnesses the Peishwa and the Nizam; on the other hand, the issue of every political arrangement now under negotiation with the powers of Hindostan, or the Deccan, must be inseparably blended with the movements of your army.

It is therefore necessary during the present crisis to unite the general direction and control of all political and military affairs in Hindostan and the Deccan under a distinct local authority, subject to the Governor-General in Council. These powers could not be placed with advantage in any other hands than those of the general officer commanding the troops destined to restore the tranquillity of the Deccan.

Your approved ability, zeal, temper, activity, and judgment, combined with your extensive local experience, your established influence, and high reputation among the Mahratta Chiefs and States, and your intimate knowledge of my

views and sentiments concerning the British interests in the Mahratta empire, have determined me to vest these important and arduous powers in your hands.

The nature of your military command under the orders of his Excellency Lieut.-General Stuart is not likely to admit any doubt, or to lead to any embarrassment. In order, however, to obviate all possible difficulty on this point, I hereby appoint you to the chief command of all the British troops, and of the forces of our allies serving in the territories of the Peishwa, of the Nizam, or of any of the Mahratta states or chiefs, subject only to the orders of his Excellency Lieut.-General Stuart, or of his Excellency General Lake.

I further empower and direct you to assume and exercise the general direction and control of all the political and military affairs of the British Government in the territories of the Nizam, of the Peishwa, and of the Mahratta states and chiefs.

The instructions addressed to the Resident at Poonah convey to you full authority to carry into complete effect all the measures therein provisionally prescribed, as far as the accomplishment of those measures may depend upon your proceedings, without previous reference to my authority.

I hereby confirm that authority, and I further vest you with full powers to decide any question which may arise in the prosecution of the measures prescribed by those orders, according to the general spirit of my views and intentions concerning the affairs of the Mahratta state, directing you however to refer to me in all cases in which a previous reference to my authority may not appear to hazard the public interests. Under the same reservation, I authorize and empower you to commence and conclude negotiations with any of the Mahratta Chiefs and Jaggeerdars on the part of the British Government, for the purpose of promoting the general objects of the alliance lately concluded with his Highness the Peishwa, or of that subsisting with his Highness the Nizam.

This general authority especially empowers you either directly or through the representatives or officers of the British Government to negotiate and conclude any engagements with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, with the Rajah of Berar, or with Jeswunt Rao Holkar, which may induce those chieftains to retire with their forces within the limits of their respective

dominions, or to afford any other satisfactory pledge of their respective pacific intentions towards the British Government and its allies. You will be careful to form any such engagements on principles conformable to the dignity, honour and interests of the British Government and of its allies, and to the spirit and tenor of our subsisting treaties. You are also authorized under this instruction to arbitrate on the part of the British Government the terms of any convention between his Highness the Peishwa and those chieftains respectively, for the settlement of mutual differences or demands, or for the adjustment of relative pretensions, and to pledge the guarantee of the British Government for the observance of those terms by the contracting parties. You are also empowered to arbitrate and guarantee the terms of accommodation between Scindiah and Holkar, if any points should yet remain unadjusted between those chieftains; and to frame, negotiate, and guarantee any terms between those chieftains jointly or separately, and the Rajah of Berar. It is my particular intention by these instructions to enable you to conclude such arrangements with any of those chieftains either separately or combined, as may preclude or frustrate any confederacy, or other measures directed to the subversion of the treaty of Bassein, or to the injury of our rights and interests, or those of our allies.

You are also empowered to conclude such engagements with any subordinate chieftains of the Mahratta state as may appear to you to be expedient for the purpose of securing their co-operation in the event of hostilities between the British Government and Scindiah, the Rajah of Berar, Jeswunt Rao Holkar, or any other power. You are authorized further to adopt the necessary measures for conciliating the obedience of the subordinate chiefs to the Peishwa's authority.

In the actual relation of the British Government to the Peishwa we possess the right of securing to the Chiefs and Jaggeerdars of the Mahratta empire the satisfaction of their just and equitable claims, even independently of any direct act of the Peishwa's Government. The exercise of that right becomes a duty in proportion to the danger with which the tardy, infirm, or erroneous proceedings of the Peishwa's Government may menace the security of the alliance, and the stability of his Highness's legitimate authority.

The policy of the treaty, and my inclination, would induce me to limit our interference in the internal affairs of the Peishwa's Government within the most moderate bounds. I am determined, however, to pursue that course which shall lead most directly and speedily to the full restoration and establishment of his Highness's authority on a permanent basis, and to the efficient operation of the benefits of the alliance. If the imbecility of his Highness's Councils, the defects of his personal character, or the intrigues of his servants should tend to frustrate or to retard the accomplishment of those salutary objects, the provisional interference of the British power must be seasonably and firmly applied to rescue his Highness from the immediate effects of evils which cannot be suffered to operate for a moment, without the hazard of every interest which the treaty of Bassein was destined to restore and to confirm.

You will, therefore, proceed without delay to conclude all such arrangements with his Highness's jaggeerdars and servants of all descriptions as may appear to you to be necessary to enable you to meet the exigencies of the present crisis; and you will not abstain from the most direct and even ostensible interposition of the British authority, which may in your judgment be requisite to secure the exertions, to animate the zeal, or to reward the services of the Peishwa's subjects and servants in the common cause of his Highness and of his allies. Whatever immediate expence may be necessary for this purpose will be defrayed at present by the British Government, and will hereafter become a charge against the Peishwa, as being inseparably connected with his Highness's restoration and establishment.

All such engagements as you may conclude with his Highness the Peishwa, and with any of the Mahratta chiefs and jaggeerdars, or other powers, will be confirmed by me under the limitations and restrictions herein prescribed.

In exercising the powers hereby entrusted to your sole discretion, I direct you to hold the most unreserved and confidential intercourse with the Residents at Poonah, at Hyderabad, and at the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and also with the Resident in the territory of the Guicowar; and you will regularly correspond with Lord Clive and with Mr. Duncan.

You will necessarily continue to receive the order of his Excellency Lieut.-General Stuart, and to submit a full view of all your operations to the direction of his Excellency. I particularly enjoin you to submit to his Excellency the earliest information of your proceedings of a political nature under these instructions.

If circumstances should render it necessary for his Excellency Lieut.-General Stuart to unite the whole force of the army in the field, and to assume in person the general command in the Deccan, in that case I hereby vest the authority conveyed to you by this despatch in his Excellency Lieut.-General Stuart, under the fullest confidence that he will exercise it with the same advantage to the public service, which I have uniformly derived from the exertion of his Excellency's distinguished talents, experience, and virtues.

In the case supposed I empower his Excellency to delegate the whole or any part of the said authority to you; and I desire that in exercising the said authority or any part thereof in his own person, his Excellency will be pleased to communicate fully with you, and to receive your advice and opinion.

In the execution of these instructions I authorize and direct you to employ any additional military staff, and to require the services of any civil officers; whose assistance you may deem necessary to the despatch of the arduous affairs connected with the subject of this order.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

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## No. XXXV.

*The Marquess Wellesley to the Hon. Major-General Wellesley.*

(Most Secret.)

SIR, Fort William, 27th June, 1803.

The conduct of Scindiah and of the Rajah of Berar requires a special notification to you of my views and intentions with regard to the operations of your army, and to such political proceedings as may be connected with a state of war, between the British Government and those chiefs.

1. On the receipt of this despatch you will desire Colonel Collins to demand an explicit declaration of the views of Scindiah and of the Rajah of Berar, within such a number of days as shall appear to you to be reasonable, consistently with a due attention to the period of the season, and to the facility of moving your army, and of prosecuting hostilities with the advantages which you now possess.

2. If that explanation should not be satisfactory on such grounds as in your discretion you may state to Colonel Collins, you will desire Colonel Collins to repair to your camp under a proper escort.

3. In this event or in any other state of circumstances which may appear to you to require hostilities consistently with the general tenor of my instructions, you will employ the forces under your command, in the most active operations against Scindiah, or the Rajah of Berar, or against both according to your discretion.

4. It is probable that the state of the rivers will afford great advantages to your army, and will embarrass the enemy in a considerable degree, if hostilities should commence during the rainy monsoon. In this event, I direct you to use your utmost efforts to destroy the military power of either, or of both chiefs, and especially of Scindiah; and to avail yourself of every advantage, which circumstances may offer to the utmost extent of the strength of your army. It is particularly desirable that you should destroy Scindiah's artillery, and all arms of European construction and all military stores which he may possess.

5. In the event of hostilities, you will, therefore, proceed to the utmost extremity which may appear to you to promise success, without admitting pacific negotiation, until the power of the opposing chief shall have been completely destroyed. In such a case, the actual seizure of the person of Scindiah or of Ragojee Bhoouslah would be highly desirable, and the state of the rivers may perhaps favour such an advantage.

6. In any crisis which may exist under the terror of your approach, or at any time after hostilities shall have actually commenced, I empower you to conclude peace with Scindiah, or with the Rajah of Berar, jointly or separately, on such terms as may appear to you most advisable; I shall, however, state to you the objects most desirable in the event of any

treaty with either, or with both those chiefs, founded on their aggression, and on our success or power.

7. The entire reduction of Scindiah's power would certainly afford considerable security to our interests. In the event, however, of a peace with Scindiah, which should leave his power in existence, among the states of India, the most desirable arrangement would be—

First. That Scindiah should cede to the Company all his possessions, rights, and pretensions within the countries to the northward of a line drawn from the north frontier of Gohud to the frontier of Jyenaghur, together with all his possessions, &c. to the northward of Jyenaghur.

This cession would include Agra, Delhi, and the remainder of the Doab of the Jumna and Ganges; the Mogul's person would necessarily fall under our protection; this article must be a special stipulation of treaty.

Our frontier towards the ceded provinces of Oude would then be formed by the small state of Gohud, and by the Rajpoot states of Jyenaghur and Jodepoor.

The Rana of Gohud to become tributary to the Company; Gwalior to be occupied by the Company.

Defensive alliances to be formed with Jyenaghur and Jodepoor.

By this arrangement the Mahrattas would be excluded from the north of Hindostan, and from communication with the Seiks.

Secondly. Scindiah to cede Broach and all his maritime possessions.

Thirdly. Scindiah to cede all his possessions, rights, &c. in Guzzerat.

Fourthly. Scindiah to cede all his possessions, &c. southward of the Nerbudda.

Arrangements might be made for a partition of these cessions with the Peishwa and the Nizam.

In the event of hostilities with Scindiah and Holkar, and of the complete defeat of those chiefs, the most distinct arrangement would be, to take for the Company all the territories, rights, or pretensions of Scindiah or Holkar to the northward and westward of the Nerbudda, and to make that river the boundary of the northern frontier of the Peishwa, giving to the Peishwa all the territories, &c. of those chiefs

to the southward of the Nerbudda, with the exception of all sea ports, which must be reserved to the Company.

Bundelcund is properly subject to the Peishwa; it would be desirable to obtain that province for the Company, with a view to secure the navigation of the Jumna, and to the further security of the province of Benares.

8. From the Rajah of Berar I should wish to acquire the whole province of Cuttack, so as to unite the northern Circars by a continued line of sea coast with Bengal.

This cession, including Balasore, &c. to be made either absolutely, or upon payment of a moderate rent, or as a security for a subsidiary force to be introduced into the dominions of the Rajah of Berar. The district of Gurry-Mundela has been an object to the Nizam, this object is to be pursued according to circumstances in the event of war with the Rajah of Berar. Without securing one or other of these advantages, you will not make peace with the Rajah of Berar, after he shall have compelled you to resort to hostilities against him, unless in your discretion you should deem peace with the Rajah of Berar advisable on different terms.

9. You are at liberty generally to modify the terms of peace herein suggested, at your discretion, or to change them altogether, if it should become advisable to detach any chief from the confederacy.

10. If Holkar should join the confederacy, you will act towards him on the principles of the preceding instructions. It is not desirable to erect Holkar's accidental power into an established state of India; his reduction would certainly be the most advisable policy: but the conduct and modification of our relations with Holkar must be left entirely to your discretion. You will not, however, prosecute hostilities against Holkar merely for the purpose of obtaining indemnity for the plunder of Aurungabad, or for any other predatory incursion; such question may be reserved for amicable negotiation.

11. In the event of hostilities, you will take proper measures for withdrawing the European officers from the service of Scindiah, Holkar, and of every other chief opposed to you.

12. You are at liberty to incur any expense requisite for this purpose, and to employ such emissaries as may appear most serviceable. You are also at liberty to enter into such

engagements as may appear advantageous with any of Scindiah's ministers, chiefs, or servants, or with those of the Rajah of Berar, or of Holkar, and to afford any useful encouragement to the party of the Ba¡ees,* or to any others in the dominions of any of the confederate chiefs.

13. In the event of hostilities, I propose to despatch proper emissaries to Gohud and to the Rajpoot chiefs. You will also employ every endeavour to excite those powers against Scindiah. I propose to engage to guarantee their independence, and to secure to them any other reasonable advantages which they may require. The independence of the Rajpoot chiefs would constitute a power which would form the best security to our north-western frontier in Hindostan, in the supposition of Scindiah's reduction.

14. You will apprize his Excellency General Lake, through the most expeditious channel, (if any more expeditious communication should offer than through Calcutta) of your plan of political and military operations under these instructions.

15. Scindiah's retreat across the Nerbudda (after his insolent and hostile declaration to Colonel Collins of the 28th of May) will not alone be a sufficient proof of his pacific intentions.† Unless, therefore, Scindiah shall have afforded full satisfaction and security in your judgment, you will pursue him across the Nerbudda, if you should deem that movement advisable for the purpose of reducing his means of mischief.

16. The same principle applies to any movement of the Rajah of Berar, or of Holkar. The retreat of Ragojee Bhoouslah, or of Holkar, to any place situated within their respective territories, or elsewhere, will not exclusively amount to a sufficient degree of satisfaction and security, after the recent proofs which the confederacy has disclosed of determined hostility and arrogant ambition.

17. You will consider what steps may be taken to excite

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* The party of Ba¡ezah Ba¡ee, Dowlut Rao Scindiah's aunt, and her adherents, a very influential party in the administration of his affairs.

† See page 159, for the letter of Colonel Collins announcing this hostile declaration.

Cashee Rao Holkar* against Jeswunt Rao, and if in prosecuting hostilities you should be able to obtain possession of the person of Khundee Rao Holkar,† you will avail yourself of that advantage.

18. The precise time of action from Oude and in Cuttack cannot now be stated, but I will seize Agra, Delhi, take the person of the Mogul under British protection, and occupy the Doab, together with Cuttack, at the earliest practicable moment after I shall have learned that you deem hostilities inevitable, or as soon as such measures of precaution may appear to me to be requisite.

19. In the movements of your army, and in all your proceedings under these instructions, you will advert to the precarious state of the Nizam's health, and to the necessity of preserving our interests at Hyderabad in the event of his Highness's decease. The Resident at Hyderabad will apprize you of the orders which he has received from me respecting the succession to the musnud of the Deccan.

20. Although a division of the French troops is already arrived at Pondicherry, and the remainder may be soon expected, I desire that you will not be induced by that event to precipitate an accommodation with any of the Mahratta powers. The effectual security of our interests in the Mahratta empire is the strongest barrier which can be opposed to the progress of the French interests in India. The early reduction of Scindiah (if that chief should compel us to resort to hostilities) is certain, and would prove a fatal blow to the views of France. An imperfect arrangement with the Mahratta power, or a delay of active measures might open to France the means of engaging with advantage in the affairs of the Mahratta empire.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

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* The eldest legitimate son of Jeswunt Rao Holkar's predecessor, Tuckojee Holkar. Jeswunt Rao was an illegitimate son of Tuckojee, but by superior energy and talents, became the head of that branch of the Mahratta confederacy in supercession of the rights of Cashee Rao.

† The legitimate and posthumous son of Tuckojee; he was kept in custody by Dowlut Rao Scindiah as an eventual instrument in the prosecution of his former efforts for the subversion of Jeswunt Rao Holkar's power.

## No. XXXVI.

*Lieut.-Colonel Collins to the Marquess Wellesley.*

My Lord, Camp near Chickly, 29th May, 1803.

1. In an official address to Mr. Secretary Edmonstone, under date the 26th instant, I acknowledged the receipt of your Excellency's notes of instructions, transmitted to me in his letter of the 5th of this month.* At the same time I informed him that I expected to have an interview with Dowlut Rao Scindiah on the 27th instant; in which expectation I was, however, disappointed, the Maharage having postponed granting me an audience until the following day.

2. Yesterday afternoon I waited on Dowlut Rao Scindiah, accompanied by my assistant Captain Paris Bradshaw, Mirza Bauker Khan, and Gunput Roy. Unna Bhasker, Ambajee Inglia, Eeitul Punth, Bappoo Chitnavees, Moonshee Kavel Nyn, and Sudda Sheo Rao, were present on the part of the Maharage. After an interchange of compliments, I informed Scindiah that as he had expressed a desire to be made acquainted with the articles of the treaty concluded at Bassein between his Highness the Peishwa and the British Government, your Excellency, actuated by motives of friendship, as well as by a wish to remove all doubts which might be entertained at this Court respecting the tendency of the late engagements contracted with Baajy Rao, had directed me to communicate to the Maharage, without delay, the whole of that treaty; that, accordingly, I had brought with me copies in Persian and English, of the treaty, in order that it might be fully explained to him. I then gave the copies into the hands of Moonshee Kavel Nyn, with a request that he would peruse the Persian one, and make a faithful report of its contents to his Prince.

3. Moonshee Kavel Nyn having attentively read the whole of the treaty, proceeded to interpret it, article by article, to Dowlut Rao Scindiah; but when the Moonshee came to the 12th article, which expressly provides additional security for

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* These instructions are given at p. 93.

the independence of the feudatory Mahratta chiefs, he by no means gave that force to the words thereof which he ought to have done, I was therefore under the necessity of assisting him; and I embraced this occasion of giving the clearest explanation of that important stipulation, and I had the pleasure to perceive that Scindiah was at length fully satisfied of the moderation, as well as friendly intent of the 12th article.

4. When the whole of the treaty had been distinctly explained to the Maharage, I then asked him whether he thought it contained any thing injurious to his just rights, since I had reason to think some doubts had arisen in his mind on this head. Unna Bhasker, who thought proper to reply to my question, acknowledged that the treaty did not contain any stipulation prejudicial to the rights of the Maharage, to which the latter assented. I then said it afforded me real pleasure to observe that your Lordship's liberal communication of the engagements contracted at Bassein, had been productive of the desired effect, for that connected as our respective states were in friendship, no explanation whatever ought to be withheld by either which could tend to remove any doubts or suspicions that might occasionally occur.

5. After making the foregoing observation, I proceeded to state that negotiations had of late been carried on between Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Berar Rajah. That these chiefs were, I understood, to have an interview shortly, somewhere in the vicinity of this place. That the Maharage had concluded a peace with Jeswunt Rao Holkar, in whose camp a Vakeel now resided on the part also of Raghoojee Bhoouslah. That he (Scindiah) had likewise avowed an intention of proceeding with his army to Poonah, accompanied by the Berar Rajah; and that on combining these circumstances, I could not but suspect that this court meditated designs adverse to the interests of the British Government. For since his Highness the Peishwa was restored to the musnud of Poonah, the presence of the Maharage at that capital could not now be of any use, but on the contrary, might be productive of evil consequences. Nor could the longer continuance of the Maharage in the Deccan be necessary to his security, since he had come to an accommodation with the only enemy from whom he had any thing to apprehend south of the Nerbud-

dah. That therefore I felt it my duty to require an unreserved explanation from this Court, as well respecting the intent of the proposed interview between the Maharage and the Rajah of Berar, as regarding the nature of the engagements entered into by those chiefs with Jeswunt Rao Holkar, as their recent union and present proceedings induced some suspicion that they were confederated either for the purpose of invading the territories of our allies, his Highness the Peishwa, and the Nabob Nizam, or of subverting the arrangements lately concluded between the British Government and Baajy Rao; and in order to induce the Maharage to favour me with a candid declaration of his intentions, I concluded with giving him the strongest assurances of your Lordship's disposition to maintain, and even to improve the existing friendly connection between the two Sircars, and I moreover positively asserted that the British Government would make no attempt whatever upon the independence of this state, unless he (Scindiah) should provoke hostility by acts of aggression.

6. As Dowlut Rao Scindiah did not instantly speak, Unna Bhasker took upon himself to say in reply, that his master had no intention whatever to invade either the territory of his Highness the Peishwa or the Nabob Nizam, adding, that when Holkar was levying contributions on the city of Aurungabad, the Maharage had desired that chief to desist from further exactions, and to retire from the Nizam's frontier. I said that I was highly gratified by these assurances, and observed that it only now remained for the Maharage to declare that the negotiations between this Durbar, the Berar Rajah and Holkar, were not entered into with any view to obstruct the completion of the treaty of Bassein.

7. Unna Bhasker then plainly told me, that Scindiah could afford me no satisfaction on this point until he had conferred with the Berar Rajah. I instantly replied, that the proposed interview between those chiefs was of itself, a sufficient cause to excite the suspicions of our government, inasmuch as the present tranquil state of affairs in the Deccan did not require the adoption of a measure, seldom resorted to but for hostile purposes, and at the same time I brought forward the arguments and observations contained in your Excellency's notes of instructions, which I had taken with me to the Durbar, in order to assist my memory.

8. I most particularly insisted on the full right of the Peishwa, to avail himself of the aid of the British power for his restoration, and to contract his present engagements with the English, independently of the consent of the feudal chiefs of the Mahratta empire, I also declared, and in the plainest terms that your Excellency was resolved not to admit of any opposition whatever, to the execution of a treaty founded in principles of justice and moderation, in short I did not fail to introduce every argument with which I had been furnished by your Lordship, and I moreover, exerted every mode of persuasion that I was master of, in order to induce this court to give me the required explanation before any meeting should take place between Raghojee Bhooslah, and Dowlut Rao Scindiah, but it is with infinite concern I inform your Excellency that my utmost endeavours on this occasion proved altogether unsuccessful, Unna Bhasker and Moonshee Kavel Nyn both persisting that the Maharage could not possibly give me the satisfaction I required previously to his conference with the Nagpore chieftain.

9. Perceiving that the ministers would not relax from this declaration, I again addressed myself to Dowlut Rao Scindiah observing, that although what I should now say to him was unpleasant to my feelings, yet the interests of both Sircars required that I should, without delay, or reserve, apprize him of the line of conduct which your Excellency would assuredly pursue, should this court persevere in withholding from me the information which I had with so much reason demanded. I also remarked, that it was the more incumbent on me to be explicit in the present instance, lest the Maharage might unadvisedly be involved in a serious and unequal contest with the English.

10. I then stated, that if this court persisted in refusing to give me the explanation which I now demanded, and at the same time conducted its military operations in opposition to the representation which I had made, that your Excellency would be compelled to adopt measures of precaution on every boundary of the Maharage's dominions, and moreover that certain intelligence of the accession of the Maharage to any confederacy against the British power would produce immediate hostility on all parts of his frontier. I added that were the united forces of the Maharage, and of the Berar Rajah

to march to Poonah at this juncture, your Lordship could not but regard such a procedure as indicative of hostile designs against the British Government, and that any attack on the territories of his Highness the Nizam would be considered by your Excellency as an act of aggression on the part of this court.

11. When I had done speaking, Unna Bhasker positively affirmed that his Highness the Peishwa since his return to his capital, had repeatedly written to the Maharage, and to the Berar Rajah, desiring both those chiefs to repair to Poonah. I expressed much surprise at this information, having as I told Unna Bhasker, understood from Colonel Close, that his Highness Baajy Rao had requested Dowlut Rao Scindiah not to advance to that city. Here the Maharage solemnly assured me that he and the Bhooslah had actually received the invitations mentioned by Unna Bhasker, and this prince further asserted that the Peishwa had never written to him, prohibiting his approach to Poonah. To this assertion I only said, that no doubt a letter to that effect from his Highness would soon arrive here. Then reverting to the required explanation, I conjured Scindiah in language both urgent and conciliatory, to remove all my doubts and suspicions by an immediate and candid avowal of his intentions.

12. Dowlut Rao in reply to those instances on my part said that he could not at present afford me the satisfaction I demanded without a violation of the faith which he had pledged to the Rajah of Berar. He (Scindiah) then observed, that the Bhooslah was distant no more than forty coss from hence, and would probably arrive here in the course of a few days; that, immediately after his interview with that Rajah, I should be informed whether it would be peace or war. These words he delivered with much seeming composure, I then asked him whether I must consider this declaration as final on his part, which question was answered in the affirmative by the ministers of Dowlut Rao Scindiah. Here the conference, which had lasted three hours ended, and I soon after took a respectful leave of the Maharage. Neither Scindiah, nor his ministers, made any remarks on the treaty of Bassein, nor did they request a copy of it.

13. If it be true, that his Highness the Peishwa has really invited Dowlut Rao Scindiah to repair to Poonah, of which

fact the Maharage assured me he had undeniable proofs under the seal of Baajy Rao, Scindiah may possibly march to that capital, and allege that this measure was sanctioned by the orders of the head of the Mahratta empire, I therefore sincerely hope that his Highness the Peishwa has not delayed to forward a letter to the Maharage, prohibiting his advance to Poonah.

I have the honour to be,
with the greatest respect, my Lord,
Your Lordship's
most obedient and humble servant,
J. COLLINS,
Resident D. R. S.

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## No. XXXVII.

*The Marquess Wellesley to his Excellency Lieut.-General Lake.*

(Most Secret and Confidential.)

MY DEAR SIR, Fort William, June 28th, 1803.

Since the date of my letter of the 7th of January,* on the subject of the affairs of the Mahratta empire, you have been regularly informed of the transactions which have occurred in Mysore, and in the Deccan, in consequence of our arrangements with the Peishwa. You know that Major-General Wellesley marched with a detachment from Hurryhaul to Poonah; that he was supported by the advance of the subsidiary force from Hyderabad, aided by the Nizam's contingent, while the Peishwa proceeded from Bassein towards Poonah under the protection of a detachment commanded by Colonel Murray. The great object of restoring the Peishwa to his government was effected on the 13th of May without opposition, nor has any hostility of any kind yet taken place between our troops employed in the Mahratta territory, and any of the chiefs or states, or even any person whatever in those dominions. The whole arrangement has proceeded in

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* See p. 28.

the most prosperous manner to its destined end. The question now remaining, regards merely the stability of the important and happy settlement which has been effected.

You will perceive by the documents which have been transmitted to you, that apprehensions are entertained of the designs of Scindiah, and of the Rajah of Berar, and that rumours are circulated of the formation of a confederacy between those chiefs and Holkar, with a view to frustrate the objects of our alliance with the Peishwa.

By this conveyance you will receive copies of the most recent despatches from the Peninsula, and you will observe many circumstances which appear to indicate hostile designs on the part of Scindiah, and which render the conduct of the Rajah of Berar, and of Holkar, suspicious.

I also enclose for your most secret consideration copies of my recent orders to Major-General Wellesley.

The opinion of the most experienced and most able men acquainted with the policy of the Mahrattas, is that the supposed confederacy will vanish upon the approach of the British force, and that the three chiefs will contend for precedence in pacific negotiation, rather than in active measures of hostility. Scindiah's language to Colonel Collins, however, has been insulting and hostile, and amounts to a positive act of aggression upon every received principle of the law of nations. Under different circumstances, I should undoubtedly have availed myself of this favourable opportunity of reducing the power of Scindiah by an immediate attack upon his possessions. But in the present state of affairs in Europe, it appears to me to be the most politic course to abstain from the exercise of our undoubted right of punishing this arrogant chieftain to the last moment compatible with our security. In the mean while it is necessary to adopt proper measures of precaution, and to prepare for active exertion at the earliest practicable period of time, although my opinion is, that Scindiah will not proceed further in his present rash course, and will enter into a satisfactory accommodation with Major-General Wellesley, as soon as that officer shall have opened a direct communication with Scindiah. At all events, I am satisfied that we shall break the confederacy at the first

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* See p. 149.

touch, and that if Scindiah thinks fit to be obstinate, he must prepare to encounter us, after the loss of all his allies.

In this state of circumstances, my dear Sir, I think it is now become necessary to commence the measures for assembling a force, with a view to active operations against Scindiah. You will at the same time enter into my extreme solicitude to avoid every proceeding which can involve expense, and which may not be indispensable to our success. A few days must decide positively whether war will become inevitable. From that moment we must press forward without hesitation, if the alternative should leave no prospect of peace. At present it appears to me that it is sufficient to transmit to you the annexed note, and to add the following observations.

In any operations to be carried on against Scindiah, I imagine that it would be advisable to collect our troops, in the first instance, at the great cantonments of Cawnpore and Futty Ghur. A full consideration of the state of the ceded provinces has convinced me that the civil power has no further occasion for that frequent and unlimited use of the regular troops which has occasioned such a dispersion of our force. The internal peace and good order of the country must now rest on the justice and benevolence of our system of government, aided by the ordinary establishments of police, and supported by the vicinity of a great army, properly distributed in such proportions as shall enable it either to move in large bodies against an external enemy, or to detach an adequate force for the suppression of internal disorder.

The collectors and magistrates must be taught or compelled to co-operate in this system; and a due distinction must be maintained between the civil and military power. It has been my intention to avail myself of an early opportunity to direct the civil authorities in Oude to abstain from the uncontrolled use of the regular troops, and to request you to collect those forces in the cantonments, according to such a plan of distribution as you might deem most effectual for the establishment of the system stated in this letter. I now request you to commence the execution of that plan immediately, and I have directed circular orders to be despatched to the civil authorities for the purpose of compelling them to co-operate in those reasonable views, of which I deem the accomplishment to be essential to the honour of the civil power, as well

as to the efficiency of the army in Oude. You will be able, under this view of the subject, to collect forces at the necessary points (or at least to issue your first orders for that purpose) without occasioning any alarm of war.

You will, however, consider this suggestion to be subordinate to the great object of securing such an armament as may enable us to meet the important views stated in my orders of the 27th instant, to Major-General Wellesley, and in the note annexed to this despatch, on the question of preparation connected with that of expense, I rely most implicitly on your judgment and public spirit, and having fully apprized you of my sentiments and views, I leave you to act according to your own opinion, with the fullest confidence that the motives by which your determination will be guided, will be honourable and prudent. I shall write to you more fully in a few days; it is desirable that you should receive this general intimation of my views as soon as possible.

Believe me to be, my dear Sir,
with great respect and esteem,
your faithful servant,
WELLESLEY.

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*Note by the Marquess Wellesley.*

Fort William, June 28, 1803.

The operations of our army in the event of war with Scindiah, must be directed to the following objects.

1st. To seize all his possessions between the Ganges and Jumna.

2nd. To take the person of the Moghul Shah Alum, under our protection.

3rd. To form alliances with the Rajpoots, and other inferior states beyond the Jumna, for the purpose of excluding Scindiah from the northern districts of Hindostan.

4th. To occupy Bundlecund, and thus to strengthen the frontier of the Province of Benares against Scindiah, or the Rajah of Berar.

The success of such a plan of operations would exclude the Mahrattas altogether from the northern parts of Hindostan, and would establish a powerful barrier between our frontier, and that of Scindiah, by the intervention of the Rajpoot and other inferior states, strengthened under our protection.

In the execution of such a plan, the following circumstances would require immediate attention.

1st. The immediate reduction of the forces collected under the command of M. Perron.

2nd. The possession of the forts and passes to the southward of the Jumna, which would impede the march of an army from the Deccan.

M. Perron's forces are said to be at present collected at Coel, and to consist of about 8000 infantry, and an equal number of cavalry. Scindiah it is generally believed, has no confidence in M. Perron's attachment to his government. In the event of a war with the British Government, it is probable that Scindiah will endeavour to conciliate M. Perron, and the prospect of this crisis of affairs, which would render M. Perron's conduct an object of attention to both states, may have contributed to induce M. Perron to postpone his avowed intention of relinquishing Scindiah's service, in the hope of more advantageous offers from Scindiah, or from the British Government. A considerable number of the sepoys, who were discharged from the British army at the late reduction, are said to have entered into M. Perron's service, and it is supposed that if any new corps were raised in the vicinity of their station, many would return to the service, and that Scindiah's European officers might be induced to resign the service of Scindiah by offers of a present subsistence, and of a future establishment in the service of some of the allies, or tributaries of the British Government.

It must be ascertained, whether it would be safe or practicable to endeavour to detach M. Perron, or any of the European officers in Scindiah's service, or any of Scindiah's troops from their employment with Scindiah, and whether any, and what emissary should be sent to M. Perron, or to the officers.

If opposition is ultimately to be expected from M. Perron's force, a detachment of an adequate strength, formed at Sarsney, or Bidjeegur, might either attack M. Perron, at Coel, or by an easy change of position, might intercept his communication with Agra, where it is probable the principal supplies and military stores would be lodged, unless such a measure should have been prevented by the seasonable interposition of a British force, between Agra and Coel, where M. Perron's principal depôts are understood to be established at present.

The fort at Agra is extensive, but insufficiently supplied with artillery. A new bastion is said to have been constructed where it was formerly breached by M. Duboigne, but this work is said not to have added essentially to the defences of the place.

After the reduction of M. Perron's force, the principal object would appear to be, to prevent Scindiah from entering Hindostan with a large body of cavalry.

If operations against M. Perron's force should be necessary, a separate detachment of sufficient force might be formed at Etawah to proceed directly upon Gwalior, which covers the principal route from Oojyn into Scindiah's possessions in Hindostan.

The position at Gwalior would probably render it impossible for Scindiah to enter Hindostan with a considerable body of cavalry.

The Ranah of Gohud is said to be reduced to poverty, and to be destitute of resourses or power. This Chief, however, is said to retain considerable influence with the Jauts.

It is said, that the Ranah of Gohud is anxious to obtain the support of the British Government; with our support he would probably be enabled to raise a considerable force, which might assist in opposing Scindiah's march into Hindostan. The possession of the fortress of Gwalior by British troops, would enable us to support the Ranah's authority in the country, and would encourage the Jauts to assist their native Chief against the depredations of Scindiah. The Jaut Rajahs holding the strong posts of Bhurtpore, Combair, and Deeg, to the southward of Agra, and Maturah, are believed to be desirous of exchanging their dependance on Scindiah for the protection of the British Government. An assurance of the secure possession of their hereditary tenures, and of their internal power would probably attach those petty states to us.

The Rajpoot chiefs of Jyenagur and Jodepore, have been long dissatisfied under the yoke of Scindiah. Those chiefs would probably enter into subsidiary engagements with the British Government, for an adequate support against the usurpation of the Mahrattas. The accession of the Rajpoot chiefs, with the Ranah of Gohud to the interests of the British Government, would present an almost insurmountable barrier to Scindiah's resumption of influence in Hindostan.

As these chiefs would furnish considerable bodies of cavalry, a small force of British infantry and artillery would be sufficient to counteract any force of that description Scindiah could detach from the Deccan.

Bundelcund and Boghilcund are considered as fiefs holden from the Peishwa; occupied by the British Government either as a security for subsidy from the Peishwa, or in consequence of a subsidy granted for the support of the internal government of Bundelcund, or Boghilcund, by British troops, these countries would oppose an effectual barrier to any attempts of the Rajah of Berar, to disturb the tranquillity of the Company's provinces from those quarters.

It is believed, that Scindiah has stationed a body of predatory horse at Kalpee and Ongassey, on the southern bank of the Jumna. This point requires immediate attention.

With a view to preparation for a war, directed to all the points stated in this note, it would appear to be proper—

*Military Preparation.*

First. That the main body of our troops should be assembled at a point between M. Perron's station and Agra, and Shah Allum invited to put himself under its protection, as soon as the communication with Delhi may be opened.

Second. That Agra should be seized, if possible, by a separate detachment to be assembled at Shekoabad.

Third. That another detachment should proceed from Etawah to occupy Gwalior.

Fourth. That Bundelcund should be occupied by a force to be assembled at Allahabad, or in its vicinity.

*Political.*

First. A negociation with M. Perron.

Second. With his European officers.

Third. With his troops.

Fourth. With the Ranah of Gohud and Jaut chiefs of Bhurtpore and Combair.

Fifth. With the Rajpoot chiefs of Jyenagur and Jodepore.

Sixth. With the chiefs of Bundelcund.

N. B. The Commander-in-Chief will make any preparations which he may deem necessary, in draft or carriage cattle immediately, and will order any corps from any of the lower stations.

Benares must be well protected until Bundelcund shall be occupied.

Q. Does the Commander-in-Chief think that the experimental horse artillery with any addition from the body-guard would be useful?

The Commander-in-Chief will be so good as to transmit any observations which may occur to him upon these notes, with a detailed plan of a campaign against Scindiah.

WELLESLEY.

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## No. XXXVIII.

*Colonel Collins, Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, to the Marquess Wellesley, &c.*

MY LORD, Camp near Chickley, 12th June, 1803.

On the evening of the 8th instant, Raghoojee Bhooslah paid a visit to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, when these chiefs conferred together in private, for several hours. On the following day, I directed Gunput Roy to intimate to the Maharage, that as he had now had an interview with the Berar Rajah, it was absolutely incumbent on him to give me an immediate and explicit answer to the question which I had stated on the 28th ultimo, at his Durbar.

2. My agent Gunput Roy could not obtain an audience of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, until the 10th instant, on account of the inclemency of the weather, but in the morning of that day, he delivered my message to the Maharage, and the enclosure No. 1, contains a copy and translation of the reply* that he received on this occasion. Yesterday Jadoon Rao Bhow had a long and secret conference with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, after which, Gunput Roy waited on that minister, and urged

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* See Appendix.

him to declare whether this court intended peace or war, with the English, but could obtain no satisfactory answer.

3. As it appeared to me that the evasive conduct of this Durbar was practised, solely with a view to gain time, and having been informed that Jeswunt Rao Holkar, was actually on his march to join the Maharage, I conceived that your Excellency would deem me inexcusable, were I to defer bringing the question of peace or war to an immediate issue. Accordingly, I addressed a memorial to Dowlut Rao Scindiah calculated to produce this effect, and I herewith do myself the honour to forward copies thereof (No. 2,) in English, and Persian, for the information of your Lordship.

4. Mirza Bauker Khan went from hence about an hour ago, accompanied by Gunput Roy, in order to present the memorial to the Maharage, and I shall not close this letter until his return, that your Lordship may be apprized by this dawk, of the result of my present representation. At the same time, I shall transmit copies of my memorial, and of the reply of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, and to the honourable Major-General Arthur Wellesley.

5. Ever since the night of the 7th instant, it has rained incessantly at this place, and so violently, at one period, that my dining tent had three feet of water in it, although the ground of our encampment is rather elevated. The distress which has prevailed here, for some days past is really great; ottah sells at five seers for a rupee, grain at five and-a-half, and grass is scarcely procurable, even at the rate of fifteen rupees for one bullock load. The foregoing detail will enable your Excellency to form a judgment of the wretched state to which Scindiah's troops will be reduced, in the event of his prosecuting hostilities, since the prices of all kinds of provisions will, it is expected, daily increase; moreover, there is not, I am credibly informed fifty thousand rupees in the camp of the Maharage, and the shroffs* will not assist him with money, on account of the losses which they have already sustained by confiding in the promises of the ministers of this court.

6. I am concerned to acquaint your Excellency that all communication between this camp, and that of the Berar Rajah, has been rendered impracticable ever since the night

* Bankers.

of the 8th instant, by reason of the overflowing of the Soonn Nuddee,* which divides the two encampments, Mirza Bauker has, in consequence, failed in several attempts, which he made by my directions, for the purpose of waiting on Raghoojee Bhooslah, in order to ascertain what effect the perusal of your Lordship's letter of the 13th ultimo, had produced on the mind of that chieftain. A circumstance of which I was very desirous of being informed in the present critical situation of affairs.

7. Mirza Bauker and Gunput Roy, are this instant returned. When they were admitted to the presence of Dowlut Rao Scindia, no person was with him but Ballajee Koonjer. Moonshee Kavel Nyn being indisposed, the Maharage desired Mirza Bauker to explain to him the contents of my memorial, and when this had been done, Scindiah said, that as yet he had not conferred on matters of business with the Rajah of Berar, but that I might rely on having the explanation I required in two, or three days. Mirza Bauker requested that this answer might be committed to writing, but which the Maharage would not permit. The Mirza and Gunput Roy then took their leave of him in order to return to me.

8. On receiving this verbal reply, I wrote to Dowlut Rao Scindiah that I considered it as final, and therefore sincerely lamented its tendency, at the same time I requested that the Maharajah would order his servants to supply me with grain as soon as possible, it being my intention to proceed to Arungabad without delay. To my certain knowledge Scindiah held a private conference of nearly three hours with Raghoojee Bhooslah on the 8th of this month.

J. COLLINS,
Resident D. R. S.

P. S. I shall send a copy of this letter to the honourable Major-General Arthur Wellesley by express.

[Enclosure.]

*Copy of a Memorial addressed to Maharage Dowlut Rao Scindiah, by Colonel Collins; presented by Moonshy Mirza Bauker Khan, on the morning of the 12th of June* 1803.

When Colonel Collins had the honor of an audience with Maharage Dowlut Rao Scindiah on the 6th of Suffer (28 May) the Colonel by

* Rivulet.

order of his Excellency the most noble the Governor-General, urged many cogent reasons and persuasions to induce the Maharage to declare without delay or reserve, whether the late negotiations carried on between this Court, the Berar Rajah, and Jeswunt Rao Holkar, had been entered into for the purpose of obstructing the completion of the engagements lately concluded at Bassein, between his Highness the Peishwa and the British Government.

But although Colonel Collins was extremely urgent with the Maharage to give him instant information on this important point, and although the Colonel particularly pointed out the line of conduct which the British Government would be compelled to pursue, should the required explanation be withheld, yet the ministers of this Durbar repeatedly declared that Colonel Collins must not expect any satisfactory answer to this question until a meeting had taken place between the Maharage and the Rajah of Berar. Maharage Dowlut Rao Scindiah, also said, that he could not, without a violation of his faith, give Colonel Collins the satisfaction he demanded, until he (the Maharage) had conversed with Ragoojee Bhooslah, but that after his interview with that Rajah, the Colonel should be informed whether there would be peace or war.

The proposed conference between Maharage Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, having taken place, Colonel Collins now expects that the Maharage will, conformable to his promise, explicitly declare whether it is his design to obstruct the completion of the treaty of Bassein, either by means of his own power, or in conjunction with Ragoojee Bhooslah, and Jeswunt Rao Holkar. And Colonel Collins further requires, that Maharage Dowlut Rao Scindiah will state without reserve, whether it be his present wish and intention to maintain and preserve the relations of friendship which have so long subsisted between his Sircar and the British Government. Finally, in performance of his duty, Colonel Collins apprizes the Maharage, that should he now refuse or delay to give explicit answers to the foregoing questions, and continue with his army south of the Nerbudda, such refusal or delay will be regarded by his Excellency as an avowal of hostile designs on the part of this court against the British Government. Colonel Collins therefore hopes that motives of moderation and justice, as well as a proper sense of his own interests, will induce Maharage Dowlut Rao Scindiah to act on the present occasion conformably with the relations of amity which have so long subsisted between the two states, and which never have been violated on the part of the English, and consistently with the declaration that he (the Maharage) made to the Colonel on the 29th of Zeecaudeh (24th of March). But should the Maharage decline giving Colonel Collins the satisfaction which he now demands, in this case the Colonel requests that Maharage Dowlut Rao Scindiah will furnish him with a party of horse to escort him as far as Aurungabad, together with supplies of grain sufficient for the subsistence of his sepoys and followers, until their arrival at that city

J. Collins,
Resᵗ. D. R. S.

## No. XXXIX.

*The Marquess Wellesley to Lieut.-General Lake.*

(Private and most Secret.)

MY DEAR SIR, Fort William, July 5th, 1803.

I have delayed my communications with you, until this day, in the hourly expectation of a despatch from Colonel Collins, which might enable me to decide the question of war or peace with Scindiah. I have just now received a letter from Colonel Collins, under date the 12th of June,* which has determined me to carry into execution with all practicable speed, the general outlines of the plan of war against Scindiah, stated in my letter of the 28th of June.† I shall now write to you from day to day, but I would not delay this communication for a moment. Scindiah's object is to gain time. Ours must be to act, between this time, and the month of October. The seizure of Agra would be a great and masterly blow. I know you will attempt it, if prudent.

Ever, my dear Sir,

Your's most sincerely and affectionately,

WELLESLEY.

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## No. XL.

*Extract of a Letter from Mr. Secretary Edmonstone to Colonel John Collins, Resident, with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, dated 6th July,* 1803.

1. I am directed by his Excellency the most noble the Governor-General to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 258, under date 12th June, and to communicate to you his Excellency's highest approbation of your conduct in the important crisis of affairs described in that despatch. His Excellency considers your conduct on this occasion to have been distinguished by the greatest degree of spirit, firmness, and decision, as well as by the most sound judgment and discretion, and by that moderation which becomes the representative of the British Government even under the most insulting and unwarrantable provocation. His Excellency entirely

* See preceding letter. † See p. 164.

approves the memorial which you presented to Dowlut Rao Scindiah. You will find by your subsequent receipt of communications made to you by his Excellency's authority, that the course which you have pursued on the present occasion, is entirely conformable to his Excellency's intention, and to the principles of policy by which his Excellency is desirous of regulating the conduct of the British Government towards Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar.

2. Further instructions will be transmitted to you at the earliest practicable period of time. In the mean while his Excellency the Governor-General deeming it expedient that you should receive the earliest encouragement to pursue the course of conduct which you have so judiciously commenced has been pleased to direct the immediate communication of his entire concurrence in the measures which you have adopted, and his peculiar approbation of the ability, temper, promptitude, and judgment, by which they have been distinguished.

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## No. XLI.

*Extract Letter from Colonel John Collins, Resident, with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, to the Marquess Wellesley, &c., dated 14th June,* 1803.

I do myself the honour to forward a copy and translation of the only written reply which this Court has thought proper to return to my memorial of the 12th instant, a transcript of which formed a part of my despatch to your Excellency of the same date.

[Enclosure.]

*Copy of a Letter from Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah to Colonel John Collins.*

I received your friendly letter along with the paper conveying your request for dismission, and understand the whole of both their contents. The affairs of our respective states are one and the same, and you are deputed to preserve the relations of friendship on the part of the Honourable Company. I have been prevented by the continuance of the rain from going a second time to see Rajah Raghoojee Bhooslah. Whenever the weather clears up, and that I can proceed to the camp of the Rajah, the

attendance of Balajee Koonjer and of Narrian Rao Beed will be ordered, and their relations taken into consideration, and after consulting together, you shall then be made acquainted with whatever may be determined on; with respect to your departure, it is not proper to use haste on this head; intimation was personally given to Gunput Roy, whose report of the matter you will have received.

A true translation,

PARIS BRADSHAW,

Assistant to the Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

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## No. XLII.

*Lord Castlereagh to the Marquess Wellesley.*

(Most Secret.)

London, February 14th, 1803.

MY DEAR LORD, [Received July 6th, 1803.]

My letter to your Lordship, bearing date the 15th of November, (most secret, No. 5,) apprized you of the reasons we then had for apprehending that a squadron, preparing at Brest, was destined for the East Indies. His Majesty's ministers thought it expedient at that time to send your Lordship instructions, upon the presumption of that intelligence being correct, and to take naval precautions accordingly.

This intention on the part of the French Government, if it ever existed, (which I much doubt,) has long since yielded to the pressing exigencies of their service in St. Domingo. Notwithstanding the successive reinforcements sent to that island, amounting in the whole to 35,000 men, the French are at this moment confined to a few of the principal stations on the coast, their army wasted to a few thousands. The negroes are in possession altogether of the interior; and the whole presents so discouraging a prospect, as to have shaken in some degree the perseverance of the first Consul. I hope, however, in this single instance, his obstinacy will not forsake him, and that St. Domingo will long continue to occupy, as it has hitherto done, a large proportion of the exertion and resources of France.

However uncertain and critical the state of things must be deemed to be in Europe, I think I can venture to relieve your

Lordship's mind from any apprehension, connected with the interests immediately entrusted to your care, which, from the magnitude of our military resources on the spot, are happily less exposed to sudden attack than our possessions in any other quarter of the globe.

Under this satisfactory reflection, that the Company's dominions are in a great degree grown out of the reach of danger from the native powers, and cannot be threatened, if at all, from Europe, without long notice and preparation, your Lordship may proceed confidently in executing all the arrangements originally in your contemplation, connected with the restoration of peace. The result of your labours has already reached us in a degree sufficient to satisfy my mind, that your Lordship's administration will stand not less distinguished in point of solid financial character, than in the more brilliant circumstances which have marked its progress.

The Chairs propose bringing the plan, of which your Lordship is in possession, for the reduction of the debt, before the Court on Wednesday next; and you will see by the enclosed memorandum, that we are using every effort to procure a liberal supply of silver. I have urged that it should not fall short, in the present season, of one million five hundred thousand pounds, if so much can be procured; and, in addition to the arrangements announced in that memorandum, I have written to his Majesty's minister at the Court of Spain to inquire into the practicability of obtaining a supply from thence adequate to our purposes. I have said enough to prove to you that we are in earnest, and that any failure in this essential part of our plan will arise neither from want of funds, nor want of exertions, but, if it should occur, will alone result from the impossibility of procuring silver in sufficient quantity.

I perceive your Lordship, in your letter to Lord Dartmouth, dated the 5th of August, expresses a wish to receive an early confirmation from home of the treaty concluded with the Vizier. My letter, explaining to your Lordship the proceedings of the Court relative to your brother's appointment to the Lieut.-Governorship of the ceded districts in Oude, will have apprized you of the circumstances, arising out of

your own communications to the Court, which led to the postponement of a final decision on the subject at large, till they were in possession of your promised despatches. I certainly do not require any farther explanations to satisfy my own mind of the wisdom and advantage of that arrangement, and should be fully prepared to concur in giving it my immediate sanction; but not having yet had an opportunity of communicating with the Chairs, since the arrival of your last despatches, I cannot judge in what degree the Court will feel precluded by their former letter from acting without having further information before them; in which case, your Lordship will feel that there may be some difficulty in either pressing them to a decision, or, after what has passed, in taking the decision out of their hands. But I shall not fail to see how far it is possible to bring this subject to an early conclusion.

The discussion in Parliament on the Carnatic question is likely to be put off till after the recess, by the voluminous list of papers moved for by Mr. Sheridan, and by a subsequent collection called for by Mr. Keene. The latter are well calculated to throw light on the system of the Carnatic, which cannot too strongly be brought into view. As I understand from Lord Grenville, that he has written to your Lordship with regard to the discussion of this subject in Parliament, I trust we shall receive, before it can be brought on, your final instructions as to the precise view you would wish to have taken of the measure. The topic which our adversaries at present expect to derive most advantage from is, by contrasting your letter of the 26th of March, 1800, with the subsequent grounds of proceeding.

The pressure of business connected with the finances, and the preparations necessary for bringing the budget of last year, as well as the arrangements for liquidating the Indian debt, before Parliament, have hitherto prevented me from going through the papers relative to the College, which I shall not fail to do (the subject being entirely new to me) as early as possible, and I shall feel anxious, knowing how much your Lordship is interested upon this point, to address you upon it without any unnecessary delay.

Lord William Bentinck expects to embark for Madras early in March.

I have the honour to be,
with great truth and regard,
My dear Lord,
your very sincere and faithful servant,
CASTLEREAGH.

P. S. Since writing the above, I find that I have not yet seen much of the correspondence relative to Oude, which passed with the Secret Committee previous to my appointment. I have called for the papers, and shall peruse them without delay.

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## No. XLIII.

*The Right Hon. Lord Castlereagh to the Marquess Wellesley.*

London, March 16th, 1803.
[Received July 6th, 1803.]

MY DEAR LORD,

You will probably hear from me, by an overland express, before this despatch may reach you by sea. I shall delay my communication, by the former channel, in hopes that I may be enabled, in the course of a very few days, to apprize you, with more precision than I can do at this moment, of the actual or probable result of the present discussions carrying on with the French Government. It is enough for me at present to say, that his Majesty's ministers felt that the situation, in which we were placed, as well by the importance and delicacy of those discussions, as by the military preparations which have been carrying on for some time past in the ports of France and Holland, destined ostensibly for St. Domingo and Louisiana, was such as to call for active measures of precaution on our part; and accordingly a strong squadron has been ordered to be equipped for sea. Press-warrants have been issued; and the entire of the militia has been called out.

The usual communication has been made to Parliament on this subject, and was received precisely with the temper one could wish. A strong disposition is shewn from all quarters to support the honour and the interests of the country. Opinions naturally withheld till information can be given, but no

attempt made to press Government for premature explanation.

The funds, as might be expected, fell on the first alarm, but have since considerably recovered.

In the present state of things we can only furnish your Lordship with intelligence of what is passing, and desire you to wait for the result before you adopt any measure which can be productive of expence. You will receive, through the Secret Committee, a despatch to this effect, coupled with some observations referable to the principles upon which it may be wise to regulate the future measures of your government in the event of a renewal of hostilities.

It is unnecessary for me to press these observations upon your Lordship's particular attention. The discussions which have lately taken place both at home and abroad on the important measure of reducing the debt, now so happily brought to a decision by the plan for that purpose, before transmitted, having received nearly the unanimous sanction both of the Court of Directors and of Proprietors, and the honourable exertions which you have been making by retrenchments of expence, for giving effect to such a measure, will render you amongst the most unwilling to disturb, beyond what the exigency shall absolutely require, those arrangements, on which the success of the plan depends.

I am sure your Lordship will keep in view how much will be gained in positive strength by directing our exertions, even in war, against the debt, so long as there is little appearance of the enemy being enabled to menace India. However jealous France is of our power in the East, and however steady she may be in her purpose of aiming at positions, from which she might one day hope to shake that power, yet I cannot persuade myself that she has, or can have for a length of time, the means to attempt any direct attack against possessions so defended as ours are by the army now on foot.

I wish you, therefore, to consider how, under the smallest possible extension of expenditure, the army can be kept in that state of adequate preparation which belongs to war. For the five first years of the late war, the surplus abroad was as follows,—1792-3, £1,326,000; 1793-4, £1,683,000; 1794-5, £1,458,000; 1795-6, £977,000; 1796-7, £508,000.

Whatever efforts France may be able to make in Europe, India cannot be considered as more exposed now than in the years 1793-4-5, &c., whilst Tippoo was yet formidable. I must, therefore, indulge a sanguine hope that your Lordship will find it practicable to adopt a system, even in war, which shall be compatible with our financial objects, and that the surplus revenue, as in the years alluded to, will be still applicable in a large amount to the reduction of debt. If peculiar difficulties arise, we must make corresponding exertions; but let us save our means till those difficulties appear, as far as prudence will permit.

I conclude that the several restitutions have ere this been made to the French and Dutch Governments. How we stand at present with respect to the Portuguese settlements, which were garrisoned by us during the war, I cannot ascertain, either from any orders sent from home, or from any intelligence received from abroad. Under present circumstances I have only to request your Lordship, till you hear further from home, to turn your attention to the possible result of the discussions now pending, and to digest previously in your own mind the war system, on which you would propose to act, if hostilities should actually recommence, limiting it within the narrowest bounds in point of expence, which you deem at all consistent with the public safety. In the latter event, you shall receive early instructions from home as to the precise measures to be taken, with respect to the possessions of the several European powers either on the Continent of India, or in the Eastern Seas.

I have the honour to remain,
with great truth and regard,
your Lordship's most faithful and sincere
humble servant,
CASTLEREAGH.

[Enclosure in the foregoing letter.]

*Account of Bullion sent and to be sent to India, from June*, 1801, *to July*, 1803.

1801. June 10th, *Terpsichore* (frigate,) Invoice amount, 206,754*l.* 1*s.* 3*d.*; August 27th, *Sea-horse* (do.) 175,444*l.* 16*s.* 6*d.*; October 10th,

*Eurydice* (do.) 50,428*l.* 1802. February, *Alnwick Castle*, 52,712*l.* February, *Perseverance*, silver, 46,199*l.*; gold, 6,495*l.*; March 1st, *Walthamstow*, 58,794*l.*; March 4th, *United Kingdom*, 60,210*l.*; May 8th, *Fame*, 24,979*l.*; May 8th, *Culland's Grove*, 17,817*l.*; May 12th, *Admiral Aplin*, 18,305*l.*; May 12th, *Sir William Bensley*, 12,339*l.*; May 12th, *Tottenham*, 38,393*l.*; August , *Devaynes*, 31,651*l.*; August , *Skelton Castle*, 19,257*l.*; total, 819,777*l.* 17*s.* 9*d.* Provision for the present season, purchased and shipped, 350,000*l.*; contracted for, 893,000*l.*; total, 1,243,000*l.*

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## No. XLIV.

*Extract of Letter from the Marquess Wellesley to his Excellency Lieut.-General Lake, the Commander-in-Chief.*

MY DEAR SIR, Fort William, July 8th, 1803.

Despatches from Colonel Collins of the 14th of June received this day, satisfy me that we shall be able to break or rather to prevent the Mahratta confederacy against the Peishwa, but Scindiah's conduct requires punishment; and I therefore wish you to use every effort to prepare your army for the execution of the plan of which I have sent you a general outline. It is extremely important to be able to strike an effectual blow in the course of the next month. Act on your own judgment, and rely on my most ardent, firm, and affectionate support. I am now anxiously employed in every possible effort to aid your ability and skill; you will receive official instruction from me soon, which will correspond with the tenour of my letters of the 28th ultimo; in the meanwhile I wish you to accelerate every preparation for assembling an efficient force, and to act firmly in the issuing of all requisite orders, depending on my unalterable principles of respect and attachment for your aid.

I propose to despatch Major Shawe to you in a day or two with all my private instructions. I hope he may reach you in ten days from the day of his departure.

I wish you to understand my dear Sir, that I consider the reduction of Scindiah's power on the north-west frontier of Hindostan to be an important object in proportion to the probability of a war with France.

M. Du Boigne (Scindiah's late general) is now the chief confidant of Bonaparte; he is constantly at St. Cloud. I leave you to judge why and wherefore?

Ever yours most faithfully,

WELLESLEY.

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## No. XLV.

*The Marquess Wellesley to the Right Honourable Lord Clive.*

MY LORD, Fort William, 9th July, 1803.

In the present critical situation of affairs between his Majesty and the French Republic, I deem it proper to transmit to your Lordship by express, the following instructions for your immediate guidance.

First. Your Lordship will not restore to any persons authorized either on the part of the French, or of the Batavian Republic, any possession within the limits of your Lorship's government, conquered from the French or the Dutch during the war, and which may now remain in the occupation of the British Government, without further orders from me.

Second. Your Lordship will use the necessary precautions for securing the means of making prisoners of war, the French troops already landed at Pondicherry, as soon as you shall receive orders from me for that purpose, or shall learn by any authentic advices, that the situation of affairs between his Majesty and France may justify such a proceeding.

Third. Your Lordship will not permit any French troops to land at Pondicherry, or elsewhere, without observing similar precautions by stationing in their vicinity a force sufficient to secure the objects stated in the preceding paragraph.

It appears more desirable to admit the disembarkation of any number of troops whose movements can be commanded by the British force under your Lordship's orders, than to suffer any such French force to retire to the Mauritius, or to any port in the Eastern Seas, from whence, in the event of war, hostilities might be prosecuted by France against the British possessions in India. You will therefore understand my intention to be, to secure as prisoners of war, all such

French troops as may arrive in India, with a view to the immediate return of such force to France.

Your Lordship will strictly prohibit the recruiting of sepoys for the French service at Pondicherry. Any proceedings of that nature, which may have been commenced by the French officers already arrived at that settlement, are entirely premature, and irregular. Pondicherry is still a part of the British territory, and the French cannot claim any right to recruit their army from our subjects.

Your Lordship will understand, that in the event of the French and Dutch possessions being ultimately restored to the two Republics, it is my determination to limit the recruiting of their respective native corps, within the boundaries of their respective settlements, and strictly to prohibit all proceedings for the purpose of raising or recruiting native corps for the French or Dutch service within the British possessions. In order to give full effect to this prohibition, it will be necessary to prohibit under the most severe penalties, all native subjects of the British Government, its dependents, tributaries, and allies, from entering into the service of any European power excepting the British Government.

Your Lordship will be pleased to consider without delay, the most effectual means of providing adequate security against any attempts of the French or Dutch to raise or recruit native corps beyond the limits of their respective settlements, or among the subjects of the British Government, its dependents, tributaries, and allies.

With respect to the native subjects of the British Government, it is my intention to prevent them by the strictest laws, from entering into the service of any of the native powers of India, with the exception of the dependents, tributaries, and allies of the Company, and I desire that your Lordship will take early measures to the same effect.

Your Lordship will be pleased to transmit a copy of this despatch to his Excellency the Vice-Admiral, and you will concert with his Excellency the necessary measures for securing the co-operation of his Majesty's squadron in any proceedings, which may become requisite under these orders, towards any French or Dutch force, which may arrive on the coasts subject to your Lordship's government.

I have received the despatch of your Lordship in council in the Secret Department, dated on the 18th ultimo, to which I shall have the honour of replying in the course of a few days; in the meanwhile, I desire that your Lordship will consider this despatch as the rule for the conduct of the Government of Fort St. George, towards the French and Batavian Republics.

Your Lordship will record this despatch in the Secret Department at Fort St. George, at such time as you shall deem most expedient for the public safety, and for the due accomplishment of the objects of these instructions.

I have the honour to be, &c.
WELLESLEY.

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## No. XLVI

*The Honourable G. H. Barlow, Esq.* to the Marquess Wellesley.*

(Private.)

MY LORD, July 12, 1803.

I do myself the honour of enclosing the draft of a note to your Excellency, which I had prepared this morning. I trust you will excuse my sending it in an almost illegible state, and on scraps of paper. I had intended to copy it fair, but it has extended to a greater length than I had expected; and not being very well, I do not feel myself quite equal to the task. In its present state, it will, I trust, answer equally well the purpose of conveying to your Excellency what has occurred to me on the subject of the question discussed yesterday.

I have the honour to be,
with the highest respect,
your Excellency's most faithful,
and obedient servant,
G. H. BARLOW.

(Enclosure.)

Conceiving it may be satisfactory to your Lordship to know what has occurred to me on a deliberate consideration of the important question

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* Now Sir George Hilaro Barlow, G. C. B., then a member of the Supreme Council.

discussed yesterday, I shall do myself the honour of stating the result. No doubt was entertained, as far as related to the question of right and justice, that the British Government was at full liberty to prosecute the present plan of measures, or to declare the alliance with the Peishwa void. If any difficulty existed with regard to this branch of the question, it was to assign reasons for declaring the alliance at an end without hazarding an impeachment of our good faith.

It only remained, therefore, to determine whether good policy required our persevering or withdrawing, under the unexpected circumstances of the total inability of the Peishwa to fulfil his part of the engagements, of the probability of hostilities with France, of the part taken by the Rajah of Berar, and the confederacy formed between Scindiah, the Rajah of Berar, and Holkar, of the certainty of the approaching dissolution of the Nizam, and of the nature of the orders received from England.

If we abandon the alliance, and withdraw our forces, (whatever may be the reasons we may assign for the measure,) no other construction will be given, both by friends and enemies, to this change of policy but this; that we were at least doubtful of the success of the impending military operations. They will never believe that in the present advanced stage of the business, and after all the declarations which have been made by our ministers at the Mahratta courts, that we should abandon a plan which has been pursued with unremitting perseverance for a course of years, and the advantages of which to our interests are so obvious, but from an apprehension of our inability to repel the opposition which has been raised to the consolidation of our alliance with the Peishwa. What will be the effect of this impression on the minds of our friends and enemies? Our friends will no longer entertain their present implicit confidence in our power and protection, and our enemies will make all India resound with shouts of triumph at our having yielded the field to them. The mischievous consequences which must be produced by this change in the sentiments of the states of India with respect to the British power, cannot be calculated.

But is it certain, in the event of our withdrawing our forces, that we should be allowed to retain the countries ceded to us by the Peishwa to indemnify us for the expense of the measures undertaken for his support? Is it not to be apprehended that the power which might succeed in usurping the authority of the Poonah Government, would endeavour to compel us to relinquish those countries, by committing continued depredations in them, in the confidence that the same motives which induced us to avoid war when our armies were in the field, and in the most advantageous positions, would influence us still more strongly, when we had to collect those armies again, and which the operations of the most successful campaign could not be expected to place in their present advantageous positions? There is no conjecturing to what lengths the presumptuous character of the Mahrattas might impel them under such circumstances. Thus we might be compelled to go to war under the disadvantages of loss of national character, and of limited means, and probably after having afforded to the French an opportunity of connecting themselves as auxiliaries with some of the Mahratta states.

Should this be the result, the Government would incur a heavy load of responsibility in England. Its conduct would be first censured for engaging in the alliance, next, for withdrawing from it, and lastly, for placing itself in a situation which reduced it to the alternative of engaging in a war under the disadvantages above stated, or of sacrificing the national character by relinquishing the retained territories.

With respect to the expected death of the Nizam, supposing the Mahrattas, or any of the disaffected members of the Nizam's family, to have it in contemplation to take advantage of that event to destroy our connection with the Court of Hyderabad, our armies in the Deccan could not be more favourably stationed than they are at present for the purpose of frustrating any such designs. If such designs are entertained, I am persuaded it would have been your Lordship's duty to have called the same armies into the field, supposing no alliance had been concluded with the Peishwa.

With respect to the French, supposing the present questions in Europe not to lead to an immediate rupture, we are now certain that the whole course of their policy has for its object the subversion of the British empire in India, and that at no distant period of time they will put their plans into execution. It is absolutely necessary for the defeat of these designs, that no native state should be left to exist in India, which is not upheld by the British power, or the political conduct of which is not under its absolute control. The restoration of the head of the Mahratta empire to his Government through the influence of the British power, in fact, has placed all the remaining states of India in this dependent relation to the British Government. If the alliance with the Peishwa is maintained, its natural and necessary operations would in the course of time reduce Scindiah (the power which may already be said to be in the interests of France) and the Rajah of Berar, to a state of dependence upon the Peishwa, and consequently upon the British power, even if they had acquiesced in the treaty of Bassein. But their unjust opposition to this treaty affords us an opportunity of at once reducing their power to a state that will remove every obstacle to the consolidation of the alliance with the Peishwa, and to the attainment of all its advantages. When can we hope for another opportunity equally favourable, or (under all the probable consequences of withdrawing from the alliance,) when can we hope to have all India again at our command? With respect to the chiefs combined against us, have we any reasonable ground to apprehend that we shall not prevail in the contest? The Guicowar state (always considered to form a considerable part of the strength of the Mahratta empire,) is actively employed in our support. The Peishwa, although unable from imbecility of character, to command with effect the resources at his disposal, is with us. We have the aid and countenance of his authority, and his territories to the south of the Godavery friendly to our cause, at least more so than to that of our enemies. Scindiah, therefore, is the only chief who possesses the means of making any serious opposition. We know that the Rajah of Berar possesses neither military knowledge nor military resources. We also know that Holkar's army consists of a body of plunderers, and that he has no means of maintaining a contest of any duration. Our army, well equipped,

has established itself within the heart of the dominions of these chiefs, and within a few marches of their camp, where they are collected without money, resources, or provisions, and where there is every prospect we shall destroy or disperse their whole force at one blow. It is scarcely possible that their military power could be placed in circumstances more favourable for our effecting its destruction.

With respect to the solicitude expressed in England for carrying into effect the plan for paying off the debt in the next six years, we can estimate with tolerable accuracy to what degree the execution of that plan is likely to be interrupted by a perseverance in the present course of measures in the Mahratta empire. This interruption is likely to be less in extent and duration than that which may be expected from abandoning the alliance with the Peishwa, if there is any foundation for the conjectures which I have stated as to the probable consequences of that measure. Every year would probably produce some of those calamities which would inevitably attend our declining power and influence, and we cannot conjecture what would be our situation at the expiration of six years. On the other hand, if we persevere in the present measures, and succeed, we are certain, not only that the existing debt, with the addition to it which may be occasioned by the prosecution of the present measures, will be extinguished within the expected time, but that the British power will be established throughout India, in prosperity, glory, and security.

The conviction of the justice and wisdom of the line of policy which your Excellency has pursued with respect to the Mahratta empire, is more strongly impressed on my mind in proportion as I consider it in all its relations. I am confident that the line of policy is entitled to this character, whether considered with reference to the discharge of the debt, to the augmentation of the investment, or the other objects which the authorities in England have in view, to the true interests of the Mahratta chiefs, to the happiness of the millions of wretched people who inhabit the countries subjected to their power, to the exclusion of the French, to the honour and reputation of our national character, or to the stability of the British empire in India.

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## XLVII.

*The Marquess Wellesley to Lieut.-General Lake.*

(Secret and Confidential.)

MY DEAR SIR, Fort William, July 18th, 1803.

I received this day with the greatest satisfaction, your very able and encouraging communication of the 9th instant. I return a copy of your memorandum with marginal notes by this express. I trust that these notes, together with my late

official communications and orders will be satisfactory to you. I am so unwell in consequence of a severe attack of rheumatism, that it is with difficulty I can contrive to write even a few lines; but I hope that you will perceive the pleasure which I derive from the prospect opened by your letter, and that you will feel the entire confidence which I repose in your zeal, ability, and honour.

I consider an active effort against the Mahrattas, I mean Scindiah and Berar, (for the Peishwa is *ours*) to be the best possible preparation for a renewal of war with France. You will therefore act confidently, and you will use every effort to prepare for the early execution of the very able plan of operations which you have framed.

Ever, my dear Sir,

Your most faithfully and sincerely,

WELLESLEY.

[Enclosure.]

*Memorandum by Lieut.-General Lake with the Marquess Wellesley's observations thereon, 18th July, 1803.**

1. Main army to consist of the under-mentioned corps, with a proportionate field train, and battering train of eighteen pounders, and two eight inch mortars.

*Cavalry* B.—8th Light Dragoons; 27th ditto; 29th ditto. N.—1st, 2d, 3rd, 4th.

*Infantry.*—76th regiment; two battalions 15th regiment; two ditto 4th regiment; two ditto 2d regiment; two ditto 12th regiment; one ditto 14th regiment.

Two gallopers with each regiment of cavalry, and two six-pounders with each battalion, making thirty field pieces attached to the corps, independent of the line part composed of twelves, sixes, and howitzers.

2. Detachment to be assembled at Allahabad for the purpose of entering Bundelcund, viz.—two battalions 18th regiment; first ditto 13th regiment; second ditto 11th regiment.

Two six-pounders with each corps is ten guns, and two twelve-pounders two howitzers, and four six-pounders in park.

3. Detachment to cover Rohilcund, and to invade Saharunpour if an opportunity offers, viz.—6th regiment of native cavalry; first battalion 12th regiment; second ditto 8th regiment; second ditto 9th regiment.

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* The observations of the Marquess Wellesley are given as notes in *italics* on General Lake's memorandum.—[*Ed.*]

Two six-pounders with each corps is eight guns, to which four additional six-pounders may be added.

4. Detachment to cover Benares, three troops 5th regiment cavalry; two battalions 6th regiment, (native infantry;) first battalion 1st regiment; to be ordered up from Dinapore.

5. At Caunpore, two battalions 17th (native infantry), and five companies of second battalion 16th native infantry.

6. At Futty Ghur, second battalion 14th regiment.

7. At Etayah, first battalion 11th regiment; this corps is conveniently situated to support either the main army, or Allahabad detachment, and it may be advisable to keep it at Etayah for a time, to cover the Ghauts on the Jumna.

*This disposition contained in paragraph* 1, *to* 7, *inclusive, appears to me to be very judicious, and to answer every purpose in my contemplation.—Wellesley.*

8. The early defeat of Perron in the field, appears to be of the first importance, and would in all probability be decisive of the success of the campaign.

8. Independent of the immediate advantages which would follow the defeat of his regular infantry, in which consists his principal strength—the effect which this would produce on the minds of the native princes, could not fail to be highly beneficial to us. So strongly are they impressed with the idea of his superiority and apprehensive of his vengeance, that however desirous they may be to throw off his yoke, still there is great room to fear, that until the superiority of the British arms shall be completely established by some decided advantage, they will not dare to declare their sentiments, or to take a hostile part against him.

The moment our superiority is manifested, there is little doubt but they will court our protection, and thereby diminish the force of the enemy in a double proportion, by adding to our strength what is taken from the enemy.

*The defeat of Perron is certainly the first object, and I entirely concur in this reasoning. The plan of seizing Agra proceeded on a supposition that it might not be practicable to induce Perron to meet us in the field; or that Agra might be seized or obtained while the main army was employed in pursuing Perron.*

*I am now convinced that the primary object of the campaign ought to be the defeat of Perron's regular corps.*

*The Commander-in-Chief will consider what advantage can be derived from any negotiation with Perron, or Hessing, (for Agra.) My opinion, however is, that it might be dangerous to attempt any negotiation with any of Scindiah's officers until we shall be masters of the field.—Wellesley.*

9. It may therefore be judged advisable to press Perron at once, with a force, sufficient to ensure his overthrow and expulsion from the Doab. This once effected, the seiges of Agra, &c. can be undertaken without inconvenience.

*I wish that not a moment should be lost in assembling the army according to the present disposition: and the moment that the Commander-in-Chief*

*shall receive advice that Colonel Collins has quitted Scindiah's camp, or that General Wellesley has commenced hostilities, or if the Commander-in-Chief should be of opinion that the Mahratta confederacy is likely to derive advantage from any operation of Mr. Perron's force, or of any other troops in Hindostan; his Excellency will not hesitate to commence hostilities, and he may rely on the support of the government.*

*This note will be made official to-morrow. It is highly desirable to anticipate the projects of Scindiah, and of the Rajah of Berar, by an early and decisive blow; and the Commander-in-Chief will understand this principle to constitute the spirit of all the Gouernor-General's views.—Wellesley.*

10. At the time the main army moves against Perron, the Allahabad detachment, at least such part of it as can be drawn together, may menace Culpee and the Bundelcund country, which will prevent any considerable assistance in cavalry being sent to Perron.

*This precaution appears to be highly judicious—the Commander-in-Chief will be furnished immediately with a copy of Mr. Mercer's instructions, who will proceed immediately to join the Commander-in-Chief for the purpose of acting under his Excellency's orders, in the various political negotiations connected with the movement of the army.—Wellesley.*

11. The detachment in Rohilcund to be assembled above Amrooa, where it will cover Rampore, and if it moves to the banks of the Ganges and threatens Saharunpore, it will prevent Bapooja Scindiah from assisting Perron and keep the Seiks and the Gudjer chiefs in check.

*Entirely approved.—Wellesley.*

12. Immediately behind Mirzapoor is the principal road leading into the Bundela country, and through it to Nagpore. A battalion from Benares might seize the passes, and by that means compel the Bundela chiefs and Rajah of Nagpore to divide their force, which would greatly facilitate the operation of the Allahabad detachment.

*The Commander-in-Chief will determine this point after having seen Mr. Mercer's instructions.—Wellesley.*

13. The detachment at Midnapore encreased to the utmost extent of troops that can be spared from the presidency, and the body guard ought to enter the Cuttack, and a diversion to be made on the opposite side from Ganjam,—this, joined to the threatened invasion from Mirzapore and Culpee, would alarm the Rajah of Berar for the safety of his dominions, and compel him to leave Scindiah, and return to protect his own country.

*The force at Midnapore has been encreased by one battalion and a company of artillery, and it is proposed to encrease it further as soon as may be practicable.*

*The Governor-General has taken means for seizing Cuttack from Ganjam.*

*The plan will be forwarded immediately to the Commander-in-Chief.*

*It appears to be difficult, if not absolutely impossible, to move troops from Midnapore into Cuttack during the rainy season; if however, this movement should appear to be practicable, it will be attempted. At all events no doubt exists of our being masters of Cuttack, from Ganjam before the conclusion of the rains —Wellesley.*

13. After the defeat of Perron, when it is expected many of the inde-

pendent princes will declare in our favour, the Allahabad detachment can be increased, so as to enable it with every assurance of success, to penetrate into the heart of Berar.

*This conclusion is just; the operations after the rains must depend on circumstances, which we shall have the full time to discuss. The great objects of the war should be* (1st), *to defeat Perron, and to occupy the whole of the Doab;* (2nd), *to secure the passes from the southward into Hindostan;* (3rd), *to occupy Cuttack;* (4th), *to defeat Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar in the Deccan, and to detach or defeat Holkar and Amrut Rao during the rainy season. If these objects be attained previously to the month of October, the Mahratta power will be extinct.—Wellesley.*

14. The most essential advantages may be derived from an union with Begum Sumroo, who has long evinced a desire to be taken under the protection of the English. Exclusive of the accession to our strength by the co-operation of her forces, (eight battalions,) her interest with the Seik Chiefs might secure their neutrality, if not their assistance.

Four of her battalions are now with Scindiah, which may prove an obstacle to an early declaration of her sentiments, but if a rupture actually takes place, and she is sincere in what she has often declared, means might be contrived to enable those battalions to join General Wellesley.

*This suggestion is extremely proper, and orders will be immediately sent to Colonel Scott; Mr. Mercer's instructions include this point.—Wellesley.*

15. There appears to be strong reasons against attacking Gwalior, while Perron is in force.

1st. A body of troops equal to the service could not be spared, for they would be opposed by the united force of Ambajee, Khoondajee, and the petty Rajahs tributary to the Mahrattas.

2nd. Ambajee is at variance with Jadoon Rao, Scindiah's Prime Minister, and disgusted at the preference Scindiah has shewn to Jadoon Rao.

3rd. Gwalior, with most of the strong forts on this side of India, belong to Ambajee and his brother Kundrojee; an attack on Gwalior would compel them to take an active part against us, whereas it is not impossible, adverting to the ill terms they are on with Scindiah and his Minister, if left unmolested, they would remain quiet, and as they formerly wished to form an alliance with the English to guard themselves from the grasping ambition of Scindiah, they might be brought over to our interest.

*The Commander-in-Chief will determine these points on his own judgment, after having received Mr. Mercer's instructions. The great object in this quarter is to prevent Scindiah from entering Hindostan with a large body of cavalry.—Wellesley.*

16. The chiefs of Bundelcund are so divided and torn into factions, that it will be easy to secure one party.

*Mr. Mercer's instructions.—Wellesley.*

17. The Rajpoot and Jaut Rajahs are disgusted with the Mahratta rule, but their dread of Perron's power exceeds their wish to be relieved; the same observation applies to the Seik Chiefs, but there is little doubt the defeat of Perron would be the signal for a general defection of all these Chiefs from the Mahratta interests.

Colonel Kyd or Mr. Ahmuty might feel the disposition of Ghunny and Himmut Behâdur in Bundelcund.

*Perfectly just; this subject is fully stated in Mr. Mercer's instructions; letters have been addressed to the Seiks, and to Himmut Behâdur, of which copies will be sent to the Commander-in-Chief.—Wellesley.*

18. Begum Sumroo has a vakeel at Lucknow who might be sounded by Colonel Scott.

*Order will be issued.—Wellesley.*

19. Colonel Sutherland, lately dismissed from the command of a brigade by Perron, might be able to give much valuable information, and be instrumental in drawing over other officers from Perron.

*I do not know where Colonel Sutherland is to be found; if the Commander-in-Chief should know, his Excellency will be so good as to take immediate means for securing Mr. Sutherland's assistance. In general I wish the Commander-in-Chief to understand, that I shall cheerfully sanction any obligations or expence incurred for the purpose of conciliating the officers or ministers of the confederates.—Wellesley.*

20. The Sepoys formerly discharged our service, would no doubt be happy to quit Scindiah, and rejoin their old corps were they permitted so to do.

*This point appears to be sufficiently secured by the late augmentation of corps to the war establishment.—Wellesley.*

21. The experimental horse artillery will be very useful in this quarter.

*The experimental horse artillery will embark this day for the upper provinces.—Wellesley.*

22. A detachment from the body guard would have been a most desirable acquisition, but on consideration, the lower provinces being so totally without cavalry, the presence of so efficient a corps may be absolutely necessary in Bengal, but of this, his Excellency the most noble the Governor-General will be the best judge.

*It appears most desirable to detain the body guard at the Presidency.—Wellesley.*

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## No. XLVIII.

*Marquess Wellesley to Right Honorable Lord Viscount Castlereagh.*

(Secret.)

MY DEAR LORD, Fort William, 25 July, 1803.

1. I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 16th March 1803.*

2. I return your lordship many thanks for the information communicated in that despatch.

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See p. 179.

3. Your Lordship may be assured of my utmost endeavours to accelerate the success of the measures adopted in England for the reduction of the Indian debt; and I entertain a confident expectation that the circumstance of a renewal of hostilities with France, unaccompanied by the danger of military operations of the French in India, or by a rupture between the Company and the Mahratta power, would not occasion any material delay in the progress of the system adopted for the liquidation of the Indian debt, provided the Court of Directors shall duly supply treasure from home equal to the prime cost of investment in India.

4. It is however my positive duty to apprize your lordship that I received the letter from the Secret Committee under date (the 17th March 1803) with sentiments of the utmost concern, as well as of the most serious apprehension.

5. The orders contained in that letter directing the principal attention of this government in the supposed event of a renewal of hostilities with France to the reduction of the Indian debt appears to me to inculcate principles of policy which may prove injurious to the safety of this empire, especially in time of war.

6. The proportion which the Indian debt now bears to our annual revenues, the proportion of our annual charges to our annual revenues, the reduction effected in the rate of interest upon public loans since the year 1798, the amount and operation of the sinking fund established in India, the present high credit of all the securities of Government, and the flourishing and progressive condition of every branch of our resources, must satisfy your lordship that exaggerated apprehensions have been disseminated with repect to the magnitude and pressure of the debt in India; and that its existence cannot be considered to form the principal object of danger to India in a season of war with France.

7. Just economy in time of war is a bulwark of strength against the enemy; and I trust that your lordship will confide in my anxious solicitude to avail myself of this powerful aid as well as of every other means of prosecuting war against France in India. At the same time I am convinced, that your lordship will not suffer commercial prejudice and the eager desire of temporary mercantile advantage to contract the comprehensive scale of our military preparations or to

repress the activity of military enterprize in India in the event of a renewal of hostilities with our formidable and implacable foe.

8. My construction of the tenor of the letter of the Secret Committee may I hope prove erroneous: it appears to me to contain orders calculated to abate that spirit of alacrity and forward military preparation which it has been my anxious endeavour to encourage, and on which must ever depend the security of the British possessions in India not only during the existence of war with France, but even in time of peace.

9. In my letter addressed to your lordship under date 20th April 1803, I had the honour to request your attention to the deficiencies in the effective strength of the European force destined for the peace establishment of India. The peace establishment proposed by your lordship if completely maintained (with some additions which I shall have the honour of submitting to your lordship's consideration in a separate despatch) would in my opinion answer every ordinary purpose of security; even in time of war.

10. Extraordinary emergencies must be met by adequate efforts; but it is absolutely necessary that the military establishment maintained in India (especially the European troops) even in time of peace with France, should be formed upon a scale calculated to frustrate surprize from the French and to maintain a commanding superiority over the improving military establishments of the Mahratta powers.

11. The degree of danger to be apprehended from the efforts of France in India in time of peace, is stated in a despatch to Lord Hobart (of the 20th June 1803) a copy of which is enclosed for your lordship's information.* Your lordship appears to be fully impressed with the necessity of maintaining in India even in time of peace with France an European army equal to all the ordinary exigencies of war: and my opinion, with regard to the amount of the force adequate to that purpose, will not be found at variance with your lordship's judgment to any considerable extent.

12. The reductions which I effected in the strength of our native regiments upon the conclusion of peace with France were expressly founded upon that event, with reference also

* See Appendix.

to the existing state of peace with all the native powers. In referring to my despatch (of the 8th February 1802*) to the Commander-in-Chief on that subject, your lordship will observe that I have considered those reductions to be inseparably connected with the continuance of general peace in India and Europe.

13. The degree of danger to be apprehended from France in India during the existence of war is in my opinion inconsiderable in the present state of our power in India, provided that power be duly exerted in maintaining a commanding superiority in these seas, and in preserving our European and native land forces in a state of complete efficiency and strength. It is also essential to the security of these dominions to cultivate the military energy of the government, and to animate its vigilance and zeal, together with the spirit of the army, by encouraging the free and unrestrained course of our exertions against the enemy in India.

14. While the Cape of Good Hope, the Mauritius, Batavia and Amboyna shall remain in the hands of the French and Batavian Republics, the security of this empire in time of war must rest upon the extent and condition of the naval and military force stationed in India; upon the constant and diligent observation of the enemy's motions, and upon the prompt application of our means of defence to such operations as may frustrate the attempts, which may be expected from those places during the progress of the war.

15. In addition to these considerations it is to be observed that the several forts and settlements of the French, the Dutch, and Portuguese in India in time of war with France must either be garrisoned by British troops or must afford considerable advantage to France in the prosecution of hostile designs against our power. This consideration necessarily requires the employment of a considerable body of our troops either for the purpose of occupying those places, or of observing the movements of any French force which may be stationed in those places respectively, or may menace them.

16. All the possessions of the French and Dutch on the continent of India now remain in our hands, and Goa must be garrisoned by British troops, it would therefore have been

* See vol. ii. p. 624.

necessary with reference exclusively to these circumstances to maintain our European establishment at least upon the full scale of efficiency proposed by your lordship for a peace establishment, and to raise all the native corps to the war establishment.

17. The state of preparation required by the commotions in the Mahratta empire, by the conduct of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and of the Rajah of Berar, by the position and strength of Scindiah's French corps under the command of M. Perron, has already compelled me to restore the native corps to the war establishment, even previously to the certainty of a renewal of hostilities with France; and the subsidiary engagements concluded in the Deccan have required the addition of three native regiments in Bengal.

18. The orders from the Secret Committee prohibit any attempt against the Mauritius or Batavia. Any such attempt from India in the present state of the Mahratta power would be imprudent. But it is my duty to state to your lordship my conscientious opinion that in the event of a renewal of war with France, the early conquest of the Isle of France would be an object of the utmost importance to the commerce and political security of these possessions.

19. While the French shall retain the Isle of France with the advantage of an amicable communication with the Cape of Good Hope, a force may be maintained between these two settlements which may be employed either in attempting some vulnerable point of our extensive coast, or in endeavouring to aid some native power in effecting conquests of neutral possessions which might enable the French to menace our frontier.

20. Your lordship will observe that this last suggestion relates to the probable designs of France upon the coast of Ava.

21. I shall entertain no apprehension of being enabled to meet the most vigorous attempt which France could probably make on any part of our possessions, provided the military establishments be preserved in complete vigour. But the arrival of a French force on the continent of India (an event which may be expected in the progress of the war if the French should retain the Cape of Good Hope and the Mauritius) and the partial or temporary success of such an

invasion would occasion alarm, and might encourage some of our tributaries or dependants to excite disturbances.

22. A French force might be employed from the same settlements against Malacca or Prince of Wales' Island, (if not against any of our continental possessions) and in that case a considerable expense must be incurred for the purpose of expelling it in the probable event of its first success.

23. Under these circumstances all our measures of defence must be adopted with the supposition that the French may assemble at the Isle of France and at the Cape of Good Hope a force adequate to hostile purposes, and your lordship is apprized that at certain seasons of the year no superiority of naval strength can entirely secure all our possessions from attack.

24. The great extent of the coasts of India, and the variety of services which may require the attention of his Majesty's ships, added to the defective authority of the Company's Government with regard to the navy in India, render the naval defences of our Indian empire extremely precarious even with a decided superiority in the number and strength of his Majesty's ships over those of France and Holland.

25. At present the French and Dutch ships in the Indian and Eastern seas exclusive of those at the Cape of Good Hope, are supposed to be superior in number and weight of metal to his Majesty squadron within the same seas. But I am not apprehensive of any early junction of these forces. The distance between Batavia, the Isle of France, and the Cape of Good Hope, and the actual position of the squadron which brought M. Decaen,* together with the state of all the French and Dutch ships and men, appear to preclude all immediate danger; and I conclude that early reinforcements to the navy and army in India will speedily arrive from England. But in any case the Company's Government must provide for the immediate defence of our ports and of their trade, while the French and Dutch shall retain any possessions or force in those seas.

26. While the French shall remain in possession of the Isle of France, the British Government in India will be subjected to a heavy expense in supporting a separate marine

* Governor of the Isles of France and Bourbon.—[*Ed.*]

force for these objects and for the protection of the country trade, and of the Company's ships. During the last war with France the captures made in India by privateers fitted out from the Isle of France, are estimated at four millions sterling.

27. This additional expense for maintaining a marine force must be incurred immediately upon the commencement of war with France.

28. During the last war his Majesty's squadron was never equal to all the objects which demand the protection of a naval force on these seas, and the immediate defence of the trade of the ports of Calcutta and Bombay devolved principally on the Company's Government. Similar difficulty must be expected to arise on the renewal of hostilities with France and Holland.

29. The possession of the Isle of France would diminish the danger to our trade and dominions in India which must be expected to arise from the possession of the Cape by the Batavian Republic if it should not be found convenient or deemed advisable to recover that colony from the hands of the enemy.

30. I have learnt with considerable concern that opinions are entertained by most respectable persons in England tending to undervalue the importance of the possession of the Cape of Good Hope in time of war with France and Holland. I cannot furnish your lordship with a more satisfactory testimony of my opinion on that question, than by requesting your attention to the annexed extract of a letter which I addressed to Mr. Dundas from the Cape of Good Hope in (the month of February) 1798, during my residence in that colony, at which I touched upon my voyage to India.*

31. Your Lordship, I trust, will pardon the emotions of zeal for the security of these possessions, which induce me to express an earnest hope that an early attempt may be made to disturb the strength of the enemy either at the Cape of Good Hope or at the Isle of France.

32. The reduction of either of those possessions would afford great additional security to our Indian empire, and it will be obvious to your Lordship that the reduction of either possession would facilitate our operations against the other.

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* See vol. i. p. 1.

33. It would not be advisable to undertake an expedition against the Isle of France by a combined operation from England and from India. It is always to be apprehended that some branches of the arrangements for a combined operation from such distant points may fail. The season may be lost, and the enemy may easily obtain information of the intended attempt, in time to prepare resistance. Under any state of affairs on the Continent of India no considerable aid in European troops could prudently be afforded from India, even if the peace establishment, proposed by your Lordship, of seventeen regiments, of one thousand men, were completed.

34. In the present state of the European force in India, your Lordship is apprized of the deficiencies which render it unequal to the purposes originally in your Lordship's contemplation.

35. After the reduction either of the Isle of France or of the Cape of Good Hope, it would be a practicable and expedient measure to compose a part of the garrisons of either of those places of native sepoys from India; and in that event, a part of the European force originally sent from England to the Cape of Good Hope, or to the Mauritius, might proceed to India.

36. Any operation against the Cape of Good Hope would, in all probability, appear to his Majesty's ministers to promise most speedy and effectual success by being despatched directly from England, and I would strongly recommend that in any expedition against the Cape of Good Hope no reliance should be placed upon co-operation from India.

37. It would be difficult to despatch an expedition against the Mauritius directly from Europe; if, therefore, any expedition be intended against the Mauritius, it would appear most advisable to commence the operation by a considerable reinforcement of the European troops in India. Those reinforcements might be divided between Madras, Bombay and Ceylon, distributing the largest proportion at Madras and Ceylon.

38. An expedition might then be prepared by the Government of India for the attack of the Mauritius, with the advantage of a short voyage, of the most recent information relative to the defences of the Island, and also with the aid of a proportion of native troops.

39. Your Lordship will remark that most of the contin-

gencies supposed in this letter require an increase of military and marine charges, and that the state of affairs with the Mahrattas has already compelled me to restore the native army to the war establishment, while the subsidiary engagements concluded with the Peishwa and the Guicowar have rendered an increase of the native force in Bengal indispensably necessary.

40. In stating the necessity of these expences, I have not pointed your Lordship's attention to any other opinions than such as I have been enabled to form upon the important question of our military establishments and state of preparation.

41. Entertaining a firm persuasion that I have the honour to possess your Lordship's confidence, I am satisfied that you will give me full credit for the most anxious desire to avoid every increase of expence which is not absolutely essential to an adequate state of preparation for war. If, however, I were to refer your Lordship to the opinions of the Commander-in-Chief General Lake, of Lieut.-General Stuart, and of the Governments of Fort St. George, Bombay and Ceylon, your Lordship would find that the additions which I have made to our military force in consequence of the events to which I have adverted is inferior to the augmentations proposed by those respectable authorities.

42. The Commander-in-Chief General Lake, for whose opinion I entertain the highest respect, concurs with me on the sufficiency of the augmentations made in Bengal, and I trust that if our European establishment be maintained complete, according to suggestions which I shall have the honour to submit to your Lordship in a separate letter, no further increase of our military force can be required, unless with a view to fulfil new treaties of subsidy, which, of course, will include the provision of additional funds.

43. To meet the expences incident to the preparations for war, and to the execution of our treaties with the Peishwa and with the Guicowar, the subsidiary grants of territory from those states will prove an efficient resource.

44. If war should take place with the Mahrattas and Monsieur Perron, it will probably be attended by the conquest of territories, which will speedily repay our expences.

45. With respect to the account which your Lordship has

enclosed of the surplus realized in India from the peace of Seringapatam to the year 1796-7, it is difficult to apply that account to present circumstances without entering into a minute examination of the principles on which the surplus in India was calculated during those years.

46. It would also be requisite to examine whether during that period of time the military establishments in India were maintained in a state of adequate preparation for war. At the time of my arrival in India, I have no hesitation in repeating to your Lordship the opinion which I recorded at that moment, that our Indian empire was not in a state of military or naval preparation in any degree calculated to meet the exigency of war.

47. The destruction of Tippoo Sultaun's power has removed the most formidable enemy of the British power in India, but the actual condition of the Mahratta powers connected with the views of France and the constitution of some branches of Scindiah's military establishment will require the most vigilant and extensive state of military preparation.

48. I entertain no apprehension, however, of meeting the expence incident to these preparations without any material check to the Company's commercial investment, and without any important delay in the operations for the reduction of the debt. My apprehensions of the approaching crisis would be much more serious, if I were not confident that your Lordship will oppose the generosity, vigour and firmness of your mind to the progress of any system of compromise between the conflicting characters of merchant and sovereign, which compose the constitution of the East India Company. While that Company shall represent the sovereign executive authority of the realm in so great, populous, and flourishing a portion of the British empire, its duties of sovereignty must be deemed paramount to its mercantile interests, prejudices, and profits. In time of peace, the happiness of its subjects, the permanent improvement of its dominions, the dignity, purity, and vigour of its government must take precedence of commercial considerations. The sovereignty of the Company is the basis and strength of its commerce; and from the faithful discharge of the duties of empire in India must ever flow the wealth and credit of the trading corporation in London. In time both of peace and of war, the strength and efficiency of

the army, and above all, the military spirit and character of the government in India must be cultivated with uninterrupted assiduity, and determined perseverance. To that spirit and character we owe the origin of this empire; and in preserving the cause of its origin we shall provide the most effectual security for its preservation. The most indispensable duty of the sovereign executive government in India is therefore the maintenance of the military power, without which no security can exist for the mercantile or financial interests of the Company, or even for the tranquillity and welfare of our Indian subjects.

49. I shall have the honour of addressing despatches to Lord Hobart relative to the restitutions to be made to the French and Dutch Governments, to the Portuguese settlements, and generally to the possessions of the several European powers on the Continent of India, or on the Eastern Seas. Copies of these despatches will be transmitted to your Lordship for your information, and I shall hope to receive his Majesty's further instructions, relative to those points, from your Lordship, or from the Secretary of State.

I have the honour to be,
with great respect, my dear Lord, &c.
WELLESLEY.

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## No. XLIX.

*W. Leycester, Esq. Collector of Moradabad, to the Marquess Wellesley.*

Moradabad, July 26, 1803.*
[Received Aug. 15, 1803.]

MY LORD,

In the present posture of affairs, I trust a zeal for the public welfare, and the anxiety I feel to render my small services of any the least benefit to a Government from which I have received such distinguished countenance, will plead in palliation of the liberty I am taking in the present address,

* This letter and its important enclosures were not received by the Governor-General until the 15th of August. They fully prove his Lordship's declaration to General Lake, (see letter 5th of July, p. 174,) that Scindiah's sole object was to gain time, and also the opinion of Col. Collins, p. 171.—*Editor.*

and that if the intrusion be altogether unacceptable or unnecessary, the motive to it will screen me from the disapprobation of your Lordship.

I am aware that it is not the policy of your Lordship's Government that an unauthorized servant should at all enter into the politics of adjoining states; but your Lordship will be sensible that it is hardly possible to withdraw from every channel of information, and that it would scarcely be safe, in the public situation I have the honour to hold, to be entirely ignorant of occurrences taking place almost on the very borders of the district. I have not, till lately, when requested to do so by your Lordship's agent at Barelly, been anxiously seeking for information, though the receipt of it from whatever channel that offered, has never been discountenanced by me. While, I apprehend, that I may in some degree be running the hazard of your Lordship's displeasure, it will occur to your Lordship's mind, that it is a risk I should not voluntarily incur, were I influenced by any other than motives of public consideration.

I have also to apologize for a direct address to your Lordship. But I did not know on whose private discretion to rely to present or to suppress it, and if improper, and made through any public channel, it could hardly escape a public censure, while I am induced to hope that in its present form it does not necessarily demand any public observation, it may, if wrong, from an indulgent view of the motive, be silently obliterated from your Lordship's memory.

I have, therefore, intruded upon your Lordship for the purpose of communicating copies of two letters from Scindiah, one to the late Rohilla chief Gholaum Mahomed,* the other to Gholaum Mohee Uddeen Khan, better known by the name of Bumboo Khan, a son of Zâbita Khan, together with the letter addressed to me by Bumboo Khan, sending these copies. A complimentary letter was also sent me the other day by a Seik chief, of the name of Roy Sing, holding a small tract of country near Seharunpore, on the western bank of the Jumna, in which he expresses his attachment to the British interest. These communications are obviously made with a

* Gholaum Mohamed Khan having usurped the government of the Rohillahs, and revolted against the Vizier, was defeated by the British troops in 1794, and expelled from Rampore.

reference to the present appearance of affairs, and if of trifling importance in every other light, they may be of benefit in showing some indisposition to hostility in that quarter.

Gholaum Mahomed and Bumboo Khan have, I understand, been long resident at Nadone,* whither the above letters were directed, the former in some degree in the capacity of commander of the Rajah of Nadone's forces, and the latter enjoying about forty-two villages by the Rajah's gift.

By reports, which, from the frequency of their repetition, I think demand credit, Gholaum Mahomed, accepting the invitation, left Nadone, and joined Major Louis's camp near Paneeput.† Bumboo Khan remained at Nadone, and would appear better disposed to connect himself with British, than Mahratta interests. I understand that in the former possessions of his father, a considerable number of people are attached to the interests of his family, and would on any favourable occasion show their zeal in his cause. These possessions of Zabita Khan, Seharunpore, &c. to the north of Delhi, it would probably be his object to recover from the Mahrattas through our means, and to hold them dependent on the Company. This tract of country is at present principally held under General Peyron by Rajah Ram Dyal Sing, who has also some possessions on this side, and on that account, and probably further induced thereto by a consideration of the stability of the English Government, would probably embrace any good opportunity of declaring in our favour, but until such opportunity offers, his force must be considered at the disposal of the Mahrattas.

Gholaum Mahomed, I believe, to possess very little weight indeed in any part of Rohilcund, his influence being, I am told, limited to the families of the late Nujjoo Khan and Omer Khan, now at Rampore, and such few adherents as may remain attached to them. In the event, however, of any hostile attempt on his part, Bumboo Khan might probably be made to form a favourable counterpoise among the numerous Patans of the country, whose whole weight might otherwise fall into the opposite scale.

I should not have troubled your Lordship on this occasion,

* A town in the province of Lahore, lat. 31° 55″ N. long. 76. 11″ E.

† One of the Sik,h chiefships between the Sutlege and the Jumna.

if I had not seen reason to suppose that as these letters were probably meant to be secret, and may not have been disclosed in any other way, the present may possibly be the first intimation of their existence; and I trust your Lordship will pardon the detail I have been led into by a consideration of the situation and interests of the persons addressed in those letters.

Begging leave to assure your Lordship of every sentiment of respect,

I have the honour to subscribe myself,

W. LEYCESTER.

(Enclosure A.)

*Translation of a paper stated to be the copy of a letter from Dowlut Rao Scindiah to Ghoolaum Mahomed Khaun.*

(No date.)

As our magnanimity is ever disposed to perpetuate and strengthen the foundations of the dominion of rulers and chieftains, whose characters are distinguished by justice and good faith, the information of your exile from your native country has been a constant source of concern to us, and it was our wish and desire that you should be restored to the possession of your hereditary dominion. But all things depend upon their appointed season, and this desire has hitherto remained unaccomplished.

Now, however, the determined resolution of extirpating that unprincipled race, the English, has been adopted, from seeing their faithless conduct; and the special retinue (meaning Dowlut Rao Scindiah and his army) has with this intention advanced from Boorhanpoor towards the place where that devoted band has taken up its position. Accordingly, the victorious troops, in number like ants and locusts, that is to say, ten formidable brigades, a train of artillery, consisting of 500 guns, and 200,000 cavalry are in attendance on us. Please God, in a very short period of time, the foundations of the fortune of that unprincipled race shall be overthrown, and they shall be expelled from the Deccan, and annihilated. Moreover, General Perron has been directed to cross the Ganges with the brigades under his command, and the cavalry in the service of the Sirkar, and with a body of Sics, and take possession of all the territory occupied by the unprincipled race, and not to leave a vestige of that tribe, whilst the cavalry of other formidable armies of the Sirkar, stationed at different places, proceed from Calpy, and also from Bundelcund, to invade the territory of the unprincipled race on every side, and taking advantage of a favourable opportunity, annihilate the whole tribe, and to restore to their hereditary possessions all the chiefs of that country who shall join the cause of the Sirkar in eradicating the foundations of the unprincipled race. Whereas, adverting to your ancient dominion, your restoration to your hereditary territory is an object in view, it is written with the pen of regard, that immediately on receipt of this letter, you should proceed to as-

semble as many troops as possible, and to invade the territory of the enemy with the utmost practicable expedition, and employ your exertions in co-operating with General Perron in offensive measures against the unprincipled race, and establish your troops in your hereditary dominions. Gen Perron has been written to on this subject. Do you act in conformity to his suggestions. Please God, all will be well. It is incumbent upon you, with the utmost firmness, to devote your mind to the object of co-operating with the Sirkar, and to fulfil the obligations of attachment. My satisfaction, and your confirmation in your ancient dominions, will depend on the degree in which you may conform to the above written suggestions. What more need be written?

(A true translation.)

N. B. EDMONSTONE, Persian Secretary.

N.B.—The letter from Scindiah to Bumboo Khan, exactly the same as this, excepting in parts not applicable to Bumboo Khan's circumstances.

(Enclosure B.)

*Translation of a letter from Bumboo Khan to Mr. Leycester, Collector of Moradabad, inclosed in a private letter from Mr. Leycester to the Governor-General, dated July* 26, 1803.

The history of the family of the late Nawaub Nujeeb ul Dowlah is universally known. By the revolutions of fortune, and the vicissitude of the times, the affairs of this family have been involved in confusion. Since then, I have resided on the south-east side of the Jumna, where Maharajah Sunsaur Chund and Jussa Sing have assigned to me forty-one villages and two forts. At this time successive letters have been received from Dowlut Rao Scindiah, requiring my attendance.

A correspondence and friendship formerly subsisted between the late Nawaub, and Governor Hastings, and General Champion; that intercourse, however, ceased after the embarrassment of our affairs, when I was thrown into a condition of distress. Now, however, in consequence of the arrival of Scindiah's letters, I being a well-wisher of the Company, have been induced by a consideration of our ancient friendship, to send Shaikh Mahboob Bukhsh with copies of the letters, and I have also written to Roy Seroop Sing, who will fully state all circumstances.

You will be pleased to give credit to the representations of Mahboob Bukhsh, and do you, Sir, obtain a favourable answer, to be transmitted through you, stating whatever may be the pleasure of the Company's Government, that I may act accordingly.

Constantly call me to your remembrance by your kind letters notifying your welfare, and commanding my services in this quarter.

(A true translation.)

N. B. EDMONSTONE, Persian Secretary.

## No. L.

*The Marquess Wellesley to his Excellency General Lake, Commander-in-chief, &c.*

(Secret.)

SIR, Fort William, July 27th, 1803.

1. The necessity of providing for the event of hostilities with Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar has already induced me to transmit to your Excellency, in the form of private notes, such suggestions as have appeared to me to be requisite for the purpose of enabling your Excellency to frame a plan of military operations, connected with the political considerations which have ultimately compelled me to engage in war against those chieftains, and with the objects which I deem most important to secure by the success of our arms in the final settlement of peace.

2. These private communications from me have been answered by your Excellency in the same form, and I have hitherto deemed it to be expedient to return my observations upon your Excellency's propositions through the channel of private correspondence. It is now expedient to adopt the regular course of official correspondence with your Excellency in the Secret Department, and I shall accordingly henceforth address you in the form observed in this letter, or through the secretary in the Secret Department, according to the nature of the subject under discussion.

3. In this despatch I propose to state to your Excellency my views and intentions with regard to the following important points.

First. The objects which appear to me to be the most desirable to be attained in the prosecution of hostilities against Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar on the north-western frontier of Hindostan.

Secondly. The general plan of military operations by which these objects appear to be attainable with the greatest degree of expedition and security.

Thirdly. The course of political arrangements and negotiations which I propose to pursue under your Excellency's superintendance, for the purpose of facilitating the operations

of your army, and of ensuring the stability of peace under the most favourable conditions to the British interests.

4. With a view to render the statement of my sentiments on these questions more clear and distinct, I have annexed to this despatch copies of the documents enumerated in the margin.

5. To every person conversant with the true nature of the British interests and power in India, the north-western frontier of Hindostan must have appeared to present the most vulnerable point of our extensive empire.

6. The condition of the power of the Seiks, as well as of that of the Mahrattas and of the Rajpoots, and other petty states, offers considerable advantage to an invading enemy from the more remote north-western countries of Asia, or from the banks of the Indus; and it is unnecessary to remark to your Excellency's judgment, experience, and knowledge, that the enterprizing spirit of France, or the ambition of Russia, or even the violence and rapacity of the Afghan tribes, or of other Asiatic nations inhabiting the northern and western countries of Asia might have pursued projects of invasion in that quarter which might have occasioned considerable embarrassment to the British power in India.

7. A sense of this danger concurred with other motives to induce me to conclude those arrangements with the Nabob Vizier, which terminated in the treaty of Lucknow, and which secured a considerable augmentation of the military, political and financial resources and power of the British nation on the north-western frontier of Oude.

8. The result of that happy settlement has certainly afforded a great accession of security against the dangers which menaced the stability of our empire on that side of India.

9. But the local position of Scindiah's territories, the condition and nature of Scindiah's military force in Hindostan, and the corrupt and profligate councils of that weak, arrogant, and faithless chief, still constitute a serious danger to

* See notes by the Marquess Wellesley, dated 28th of June, 1803, at p. 167; also notes by his Lordship on General Lake's memorandum dated 18th of July, at p. 189. The Marquess Wellesley's additional notes to those dated 18th of July, 1803, (see p. 223,) follow this letter, and together with the instructions to Mr. Græme Mercer, dated 22nd July, (see p. 224.) comprise all the documents alluded to in the text.

the British interests. The territories of Scindiah between the Jumna, and the Ganges interrupt the line of our defence in that quarter; and some of his principal posts are introduced into the centre of our dominions, while the possession of Agra, Delhi and of the western and southern bank of the Jumna enables him to command nearly the whole line of our north-western frontier.

10. In the event of any considerable accession to Scindiah's power, or in the event of his forming any connection with France, or with any other enemy to the British interests, the actual position of his territories and forces in Hindostan would furnish great advantages to him in any attack upon the Company's dominions.

11. Formidable as the power of Scindiah might have become in the event of any accession to his strength, a danger more urgent and more direct in all its consequences has grown out of the decline of Scindiah's local authority in Hindostan, and has recently assumed a more alarming aspect in proportion to the accumulated embarrassment of Scindiah's circumstances in the Deccan, and to the general decay of his resources and power.

12. The regular infantry in the service of Scindiah under the command of European officers; is supported by funds derivable almost exclusively from the territorial possessions of that chief situated between the Jumna, the Ganges and the mountains of Kumaon.

13. A considerable portion, if not the whole of this territory has been assigned to M. Perron, a French officer, who has succeeded Mr. Dubqigne in the chief command of Scindiah's regular infantry.

14. M. Perron has formed this territory into an independent state of which Scindiah's regular infantry may be justly termed the national army. That force is now stated to amount to 8,000 infantry and an equal number of cavalry.

15. The inhabitants of the districts comprehended in M. Perron's Jagheer, consider that officer as their immediate sovereign while the troops supported from the revenues of the country regard M. Perron as the immediate executive authority from which the army is to receive orders, subsistance and pay. Possessing such means M. Perron dictates with the authority of a sovereign state of a superior rank, and

with the vigour of efficient military power to the petty states occupying the countries to the southward of the Jumna, and by the terror of his name and arms holds in abject submission the Rajpoot states of Jyenagur and Jodpore, together with the Jauts and the state of Gohud, extending his influence even to Bundelcund and to the country occupied by the Seiks.

16. Scindiah retains no efficient control over M. Perron or over his regular troops. Various instances must be familiar to your Excellency's knowledge in which M. Perron has either openly disobeyed, or systematically evaded the orders of Scindiah especially in the late crisis of that chief's affairs.

17. M. Perron has for some time past manifested a systematic disposition to remove all British officers from the command of Scindiah's regular infantry, and to introduce French officers under his own immediate patronage.

18. M. Perron is supposed to have amassed a considerable fortune, and your Excellency is intimately acquainted with his anxious desire to retire to Europe, and to dispose of his actual command, and of his territorial possessions to some person of the French nation.

19. To these considerations it is important to add that M. Perron is in possession of the person of the unfortunate Emperor Shah Allum, and consequently is master of the nominal authority of that unhappy prince. M. Perron therefore may transfer this valuable possession together with his property of any other description to any French adventurer, or officer, who may be enabled to complete such a purchase.

20. Thus the coincidence of various extraordinary and uncontrolable accidents, the weakness of Scindiah's personal character, the rapacity and profligacy of his ministers, (who have engaged him in pursuits of aggrandizement, avarice, and ambition, at a distance from Hindostan, in the Deccan, at Poonah, and in the southern provinces of the Mahratta empire)—the treachery of many of his chiefs whose interests consist in diverting his attention from the affairs of Hindostan to those of the Deccan, and the recent shock which his power has received from Holkar, have contributed to found an independent French state on the most vulnerable part of the Company's frontier.

21. Under the influence of a succession of French adventurers, this state must be exposed to every intrigue of the

French in India, and even to the ambition and hostile spirit of the person who now rules the French nation; nor could an instrument of destruction more skilfully adapted to wound the heart of the British empire in India, be presented to the vindictive hand of the Chief Consul of France.

22. This French state actually holds possession of the person and nominal authority of the Moghul, maintains the most efficient army of regular native infantry, and the most powerful artillery now existing in India, with the exception of the Company's troops, and exercises a considerable influence over the neighbouring states, from the banks of the Indus to the confluence of the Jumna and the Ganges.

23. In the supposition of the most intimate and established connection of amity and alliance between Scindiah and the British power, and in the event even of Scindiah's accession to the treaty of Bassein, and to the general defensive alliance with the Company, the Nizam and the Peishwa, it is impossible to suppose that this French state would co-operate with cordiality in support of the British interests. The aid of this state could be least expected in the case which would most urgently demand it, and which would require the most active operation of the principles of the general defensive alliance.

24. In the event of an attack from France upon the British dominions or power in India, it would not be expected that a French state erected under the nominal and ostensible auspices of Scindiah in Hindostan, would afford any substantial aid to the ally of the British power in a contest against France, even if that ally should be disposed to assist us in such a crisis.

25. On the other hand no doubt exists that Scindiah would receive the most zealous aid from the same state in any attempt which he might be disposed to make either for the reduction of the British or for the aggrandizement of the French power in India.

26. In addition to these remarks, your Excellency is apprized that the vicinity of M. Perron's regular infantry, operates as a constant drain upon the population of the Company's provinces and diminishes the sources of our agriculture, manufactures, commerce, and revenue as well of our recruits for the army in that quarter.

27. In the present crisis when every circumstance announ-

ces the probability of a renewal of the war with France, and urges the necessity of resorting to every practicable measure of precaution and security, the safety of the British dominions requires the reduction of M. Perron's military resources and power, independently of any question which might exist between Scindiah and the British Government.

28. In a state of profound peace and even of alliance with Scindiah, the necessity of providing for our own security would justify a formal demand for the removal of a danger, so imminent, from the frontier of our dominions. The refusal of Scindiah to comply with such a demand would afford a just ground of war against that chief; and any true or false plea of inability on the part of Scindiah to control the movements or to reduce the power of this French state, would authorize and require the British Government to assume the protection of its own territories, and to remove with its own hand the proximate cause of insecurity and alarm. Your Excellency will therefore be pleased to understand that the most desirable object in prosecuting hostilities against Scindiah on the north western frontier of Hindostan appears to me to be the entire reduction of M. Perron's regular corps. This operation necessarily includes the capture or destruction of all his artillery and military stores and especially of all arms of European construction.

29. Connected with this object and with every principle of security bearing relation to it is the occupation of the whole tract of country forming the Doab between the Jumna and Ganges to the mountains of Kumaon. And similar considerations will require the occupation of Delhi and Agra and of a chain of posts on the western and southern bank of the Jumna from the mountains of Kumaon to Bundlecund sufficient to secure to the British power the free navigation of the Jumna and the possession of both banks of that river. It is not my desire to extend the actual possessions of the Company beyond the line of the Jumna including Agra and Delhi, with a continued chain of posts to the westward and southward of the Jumna for the purpose already described.'

30. Within the described line my wish and intention is to establish the system of the Company's Government in all its

branches, but whatever connections may be formed beyond that line to the westward and southward of the Jumna must be regulated on the principle of defensive alliance or tributary dependence in such manner as shall form between the actual possessions of the Company and the Mahrattas, a barrier of petty states exercising the internal Government of their respective dominions in alliance with the Company and under the protection of our power.

31. In drawing this line I am aware of the position of the Jagheers of Sumroo's Begum situated between the Jumna and the Ganges. For this special case I have accordingly provided in my instructions to Mr. Mercer. It is certainly necessary that the Jagheers of Sumroo's Begum should ultimately be brought under the immediate government of the Company.

32. It is highly important to secure the possession of the person and nominal authority of the Moghul against the designs of France. The Moghul has never been an important or dangerous instrument in the hands of the Mahrattas, but might become a powerful aid to the cause of France in India, under the direction of French agents.

33. The person and authority of that unhappy monarch have been treated by the Mahrattas and by M. Perron with the most barbarous indignity and violence, and it would contribute to the reputation of the British name to afford an honourable and tranquil asylum to the fallen dignity and declining age of the King of Delhi. It would also be necessary to extend our protection to his majesty's heir apparent and to any of the royal family who might otherwise fall into the hands of France.

34. The reduction of M. Perron's force would afford us the means of forming alliances with all the inferior states beyond the Jumna for the purpose of enabling us in the first instance to prosecute the war with the greatest advantage and finally by forming a barrier composed of these states, to exclude Scindiah and the Mahrattas altogether from the northern districts of Hindostan.

35. It is extremely desirable that Bundelcund should ultimately be placed under the immediate authority of the British Government. Such an arrangement would afford great

additional security to the rich province and city of Benares and would effectually check whatever power might remain to the Rajah of Berar or to any other Mahratta chief in that quarter.

36. Reviewing these statements your Excellency will observe that the most prosperous issue of a war against Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar on the north-western frontier of Hindostan would in my judgment comprize,

1st. The destruction of the French state now formed on the banks of the Jumna together with all its military resources.

2dly. The extension of the Company's frontier to the Jumna, with the possession of Agra, Delhi and a sufficient chain of posts on the western and southern banks of the Jumna.

3dly. The possession of the nominal authority of the Moghul.

4thly. The establishment of an efficient system of alliance with all the petty states to the southward and westward of the Jumna from Jyenagur to Bundelcund.

5thly. The annexation of Bundelcund to the Company's dominions.

37. The result of such an arrangement would destroy the influence of the French and of the Mahrattas in the northern districts of Hindostan, and would enable us to commence the foundations of such an intercourse with the Seiks and with the tribes inhabiting the Punjab and the banks of the Attock, as might furnish sufficient means of frustrating any attempt of an invading enemy from the western side of the Indus.

38. In stating to your Excellency my sentiments with regard to the general plan of military operations by which the proposed objects appear to be attainable with the greatest degree of expedition and security, your Excellency will be pleased to understand that it is not my intention either to limit the free exercise of your discretion, or to interpose any ideas, which may not meet the full approbation of your Excellency's superior judgment, experience and professional skill.

39. I have however deemed it to be my duty under this restriction to communicate to you in my private correspondence such opinions on this branch of the subject as have appeared to me to merit consideration; and with the same

view I have transmitted to your Excellency my observations on the plans which I have received from you. I shall therefore proceed to state without further reserve in this official form such conclusions as I have drawn from a review of the documents and suggestions which have been brought under my examination.

40. The first object of the campaign must be to destroy the military force and resources of M. Perron; and it is extremely important that this object should be accomplished previously to the close of the rainy season.

41. It is therefore necessary that the main body of the army should be assembled at the point most favourable for the attack of M. Perron's force, and in the state of preparation and of equipment which may be deemed by your Excellency most advantageous for the speedy execution of that service.

42. Your Excellency will have observed from the whole tenor of every communication which you have received from me, that I not only concur entirely with you in deeming the destruction of M. Perron's force to be the primary object of the campaign, but that the most deliberate consideration of the actual state of affairs between his Majesty and France would have induced me to have undertaken this service even independently of any contest with Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

43. I shall therefore readily sanction any augmentation which your Excellency may think fit to make to the strength of the main army to be directed against M. Perron, by suspending the operations of the several proposed detachments or by concentrating the movements of those detachments with a view to the principal object of the campaign, which is comprized in the "*early and effectual demolition of the French state erected by M. Perron on the banks of the Jumna.*"

44. With this observation I desire that your Excellency will compose the main army and regulate the strength and operations of the several detachments in the manner which shall appear to your judgment to afford the most absolute security for the "*complete destruction of M. Perron's force previously to the conclusion of the rains.*"

45. The point of most urgent importance connected with the destruction of M. Perron's force is in my opinion the security of the person of the Moghul, and of the heir apparent, and it is therefore my earnest wish that early measures

should be taken for that purpose. The operations of the detachment proposed to cover Rohilcund, and eventually to invade Saharunpore might probably effect this object, and at the same time might tend to promote the success of the movements of the main army against M. Perron.

46. I trust that the powers already furnished to your Excellency for the augmentation of the regular corps to the war establishment, and for raising such temporary and local corps as may be requisite for the maintenance of the internal tranquillity of the provinces, will enable you to provide effectually against internal commotion during the continuance of the war. But any temporary inconvenience of that nature must be hazarded if the security of the great objects of the campaign should require you to incur such a danger. The early success of the army in the field will enable you to suppress without difficulty every effort of our domestic enemies whose number cannot be considerable and whose power is extremely contemptible.

47. I consider the operations of the detachment stationed in the direction of Delhi to be next in importance to those of the main army.

48. After the destruction of M. Perron's power shall have been effected and the person of the Moghul shall have been protected beyond the possibility of hazard, the operation of greatest importance will be the reduction of the fortress of Agra. Your Excellency will form the most correct judgment in deciding the time and mode of undertaking this service. Whether it would be possible either to blockade or to seize Agra during the time of the movements of the main army against M. Perron, or whether the siege of Agra should be postponed until the main army shall be at liberty to act against Agra, are points which I submit implicitly to your Excellency's determination, it is however important that Agra should be reduced previously to the close of the rainy season.

49. The occupation of Bundelcund is the object next in importance to those already stated, and it appears to me that the detachment to be assembled at Allahabad and the detachment to be assembled for the purpose of covering Benares will effect that object in sufficient time to afford additional countenance to the operations of the main army.

50. The effectual protection of Benares is a point of con-

siderable importance and your Excellency appears to have taken sufficient precautions for that purpose.

51. It has appeared to me to be prudent to adopt a systematic and comprehensive plan of defensive measures on the whole line of the frontier from Mirzapore to Midnapore, and I have directed the Chief Secretary to transmit to your Excellency a copy of the orders which I have issued on that subject.

52. The occupation of the passes from the southward and westward of the Jumna to the Deccan, is an object which has already engaged your Excellency's attention. If you should be enabled to bring the main body of M. Perron's force to action, or should find it practicable to secure that force in any other manner, it appears improbable that Scindiah's troops can occupy those passes in any considerable strength.

53. Major-General Wellesley may be expected to commence operations against Scindiah in the Deccan at the close of this month, and I entertain a firm confidence of the complete success of those operations in the entire defeat of Scindiah's forces and of those of the Rajah of Berar in that quarter. It is however an object of importance and of prudent precaution, to secure the passes between Hindostan and the Deccan previously to the close of the rains.

54. The expediency of occupying the post of Gwalior previously to the defeat of M. Perron, must depend upon local circumstances upon which your Excellency will exercise your discretion, after having considered the tenor of my instructions to Mr. Mercer.

55. Mr. Duncan has received my orders for the seizure of Scindiah's sea port of Baroach, and of all his other possessions in Guzerat; which objects will probably be effected whenever General Wellesley shall seize the important fortress of Ahmednugger. The loss of these possessions will deprive Scindiah of the most efficient portion of his military resources in the Deccan.

56. An expedition from Calcutta and Ganjam will occupy Cuttack in the month of August.

57. It may be reasonably expected that these combined attacks will leave no other enemy opposed to your Excellency's force during the rainy season than M. Perron's troops, and whatever force may have been assembled at Cal-

pee: and I confidently expect that before the close of the rains, a material impression will have been made on every branch of the Mahratta power. It is however possible that M. Perron may have induced some of the Seik chiefs to aid him by predatory incursions into the Company's northern territories, and it will therefore be necessary for your Excellency to advert to that possible danger.

58. The objects proposed to be attained in this campaign, and the general plan of military operations which I have described, will limit the movement of the main army to the Doab between the Ganges and the Jumna, with the addition of a narrow tract of country on the western and southern branch of the Jumna.

59. No detatchment of the army will probably be required to move beyond Gwalior before the close of the rains. It may therefore be expected that your Excellency will not experience any considerable difficulty either in the supply or movements of the armies; and that you will be enabled during the course of this campaign to establish such depôts of provisions, stores and other supplies, as may facilitate your advance into Berar, towards the Deccan, or towards the territories of the Rajpoot chiefs, if such movements should become necessary in another campaign.

60. Your Excellency has provided with great prudence for the maintenance of tranquillity and order within the reserved territories of his Excellency the Nabob Vizier, by leaving a respectable force in that quarter. I entirely approve that precaution, leaving it however, to your discretion to vary the description or strength of the force stationed in the Vizier's reserved territories according to your judgment, and to the state of local circumstances.

61. I have written to the Vizier, desiring his Excellency's assistance in the supply of elephants and cattle, and as I have engaged to defray the whole expense of whatever assistance the Vizier may contribute, I entertain a sanguine hope that his Excellency will be desirous of making an effort to manifest his zeal and attachment on this important occasion.

62. In stating these observations to your Excellency, I have purposely avoided all details relative to the disposition of corps, to the strength of the main army, or of the several detachments, to the formation of the staff, or of the different

constituent parts of the army in the field. The regulation of all questions of this description, is more properly your Excellency's peculiar duty, and I entertain the most firm confidence that your Excellency will form your arrangements with that ability, public spirit, and honourable zeal for the service, which have distinguished your conduct in the various arduous situations, to which you have been called by the confidence of your Sovereign and of your country.

63. With these sentiments, I am particularly anxious to abstain from any interference of my authority which might tend to contract the sphere of your Excellency's approved talents, activity, and integrity. It will be my constant endeavour to apply my authority in such a manner, as shall afford the most effectual support to your Excellency in the display of those eminent qualifications, during a crisis, which demands their unrestrained exertion, and which promises to augment the reputation and honour of your Excellency's name, together with the glory of the British arms, and the security of the British power.

64. With regard to the political negotiations and arrangements connected with the operations of your Excellency's army, I have addressed to you on this day a letter, vesting you with special powers of the same nature as those which I have entrusted to Major-General Wellesley, and eventually to Lieut.-General Stuart in the Deccan. That letter, connected with my instructions to Mr. Mercer, and with my separate letter to your Excellency of this date respecting the situation of his Majesty Shah Allum, will sufficiently apprize you of the course of political measures which your Excellency is empowered to pursue, with a view of facilitating your military operations.

65. It may, however, be convenient to state in this place, the general principles by which I am desirous of regulating your Excellency's proceedings, under the powers committed to your management.

66. It will be highly desirable to detach M. Perron from Scindiah's service by pacific negotiation. M. Perron's inclination certainly is, to dispose of his power to a French pur-

* This is a brief letter dated 11th July, 1803, and the whole substance is stated in the above paragraph.—[Ed.]

chaser; but I should not be surprized if he were to be found ready to enter into terms with your Excellency, provided he could obtain sufficient security for his personal interests. I desire your Excellency however, to abstain from any negotiation which may afford M. Perron the opportunity of gaining time, or of preserving, by escape, or by any means, any part of his force, especially of his artillery, or ordnance.

67. I therefore request your Excellency not to commence any negotiation with M. Perron, until the success of the force to be employed against him shall appear to be perfectly secure, or until you shall be fully satisfied that the negotiation cannot afford to M. Perron any means of defeating the objects of the armament.

68. Under these precautions, I empower your Excellency to conclude any agreement for the security of M. Perron's personal interests and property, accompanied by any reasonable remuneration from the British Government which shall induce him to deliver up the whole of his military resources and power, together with his territorial possessions, and the person of the Moghul, and of the heir apparent, into your Excellency's hands.

69. The same principle applies generally to M. Perron's European officers, and the proclamations with which I have furnished your Excellency, will enable you to avail yourself of the first proper opportunity of offering propositions to those officers, or to the several corps under M. Perron's command.

70. It is probable that the blockade of Agra would enable your Excellency to obtain immediate possession of that place by offering favourable terms to Mr. Hessing and his garrison. You will act in this matter according to your judgment.

71. This despatch together with those which you have already received from me, will relieve your Excellency from any difficulty with regard to the suspension of the question of war or peace. You are now in possession of my final determination "*to reduce the power of the French state in Hindostan without delay*," and to liberate the neighbouring chiefs and Rajahs from the yoke of that state, and of the Mahrattas, for the purpose of establishing an effectual barrier against the revival of a similar danger in Hindostan.

72. My instructions to Mr. Mercer contain every detail

which can be requisite to guide your Excellency's judgment in forming engagements with those chiefs, either for the purpose of securing their assistance during the war, or of establishing a permanent system of alliance at the conclusion of peace.

73. The general objects of the war, as described at the commencement of this despatch, sufficiently indicate the nature of the final settlement by which it is my desire to terminate hostilities, and to secure peace.

74. Your Excellency will be pleased to fix your attention upon those objects as stated in the 36th paragraph of this despatch, and to frame every permanent arrangement with the native Chiefs and Rajahs, in conformity to the general principles of excluding the influence of the French and Mahrattas from the northern provinces of Hindostan, of extending the British territory to the Jumna, and the British influence to the borders of the Deccan, and of engaging the petty chiefs and states to strengthen the proposed system by their aid and co-operation under the assurance of the protection of the British arms, and of the secure and free enjoyment of their respective rights, authorities, and possessions, within the limits of their respective territories.

75. The principles by which your Excellency will regulate your conduct towards the Moghul, are stated in my separate despatch of this date.*

I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your Excellency's most faithful servant,
WELLESLEY.

[1st Enclosure.]

*Additional Notes to those dated 18th July, (see p. 189) on the memorandum of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, by Lord Wellesley.*

Fort William, July 23, 1803.

3.† It may perhaps deserve consideration, whether this detachment might not be so stationed as eventually to proceed upon Delhi, instead of Saharunpore, unless the Goojur chiefs of that quarter should evince a

* See p. 230.

† The paragraphs are numbered in these notes, in reference to the notes at p. 189, on which they are additional comments by Lord Wellesley. —*Ed.*]

disposition to attack Rohilcund. No measures appear to be proposed by the Commander-in-Chief for seizing Delhi, which would seem to be an object of importance.—W.

3.* *Detachment to cover Rohilcund, and to invade Saharunpore, if an opportunity offers.—L.*

4. This detachment, with the exception of such part of it as may be necessary to secure the internal quiet of the city of Benares, might proceed towards the borders of Boghelcund behind Mirzapore, to take possession of the passes, or to enter Boghelcund as proposed in the 15th paragraph of the instructions to Mr. Mercer. The Rajah Ajeet Sing is inimical to the present ruling powers in Bundelcund, and may probably be inclined to assist to the extent of his means, in preventing the Berar Mahrattas from entering his country. The co-operation of Ajeet Sing would secure a passage to a British force to Nagpore, should a measure of this kind be hereafter deemed expedient.—W.

4. *Detachment to cover Benares.—L.*

8. From private information it would appear, that the inhabitants of the country under M. Perron, consider the Mahratta Government, and that of M. Perron as perfectly distinct, and independent of each other, and they even suppose that Scindiah and M. Perron are inimical to each other. In this state of affairs, an immediate attack on M. Perron might oblige him to defend himself, and unite more cordially with Scindiah's interests than he would be otherwise disposed to do. His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief's preparations to attack him must be immediately known to M. Perron who will naturally dispose of his force to the best advantage if resolved to support the interests of Scindiah. When these preparations are made, an opportunity might perhaps be successfully given to M. Perron to withdraw from Scindiah's interests, without that discredit to himself which would be the consequence of his withdrawing after an actual movement has been made by the British army to attack him. It does not appear probable that Perron would meet the main army in the Dooab, if resolved to support Scindiah, but would retire across the Jumna, and endeavour to keep up a chain of posts which would enable him to keep the Jaut chiefs in subjection, to receive succours from Scindiah, and to prevent our communication with the Rajahs of Jeypore, and Jodepore. The Commander-in-Chief will therefore consider himself to be entirely at liberty to negotiate with M. Perron previously to hostilities, or during hostilities. The great object must be to prevent M. Perron from escaping with his forces (especially his ordnance and artillery) over the Jumna—W.

8. *The immediate attack of M. Perron.—L.*

10. It does not appear that any considerable part of Scindiah's force are at present in Saharunpore, and Baboojee Scindiah is with Dowlut Rao, in the Deccan. A Goojur chief of considerable influence in the country, between Saharunpore, and Hurduar, (Ram Deyal Goojur)

* The paragraphs printed in *italic* are notes by General Lake.

offered his services to Mr. Wellesley, at Hurduar, and may perhaps be induced to give assistance in defending that frontier.—W.

11. The remarks which occur in this suggestion, are stated in suggestion 4.—W.

*11. *A battalion to march to seize the passes behind Mirzapore.—L.*

15. It appears from the general tenor of Colonel Collins's despatches, that Ambajee has been the principal promoter of the hostile designs of Scindiah, and that there exists no probability of that Chief's joining us against Scindiah's interests. If M. Perron, in consequence of a meditated attack upon him, adopts the plan of retiring behind the Jumna, a part of his army posted at Gwalior, would be enabled to defend itself until joined by Scindiah's forces from Oujein, and enable him to carry on a destructive predatory war in the Dooab, or to throw a large force into Bundelcund. If his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief is of opinion, that an attack on Perron may be made so promptly, as to prevent his withdrawing his troops across the Jumna, this reasoning becomes nugatory, otherwise it appears to merit consideration. The expediency of an immediate attack on Gwalior must depend on his Excellency's having a disposable force for that purpose, or the inclination and means of the Ranah of Gohud to assist in supplying the troops, and on the success of the measures proposed to be followed in regard to M. Perron If Perron retires behind the Jumna, a considerable detachment might perhaps be spared from the main army, to anticipate any views he might form to gain possession of this important post.—WELLESLEY.

15. *Reasons against attacking Gwalior.—Lake.*

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[2nd Enclosure.]

*N. B. Edmonstone, Esq. Secretary to Government, to Græme Mercer, Esq.*

(Most Secret.)

SIR, Fort William, July 22nd, 1803.

1. I am directed by his Excellency the most noble the Governor-General in Council to inform you that in consequence of a probable rupture with Dowlut Rao Scindiah and other Mahratta chieftains who have manifested a disposition to form a confederacy with that chief against the interests of the British Government, his Excellency in Council has deemed it expedient to appoint a special agent for the purpose of conducting certain political negotiations with the several states bordering on the western

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* Mr. Mercer was a Surgeon on the Company's Medical Establishment. He was appointed in the year 1789 to succeed the late Dr. Alexander Russell, as Surgeon to the Embassy to Hydrabad, under the late Sir John Kennaway, Bart., and attended that distinguished officer during the whole of the campaign against Tippoo Sultaun, in a political as well as medical capacity.

frontier of the British provinces under the Presidency of Bengal, and of forming defensive alliances with those states on the part of the British Government against the hostile designs of the Mahratta chieftains.

2. His Excellency in Council, in consideration of the local knowledge which you have obtained of the state of those countries, and having a firm reliance in your zeal, ability, and discretion, has been pleased to nominate you as his special agent for the purposes abovementioned, and to direct that you will immediately proceed to Allahabad with all practicable expedition, where you will enter upon the duties of the charge entrusted to you, under the following instructions.

3 You are already apprized of the proposals made some time since by Himmut Behâdur to the honourable Henry Wellesley, through Mr. John Messelbeek at Allahabad, for the transfer of the province of Bundelcund to the authority of the Honourable Company.

4. The importance which his Excellency in Council attaches to the possession of this province, as covering the Company's possessions from the inroads of a hostile force from Berar has been considerably increased by the information received from Mr. Ahmuty, the Collector of Allahabad, that Dowlut Rao Scindiah has actually despatched a considerable body of his forces to the north-western frontier of the Company's dominions, and has addressed letters to Himmut Bahâdur, instigating those chieftains to commit depredations in the Company's dominions contiguous to Bundelcund; and that Shumshere Bahâdur, the eldest son of the late Ali Bahâdur, has arrived in the province, and assumed the authority over it, under a sunnud from Amrut Rao, and supported by a force in the service of Jeswunt Rao Holkar.

5. Under these circumstances, the immediate interposition of the British Government in the affairs of Bundelcund has become necessary, as a part of the general system of defence against the meditated designs of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and his confederates the Rajah of Berar and Jeswunt Rao Holkar.

6. His Excellency has, therefore, determined to enter into a negotiation with Himmut Behâdur for his aid and influence in establishing in the province of Bundelcund an arrangement calculated to afford to the British Government the military and political advantages of the local situation of that province in the present crisis of affairs, and his Excellency has accordingly addressed a letter to that chieftain, stating, in general terms, his Excellency's views with respect to the province of Bundelcund, and requesting him to despatch to Allahabad a confidential agent for the express purpose of conferring with you on the details of the proposed arrangement. Copies of this letter, and of the detailed proposals which Himmut Bahâdur has lately transmitted through Mr. Ahmuty, are enclosed for your information.

7. During the progress of the negotiation you will be enabled to ascertain more precisely than has hitherto been done, the means which Himmut Bahâdur may possess of effectually supporting the interests of the British Government in the province, and will accordingly be enabled to

submit to his Excellency the claims which he may possess to a recompense from the Government for his co-operation.

8. It appears from the former communication with Himmut Bahâdur that his objects are the attainments of a Jaghire in the Company's provinces within the Dooab, and the release of his relation Omrao Geer, from confinement at Lucknow.

9. The first of those objects his Excellency authorizes you to engage for on the part of the Government; the extent of the Jaghire to be hereafter proportioned to the means he may possess of forwarding the views of Government; and to the zeal and activity he may shew in the application of those means to the desired object.

10. Omrao Geer was put into confinement on a suspicion of his having been engaged with the adherents of Vizier Ali in a conspiracy against the government of the Nabob Vizier. As the British Government is exclusively responsible for the protection of the dominions and government of the Nawaub Vizier, his Excellency is of opinion that an application from the British Government to the Nawaub Vizier for the release of Omrao Geer would be acceded to on proper measures being taken to obviate the risk of any future attempts on the part of Omrao Geer to disturb the tranquillity of the Vizier's Government. This might, perhaps, be most effectually guarded against by rendering Himmut Bahâdur responsible in his person and Jaghire for the future conduct of Omrao Geer.

11. Our imperfect knowledge of the internal state of Bundelcund and of the relative situations of the several chiefs of the Bundelahs possessing power or influence in that province, precludes the practicability of determining at the present moment the specific arrangements which it may be advisable and practicable to enter into with them for the attainment of the object in view. Those arrangements must be regulated by the information you may be enabled to acquire on those points after your arrival at Allahabad, and by the general spirit of his Excellency's views and intentions. General assurances may be given to those chiefs who may be inclined to support the British interests of a liberal attention on the part of Government to their rights and interests; and the advantages which they will individually obtain from an emancipation from the yoke of the Mahrattas, may be urged in favour of their ready co-operation with the British troops for that purpose.

12. His Excellency has been informed that the strong forts of Calinger and Damounie in Bundelcund are still possessed by dependants of the former Bundelah Rajahs, and that the determined resistance which has been shewn by those people to the Government of Ali Bahâdur and the present Regency, has arisen from the dread that, notwithstanding any engagements to the contrary, the very considerable property they possess would be plundered by the Mahrattas on their resigning the possession of those forts. As it is probable that an engagement on the part of the British Government for the security of their persons and property would induce those dependants of the former Bundelah Rajahs to resign the possession of these forts to the British Government, you are authorized

to enter into engagements with them for that purpose, on the condition of their ready submission to the Government. This, however, is to be considered as a secondary object, and you will attempt a negotiation of this nature only in the event of your deeming it in no measure inconsistent with the general conciliatory measures to be pursued with the inhabitants of the country.

13. His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief will be requested to take the necessary measures to support the arrangements which may be formed by the application of a military force to act in conformity to them.

14. The province of Boghelcund or Rewah Mackunpore, situated to the south-east of Bundelcund, is considered by his Excellency as tributary to the latter. As no permanent conquest of this province has, however, been made by Ali Bahâdur, and as Rajah Ajeet Sing, the hereditary chief of the province, is in actual possession, it is his Excellency's wish that every endeavour should be made to conciliate that chief to the interests of the British Government, and the necessary assistance granted him, if required, to defend the province from the inroads of the Berar Mahrattas, by sending a detachment to assist him in securing the principal passes into his country from Nagpore.

15. The countries adjoining to Bundelcund, on the north-west, formerly possessed by the Ranah of Gohud and other Jaut chiefs, are now, with the exception of Kalpee, (a Jaghire, held under the sunnud of the Peishwa,) exclusively under the dominion of Dowlut Rao Scindiah. It is understood that those chiefs are very generally averse to the authority of the Mahratta chieftain, and that they would readily embrace any effectual means which might be proposed to them for the purpose of obtaining an emancipation from that authority.

16. As a co-operation on the part of those chiefs would essentially forward the military operations which it may be found expedient to prosecute in those countries, his Excellency directs me to furnish you with the following observations on the general principles which it is his Excellency's wish to adopt in forming arrangements with those chiefs.

17. In the event of a war with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, the security of the British possessions in the Dooab against the future designs of that chief, would seem to demand the total abolition of his authority and interference in the north-western provinces of Hindostan.

18. As it is not his Excellency's intention, however, in the event of a successful war with Scindiah, to extend at present the British regulations beyond the Dooab, with the reservation of Bundelcund and of such cities, forts, or districts, on the western banks of the Jumna, as may serve effectually to secure the safe navigation of that river, and to protect the frontier of the Dooab, it appears to his Excellency that engagements with those chiefs, formed on the basis of mutual security and support, and excluding all interference on the part of the British Government in the internal regulation of their respective possessions, would most effectually secure their co-operation, and present the strongest barrier to the efforts of Scindiah to regain an influence in that quarter.

19. Upon this principle engagements may be entered into with those

chiefs, securing to them the undisturbed possession of their hereditary tenures on the condition of their zealous and ready co-operation with the British Government, to the extent of their respective means, in expelling the troops of Dowlut Rao Scindiah from that quarter of Hindostan, and preventing any future attempts on the part of that chieftain, or of any other foreign power, to establish an authority in those provinces.

20. The ancestors of the Ranah of Gohud possessed the principal authority and influence amongst the Jaut chiefs to the westward of the Jumna, and although the authority and property of the present Ranah have been completely subjugated by Dowlut Rao Scindiah, yet his influence amongst the Jaut tribes is supposed to be still considerable, and might, perhaps, be advantageously used to assist in expelling the troops of Dowlut Rao Scindiah from the provinces of Hindostan.

21. The poverty of the Ranah might, however, render it necessary that he should be supplied with sufficient funds to enable him to exert this influence to the effectual support of the British interests.

22. If upon more minute and local information of the state of the Ranah's circumstances, and of the influence which he may possess amongst the Jaut tribes, you should be of opinion that he is inclined to co-operate with the British forces in the expulsion of the troops of Dowlut Rao Scindiah from the country of Gohud, and that an advance of money from the British Government might enable him to give useful support to the military operations of the British forces in that country, his Excellency directs me to authorize you to grant him such advance as you may deem immediately necessary for the purpose of enabling him to collect his adherents, not to exceed the amount of rupees, 100,000, without receiving the further authority of his Excellency in Council. The enclosed letter addressed by his Excellency to the Ranah of Gohud (a copy of which is enclosed for your information) will be forwarded by you only in the above event of your conceiving that his co-operation may be advantageously exerted.

23. To complete the system proposed by his Excellency of defensive alliance against the future encroachments of Dowlut Rao Scindiah or other foreign powers into the north-western provinces of Hindostan, his Excellency attaches much importance to securing the accession of the Rajpoot chiefs of Jypore and Jodepore to the plan above laid down, of mutual security and support.

24. Enclosed are copies of letters which his Excellency has with this view addressed to the Rajahs of Jypore and Jodepore, which sufficiently explain the principles on which it is his Excellency's intention to form arrangements with those chiefs. The original letters have been forwarded through his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, and duplicates have been delivered to the Vakeels of those chiefs at the Presidency for transmission to their principals.

25. His Excellency considers it a desirable object to be attained in the negotiation with the Jaut and Rajpoot chiefs, that their frontiers should be secured by a subsidiary force from the British Government proportionate to the extent of their possessions and means respectively.

This will more particularly be desirable with the Ranah of Gohud and the Rajahs of Jypore and Jodepore, the amount of whose revenues his Excellency conceives would easily admit of a subsidy being paid to the British Government for the defence of their possessions.

26. From the enclosed copy of a letter, addressed to Zeib ul Nissa Begum, you will observe that his Excellency the Governor-General is inclined to extend the protection and favour of the British Government to the Begum. As the Jaghire possessed by the Begum is within the Doab, his Excellency is desirous that in any engagement entered into on the part of the British Government, such conditions may be inserted as may facilitate the introduction of the British regulations into the Jaghire in the event of a settlement of the adjoining parts of the Doab being formed upon the system of government established in the British possessions.

27. His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief has already been furnished with the instructions of his Excellency the most noble the Governor-General, in regard to the measures to be pursued for dissolving the force under the command of M. Perron, and in the service of Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

28. A general political authority will also be vested in his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief by his Excellency in Council, founded on the spirit of these instructions, a copy of which will be forwarded to his Excellency, and subject to such further secret instructions as his Excellency the most noble the Governor-General may deem expedient to forward to the Commander-in-Chief.

29. As it will be of the utmost importance that the details of the measures, directed by the above general instructions, should be conducted under the inspection and with the sanction of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, his Excellency in Council desires that so soon as you may deem the negotiation in regard to Bundelcund, in such a state of forwardness as to admit of your proceeding to join his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, you will entrust the further prosecution of the arrangement adopted for putting the British troops in possession of that province, to Mr. R. Ahmuty, the collector of Allahabad; and proceed yourself to the head quarters of the army, under the command of his Excellency, where you will be furnished with such further instructions as may be deemed necessary, through the medium of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

30. To enable you to discharge the varied and extensive duties now entrusted to you with promptitude and effect, his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief will be requested to authorize one or more of the military officers under his Excellency's command, who may be spared from their military duties, and who may be otherwise qualified, to be employed under your direction in carrying into effect the political arrangements committed to the general superintendence of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

31. The collectors of Allahabad, Cawnpore and Etawah, will be directed to honour your drafts on his Excellency the most noble the Go-

vernor-General for such sums as you may require for the purposes of the public service.

32. You will be pleased to correspond with the Secretary to the Government in the Secret Department on all points connected with the objects of your mission, transmitting for the information of his Excellency the most noble the Governor-General, a regular detail of your proceedings, and you will communicate copies of all your letters to the Secretary to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

I am, &c.
N. B. EDMONSTONE,
Secretary to Government,
Secret and Political Department.

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## No. LI.

*The Marquess Wellesley to Lieut.-General Lake.*

SIR, Fort William, July 27th, 1803.

1. In my despatch of this date,* I signified my intention of communicating to your Excellency, in a separate address, the detail of the measures to be pursued with respect to his Majesty Shah Alum, and my general sentiments with regard to the conduct to be observed by the British Government towards his Majesty and the royal family of Delhi, if their persons should be brought under our protection.

2. Deeming it to be expedient that his Majesty should be speedily apprized of my intentions in his favour, I have addressed the letter to his Majesty, which accompanies this despatch, together with a copy of it for your Excellency's information.†

3. It will be proper that my letter to his Majesty should be despatched with every practicable degree of secrecy and caution. I have reason to believe that Syud Rezza Khan, who has long resided at Delhi, in the capacity of agent on the part of the Resident, with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, at the Court of his Majesty, may safely be trusted on this occasion. If upon enquiry your Excellency should find no cause to dissent from this opinion, your Excellency will be pleased to render Syud Rezza Khan the channel for the transmission of the letter, under such instructions as may appear to your

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* See p. 208. † See p. 233.

Excellency to be applicable to the occasion. In this event your Excellency will deem it expedient to direct that agent to transmit to your Excellency accurate and regular information of every transaction at Delhi which may come to his knowledge.

4. It may be expected that any movement of the British troops which menaces the security of Delhi will be followed by an attempt on the part of the French officer, who is in charge of the Moghul's person, to place his Majesty beyond the reach of our power. Your Excellency will, therefore, deem it proper, as far as may be practicable, to regulate the operations of the British troops, with respect to that city, in such a manner as to preclude the success of any attempt of that nature.

5. The arrangement to be finally concluded with respect to his Majesty, involves a question of great political and national importance, which will form the subject of future deliberation. For the present it is my intention merely to secure to his Majesty the protection of the British Government, and to assign to him and to his family a provision for their immediate support. The extent of that provision must be regulated by future events and circumstances. I entertain no doubt that his Majesty will be cordially disposed to place himself under the British protection without any previous stipulation.

6. The apparent impossibility of his Majesty's effecting his escape from Delhi, for the purpose of claiming the offered protection of the British Government, renders it unnecessary to contemplate that event. It cannot be expected that his Majesty's person should come under our protection until we shall have succeeded in occupying Delhi.

7. When that event shall have taken place, it is my anxious desire that his Majesty and the royal family should immediately experience the benefit of the change by receiving from your Excellency, and from all persons acting under your authority, every demonstration of reverence, respect, and attention, and every degree of regard to the comfort and convenience of his Majesty and the royal family, consistent with the security of their persons. It will be proper that your Excellency should immediately appoint a civil or military officer, who may be duly qualified to attend

his Majesty in the capacity of agent or representative of the British Government, furnishing such officer with proper instructions for the regulation of his conduct towards his Majesty and the royal family, founded on the actual circumstances of their situation, and on the spirit of these suggestions.

8. It is advisable that his Majesty and Mirza Akber Shah, the heir apparent, should consent to reside at some station in the south-eastern provinces of the British dominions. Monghyr appears to me to be most eligible for that purpose. I accordingly authorize your Excellency to propose to his Majesty and Mirza Akber Shah to proceed to that station, under a proper escort of troops, at the earliest practicable period of time, after the occupation of Delhi by the British troops. It is not, however, my wish to compel his Majesty and the Prince to proceed to that station, in opposition to their decided inclination. Your Excellency will, however, be pleased to employ every argument to induce them to consent to that measure, and in the event of success, it may be necessary to permit his Majesty and Akber Shah's immediate household to accompany them—the remainder of the royal family (in which is to be included the relatives of the late emperors) should continue at Delhi.

9. Your Excellency will be pleased to transmit to me, as soon as may be practicable, a statement of the names and degrees of the persons, for whom it may be necessary to assign a provision, together with such suggestions as your Excellency may deem advisable, to enable me to determine the extent of such provision.

10. If his Majesty and the Prince should be disposed to proceed to Monghyr, your Excellency will be pleased to make the necessary arrangements for their removal from Delhi without previous reference to my authority, and to signify to Colonel Palmer the proposed arrangements for the residence of his Majesty at Monghyr. On receiving information of their consent to the proposed measure, I shall immediately issue the necessary orders to provide for their accommodation.

11. Under the resolution, which I have stated to your Excellency of postponing a final arrangement with respect to his Majesty and the royal family, your Excellency will decline

to enter into any negotiation with his Majesty for that purpose, and your Excellency will be pleased to refer to me any propositions which you may receive from his Majesty of a nature to admit the delay of a reference to my authority.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

[Enclosure.]

*The Marquess Wellesley to his Majesty Shah Allum.*

Fort William, July 27th, 1803.

Your Majesty is fully apprized of the sentiments of respect and attachment which the British Government has invariably entertained towards your royal person and family.

The injuries and indignities to which your Majesty and your illustrious family have been exposed since the time when your Majesty unhappily transferred the protection of your person to the power of the Mahratta state, have been a subject of unceasing concern to the Honourable Company and to the British administration in India; and I have deeply regretted that the circumstances of the times have hitherto precluded the interposition of the British power for the purpose of affording to your Majesty effectual relief from the oppressive control of injustice, rapacity, and inhumanity.

In the present crisis of affairs, it is probable that your Majesty may have the opportunity of again placing yourself under the protection of the British Government, and I shall avail myself with cordial satisfaction of any event which may enable me to obey the dictates of my sincere respect and attachment to your royal house.

If your Majesty should be disposed to accept the asylum, which, in the contemplation of such an event, I have directed his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief of the British forces in Oude to offer to your Majesty, in the name of the British Government, your Majesty may be assured that every demonstration of respect and every degree of attention which can contribute to the ease and comfort of your Majesty and the royal family, will be manifested on the part of the British Government, and that adequate provision will be made for the support of your Majesty and of your family and household.

At a proper season his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief will have the honour of communicating to your Majesty my further sentiments on the subject of the proposed arrangement.

WELLESLEY.

A true Copy,
N. B. EDMONSTONE,
Persian Secretary to Government.

## No. LII.

*The Marquess Wellesley to Lieut.-General Lake.*

(Secret.)

Fort William, July 27th, 1803.

SIR,

1. The present state of affairs in the Mahratta empire, and the security of the alliance lately concluded between his Highness the Peishwa and the British Government, require that a temporary authority should be constituted in the vicinity of the north-west frontier of Oude, with full powers to conclude upon the spot whatever arrangements may become necessary for the purpose of accomplishing the plan of operations and of political settlement, stated to your Excellency in my recent despatches.

2. This power cannot be exercised with equal propriety and advantage to the public service by any other person than your Excellency, and I have, therefore, determined to vest this important and arduous trust in your hands. I therefore empower and direct your Excellency to assume and exercise the general direction and control of all political negotiations, connected with the operations of your army, and with the plan of political settlement, stated in my instructions of the 22nd instant to Mr. Mercer, and in my instructions of this date to your Excellency.

3. I further vest you with full powers to decide any question which may arise in the prosecution of the measures prescribed by those orders, according to the general spirit of my views and intentions concerning the affairs of the Mahratta state, and of the powers bordering the Jumna, directing you, however, to refer to me in all cases, in which a previous reference to my authority may not appear to hazard the public interests. Under the same reservation, I authorize and empower you to commence and conclude negotiations with any of the Mahratta chiefs and jagheerdars, on the part of the British Government, for the purpose of promoting the general objects of the alliance lately concluded with his Highness the Peishwa, or the general objects of your operations in the field.

4. This general authority especially empowers you either directly, or through the representatives or officers of the British Government, to negotiate and conclude any engage-

ments with M. Perron or any of Scindiah's European or native officers, with Ghunnee Behadur, Himmut Behadur, Shumshere Behadur, or any other Bundela chiefs, with the Rajahs of Jyenagur, Jodepore, and other Rajpoot chiefs, and with the Ranah of Gohud and other Jaut chieftains, with Sumroo's Begum, with any of the chiefs of the Seiks, on the principles stated in my instructions to Mr. Mercer.

5. Your Excellency will be careful to form any such engagements on principles conformable to the dignity, honour, and interests of the British Government and of its allies, and to the spirit and tenor of our subsisting treaties.

6. Your Excellency is also authorized, under this instruction, to make such arrangements as your Excellency may consider to be proper with his Majesty Shah Alum on the principles stated in my separate instructions of this date.

7. Your Excellency is further empowered to conclude such engagements with any subordinate chieftains of the Mahratta state on the north-west frontier of Oude, as may appear to you to be expedient for the purpose of securing their co-operation, in the event of hostilities between the British Government and Scindiah, the Rajah of Berar, Jeswunt Rao Holkar, or any other powers.

8. All such engagements as your Excellency may conclude with any of the chieftains or powers above enumerated will be confirmed by me under the limitations and restrictions herein prescribed.

9. Copies of these instructions will be transmitted to the Hon. Major-General Wellesley, to his Excellency Lieut.-General Stuart, to the Residents at Lucknow and Poonah, and the Resident in the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and to the Governor-General's agent in the ceded provinces, with directions to those several authorities to co-operate with your Excellency as far as their respective situations will admit in all points connected with the efficient exercise of the powers, with which your Excellency is hereby invested.

10. Your Excellency will be pleased to hold the most confidential and unreserved intercourse with Major-General Wellesley, who possesses my authority to conduct and to conclude all political negotiations in the west of India under instructions, dated 26th June, of which a copy is enclosed for your Excellency's information.

11. In the execution of these instructions, I authorize your Excellency to require the services of any civil officers whose assistance you may deem necessary to the despatch of the arduous affairs connected with the subject of this order.

I have the honour to be, Sir,
your Excellency's most faithful servant,
WELLESLEY.

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## No. LIII.

*Lieut.-Colonel Collins to the Marquess Wellesley.*

Written 6th July 1803.

MY LORD, [Received 28th or 29th of July, 1803 ]

In the afternoon of the 4th instant I had an interview with Dowlut Rao Scindiah and with Ragojee Bhooslah, at the tent of the latter chieftain. I was attended on this occasion by Captain Paris Bradshaw, Moonshee Mirza Bauker Khan, and Gunput Roy. Seredhur Punth, Kishen Rao the eldest son, and the brother of the Berar Rajah, were present at this conference; also Jâdoon Rao Bhow, Unna Bhasker, Eethul Punth, and Ambajee Inglia, on the part of Scindiah.

2. After an interchange of compliments I commenced the conversation, by observing that I had for some time past been extremely anxious to obtain an audience of these chieftains, in order to learn their final determination respecting the line of conduct which they intended to pursue in consequence of the engagements concluded at Bassein, between his Highness the Peishwa and the British Government, and I concluded with expressing my belief that the result of the present meeting would enable me to assure your Excellency of the friendly disposition of both chieftains towards the British Government.

3. Here I paused, in the expectation of a reply; but as none was given, I proceeded to state, that the treaty of Bassein was purely of a defensive nature; that it contained no stipulation whatever injurious to the just rights of the Decanny Sirdars; but on the contrary, had expressly provided for the security and independency of the feudatory Mahratta chiefs. That the principal object of the treaty at Bassein, was to preserve the peace of India; that your lordship regarded

Dowlut Rao Scindiah and Ragojee Bhooslah, as the ancient friends of the Honorable Company, and was on this account willing to improve the existing connection between those states and the British Government. I insisted on the right of the Peishwa to contract engagements with the English, without any of the Mahratta Sirdars; I desired that the Berar Rajah would advert to the very clear exposition of the views and principles which induced the treaty of Bassein, as set forth in your Excellency's letter,* to his address under date the 13th of last May; I observed that this letter contained the most satisfactory proofs of the moderation and justice of the British Government. Then addressing myself to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, I said that conformably to your lordship's directions, I had already given the same explanation to him verbally, and I reminded the Maharage of his having positively assured me on the 24th of last May, that he had no intention whatever to obstruct the completion of the engagements lately concluded at Bassein. I then remarked, that I only required from him a confirmation of this assurance, together with a similar declaration on the part of Rajah Ragoojee Bhooslah, and in conclusion, I declared that it was your Lordship's earnest desire to promote the prosperity of their respective sircars, and that they might safely rely upon the continued friendship of the British Government so long as they refrained from committing acts of aggression against the English and their allies.

4. Instead of making any observations on the foregoing discourse, Seredhur Punth entered into a most tedious explanation of the conduct which ought to have been adopted by the Peishwa previously to his forming a new treaty with the British Government. He said it had been invariably the usage on such occasions to consult with the Deccanny Sirdars, whereas Baajy Rao had acted in the present instance, not only without the concurrence, but even without the knowledge, of Ragoojee Bhooslah and Dowlut Rao Scindiah, although they were his friends, and confessedly, the most powerful chiefs in the Mahratta empire. This is the substance of the only material points urged by Seredhur Punth. I replied, that his highness the Peishwa had repeatedly

* See p. 99.

written to the Maharage and to the Berar Rajah to repair to Poonah, but that these requisitions of his Highness had not been complied with; that in consequence the Peishwa was left without any means of defence against his enemies, except that which he derived from the English to whom his Highness was solely indebted for the preservation of his life, honour and dignity. I further observed, that his (the minister's) reference to old usages, was inconclusive, inasmuch as no one instance had been adduced tending to prove that the Peishwa had not an undoubted right to enter into any new engagements with the English, independently of the consent of any of the feudatory Mahratta chiefs, and that in fact the only point for consideration was, whether Ragoojee Bhooslah and Dowlut Rao Scindiah designed to oppose the completion of a treaty actually concluded between his Highness the Peishwa and the British Government.

5. Here again Seredhur Punth made a long speech, containing for the most part professions of the friendly disposition which his master entertained towards the British Government; he ended by remarking, that the English troops having crossed the Godavery were advancing towards the Ghaut* of Adjuntee, in consequence of which, he requested I would write to the honorable General Wellesley, for the purpose of prevailing on him to recal that detachment. I excused myself from preferring any request of the kind, and observed, that the British troops generally advanced when any army was approaching them, but never retreated. I then recurred to the question which I had so frequently stated; Seredhur Punth said, that he had a great many remarks to make on the different articles of the treaty of Bassein; I replied, that these remarks might be committed to writing and hereafter sent to your Excellency, but in the mean time I expected he would answer my question. The Bhooslah's minister then objected, that the Peishwa had not to this hour informed either Scindiah or Ragoojee, of his having concluded a new treaty with the English; I reminded Seredhur of the duplicate letters which both the Maharage and the Berar Rajah had received through me from his Highness the Peishwa, and in which his Highness ex-

* Pass.

pressly mentions having improved the friendship that had so long subsisted between his Government and that of the Honorable Company. Both Jadoon Rao and Seredhur Punth admitted the correctness of this statement, but said that they had never received the originals, and gave me to understand that they yielded no credit whatever to the duplicates. On this head much warm conversation ensued, but both Seredhur Punth and Jadoon Rao declared that it was necessary for the satisfaction of the Bhooslah and of Scindiah, that they should receive the foregoing information from the Peishwa himself, and that for this purpose they intended deputing two confidential persons to Poonah. In the mean time, they assured me, that their masters had no design whatever to oppose any engagements which the British might have contracted with his Highness, and they also promised that their armies should not advance towards Poonah nor ascend the Adjuntee Ghaut. After giving these assurances, they requested I would endeavour to prevent the nearer approach of the British troops under the command of Colonel Stevenson. I replied, that to evince the sincerity of their present professions, it was indispensably requisite that Dowlut Rao Scindiah should recross the Nerbuddah, and the Bhooslah repair to Nagpore; that while they continued in this quarter with their armies, it was impossible for your Excellency to rely on their friendly promises; and I added, that if the Maharage and the Berar Rajah, would immediately return to their respective capitals, I had no doubt of obtaining the consent of the Honorable General Wellesley to withdraw his forces also. But although I persisted in contending and urging this point a considerable time, and did not fail to state that the continuance of the Mahratta armies in this quarter would most probably be productive of serious evils, yet I could obtain no satisfactory assurance either from Jadoon Rao or Seredhur Punth, that Scindiah and the Bhooslah would shortly return to their respective capitals; and hence I am inclined to infer that their friendly professions are insincere.

6. Dowlut Rao Scindiah and Ragoojee Bhooslah, both promised to send me letters on the following day, for your Excellency, containing the strongest assurances of their determination to preserve and maintain the relations of friend-

ship which have so long subsisted between their states and the British Government. I waited for those letters during the whole of yesterday, but as they are not yet sent to me, although this day be far advanced, I shall no longer defer the despatch of my present address.

I have the honour to be with the greatest respect,
My Lord,
Your Lordship's most obedient
and very humble servant,
J. COLLINS,
Resident D. R. S.

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## No. LIV.

*The Marquess Wellesley to Lieut.-General Lake.*

(Official and Secret.)

SIR, Fort William, July 28, 1803.

Your Excellency will be apprized by my despatch under date the 27th instant,* of the general principles of the system of political arrangement which I propose to adopt in the present crisis of affairs with respect to the several chiefs and states occupying the north-western part of Hindostan. That despatch refers to my instructions to Mr. Mercer, whom I have selected for the conduct of the detail of the proposed arrangement under your Excellency's immediate superintendance.

A copy of Mr. Mercer's instructions has been forwarded to your Excellency,† and I now have the honour to communicate to your Excellency such directions as are necessary to enable you to regulate and support Mr. Mercer's proceedings, and to carry into effect such of the measures which those instructions describe, as may depend for their immediate execution on the exercise of the powers vested in your Excellency's hand.

Your Excellency will observe, that although Mr. Mercer is appointed to be the special agent to the Governor-General for conducting the proposed negotiations with the Bundelah chiefs, he is required to exercise the powers with which he is vested under the immediate control and superintendance of

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* See p. 208 † See p. 224.

your Excellency, and is accordingly directed to transmit to your Excellency regular information of his proceedings, and to conform to such instructions as your Excellency may think proper to issue to him for the regulation of his conduct in carrying into effect the measures entrusted to his execution.

In conformity to the intimation contained in the 13th paragraph of Mr. Mercer's instructions, I request that your Excellency will be prepared to support the arrangements which Mr. Mercer may conclude with the Bundelah chiefs, by the application of a military force to such an extent as your Excellency may deem sufficient, and the exigencies of the public service may enable your Excellency to detach for that purpose. In deciding this point, your Excellency will advert to the important object of securing the principal passes into the country of Berar, from the contiguous province of Boghilcund.

My despatch No. 2 of the 27th instant* contains my sentiments with respect to the importance of securing the co-operation of the principal Rajpoot chieftains, and of concluding permanent alliances with those states. I have every reason to be satisfied of the disposition of the Rajahs of Jyenagur and Jodepore to connect themselves with the British Government, for the purpose of emancipating themselves from the oppressive control of the Mahrattas. I am at the same time aware that a dread of M. Perron's resentment may deter those chieftains from an open manifestation of that disposition, until the operations of the British army shall have placed them beyond the reach of M. Perron's power. The immediate despatch of a commissioner to those chieftains for the purpose of negotiating the terms of the proposed engagements, might induce M. Perron to adopt such measures with respect to those chieftains as might prevent their co-operation with the British forces. Deeming it, however, to be of importance that the Rajahs of Jyenagur and Jodepore should be apprized at the earliest practicable period of time, of the disposition of the British Government to favour their supposed views, I have addressed letters to those chieftains offering to their acceptance propositions of a general nature intended to

* See p. 234.

secure their co-operation in the approaching contest, and to form the basis of a future defensive alliance between those chieftains and the British Government, and I have requested them to transmit to your Excellency duplicates of their replies, in order that your Excellency may receive the earliest practicable information of their assent to the proposed terms, and be prepared to suggest to them the mode in which their military power and resources may be most advantageously employed in promoting the success of the common cause.

Those letters have already been transmitted to your Excellency by my directions, in a private letter from the Secretary to Government in the Secret Department, accompanied by copies of them for your Excellency's information.

If the Rajahs of Jyenagur and Jodepore should be disposed to afford their co-operation, the danger of a premature disclosure of their intentions will probably prevent them from immediately despatching their agents to your Excellency for the purpose of concerting with your Excellency the plan of co-operation.

It may therefore be necessary, that after being apprized of their disposition to co-operate, your Excellency should communicate your sentiments on that subject to those chieftains in writing. The mode in which those chieftains shall be required to co-operate with the British forces is a question exclusively of a military nature, to be regulated by your Excellency's discretion, and by contingent circumstances. It is unnecessary at the present moment to state to your Excellency the detail of the defensive engagements which I am desirous of concluding at a future period of time with the Rajahs of Jyenagur and Jodepore.

It is probable that Mr. Mercer will arrive at your Excellency's camp in time to enable you to avail yourself of his services in the negotiations which your Excellency may have occasion to conduct with those chieftains.

Your Excellency will be apprized by Mr. Mercer of the aid to be expected from the power or influence of the Ranah of Gohud, and your Excellency will be prepared to regulate your proceedings with regard to that chief and the Jauts according to the information which you may receive from Mr. Mercer on that subject.

Your Excellency will be apprized by the 26th paragraph of

my instructions to Mr. Mercer, of the arrangement which I propose to conclude with respect to the Jageer of Zeeboo Nissa Begum, commonly called Sumroo's Begum.* The disposition of the Begum to place herself under the protection of the British Government is distinctly declared in two letters which I have lately received from her.

I have stated in my instructions to Mr. Mercer that the local situation of the Begum's Jaggeer renders it desirable that in any engagement concluded with her on the part of the British Government, such conditions should be inserted as may facilitate the introduction of the British regulations into the Jaggeer and I request that your Excellency's negotiations with the Begum may be directed to the accomplishment of this object. It may not, perhaps, be expedient directly to propose to her this arrangement, until the British power shall have been established in the adjacent territories of the Dooab. But in that case, the engagements to be concluded with the Begum should be such as to form a basis for the future accomplishment of the proposed arrangement. Your Excellency, however, will be guided in the determination of this point, by the information which you may acquire of the disposition of the Begum to acquiesce in the extent of my views with relation to her Jaggeer. It is my wish to commute her Jaggeer for a suitable stipend, the extent of which must be regulated by the profits which she actually derives from her territorial possessions, and by the importance of the services which the British Government may derive from the exertion of her aid and influence.

As an immediate proof of her disposition to connect her interests with those of the British Government, and as the condition of her being admitted to the benefits of its protection, she should be required to recal her battalions now serving in the army of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and to employ whatever influence she may possess over the Zemindars and chieftains in the Dooab, to induce them to place themselves under the authority of the British Government, and to employ their resources in assisting the operations of the British arms.

With a view, however, to expedite the proposed arrange-

* Widow of a Frenchman named Sombre, formerly in the service of the Nawaub Cossim Alli Khaun, Nawaub of Bengal.

ment with the Begum, I have deemed it expedient to transmit a duplicate of my letter to her to the Resident at Lucknow, directing him to deliver it for transmission to the Begum's Vakeel stationed at that city, and if he should have reason to suppose that Vakeel to be in the confidence of the Begum, to communicate to him generally the disposition of the British Government to afford its protection to the Begum, to require him to suggest to her the immediate despatch of orders of recall to her battalions serving with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and to propose his proceeding to the camp of your Excellency for the purpose of eventually becoming the channel of negotiation between your Excellency and the Begum.

Although I have vested Mr. Mercer with authority to aid your Excellency in the conduct of all or any of the foregoing arrangements, it is not my wish that such negotiations as appear to be of an urgent nature should be postponed until Mr. Mercer's progress in the negotiations to which his attention has been immediately directed, may enable your Excellency to avail yourself of his services in other branches of general political arrangement.

In conformity to the intimation contained in the 30th paragraph of Mr. Mercer's instructions, I request that your Excellency will be pleased, if necessary, to authorize one or more of the military officers under your command, who may be spared from military duty, and who may possess the necessary qualifications, to aid Mr. Mercer in carrying into effect such of the political arrangements prescribed by my instructions, as may remain unaccomplished when Mr. Mercer's negotiations in Bundelcund and its vicinity shall enable him to attend your Excellency for that purpose.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

Examined,
W. B. BAYLEY,* Assistant.

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* William Butterworth Bayley, Esq. was recently Acting Governor-General of India, and is now one of the Directors of the East India Company.—*Ed.*

## No. LV.

*The Marquess Wellesley to Lieut.-General Lake.*

(Secret.)

SIR, Fort William, 30th July 1803.

1. Your Excellency has been apprized by my official despatch No. 2, dated the 27th instant, of my general views and intentions with respect to the campaign against Dowlut Rao Scindiah in the north-west of India. I now consider it to be expedient to state to your Excellency my directions with respect to the adoption of such measures after you shall have passed the frontier of the Company's provinces, as may be calculated to facilitate the success of the British arms, to conciliate the minds of the inhabitants of the country, and to enable your Excellency to secure supplies for the army in the field.

2. When your Excellency shall have passed the frontier of the Company's dominions you will issue a proclamation in your own name, promising protection to the persons and properties of all such inhabitants of the country, as shall on just and reasonable terms assist the army by supplies of cattle, grain, forage, or provisions of any description, and further assuring the inhabitants in general, that no persons shall be molested excepting such as shall appear in arms or shall impede the operations of the army by the removal of those supplies, which may be useful to its progress or subsistence. Your Excellency will also employ every means to conciliate the inhabitants of the countries through which you shall pass, as well by the orderly and regular conduct of the army, as by the publication, from time to time, of such assurances as may be adapted to the occasion.

3. I enclose to your Excellency, for reference, copies of the proclamation issued by Lieutenant-General Harris on entering Mysore, at the commencement of the war of 1799,* and of the proclamation issued by the Commissioners subsequently to the fall of Seringapatam, for the settlement of the conquered territory.

* See Vol. I. p. 498.

4. It is extremely important to use the most effectual precautions for the prevention of plunder of every description, and for compelling every officer and soldier to pay regularly for all such articles, as shall be furnished by the inhabitants during the march of the army.

5. It is possible that some of the tributaries, principal officers, or other subjects of Dowlut Rao Scindiah exclusively of those described in my general instructions to your Excellency, and in my instructions to Mr. Mercer, may be inclined to place themselves under the protection of the Company. The war in which we are involved by the aggression of Scindiah, renders it both just and expedient, that we should avail ourselves as much as possible, of the discontents and disaffection of his subjects or officers, and I accordingly desire, that in all cases where overtures of this nature may be made to your Excellency, which may not admit of reference to me, you will be pleased to decide on the degree and nature of the encouragement, proper to be given to the persons by whom they may be made.

6. I also authorize your Excellency to give to all tributaries or others renouncing their allegiance to Scindiah, and acting sincerely in our favour, the most positive assurances of effectual protection in the name of the Company. Your Excellency will observe that this authority must be exercised with reference to my separate instructions regarding the extent of territory, which it is at present in my contemplation to subject to the general regulations established in the British possessions, and you will be pleased to remark that the limits of of that territory are described by the Jumna, including its western and southern bank, and the mountains of Kumaon to the north and the whole of Bundelcund. Within these limits you may engage to secure to the inhabitants the advantages of British subjects.

7. The inhabitants of that part of the Dooab now subject to the authority of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, or of M. Perron, must be apprized of the general security to persons and property, afforded by the system of administration introduced by the British Government into the ceded provinces, and it is probable that many of them will manifest a ready disposition to accept the protection of the Company.

8. In that event your Excellency may find it practicable,

as the army under your command shall advance into the enemy's country, and after the destruction of the authority of M. Perron to effect a settlement of the revenues of the conquered country, for a term of one year, with the persons, who may be in actual possession. The success of this measure would afford an acceptable resource for the prosecution of the war to a successful termination, and, if the settlement were made on moderate terms, it might attach to our cause a body of men, who would not only possess the means of affording essential assistance in the provision of supplies, but who would likewise oppose a formidable barrier against any incursions into our own territories, or into the reserved dominions of his Excellency the Nabob Vizier.

9. It is not in my power to prescribe the terms on which such a settlement of the revenues as is here proposed ought to be concluded; these must necessarily be left to your Excellency's discretion. I think it proper however to observe, that the revenue to be assessed should be so moderate in its amount, as to conciliate the parties, with whom any engagements may be contracted towards the British Government.

10. In the conduct of this branch of the public service, your Excellency will obtain material assistance from the experience, zeal and talents of Mr. G. Mercer, who was employed under the orders of the Lieutenant-Governor in the settlement of a considerable portion of the territory ceded by the Vizier. Mr. Mercer will join the army immediately.

11. Your Excellency has received my authority to resort to the assistance of any of the civil servants of the Company, employed in the the Upper Provinces whenever you may require it, and I propose to direct others properly qualified for that service to proceed to the army for the purpose of affording the aid of their talents, and knowledge in the execution of your arrangements for a temporary settlement of the country.

12. I have the honour to transmit with this despatch several copies of a proclamation* issued by me in council, commanding all the civil servants and military officers subject to the authority of this Presidency, to pay immediate and prompt

* This proclamation bears date 30th July, 1803, and is fully abstracted in the paragraph above given (No. 12.)

obedience to all such requisitions or orders as they may receive from your Excellency, whether for the provision and transportation of supplies and stores for the use of the army, or for any other purpose whatever. Your Excellency will be pleased to circulate this proclamation whenever the public interests shall appear in your judgment to require it, and you will desire Mr. Seton and Mr. Neave at Benares, to transmit it to the civil officers in their respective divisions.

13. Your Excellency will observe from my general instructions, that it is my ultimate intention to extend the regulations of the British Government throughout the whole of the country, bounded by the rivers Ganges and Jumna, and by the mountains of Kumaon. A part of this territory is possessed by a race of inhabitants known by the designation of Goojurs, who are understood to be adverse to the authority of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and to have frequently been engaged in hostilities with that chieftain in the vicinity of Saharunpore.

14. Your Excellency's prudence will dictate the expediency of employing the most efficacious measures for the purpose of conciliating the Goojurs, and of inducing them to unite with the British Government for the overthrow of Scindiah's power in the Dooab. An amicable arrangement may hereafter be concluded with the Goojurs, for the regulation of the conditions on which their possessions shall be held subject to the paramount authority of the Honourable Company.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

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## No. LVI.

*The Marquess Wellesley to Lieut.-General Stuart.*

(Secret.)

SIR, Fort William, 30th July, 1803.

1. I have received from the right honourable Lord Clive, copies of your Excellency's letter to his Lordship, under date the 27th of June, and of his Lordship's reply, containing a detailed statement of the considerations, which have induced your Excellency and his Lordship to concur in the expedi-

ency of placing the army under your Excellency's immediate command, in a position to the southward of the Tungbuddra, calculated to provide for the security of the British possessions in that quarter, against the dangers to be apprehended from the renewal of war between great Britain and France.

2. Your Excellency and his Lordship have justly founded your deliberations, with respect to the expediency of that measure, on a comparison between the danger, to which the British possessions may be immediately exposed by the absence of a protecting army, and the effect which the retreat of the army from the station of Moodgul may be expected to produce on the state of our affairs in the western side of India, and the estimate which your Excellency has formed of the comparative hazard of either alternative, founded on the information at that time in your Excellency's possession justified the measure, which your Excellency, in concurrence with the opinion of Lord Clive, resolved to adopt.

3. The importance however, which I have uniformly attached to the continuance of the army under your Excellency's command, in a position favourable to our eventual military operations in the west of India, and the opinion which I entertained of the degree of danger to the security of our southern possessions under the circumstances of an impending war with France, and of the arrival of a French force at Pondicherry, would probably have induced me to direct that the army should not retreat, if the question could have been previously referred to my decision.

4. The advices, which I have lately received of the state of affairs in the west of India, are of a nature to augment the importance of maintaining the advanced position of your Excellency's army, and the departure of the French squadron from the coast of Coromandel has suspended the danger, which induced your Excellency and Lord Clive to adopt the measure of withdrawing that army from its position at Moodgul, and has afforded time for supplying in a great degree, the absence of the troops under your Excellency's immediate command.

5. The complete establishment of the operation of the treaty of Bassein will, in my judgment, oppose the most effectual barrier to the designs of France against the British possessions in India, any arrangement therefore calculated to

secure and accelerate the attainment of that important object, should supersede every other consideration, excepting that of providing for the safety of our possessions against immediate and inevitable danger.

6. For these reasons it is my decided opinion, that the general interests of the public service will be most effectually promoted by the return of your Excellency's army to the position, which it lately occupied for the purpose of controlling the confederated chieftains of the Mahratta state, and of maintaining the faith of the southern Jaggeerdars (some of whom have been tempted by the suspense of our military operations to intrigue with the confederates) and of being prepared to support the operations of the British forces under the command of the honourable Major-General Wellesley. I accordingly request, that unless your Excellency should be in possession of intelligence, of a nature to render indispensably necessary, the near approach of your Excellency's army to the presidency of Fort St. George, for the safety of that presidency, or of our southern possessions, your Excellency will return with the army under your command, to the station which it lately occupied at Moodgul, or to a station commanding similar advantages, with regard to the operations of Major-General Wellesley, to the state of affairs at Poonah and Hyderabad, and to the disposition and conduct of the southern Jaggeerdars.

7. A copy of this despatch will be transmitted to the right honourable Lord Clive for his Lordship's information.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

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## No. LVII.

*Dowlut Rao Scindiah to the Marquess Wellesley.**

Received July 31st, 1803.

I have received your Lordship's friendly letter notifying the conclusion of new engagements between his Highness the

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* A letter of similar words and tenor was received on the same day by the Marquess Wellesley from Ragojee Bhoosla, the Rajah of Berar. —[*Ed.*]

Peishwa and the English Company at Bassein, together with a copy of the treaty; and I have been fully apprized of every word of its contents, which have also been fully communicated to me by Colonel Collins.

Whereas the engagements subsisting between the Peishwa and me are such, that the adjustment of all affairs and of the concerns of his state and government, should be arranged and completed with my advice and participation, by the favour of God! through a regard to what is above stated, the degrees of mutual concord have so increased, that to this time no interruption or derangement of them has occurred on either side. Notwithstanding this, the engagements which have lately been concluded between that quarter (British Government) and the Peishwa have only now been communicated; and on the part of the Peishwa, to this time of writing, *nothing*. Therefore, it has now been determined with Rajah Ragojee Bhoosla, in presence of Colonel Collins, that confidential persons on my part and the Rajah's, be despatched to the Peishwa, for the purpose of ascertaining the circumstances of the (said) engagements. At the same time no intention whatever is entertained on my part to subvert the stipulations of the treaty consisting of nineteen articles, which has been concluded at Bassein, between the British Government and the Peishwa, on condition that there be no design whatever on the part of the English Company and the Peishwa to subvert the stipulations of the treaty, which, since a long period of time, has been concluded between the Peishwa's Sircar, me, and the said Rajah and the Mahratta chiefs.

Further particulars will be communicated by the letters of Colonel Collins. Let the receipt of friendly letters continue to be the means of gratification to me.

A true translation.

N. B. EDMONSTONE,
Persian Sec. to Government.

## No. LVIII.

*The Marquess Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh.*

MY DEAR LORD, Fort William, August 1st, 1803.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatches noted in the margin (14th February, 1803.)

I return your Lordship many thanks for the intelligence communicated in this despatch relative to the movements of the French armaments.

Your Lordship will be apprized by my despatches to the Secret Committee of the considerations arising from the state of Mahratta affairs, which have compelled me to increase the military charges of the last and of the present year.

The official returns which must have reached England of the deficient state of his Majesty's and the Honourable Company's European force, especially the Company's artillery, will also have attracted your Lordship's attention, together with the suggestions contained in my despatch of the 20th of April, 1803.

That passage of your Lordship's letter which states that "the Company's dominions are in a great degree grown out of the reach of danger from the native powers," induces me to apprehend that the condition of the military establishments of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, under the command of Monsieur Perron, and of his French officers, may not have obtained sufficient consideration in England.

The condition of that military force, connected with the probability of a renewal of war with France, constitutes a serious object of danger, and will require the most vigilant observation, whatever may be the result of the depending discussions with Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

Your Lordship, however, may entertain, under every probable contingency, a confident expectation of a continued improvement in the state of our finance.

With respect to the supply of silver, I need not remark to your Lordship that India has not received the expected aid; the prime cost of the commercial investment of Bengal and Oude, however, in the approaching season, will amount to the extraordinary sum of one crore and eight lacs of rupees (1,08,00,000.)

The documents transmitted by Mr. Wellesley will enable your Lordship to decide the policy and justice of the treaty concluded with the Vizier in November, 1801.

Your Lordship must be apprized that I can feel no other solicitude on this question than that which arises from my regard for the public interests.

The documents which have been already transmitted to England relative to the affairs of the Carnatic appear to me to be so ample, that I have determined to request that the decision of the question may be rested upon those materials.

I trust entirely to your Lordship's judgment to take the most correct view of that measure. I am not aware of the nature of the advantage expected to be derived by the Nabob's creditors from contrasting my letter of the 26th of March, 1800, with the subsequent grounds of the proceedings in the Carnatic. Mr. Henry Wellesley, Mr. Cowper, Lieut.-Colonel Kirkpatrick, and Mr. Cockburn, can afford your Lordship full information with respect to the motives which induced me to furnish Lord Clive with the view of my sentiments contained in the letter of the 26th of March, 1800.

I derive great satisfaction from the postscript of your Lordship's letter, by which it appears that the affairs of Oude will be decided by your Lordship's judgment.

Your Lordship will be apprized by my despatch to Lord Hobart, noted in the margin (19th March, 1803,) of the circumstances which attended General Decaen's arrival at Pondicherry.

I have employed every possible effort to secure the Portuguese settlements from any attempt of the French. The most effectual defence, however, of these settlements must depend upon the distribution of his Majesty's squadron in the Indian Seas, it is therefore difficult for me in the present limited condition of my authority to provide for the security of those possessions in a manner entirely satisfactory to my wishes.

Your Lordship will also remark that the garrisons to be provided for the Portuguese settlements must constitute an addition to the military charges in India.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

## No. LIX.

*The Marquess Wellesley to the Right Honourable Lord William Bentinck.*

MY LORD, Fort William, 1st August, 1803.

This letter will be delivered to your Lordship by Lieut.-Colonel Hoghton, an officer belonging to my family, in whose talents, integrity, and honour, I place the most implicit confidence. I have directed Lieut.-Colonel Hoghton to attend your Lordship at Fort St. George for the purpose of offering my congratulations to you upon your arrival at that Presidency, together with the assurance of my sincere disposition to afford your Lordship my most cordial assistance and support in the discharge of the arduous duties of the difficult and important trust committed to your hands.

Lieut.-Colonel Hoghton is authorized by me to communicate to your Lordship without reserve on every point of detail, which may appear to merit your attention; and is also charged by me with several communications of the most confidential nature for your Lordship's information and service.

It will afford me great pleasure to have the honour of a letter from your Lordship as soon as you shall have conversed with Lieut.-Colonel Hoghton. My satisfaction would have been perfect, if I could have been enabled to have the advantage of a personal interview with your Lordship, previously to the commencement of your administration. Your Lordship will, however, undertake your great charge with the most firm confidence in my zealous co-operation, and in my disposition to consider the prosperity and honour of the government subject to your immediate authority, as inseparably connected with the efficiency of the power of the Supreme Government, with the general interests of this vast empire, and with the stability of the British influence, and the glory of the British name in India.

I have the honour to be,
with great respect, my Lord,
Your Lordship's
most faithful servant,
WELLESLEY.

## No. LX.

*The Governor-General in council to the Honourable the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors.*

HONOURABLE SIRS, Fort William, 1st August, 1803.

The Governor-General has had the honour of communicating to your honourable Committee, in his several despatches of the 24th of December, 1802, * 10th of February,† 19th of April,‡ and 20th of June, 1803,§ the progress of transactions in the Mahratta empire, and of stating to your honourable Committee the measures which his Excellency deemed it necessary to pursue for the security and improvement of the British interests, as connected with that empire, and his general sentiments with respect to the actual state of affairs at those several periods of time.

The Governor-General in council now deems it proper to continue the narrative of events from the date of the Governor-General's latest communication to your honourable Committee, a duplicate of which accompanies this despatch overland.

At a conference between Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and the Resident at the court of that chieftain, holden on the 28th of May, the Resident communicated to Dowlut Rao Scindiah the representations which he was instructed to make in conformity to the notes of instruction, of which a copy formed an enclosure in the Governor-General's address to your honourable Committee of the 20th of June.||

The Resident began the conference by imparting to Dowlut Rao Scindiah the whole of the treaty of Bassein, of which he also delivered a copy to that chieftain, agreeably to the directions of the Governor-General. After some discussion with regard to particular parts of that treaty, the Resident called on Dowlut Rao Scindiah to declare whether it appeared to him to contain any stipulations injurious to his just rights. In reply to which, that chieftain candidly acknowledged that it contained no such stipulations. The Resident then ad-

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* See p. 3. † See p. 49. ‡ See p. 72. § See p. 142.
|| See instructions to the Resident, 30th May, 1803, p. 106.

verted to the reported confederacy between Dowlut Rao Scindiah, the Rajah of Berar and Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and to the actual approach of the Rajah of Berar, for the purpose of meeting Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and in conformity to the Governor-General's instructions, required that chieftain to state the nature of the late negotiations between those Mahratta chiefs, and to disavow any intentions of confederating with the Rajah of Berar, and with Jeswunt Rao Holkar, for the purpose of obstructing the completion of the arrangements established by the treaty of Bassein.

The Resident enforced these demands by every argument which the nature of the case suggested, and by the declaration, which he was instructed to make, of the determined resolution of the British Government to resist any attempt on the part of any state or power to obstruct the complete execution of the treaty of Bassein, and the Resident apprized Dowlut Rao Scindiah, that in the event of his refusing to afford the just and reasonable explanations and assurances which the Resident has demanded, and of his continuing to prosecute military operations in opposition to the Resident's remonstrances, the British Government would be compelled to adopt measures of precaution on every boundary of that chieftain's dominions. The Resident added, agreeably to the Governor-General's instructions, that certain intelligence of the accession of Dowlut Rao Scindiah to any confederacy against the British power would produce immediate hostility on all parts of his frontier.

These representations however, failed to produce the desired effect; Dowlut Rao Scindiah repeatedly declared to the Resident, that he could not afford the satisfaction demanded until a meeting should have taken place between that chieftain and the Rajah of Berar, whose arrival was expected in the course of a few days, and Dowlut Rao Scindiah closed the discussion by stating to the Resident, that immediately after his interview with the Rajah of Berar, the Resident should be informed "whether it would be peace or war."

This unprovoked menace of hostility, and the insult offered to the British Government by a reference of the question of "peace or war," to the result of a conference with the Rajah of Berar, who, at the head of a considerable army, had reached the vicinity of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's camp, together

with the indication which it afforded of a disposition on the part of those chieftains to prosecute the supposed objects of their confederacy, rendered it the duty of the British Government to adopt without delay, the most effectual measures for the vindication of its dignity, and for the security of its rights and interests, and those of its allies, against any attempt on the part of the confederates, to injure or invade them.

The Governor-General accordingly issued private instructions to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief at Cawnpore, to make the necessary arrangements for assembling the army on the north-west frontier of the Company's possessions, and the Governor-General at the same time directed his attention to the formation of a plan of operations for the British army in that quarter, and to the accomplishment of a system of political arrangement with the neighbouring states and chieftains, calculated to diminish the power and resources of the enemy, and to facilitate the success of the British arms in the event of our being compelled to proceed to measures of hostility against the power and possessions of Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

The course of measures which the Governor-General deemed it advisable to adopt for those purposes, is described in the enclosed paper of notes, which was transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief for his immediate information and guidance.*

Adverting to the actual state of affairs in the western side of India, and to the doubtful nature of the designs of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, it appeared to the Governor-General to be indispensably necessary that a temporary authority should be constituted at the least possible distance from the scene of eventual negotiation or hostilities, with full powers to conclude upon the spot whatever arrangements might become necessary, either for the final settlement of peace, or for the active prosecution of war. The Governor-General considered that in such a crisis, various questions might arise, of which the precise tenor could not be foreseen, and which might demand a prompt decision. That the issue of those questions might involve the result of war or peace, and in either alternative, the delay of reference to the Gover-

* See p. 245.

nor-General's authority might endanger the seasonable despatch, and the ultimate prosperity of the public service.

That the success of the military operations placed under the direction of the honourable Major-General Wellesley, might depend on the timely decision of various political questions which might occur with relation to the interests and views of the several Mahratta chiefs and Jageerdars and of their Highnesses the Peishwa and Nizam, and that on the other hand the issue of every political arrangement then under negotiation with the powers of Hindostan or the Deccan, must be inseparably blended with the movements of the army under the command of Major-General Wellesley.

The Governor-General therefore, deemed it necessary during that crisis, to unite the general control of all political and military affairs in Hindostan and the Deccan, connected with the depending negotiation, and with the movement of the army, under a distinct local authority, subject to the Governor-General in council; and the Governor-General was decidedly of opinion, that those powers could not be placed with advantage in any other hands than those of the general officer commanding the troops destined to restore the tranquillity of the Deccan; and the approved ability, zeal, temper, activity, and judgment, of the honourable Major-General Wellesley, combined with his extensive local experience, his established influence and high reputation among the Mahratta chiefs and states, and Major-General Wellesley's intimate knowledge of the Governor-General's views and sentiments concerning the British interests in the Mahratta empire, determined the Governor-General to vest those important and arduous powers in that officer's hands. The same powers were also vested in Lieutenant-General Stuart, in the event of his assuming the immediate command of the forces in the Deccan.

The Governor-General in council now proceeds to state the progress of the negotiations and transactions on the western side of India.

Although the answer which Dowlut Rao Scindiah returned to the just and reasonable demands of the Resident, on the 28th of May, would have justified the Resident in immediately quitting the camp of that chieftain, the Resident in conformity to the desire expressed by the Governor-General

to employ every practical endeavour to effect a pacific accommodation of subsisting differences, properly resolved to postpone his departure until a meeting should have taken place between Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar.

On the 3d of June, the Rajah of Berar arrived within one march of Scindiah's camp, and was met by the latter chieftain on the following morning. On the 5th the Resident despatched his native Secretary with a complimentary message to the Rajah of Berar, who received him with distinguished attention. The Rajah of Berar expressed with apparent sincerity, his solicitude to maintain the relations of friendship which had so long subsisted between the British Government and the state of Berar, and informed the Resident's emissary that he had received the Governor-General's letter of the 13th of May,* and that he should speedily return a reply.

The two chieftains having held a private conference on the 8th, the Resident despatched a message to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, on the following day, intimating that the intended interview between Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and the Rajah of Berar, having taken place, it was incumbent on Dowlut Rao Scindiah to return an immediate and explicit answer to the demands, which the Resident had stated on the 28th of May. To this message, Dowlut Rao Scindiah returned an evasive reply. The Resident being of opinion, that Dowlut Rao Scindiah systematically postponed a decisive reply with a view to gain time, and being aware of the necessity of bringing the question of peace or war to an immediate decision, addressed a memorial to that chieftain. In reply to this memorial, the Resident received a verbal message, purporting that the required explanation should be afforded in the course of two or three days. On receiving this message, the Resident signified to Dowlut Rao Scindiah that he considered that reply to be final, and apprized that chieftain of his intention to quit his camp without further delay. On the 14th the Resident received a reply to his memorial, containing excuses for the delay of a specific answer on the subject of the question depending, and soliciting the Resident to postpone his departure.

Dowlut Rao Scindiah having declared, that the decision of the question of peace or war rested with the Rajah of Berar,

* See p. 99.

and the latter chieftain being equally concerned in the progress and issue of the depending negotiations, the Resident deemed it expedient to communicate with that chieftain, in the hope that the Governor-General's letter of the 13th of May, might have induced the Rajah of Berar to manifest a disposition more conformable to the dictates of policy and justice, than that which appeared to actuate the conduct of Dowlut Rao Scindiah. The Resident accordingly despatched his native secretary to the Rajah of Berar with instructions to ascertain whether that chieftain had prepared any reply to the Governor-General's letter of the 13th of May, and to apprize him of the contents of the memorial which the Resident had addressed to Dowlut Rao Scindiah. This message produced no other result than a continuation of the same system of evasion, and delay, which the Resident had already experienced from Dowlut Rao Scindiah. The Resident therefore addressed another memorial to Scindiah, respecting his determination to quit the camp on a specified day. The memorial produced a correspondence between the Resident and Dowlut Rao Scindiah, which terminated in a resolution on the part of the Resident to postpone his departure for a few days, in the expectation which he was induced to entertain of a change of conduct on the part of those chieftains.

It is impracticable to comprise within the compass of a despatch overland the detail of the subsequent negotiations between the Resident and the confederated chieftains to the date of our latest advices from the Resident. Those details will be communicated to your honourable Committee by a sea conveyance. The particulars already stated will enable your honourable Committee to form a judgment of the spirit which has actuated those chieftains in the late important discussions. It is sufficient to add, that although they continued to practise the same artful evasions, the Resident was induced, by their promises and persuasions, to protract the period of his actual departure from the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, with a view to afford an unequivocal proof of the anxiety of the British Government to maintain the relations of amity and peace with those chieftains, and to render them exclusively responsible for the consequences of their perseverance in a system of conduct inconsistent with those relations, and repugnant to every principle of justice and good faith.

From the documents transmitted to your honourable Com-

mittee, it will be manifest that the utmost degree of moderation and forbearance has been practised by the British Government consistently with the due support of its dignity, and with a just regard to its acknowledged rights and essential interests.

Those chieftains having distinctly acknowledged that the treaty of Bassein contains no stipulations injurious to their rights, and their continuance with their united armies in the Deccan being manifestly unnecessary for any purposes connected with their security, or with the interests of their respective states, no reasonable cause exists for their refusal to afford the proofs which the Governor-General has required of the sincerity of their amicable professions. Under these circumstances, the continuance of their armies in their present menacing position, combined with the equivocal and evasive tenor of their language and conduct, justifies the most serious doubt of the sincerity of their professions, and the Governor-General in council would consider it to be a violation of his public duty to accept as sufficient security for the safety of the dominions of our ally the Nizam, the pacific declarations contained in the letters from those chieftains, while those chieftains remained on the frontier of the Nizam's dominions with a formidable military force, and absolutely refused to return to their respective dominions. The Governor-General in council, therefore, deems it indispensably necessary to prosecute the political and military arrangements which have been adopted with a view to the event of a war between the British Government and its allies, and the confederated Mahratta chieftains.

Your honourable Committee is apprized of the grounds on which the Governor-General founded his reasonable expectation of the pacific accomplishment of the arrangements concluded between the British Government and the Peishwa. Every argument deducible from the just and amicable nature of those arrangements, from the equitable and moderate course of proceeding adopted by the British Government towards the Mahratta states, and from the relative power and resources of the British Government, and the confederated chieftains in the actual situation of their respective forces, favour that expectation. If, under the peculiar disadvantages with which those chieftains must now undertake a contest

with the British power, they should continue to withhold the proofs which the Governor-General has demanded of their pacific intentions, it must be obvious to your honourable Committee that any delay in the prosecution of offensive operations against the power and possessions of those chieftains would hazard the security of the British interests by enabling those chieftains to pursue their hostile designs at a future period of time under circumstances more favourable to their success.

The Governor-General in council confidently expects that under the powers vested in the honourable Major-General Wellesley, that officer will have required the Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah to quit that chieftain's camp within a specified period of days, unless Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar shall previously separate their forces, and commence their return to their respective territories.

By the latest accounts the united armies of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar occupied a position within a few days' march of the pass of Adjuntee, one of the principal passes on the western frontier of his Highness the Nizam's dominions. The subsidiary force under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Stevenson, together with his Highness the Nizam's contingent, was encamped at a short distance from Aurungabad.

The honourable Major-General Wellesley marched from Poonah with the main body of the forces under his command on the 4th of June, and by the latest advices was encamped within a few marches of Ahmednuggur, a strong fort belonging to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, at the distance of about eighty miles from Poonah. The army under the command of Major-General Wellesley is accompanied by an inconsiderable portion of the contingent of troops which the Peishwa is required to furnish by the treaty of Bassein. There is no reason, however, to ascribe this deficiency to any want of inclination on the part of his Highness to adhere to the faith of his engagements with the British Government.

By the latest advices, Jeswunt Rao Holkar occupied a position with the main body of his army on the north side of the Taptee river. The endeavours of Dowlut Rao Scindia and the Rajah of Berar to induce that chieftain to join them, appear to have been unsuccessful. It is not probable that Jes-

wunt Rao Holkar will ever be induced by any concessions cordially to connect his interests with those of Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

The Governor-General has great satisfaction in assuring your honourable Committee that in the event of hostilities between the British Government and the confederated chieftains, we shall enter upon the contest under every circumstance of advantage arising from the season of the year, from the superiority of our troops, and from the relative position of the British forces.

The character of Major-General Wellesley, the extent of our force, and the approved valour, steadiness, and discipline of our troops, afford a prospect of the speedy and complete success of our arms on the western side of India, if the conduct of the Mahratta states should ultimately compel us to resort to hostility.

The extent and efficiency of the British forces on the north-western quarter of the Company's dominions under the command of his Excellency the commander-in-chief, and his Excellency's approved skill, activity, perseverance and prudence constitute a just foundation of confidence in the success of our military operations against the possessions of Dowlut Rao Scindiah in that quarter of Hindostan.

The Governor-General is employed in framing the necessary arrangements for the occupation of the province of Cuttack in the event of hostilities, and the Governor-General in council entertains no doubt of the speedy success of the expedition which will be directed to that quarter in the event of hostilities between the British Government and the confederated Mahratta chieftains.

The necessary measures have been adopted for defending the whole line of frontier from Allahabad to Midnapoor from the incursions of predatory bodies of the enemy's troops.

No events have occurred at Poonah of a nature to produce any change in the sentiments which the Governor-General has had the honour to state to your honourable Committee with respect to the stability and the benefits of the alliance concluded between the British Government and the Peishwa.

The accounts which the Governor-General in council has received of the state of his Highness the Nizam's health, lead to an apprehension of that prince's immediate decease. Mea-

sures have long since been adopted for securing to his Highness's eldest son, Mirza Secunder Jah, the succession to the Soobahdarry of the Deccan on the decease of his father, and the Governor-General in council has no reason to apprehend that the decease of his Highness the Nizam will occasion any commotion at Hyderabad, or in any degree operate prejudicially to the political interests of the British Government in India.

We have the honour to be,
Honourable Sirs,
your most obedient and faithful servants,
WELLESLEY,
G. H. BARLOW,
G. UDNY.

Examined,
W. B. Bayley, Assistant.

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## No. LXI.

*The Marquess Wellesley to Lieut.-General Lake.*

(Secret and Official, No. 8.)

SIR, Fort William, Aug. 2, 1803.

1. Your Excellency has anticipated my opinion with respect to the expediency of endeavouring to obtain the co-operation of the principal chiefs of the tribe of Seiks, in the approaching contest with the Mahratta power.

2. The object of this despatch is to communicate to your Excellency my sentiments and instructions upon that subject.

3. The chiefs from whose influence or exertions the greatest benefit is to be derived, are the Rajah of Putteeala, and those petty chieftains who occupy the territory between Putteeala and the Jumna. I understand, however, that Rajah Runjeet Sing the Rajah of Lahore, is considered to be the principal among the chiefs of the tribe of Seiks, and to possess considerable influence over the whole body of the Seik chiefs.

4. In the year 1800 the Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, by my direction, despatched a confidential agent to the principal chiefs, for the purpose of persuading them to unite in opposing the apprehended invasion of Zemaun Shah and of conciliating them to the interests of the British Government.

5. Those chieftains manifested a disposition highly favourable to the British Government, until the receipt of letters from M. Perron, who succeeded in exciting their suspicions, by false and malignant statements of the views and intentions of the British Government with respect to the Seiks; and although Rajah Runjeet Sing subsequently disavowed all belief of M. Perron's statements, and both that chieftain and the Rajah of Putteeala repeated their professions of attachment to the British Government, I have reason to believe that the unfavourable impressions produced on their minds by M. Perron's misrepresentations were never entirely effaced. Since that period of time M. Perron has industriously cultivated the attachment of the Seik chieftains, and has probably continued his endeavours to preserve in their minds the spirit of jealousy and mistrust which he had excited against the British Government.

6. In any communications, therefore, which your Excellency may convey to any of those chieftains under the instructions contained in this despach, it will be proper that your Excellency should endeavour to remove from their minds any apprehension of a design, on our part, to interfere in the concerns of their respective states, or to control their authority and independence.

7. I am not sufficiently apprized of the names, possessions, and relative conditions of the various Seik chieftains occupying the territory between Putteeala and the Jumna, to be enabled to address letters to all of them, or to prescribe the detail of your Excellency's proceedings with regard to them. Your Excellency will endeavour to acquire the requisite information, and you will regulate your communications with those chieftains accordingly, in the general spirit of these instructions.

8. I transmit to your Excellency, for the purpose of being forwarded, at such time and in such manner as may appear to your Excellency to be most proper, letters to those among

the Seik chiefs with whom the agent of the Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah communicated.

9. Your Excellency will be guided by your own judgment and discretion in conveying your communications to the Seik chieftains through the channel of a native agent, despatched for that purpose, or in writing.

10. Adverting to the great distance of Lahore from the scene of intended operations, the only support to be expected from Rajah Runjeet Sing, is the exertion of his influence with the other Seik chieftains, to induce them to favour the cause of the British Government.

11. With the limited knowledge which I possess of the relative power and situation of the Seik chieftains, I am unable to suggest any conciliatory proposals which can be made to those among them who are independent of the Mahratta power. Their opinion, however, of the probability of the success of the British arms against the power of Scindiah, and their sense of the expediency of cultivating the good will of the British Government, when the authority and influence of the Mahrattas shall have been subverted by our exertions in the north-west of Hindostan, may constitute powerful motives with all the Seik chieftains, to promote the British interests, or at least to refrain from any opposition to our power.

12. Such of those chieftains as are subject to the control and exactions of the Mahratta power, may perhaps be detached from the interests of that nation by promises of protection from the British Government, and of exemption from the payment of tribute in future.

13. By a paper of intelligence received from the Resident at Lucknow, it appears that the Rajah of Putteeala is prepared, in consequence of a requisition from M. Perron, to despatch an escort for the purpose of conducting Gholaum Mohummed Khaun to M. Perron's camp. Your Excellency will infer from this circumstance that the Rajah of Putteeala is in the interest of the Mahrattas, and from all the information which I possess, I am led to suppose that most of the Seik chieftains are equally under the influence or power of M. Perron.

14. If your Excellency should succeed in detaching the Rajah of Putteeala and the chieftains who occupy the terri-

tory between Putteeala and the Jumna, from the interests of the Mahrattas, their services might be usefully employed in opposing the progress of Gholaum Mohummed Khaun, and in endeavouring to obtain possession of his person.

15. If it should appear impracticable to obtain the co-operation of those chieftains, it would still be an object of importance to secure their neutrality.

16. In your communications to the Seik chieftains, it may be proper that your Excellency should suggest to their consideration the danger to which they will hereafter be exposed by any opposition to the interests of the British Government, and the advantages which they may derive from a connection with so powerful a state.

17. On these general principles and observations your Excellency will be pleased to found your instructions to any agent whom you may think proper to despatch, for the purpose of negotiating a connection with the Seik chieftains, or the communications which you may have occasion to convey to them in writing, subject, however, to such variation as in your Excellency's judgment may appear advisable.

18. It is possible that, however well disposed those chieftains may be towards the British Government, they may be deterred from openly manifesting that disposition, by their apprehension of M. Perron's resentment, until the operations of the British troops shall relieve them from that danger, and a premature disclosure of our intentions with respect to the Seik chieftains may enable M. Perron to frustrate the object of these instructions. This consideration may require the observance of secrecy and caution in your Excellency's communications with those chieftains.

I have the honour to be, Sir,
your Excellency's most faithful servant,
WELLESLEY.

Examined,
C. T. METCALFE,* Assistant.

* It has been stated in a former note that the Assistant who examined the despatch (W. B. Bayley, Esq.) was subsequently Acting Governor-General of India; a similar remark occurs here: the Assistant who examined this despatch is now Sir Charles Theophilus Metcalfe, Bart. and G.C.B., recently Acting Governor-General of India, and by the date of the latest advices (Aug. 1836) placed at the head of the new government of Agra and of the north-western provinces. These gentlemen, and Mr. Adam (also

## No. LXII.

*The Marquess Wellesley to Lieut.-Colonel Campbell, commanding the Northern Division of the Army.*

SIR, Fort William, August 3rd, 1803.

1. You have been apprized by my military Secretary of my general views and intentions, with respect to the occupation of the province of Cuttack.

2. You have been informed that a force will be detached from Bengal to act under your command, together with the force which you may be enabled to collect from the Northern Circars, in consequence of the orders signified to you by my military Secretary. The force from Bengal will embark in the course of a day or two, and I have directed returns of it to accompany these instructions.

3. You were directed to assemble at Ganjam from the division of the army under your command, a force of not less

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Acting Governor-General) were assistants in the Governor-General's office, (created by the Marquess Wellesley) in which such writers as had been distinguished in the College of Fort William, were employed. The following letter from Sir Charles Metcalfe to the Marquess Wellesley may here be inserted.—[*Ed.*]

*Sir Charles Theophilus Metcalfe, Bart., Acting Governor-General of India to the Marquess Wellesley.*

Camp, Burdwan, Dec. 23, 1834.

MY LORD,—Few things in life have given me greater pleasure than the receipt of your Lordship's kind letter delivered by Lieut. Campbell. It is now within a few days of thirty-four years since I had the honour of being presented to you. You were then Governor-General of India, and I was a boy of fifteen, entering on my career; I shall never forget the kindness with which you treated me from first to last during your stay in India; nor the honour and happiness which I enjoyed in being for a considerable period a member of your family. So much depends on the first turn given to a man's course, that I have a right to attribute all of good that has since happened to me, to the countenance and favour with which you distinguished me at that early period. My public principles were learned in your school, pre-eminently the school of honour, zeal, public spirit, and patriotism; and to my adherence to the principles there acquired I venture to ascribe all the success that has attended me.

Believe me, my Lord,
with reverence, gratitude, and attachment,
sincerely and affectionately,
your Lordship's most obedient servant,
C. T. METCALFE.

than fifteen hundred native infantry, and to increase that force, if practicable, consistently with the tranquillity of the Northern Circars.

4. With the force, which you have assembled under those orders, and with the detachment from Bengal, you will enter the province of Cuttack and proceed to Jaggernaut.

5. In passing the frontier of the Mahratta territory you will use every possible means to conciliate the inhabitants, for which purpose you will issue the proclamation,* which accompanies this despatch. You will also promise protection to the persons and property of all those who shall remain in their possessions, and shall not attempt to act against the British authority; declaring that no person shall be molested excepting such as may appear in arms.

6. The situation of the pilgrims passing to and from Jaggernaut will require your particular attention, you will be careful to afford them the most ample protection, and to treat them with every mark of consideration and kindness.

7. On your arrival at Jaggernaut, you will employ every possible precaution to preserve the respect due to the Pagoda, and to the religious prejudices of the Bramins and Pilgrims. You will furnish the Bramins with such guards as shall afford perfect security to their persons, rites and ceremonials, and to the sanctity of the religious edifices, and you will strictly enjoin those under your command to observe your orders on this important subject, with the utmost degree of accuracy and vigilance.

8. The Bramins are supposed to derive considerable profits from the duties levied on pilgrims, it will not, therefore, be advisable at the present moment to interrupt the system which prevails for the collection of those duties. Any measures calculated to relieve the exactions to which pilgrims are subjected by the rapacity of the Bramins, would necessarily tend to exasperate the persons whom it must be our object to conciliate. You will, therefore, signify to the Bramins that it is not your intention to disturb the actual system of collections at the Pagoda. At the same time you will be careful not to contract with the Bramins any engagements

* Similar to the proclamation issued by General Harris when entering Mysore, see Vol. I. p. 498.

which may limit the power of the British Government to make such arrangements with respect to that Pagoda, or to introduce such a reform of existing abuses and vexations as may hereafter be deemed advisable.

9. You will assure the Bramins at the Pagoda of Jaggernaut, that they will not be required to pay any other revenue or tribute to the British Government than that which they may have been in the habit of paying to the Mahratta Government, and that they will be protected in the exercise of their religious duties.

10. In every transaction relative to the Pagoda of Jaggernaut, you will consult the Civil Commissioner, whom I have named for the settlement of the province of Cuttack.

11. You will understand that no part of the property, treasure, or valuable articles of any kind, contained in the Pagoda of Jaggernaut, or in any religious edifice, or possessed by any of the Priests and Bramins, or persons of any description attached to the temples or religious institutions is to be considered as prize to the army. All such property must be respected as being consecrated to religious use, by the customs or prejudices of the Hindoos. No account is to be taken of any such property, nor is any person to be allowed to enter the pagodas or sacred buildings without the express desire of the Bramins.

12. You will leave a sufficient force in the vicinity of Jaggernaut, under the command of an officer, whom you will particularly select, and in whom you can place perfect reliance, for the due execution of the directions contained in these instructions.

13. You will then proceed to the town and fort of Cuttack, on the reduction of which places, the same precautions are to be employed for the prevention of plunder, and for preserving the inhabitants from all violence and oppression. You will employ similar precautions in your march through the country; in order to form the basis of rules for the conduct of your army during its progress, my military Secretary has been directed by me to forward a memorandum, to which I desire to point your special attention.

14. You will endeavour to open an immediate communication with Midnapore and Jelasore at the earliest practicable moment.

15. It is desirable to establish posts at Balasore, and from thence to Jelasore, for the purpose of ensuring the line of communication with Bengal.

16. You will afford the most vigilant and effectual protection to the Dawk Peons* and to the Dawk Chokeys,† and you will use every endeavour to secure a free intercourse between Calcutta and your army, and also with Ganjam; your first object should be to secure the free and safe passage of the Dawk.‡

17. You are at liberty to detain the ships which convey the troops to Ganjam.

18. In establishing your posts at Jaggernaut and Cuttack, you will use the necessary precautions to secure your army against any surprize from the side of Nagpore. It is my intention, as soon as I shall learn the intelligence of your arrival at Cuttack, to detach a force of not less than two hundred Sepoys by sea to occupy Balasore, and I shall also strengthen the post of Jelasore, whence, as soon as the season shall admit, I propose to direct a battalion of Sepoys to advance into the province of Cuttack, and to join your army.

19. I have selected Captain Blunt, of the Bengal engineers, to act as engineer and surveyor on the present service, as he has surveyed the province of Cuttack, and possesses much local information. I refer you to Captain Blunt for detailed information respecting the route from Ganjam to Cuttack; in the meanwhile my military Secretary is directed to transmit to you a map of the road according to the best and most recent authorities.

20. I have reason to believe that a considerable proportion of the province of Cuttack is occupied by Chieftains or Zemindars who have been enabled by the weakness of the Mahratta Government to render themselves independent of the Mahratta power, or who yield to it a partial obedience. Considerable tracts of country contiguous to that province are also possessed by chieftains, who acknowledge no superior authority, or who are merely tributary to the Mahratta state. I deem it necessary that such of those Chieftains or Zemindars as are subjects of the Mahratta Government, and have revolted, should be required to acknowledge subjection

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* Letter-carriers. † Post-stations. ‡ Post.

to the British power. With other chieftains who may possess the means of embarrassing your progress, it may be advisable to negotiate engagements on terms favourable to their interests, without requiring their absolute submission to the British authority.

21. I have appointed Mr. J. Melvill to be Commissioner for the affairs of Cuttack. The object of this appointment is to provide in the most effectual manner for the speedy settlement of the revenues of the province of Cuttack, and to afford you the aid of a civil officer of Government in conducting any negotiations with the officers and subjects of the Government of Berar, or with any of the independent chieftains of the province of Cuttack.

22. I have furnished Mr. Melvill with special instructions with respect to the settlement of the revenues of the country, and I direct that you afford him every assistance which he may require to enable him to carry my instructions into effect. I have also vested Mr. Melvill with powers to conduct, in concert with you, any negotiations of the nature described in the 20th paragraph of this despatch.

23. You will take every necessary precaution for the regular supply of provisions for your detachment, and you are hereby authorized to purchase whatever cattle and grain you may deem necessary.

24. The Collector of Ganjam will be authorized to make to you any advances of money on the public account which may be required.

25. You will correspond regularly with my military Secretary, or with the Secretary to Government in the Secret Department, and if you should entertain any apprehension of the security of the Dawk, you will despatch your letters by proper boats to Kedgeree, or to the nearest port in Bengal.

26. If any circumstance should require your return to your command in the Northern Circars, you will be particularly careful to select an officer properly qualified to hold the command in Cuttack until my orders can be received; and you will transmit to Fort William the earliest notification of your departure and of the appointment of the officer whom you may select to succeed you in the command at Cuttack.

I am, &c.

WELLESLEY.

## No. LXIII.

*The Honourable Major-General Wellesley to the Marquess Wellesley.*

My Lord, Camp near Walhee, August 6th, 1803.

I have the honour to enclose copies of a letter and its enclosure, dated the 1st instant, which I received last night from Colonel Collins, and the copy of a letter dated the 3rd instant, which I have received this day. I likewise enclose a translation of the letter received yesterday from the Rajah of Berar, and the translation of one which I have written this day to that chief and Dowlut Rao Scindiah. The letter from Dowlut Rao Scindiah is written in the same terms as that received from the Rajah of Berar.

Colonel Stevenson has already got orders to move forward, and I have received a letter from him, by which I learn that he proposes to march from Aurungabad on this day. I have sent orders to the officer in command of the troops in the territories of Anund Row Guikwar to commence his operations against Baroach, and not to suffer them to be interrupted by any negotiations. It has rained violently in this part of the country for the last three days, and the roads from this place to Ahmednuggur are at present impracticable; but if the weather should become more favourable in the course of the evening or night, and the roads should be tolerably good in the morning, I propose to move to that place.

I have written to the right honourable the Governor of Fort St. George, to suggest that the officer in command of the troops in Ganjam should receive orders, if possible to commence his operations against Cuttack.

I have the honour to be,
My Lord, with the greatest respect,
Your Excellency's
Most obedient and faithful humble servant,
Arthur Wellesley.

[1st. Enclosure.]

*Lieut.-Colonel Collins, to the Honourable Major-General Arthur Wellesley, commanding the British forces in the territories of his Highness the Peishwa, and of the Nabob Nizam, &c.*

SIR, Camp near Julgong, 1st August, 1803.

1. I little thought that I should have the honour of addressing you again from the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, but the very heavy and incessant rains which have fallen since I wrote to you on the 30th ultimo, rendered it impossible for me to proceed on my journey.

2. About four o'clock yesterday morning, Captain Lyons who commands my escort, came to my tent and stated, that in consequence of the great quantity of rain which had fallen since eleven o'clock the preceding night, the roads were become unpassable for guns.

3. On the 30th ultimo, at ten o'clock at night, Dowlut Rao Scindiah sent me a note, a copy and translate of which* I herewith forward—at the time when I received it the weather had cleared up, and I had not a doubt of being able to march on the following morning; I therefore told the person who brought the note from the Maharage, that I would reply to it the next day, after my arrival at Toudapore, to which place my Peishkhaneh† and baggage had been sent, and where they still remain.

4. Having however, been necessarily detained here the whole of yesterday, and Rajah Raghojee Bhooslah having preferred a request similar to that contained in the note from Dowlut Rao Scindiah, I conceived it might be giving those chiefs an advantage were I to refuse the interview which they so pressingly solicited, and in this idea I returned an assenting answer.

5. I arrived at the tent of the Berar Rajah at four o'clock yesterday afternoon, but not without considerable difficulty on account of the extreme heaviness of the roads. Captain Paris Bradshaw, and Mirza Bauker Khan attended me on this occasion, and I was received with great politeness as well by Scindiah as by Raghojee Bhooslah, in the fullest Durbar that I have yet seen.

6. Although our conference lasted more than four hours; yet, as the arguments on the part of the Mahratta ministers contained no new matter whatever, and as my replies were of course the same as I had so often given at our former interviews, I shall not trouble you with a repetition thereof, but proceed to state the propositions that were made to me by Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and Raghojee Bhooslah, after numberless evasions and much disagreeable altercation.

1st. Proposition. That the united forces of the Maharage and the Berar Rajah, should retire to Burhanpoor, and that the honourable General Wellesley should withdraw the Company's troops to their usual stations. This proposition I rejected as altogether inadmissible, inasmuch as it was in

* This note intimated a wish from Scindiah, that Colonel Collins would repair to his tent and hold another interview with him.—[ED.]

† Advanced tents.

opposition both to the letter and spirit of your requisition, which demanded that Dowlut Rao Scindiah should recross the Nurbuddah, and the Berar Rajah return to Nagpoor. As this proposal was strongly contested on their part, I said, at length, that if Raghojee Bhooslah would repair to his own capital, and Scindiah to Burhanpoor, I would not, in such case, leave the camp of the Maharage until I received your further instructions. But this concession did not satisfy those chieftains who then introduced a second proposition, namely,

2nd. Proposition. That I should fix on a day for their marching hence with their respective forces, and at the same time pledge myself that the honourable General Wellesley should withdraw his troops on the precise day that they moved towards their usual stations. I replied, that you required, in the first instance, the removal of the Mahratta armies from their present menacing position on the frontier of our ally, the Nabob Nizam, and exclusive of this consideration, I observed, that as the political and military authorities were vested in the honourable General Wellesley, I could not be responsible for the execution of any measure, but such as the honourable General had particularized in his instructions to me, and in his letters to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and Rajah Ragojee Bhooslah. This remark produced their third and last proposition, and from which they positively declared they would not recede.

3rd. Proposition. That Scindiah and the Bhooslah would propose to the honourable General Wellesley, by letter, that he should specify some particular day for withdrawing his own armies, and for the removal of theirs, from their present position on the Nizam's frontier, and that on the day so specified, they would assuredly commence their march. These chieftains further said, that they would also request of the honourable General Wellesley, in the same letter, to name the time when the forces under his command might be expected to reach their usual stations, and that they (Scindiah and the Bhooslah) would so regulate their marches as to arrive at their usual stations precisely at the same period of time.

7. I objected to this proposal, on the ground of its being different in one particular from your requisition, which demanded in the first instance, the removal of the Mahratta armies from the Nizam's frontier.* But as Scindiah's ministers declared, that unless you consented to this proposition, their prince could not retire without an indelible stain on his honour, and as the servants of the Berar Rajah maintained the same sentiments, with great firmness, I at last agreed to refer the point in question to your consideration, and to remain with the Maharage until I received your determination on this proposition, provided the letters to your address were sent to me for transmission before noon, on the following day, and provided those letters were expressed conformably with the terms they had then proposed. Here the conference ended, and I took my leave after the usual compliments of otter and paun.

8. It rained during the whole of yesterday, and until the present hour, which is eleven o'clock in the forenoon; whatever therefore, may be the line of conduct pursued by the Mahratta chieftains, with respect to the proposed letters to your address, it will be utterly impracticable for me to

proceed towards Aurungabad, until an interval of fair weather, as well on account of the heavy roads as of the overflowing of a nulla,* about midway between this and Toudapoor.

9. I have just received a letter to your address from Rajah Raghojee Bhooslah, in which this chief proposes to retire to Burhanpoor with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, instead of returning to Nagpoor, conformably to the proposition that his own minister, Sereedur Punth, first brought forward. I am too much accustomed to Mahratta tergiversations to be surprized at the disingenuous conduct of the Berar Rajah on the present occasion, but I must confess that I feel extremely hurt at my inability to leave the camp of the Maharage this very day. I have acknowledged the receipt of the Bhooslah's khereetah,† and told him that I should march from this place the instant that the roads were passable.

I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your most obedient humble servant,
J. COLLINS, Resident D. R. S.

[2nd. Enclosure.]

*Translation of a letter from Rajah Ragojee Bhooslah to the Honourable Major-General Wellesley, received the 6th of August,* 1803.

[After compliments] I have received your letter (here the contents of the honourable Major-General Wellesley's letter are recapitulated) and from the Colonel's verbal communications, I have been further assured of your friendship. No doubt where the foundations of unity and amity have so long subsisted they must be firm and solid, and there can be no apprehension or suspicion admitted between parties so connected. By the blessing of God, both armies are to this moment on their own territories, and no aggression or excesses have been committed on the countries of his Highness the Nizam; however, to satisfy your mind and to dispel your alarms, it has been resolved upon in the presence of Colonel Collins, that the armies now encamped here shall retire toward Burhanpore, on condition that the armies now assembled here, and those of the English Government and the Nizam, shall commence their retreat upon the same date, and each of the armies shall arrive at their usual stations on a date previously settled; that is, that the army of the English, and of the Nizam, now encamped near Aurungabad, the army of the English encamped near the Kistna, and you also with your army shall all march towards their stations, on the same date that the armies move from this encampment, and on the same date that all the different armies reach their respective stations at Madras, Seringapatain, and Bombay, Scindiah and myself will reach Burhanpore. In this manner has it been agreed and settled in presence of Colonel Collins, and I have written it for your information.

It was written in your letter that the English Government, and the Peishwa would never destroy the relations and engagements that have long subsisted between the Peishwa, Scindiah, and the other Sircars of the Mahratta empire.

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* Rivulet.

† Khereetah is the bag of brocade or silk in which the letter is put, and therefore is often used in the sense of a despatch or letter.

This assurance has made me most happy and tends to confirm friendship. Colonel Collins will satisfy you further upon this subject. Continue to write me accounts of your health.

[The letter from Scindiah is verbatim the same as that from Rajah Ragojee Bhooslah.]

(A true copy.)

R. BARCLAY,
Dep. Adj.-General in Mysore.

[3d. Enclosure.]

*Translation of a letter from the Honourable Major-General Wellesley, to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, dated 6th of August*, 1803.

I have received your letter [here the contents were recapitulated.]

You will recollect that the British Government did not threaten to commence hostilities against you; but you threatened to commence hostilities against the British Government, and its allies; and when called upon to explain your intentions, you declared that it was doubtful whether there would be peace or war; and in conformity with your threats, and your declared doubts, you assembled a large army in a station contiguous to the Nizam's frontier.

On this ground I called upon you to withdraw that army to its usual stations, if your subsequent pacific declarations were sincere; but instead of complying with this reasonable requisition, you have proposed that I should withdraw the troops which are intended to defend the territories of the allies against your designs, and that you, and the Rajah of Berar, should be suffered to remain with your troops assembled in readiness to take advantage of their absence.

This proposition is unreasonable and inadmissible, and you must stand the consequences of the measures which I find myself obliged to adopt, in order to repel your aggressions.

I offered you peace upon terms of equality and honourable to all parties, you have chosen war, and are responsible for all the consequences.

(A true copy.)

R. BARCLAY,
Dep. Adj.-General in Mysore.

[4th. Enclosure.]

*Lieut.-Colonel Collins to the Honourable Major-General Wellesley, commanding the British forces in the territories of his Highness, and of the Nabob Nizam, &c.*

SIR, Camp near Joudapour, August 3rd, 1803.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter under date the 29th ultimo, and to apprize you of my having left the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

2. In my conference with the Maharage and the Rajah of Berar on the 31st ultimo, when I observed to those chieftains, that if they did not instantly retire from the frontier of the Nabob Nizam, you would no longer

delay taking advantage of your present position, Sereedur Punth, without hesitation replied, that should the honourable General Wellesley commence hostilities, or order the British forces to advance towards the Adjuntee Ghaut, in either of these events, Raghojee Bhoosla, and Dowlut Rao Scindiah would consider themselves at liberty to march their troops in whatever direction they might think proper.

3. Although the weather began to clear up yesterday at noon, and no rain fell during the night, yet I found the road to this place exceedingly deep. It is now one o'clock in the afternoon, and my escort is not yet arrived though it marched at half-past four this morning. I purpose ascending the Joudapour Ghaut to-morrow, and proceeding as far as the town of Adjuntee, provided the gun bullocks are in a condition to perform the journey. I have apprized Colonel Stevenson that I should this day leave the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, in consequence of his refusal to retire from his present position, and of my intention to prosecute my march to Aurungabad with all practicable expedition.

4. Last night I received the enclosed khereetah to your address from Dowlut Rao Scindiah, but I believe it is to the same purport as that which I had the honour to forward to you on the 1st instant, from the Rajah of Berar.*

I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your very obedient humble servant,
J. Collins,
Resident D. R. S.

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## No. LXIV.

*The Marquess Wellesley to Lieut.-General Lake.*

(Secret.)

Sir, Fort William, August 22nd, 1803.

I have the honour to transmit to your Excellency a copy of a letter, which I have received from Mr. Leycester, the Collector of Moraudabad, together with copies and translations of the Persian documents, to which that letter refers.†

It will be obvious to your Excellency that the public service may be essentially promoted by securing the attachment and exertions of Buhboo Khaun in the present crisis of our affairs, I have therefore addressed a letter to that chieftain, signifying my disposition to accept his services, and to extend to him in return for his exertions, the protection and favour

* It is the very same, word for word.—[*Ed.*]

† See p. 203.

of the British Government. That letter accompanies this despatch, together with copies of it, for your Excellency's information.

Your Excellency will determine the mode in which the influence and exertions of Bumboo Khaun may be most advantageously employed for the benefit of the public service, and in transmitting my letter to that chieftain, your Excellency will be pleased to communicate to him your sentiments and wishes upon that subject.

I deem it to be proper, however, to suggest to your Excellency's consideration the expediency of encouraging Bumboo Khaun to apprehend and to deliver the person of Gholaum Mohummud Khaun into the hands of the British power, or at least to prevent Gholaum Mohummud from proceeding with the force which he may have collected either for the purpose of joining the army under General Perron, or of exciting disturbances in the territories of the Company or the Nabob Vizier. If your Excellency should be of opinion that the offer of a pecuniary reward is calculated to stimulate the exertions of Bumboo Khaun for the accomplishment of either of those purposes, your Excellency is at liberty to convey to him the offer of such a reward to any extent which your Excellency may deem proper.

Your Excellency will probably consider it to be most advisable to convey your communications to Bumboo Khaun upon this subject through the channel of a confidential native agent.

The concessions to be offered to Bumboo Khaun must necessarily be left to your Excellency's discretion, regulated by the importance of the services which that chieftain may be enabled to render to the British Government, and by the general spirit of my instructions with respect to the system of political arrangements to be eventually concluded with the states and chieftains on the north-western frontier of the British dominions.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

[Enclosure.]

*The Marquess Wellesley to Bumboo Khaun.*

Written 18th August, 1803.

Mr. Leycester has communicated to me the letter which you lately addressed to him,* expressing your desire to renew the connection which formerly subsisted between your family and the British Government, and of your disposition to manifest your attachment to the British interests, and transmitting copies of letters addressed by Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah to you and to Ghoolaum Mohummud Khaun. This communication has afforded me the highest satisfaction. I have great pleasure in expressing to you the disposition of the British Government to consider you among the number of its faithful adherents; to afford you its protection, and to promote your interests in proportion to the proofs which you shall manifest of the sincerity of your attachment, and to the exertions which you shall employ in promoting the British interests.

This letter will be transmitted to you by his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief of the British forces, who is fully apprized of your late communication. His Excellency will communicate to you, in conformity to my directions, the manner in which your influence and exertions may most advantageously be employed in the service of the British Government. Your compliance with his Excellency's suggestions will entitle you to every practicable degree of favour and protection on the part of the British Government.

For further particulars I refer you to his Excellency, who is empowered to adjust with you all points connected with the subject of this letter.

I have directed Mr. Leycester to reply to your letter with expressions of friendship and regard, and to convey to you a particular application, your compliance with which will afford an additional testimony of the sincerity of your attachment to the interests of the British Government.

A true Copy,
J. MONCKTON,
Assistant Persian Secretary to Government.

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## No. LXV.

*The Marquess Wellesley to Lieut.-General Lake.*

(Secret.)

SIR, Fort William, August 24th, 1803.

I have the honour to enclose for your Excellency's information copies of letters received yesterday and this day from Major-General Wellesley and Colonel Collins.†

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* See p. 207.

† See letter of 6th August and Enclosures, p. 273.

Being apprehensive that Colonel Collins has discontinued his correspondence with your Excellency by the route of Hindostan, and being uncertain of the security or despatch of the Dawk in that direction, I have forwarded these documents by express to your Excellency.

Their respective enclosures shall be transmitted to your Excellency without delay.

The documents now transmitted will, however, sufficiently indicate to your Excellency the necessity of prosecuting, with the utmost activity and despatch, the system of military operations and political arrangements described in my several letters addressed to your Excellency previously to the 10th instant.

Your Excellency will, therefore, proceed in the war against Dowlut Rao Scindiah without delay or interruption, unless you should receive official advices of the conclusion of peace in the Deccan, or unless Major-General Wellesley should signify to your Excellency his desire that offensive operations should cease in the north-western countries of Hindostan.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

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## No. LXVI.

*The Marquess Wellesley to Lieut.-General Lake.*

(Secret.)

SIR, Fort William, August 26th, 1803.

I have the honour to enclose for your Excellency's notice copy of a letter received this day from Major-General Wellesley, together with its enclosures,* by a reference to which your Excellency will observe that hostilities must have commenced against Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar in the Deccan, at the close of the first week of this month.

* These documents detail the quitting of Scindiah's camp by Colonel Collins; the continued evasion of the Mahratta chiefs, and the declaration of Major-General Wellesley to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, that negotiation was now at an end. See Major-General Wellesley's letter of the 6th August, p. 273.—[ED.]

I trust that your Excellency has received timely notice from Major-General Wellesley and Colonel Collins of their respective proceedings by the direct Dawk from Hindostan, but as my intelligence from those officers contains no positive information on the subject of their communications with your Excellency, I am extremely anxious to learn from you the state of your communications with the Deccan and with General Wellesley.

My former instructions to your Excellency do not appear to require any addition; the actual commencement of hostilities in the Deccan will render the system of measures to be now pursued by your Excellency perfectly plain and distinct, under the rules which I have already suggested for the guidance of your conduct.

I trust that I shall be enabled, in the course of a few days, to inform your Excellency of the success of the expedition against Cuttack. The armament destined to co-operate with Colonel Campbell's detachment from Ganjam left the *Pilot* on the 13th instant, and I expect to hear of their successful operations in the course of the ensuing week.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

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## No. LXVII.

*General Orders from the Government Gazette.*

Fort William, August 29th, 1803.*

Authentic intelligence has been received at Fort William of the successful commencement of operations against Dowlut Rao Scindiah by the forces under the command of Major-General Wellesley. On the 8th instant, the large fortified Pettah of Ahmednuggur was carried by escalade with the utmost gallantry and rapidity. This operation was effected immediately upon the arrival of the army on its ground before Ahmednuggur, by the advanced piquets, reinforced by the flank companies of his Majesty's 74th and 78th regiments, and the 1st battalion of the 3d Madras regiment native

* This announcement appeared in a Calcutta Gazette Extraordinary. —[ED.]

infantry, under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Harness, the field officer of the day.

The names of the officers stated to have been killed in the assault are Captains Grant and Humberstone, and Lieutenant Anderson, of his Majesty's 78th regiment.

Lieutenant Wilson, of his Majesty's 74th regiment, and Lieutenant Plenderleath, of the 1st battalion 3d Madras regiment native infantry, are stated to have been wounded.

Published by command of his Excellency the most noble
the Governor-General in Council,
J. LUMSDEN,
Chief Sec. to Government.

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## No. LXVIII.

*Lieut.-General Lake to the Marquess Wellesley.*

Camp before Allyghur, Aug. 29th, 1803.
[Received at Fort William, Sept. 8th, 1803.]

MY LORD,

I have the honour to inform your Lordship that I attacked M. Perron's force this morning, which was strongly posted with their right extending to the fort of Ally Ghur, and their entire front protected by a deep morass, which obliged me to change my original plan of attack, and detour considerably to the right, to turn their left flank, which I completely effected, dislodging a body of troops which were posted in a village in the enemy's front.

On moving forward with the cavalry in two lines, supported by the line of infantry and guns, the enemy immediately retired after a very few shot from the cavalry guns, which did some execution.

Several attempts were made to charge some considerable bodies of cavalry, who made an appearance of standing, but the rapidity of their retreat prevented the possibility of effecting it so completely as I could have wished, but I have reason to believe, that in consequence of the operations of this day, many of his confederates have left him.

My loss in men and horses is very inconsiderable, and no officer.

I have the pleasure to assure your Lordship that the zeal,

activity, and steadiness, displayed by both officers and men, afforded me entire satisfaction, and deserve my warmest praise.

My staff afforded me every assistance, and I feel myself under great obligations to them.

From every information I can obtain, immediately on our advancing, M. Perron, with his body-guard, retired towards Agra, and has left Colonel Pedron in charge of the fort. I am at present encamped to the southward of the fort, and the town of Coel is occupied by one of my battalions.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,
your Lordship's most faithful, humble servant,
G. LAKE.

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## No. LXIX.

*Lieut.-General Lake to the Marquess Wellesley.*

(Private.)

Camp at Coel before Alighur,
August 29th, 1803.

MY LORD,

I am happy to say that I am in possession of Coel, and that Perron has left Mr. Pedron in the fort at Alighur. I am not quite determined whether I shall remain here with the army, to take the fort, or move forward, at any rate I must stay here to-morrow, as my men are much fatigued from this day's work. They were marching from five in the morning till near two o'clock P.M. The thermometer in the tents was upwards of one hundred. The army behaved uncommonly well in every particular. The cavalry did every thing in their power to cut up the enemy, but as their army consisted entirely of cavalry except a few matchlock men, they were so quick in their retreat the moment we attempted to charge them, that there was no possibility of catching many of them. I am convinced the day has had a most wonderful effect upon the minds of the natives, who always thought M. Perron invincible; indeed I have every reason to believe that some of his confederates left him the moment they heard of our approach, particularly the Jauts, and some few Seiks which are reported to have been with him; and I think most of the

others have gone to their homes, and never will encounter us again. It always was (as your Lordship knows) my opinion that the moment Perron was beat, no one would come to him, which is, I think, now the case. I write in haste, and will write again to-morrow. Six officers of Perron's second brigade are just come in, having resigned the service even before they knew of the proclamation.*

I have only to assure your Lordship that you may depend upon every exertion on my part to carry your wishes into effect, and that I am

your truly attached and devoted servant,

G. Lake.

P. S. These six officers of the second brigade are all belonging to it, except a man of the name of Hennessy, who deserted about two months since from the 14th native infantry, to which he was Serjeant-Major.

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## No. LXX.

*Lieut.-General Lake to the Marquess Wellesley.*

Camp before Allyghur, Aug. 30, 1803.

My Lord, [Received Sept. 9, 1803.]

It is with infinite satisfaction I inform your Lordship that the inhabitants of this part of the country are coming in fast, and manifest a wish of being protected by the British Government, and that in consequence of my having caused it to be made known to the head men of the villages in this neighbourhood, that it is not my intention to molest either the persons or properties of such of the inhabitants as shall claim my protection, I have the pleasure to say, that the people who had deserted the town of Coel on our approach yesterday, are returning fast to their houses, and the town is nearly repeopled; indeed, they have every reason to be satisfied, as the instant this position was gained, a battalion was posted in Coel to prevent plunder, by which means very little loss was sustained by the inhabitants.

I learn from all quarters that most of the enemy's cavalry who opposed us yesterday, have returned to their homes, declaring their inability to oppose the English.

* See Appendix.

From every account I can receive, the number of cavalry opposed to us amounted to fifteen or twenty thousand.

The country in our rear is in a state of perfect tranquillity, nor has it been molested by a single horseman.

I have sent into the fort a summons in English and French, which, I trust, will have the desired effect.

I have the honour to be, &c.

G. LAKE.

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## No. LXXI.

*Lieut.-General Lake to the Marquess Wellesley.*

MY LORD, Camp at Coel, Aug. 30th, 1803.

Since my letter of yesterday every thing has remained quiet. The horse had all retired, and I believe to their own homes, as no depredations have been committed, or a horseman to be seen or heard of in this part of the Dooab, or in any of our districts. The inhabitants of Coel, finding their property secured, are returning fast to their habitations, the people of the country seem to have confidence in the protection of the British Government, and do not regret the loss of M. Perron. Such is the appearance of things at present, and I hope to confirm the report more fully to-morrow. In the mean time allow me to congratulate your Excellency on the full possession of the Dooab, and

Believe me ever, my dear Lord,
your attached and faithful servant,
G. LAKE.

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## No. LXXII.

*General Orders from the Government Gazette.*

Fort William, Aug. 31, 1803.*

Authentic intelligence has been received at Fort William of the capitulation of the important fortress of Ahmednuggur to the forces under the command of Major-General Wellesley.

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* This announcement appeared in Calcutta Gazettes Extraordinary. —*Editor.*

The fortified Pettah having been taken by escalade on the 8th instant, batteries were opened on the night of the 9th against the fort.

On the 10th the killedar* of the fort requested permission to send an officer to confer with Major-General Wellesley, and desired at the same time that the fire from the batteries might cease. Major-General Wellesley agreed to receive an officer from the fort, but refused to interrupt the fire of the batteries.

On the 11th the fortress capitulated.

The terms of the capitulation are, that the garrison should march out on the 12th at noon with their arms, and that all private property should be saved to the inhabitants.

Hostages had been delivered into the hands of Major-General Wellesley, to be detained until the evacuation of the fortress should actually be completed; and all operations against the fort had ceased on the 11th instant.

Published by command of his Excellency,
the Most Noble the Governor-General in Council,
J. LUMSDEN,
Chief Secretary to the Government.

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## No. LXXIII.

*Lieut.-General Lake to the Marquess Wellesley.*

(Private.)

MY LORD, Camp at Coel, Sept. 1, 1803.

I have not yet moved from hence, nor am I in possession of the fort of Allyghur; my object is to get the troops out of the fort by bribery, which I flatter myself will be done. My reason for gaining it this way, proceeds from a wish to expedite matters, and save the troops. The place is extremely strong, and if regularly besieged, will take a month at least. If attempted to be gained by a *coup de main*, I think we must lose men, but I am at present adverse to this mode of attack, (in the event of my negotiation not succeeding,) from a consideration that by losing time here I shall not carry into effect your Lordship's plans so expeditiously as I could wish. The loss of men, particularly Europeans, is a most serious consideration. Therefore, if by a little money, I can save the lives

* Commandant.

of these valuable men, your Lordship will not think I have acted wrong, or been too lavish of cash.

No one exacts more of a soldier than myself, when I think it absolutely necessary to call forth their exertions; at the same time, I have ever avoided risking the life of a soldier when it could be spared.

Diaram of Hatrass is exceedingly attentive, and very desirous of the protection of the British Government, by sending in provisions of all kinds, and is willing to send his troops, such as they are, (if called for). I have directed him to order some of them to escort the provisions into our camp merely to convince the natives of his being attached to us. The whole country are coming in. The protection given to the town of Coel, and the haranguing of the men yesterday has convinced the people of our inclination to save their lives and property.

Not one depredation has been committed in our own provinces; all the cavalry that came to the assistance of M. Perron are certainly gone home, and I believe will never more approach our army.

Believe me, my dear Lord,
your truly attached and faithful servant,
G. LAKE.

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## No. LXXIV.

*Lord Castlereagh to the Marquess Wellesley.*

London, March 16, 1803.
[Received Sept. 4, 1803.]

MY DEAR LORD,

You will probably hear from me by an overland express before this despatch may reach you by sea. I shall delay my communication by the former channel in hopes that I may be enabled in the course of a very few days to apprize you with more precision than I can do at this moment, of the actual or probable result of the present discussions carrying on with the French Government. It is enough for me at present to say that his Majesty's ministers felt that the situation in which we were placed, as well by the importance and delicacy of those discussions, as by the military preparations which have been carrying on for some time in the ports of

France and Holland, destined ostensibly for St. Domingo and Louisiana, were such as to call for active measures of precaution on our part, and accordingly a strong squadron has been ordered to be equipped for sea; press warrants have been issued, and the entire of the militia has been called out.

The usual communication has been made to Parliament on this subject, and was received precisely with the temper one could wish, a strong disposition shown from all quarters to support the honour and interests of the country; opinions, naturally withheld till information can be given, but no attempt made to press Government for premature explanation. The funds, as might be expected, fell on the first alarm, but have since considerably recovered.

In the present state of things, we can only furnish your Lordship with intelligence of what is passing, and desire you to wait for the result before you adopt any measure which can be productive of expense. You will receive, through the Secret Committee, a despatch to this effect, coupled with some observations referable to the principles upon which it may be wise to regulate the future measures of your Government, in the event of a renewal of hostilities.

It is unnecessary for me to press these observations upon your Lordship's particular attention. The discussions which have lately taken place, both at home and abroad, on the important measure of reducing the debt, now so happily brought to a decision by the plan for that purpose, before transmitted, having received nearly the unanimous sanction, both of the courts of Directors and Proprietors, and the honourable exertions which you have been making, by retrenchments of expense, for giving effect to such a measure, will render you amongst the most unwilling to disturb, beyond what the exigency shall absolutely require, those arrangements on which the success of the plan depends.

I am sure your Lordship will keep in view how much will be gained, in positive strength, by directing our exertions, even in war, against the debt, so long as there is little appearance of the enemy being enabled to menace India. However jealous France is of our power in the east, and however steady she may be in her purpose of aiming at positions from which she might one day hope to shake that power, yet I cannot

persuade myself that she has or can have, for a length of time, the means to attempt any direct attack against possessions so defended as ours are by the army now on foot.

I wish you, therefore, to consider how, under the smallest possible extension of expenditure, the army can be kept in that state of adequate preparation which belongs to war. For the first five years of the late war the surplus abroad was as follows:—1792-3, 1,326,000*l.*; 1793-4, 1,683,000*l.*; 1794-5, 1,458,000*l.*; 1795-6, 977,000*l.*; 1796-7, 508,000*l.*

Whatever efforts France may be able to make in Europe, India cannot be considered as more exposed now than in the years 1793-4-5, and whilst Tippoo was yet formidable. I must therefore indulge a sanguine hope, that your Lordship will find it practicable to adopt a system, even in war, which shall be compatible with our financial objects, and that the surplus revenue will, as in the years alluded to, be still applicable, in a large amount, to the reduction of debt. If peculiar difficulties arise, we must make corresponding exertions; but let us save our means till those difficulties appear, as far as prudence will permit.

I conclude the several restitutions have, ere this, been made to the French and Dutch governments. How we stand at present, in respect to the Portuguese settlements, which were garrisoned by us during the war, I cannot ascertain, either from any orders sent from home, or from any intelligence received from abroad. Under present circumstances, I have only to request your Lordship, till you hear further from home, to turn your attention to the possible result of the discussions now pending, and to digest previously, in your own mind, the war system on which you propose to act, if hostilities should actually recommence, limiting it within the narrowest bounds, in point of expense, which you deem at all consistent with the public safety. In the latter event, you shall receive early instructions from home as to the precise measures to be taken with respect to the possessions of the several European powers, either on the Continent of India, or in the eastern seas.

I have the honour to be, my dear Lord,
your very faithful, humble servant,
CASTLEREAGH.

## No. LXXV.

*Lieut.-General Lake to the Marquess Wellesley.*

Head Quarters, Camp Allyghur, Sept. 4th, 1803.

My Lord, [Received Sept. 15th, 1803.]

It is with inexpressible satisfaction that I have the honour to report to your Lordship, the capture of the Fort of Allyghur this morning by assault.

Having spent some days in fruitless endeavours to save the unnecessary effusion of blood, on finding that the natives persisted obstinately in their determination of resistance, and rejected every overture I made, I found myself under the necessity of determining on some decisive measure, and after maturely considering the probability of success with the obstacles that opposed us, I judged it preferable to carry it by assault, than to lose time by the slower operations of a siege.

In consequence of this resolution, I ordered the honourable Lieutenant-Colonel Monson to lead the attack, composed of four companies of his Majesty's 76th regiment, and the 1st battalion of the 4th regiment native infantry under Lieutenant-Colonel Browne, with a detachment of the 17th native regiment under Captain Bagshaw.

Colonel Horsford, of the artillery, covered their advance by a heavy fire from batteries in situations which had been previously determined on.

I attribute the success of this attack entirely to the gallantry and steady conduct displayed by the honourable Lieutenant-Colonel Monson, in leading on his men under a most galling fire of musquetry and grape against a fort hitherto deemed impregnable, and defended on all sides with the utmost obstinacy.

It would be injustice in me were I not to mention the distinguished bravery of the men of his Majesty's 76th regiment, who notwithstanding the loss of many of their officers, steadily persevered till the attainment of their object was effected.

To Colonel Browne, of the 1st battalion of the 4th regiment, who has received a severe wound, and to the whole of the officers of that battalion, whose exertions on this occasion were most meritorious, my praise is justly due.

To Major McLeod, who gallantly led the 76th regiment, after Colonel Monson was wounded, and to Captain Shipton of the artillery, who had charge of the guns that forced the gate, both of whom, though wounded, still remained at their post, I feel myself much indebted.

To Colonel Horsford, who commanded the artillery, as well as to Captains Robertson and Green, who commanded the covering batteries, I feel myself under infinite obligations, and indeed that whole corps merit my warmest praise for the gallantry displayed on this occasion, as well as on every other in which they have been engaged.

It is with extreme sorrow I lament the loss of many valuable officers of his Majesty's 76th regiment, and also of the Honourable Company's service.

I am sorry to add, that Colonel Monson's wound is dangerous, and I fear I shall at all events be deprived of the services of this gallant officer for some time.

I shall have the honour to forward to your Lordship, as soon as possible, returns of the killed and wounded officers, and men, of the army under my command;* which, considering the nature of the attack, are as few as could be expected.

I feel I shall be wanting in justice to the merits of Mr. Lucan, an officer, a native of Great Britain, who lately quitted the service of Scindiah, to avoid serving against his country, were I not to recommend him to your Lordship's particular attention. He gallantly undertook to lead Colonel Monson to the gate, and point out the road through the fort, which he effected in a most gallant manner, and Colonel Monson has reported having received infinite benefit from his services. If you deem him worthy of any mark of your Excellency's favour, it will afford me great satisfaction, if his services are rewarded by Government.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,

Your Lordship's most faithful humble servant,

G. LAKE.

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* See Appendix.

## No. LXXVI.

*Lieut.-General Lake to the Marquess Wellesley.*

Camp at Coel, Sept. 4th, 1803.
[Received Sept. 15, 1803.]

My Lord,

By my official letter which accompanies this, you will, I am sorry to say, perceive that I have lost a great many valuable officers, and that unfortunately Colonel Monson, who behaved most gloriously, has received a most severe wound in the arm from a pike, the bone I understand is broke high up, but Mr. Lenny and the other surgeons who have examined it, have hopes that he may recover without amputation. I cannot say too much of the conduct of Colonel Monson upon this occasion; he is a most serious loss to the army. Your Lordship may easily conceive what I feel at his misfortune, and the loss of so many brave men.

As I told your Lordship in my letter of the 1st instant, I had tried every method to prevail upon these people to give up the fort, and offered a very large sum of money, but they were determined to hold out, which they did most obstinately, and I may say most gallantly. In short, my Lord, from the extraordinary strength of the place, and being obliged to win it inch by inch, it being so determinately defended, that in my opinion British valour never shone more conspicuous. I think this action will strike terror into the natives, and prevent us some trouble; I trust your Lordship will agree with me in thinking that I have done right in gaining this fort, at any rate, as in the first place it was so strong that I could not look upon my army safe with such a fort in my rear; in the second place, it would have given the natives a very poor opinion of our troops, and in the third place, I am convinced that, after a regular siege, we must have had the same difficulties to encounter, the strength of the place cannot be described but by a drawing, which shall be sent down to you as soon as it can be prepared; a seventy-four might sail in the ditch. The engineer and Colonel Horsford both think that after a breach had been made, we should have lost as many men as we now have, besides what would have fallen during a siege, which would have lasted nearly a month. All these points being considered, the delay that would have

been caused in the execution of your orders, and the certainty of giving spirit to the Mahratta chiefs, who would then have been inclined to flock to the Frenchman's standard, I feel happy at having gained the fort, which stood out for more than an hour. A more anxious time I never experienced; the fire was tremendous, and nothing, from the strong way in which the natives were posted, with all their advantages, but British soldiers would have effected the business. I have wrote more than I intended, and must beg you will pardon me for being so prolix, but really my mind is so much agitated from the loss of so many excellent men, that I hardly know what I do.

It appears, I am sorry to say, that poor Monson's wound may be attended with danger, as in the event of amputation, danger is always to be apprehended in this country, but I trust and hope I shall be able to send you a better account of him to-morrow.

I remain,
my dear Lord,
your attached and faithful servant,
G. LAKE.

P. S. I have only to add that, without the fort of Alyghur, we could not have had the entire possession of the Dooab; indeed, till it was ours, we were liable to be driven out of it at any time.

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## No. LXXVII.

*The Hon. A. Paget to the Marquess Wellesley.*

Vienna, June 3rd, 1803.

MY DEAR LORD, [Received Sept. 6th, 1803.]

Lord Whitworth left Paris on the night of the 12th ultimo, and General Andreossi having been detained some time at Dover by winds, &c., reached it on the 20th.

I do myself the honour of enclosing to your Lordship the supplement to the Moniteur, containing (as it is avowed) the whole of the negotiations between England and France previous to the signature of the preliminary articles of peace down to the departure of Lord Whitworth; from the perusal of which, I am led to suppose that some parts of them must have been omitted.

I also enclose the Francfort Journal of this day, in which your Lordship will find the King's message.

I must now inform your Lordship that within a very few days after the departure of Lord Whitworth, instructions and full powers were received by Count Woronzow in London, and Count Marcoff at Paris, to make a tender of the good offices of the Emperor of Russia, but it is probable that this interposition will have been offered too late.

The telegraph between Brest and Paris announces a fleet of twelve sail of the line and six frigates off Brest.

We have not hitherto heard of hostilities having actually taken place. The King's proclamation for letters of marque, &c. &c. has been issued.

We have down to this moment no official accounts of the movement of the French troops in Italy, it is rumoured that a considerable body, under the command of General Murat, is moving southward.

The French are also preparing to take possession of Hanover and the maritime towns.

The King of Prussia has made known his intention of accomplishing the same object.

Whichever of these powers may effectuate this unwarrantable design, will act with the connivance of the other, and I am grieved not to find any disposition, whether on the part of Austria or Prussia, to oppose either.

I have the honour to be,
with the sincerest regard and esteem,
my dear Lord,
your Lordship's most obedient and very
faithful friend and servant,
ARTHUR PAGET.

P. S. The Paris papers just received contain the following telegraphic despatch:—

*Brest le 1er Prairal.*

Avant hier deux Frégates Angloises ont pris deux Bâtimens dans la baye d'Audierne; l'un alloit chercher des bois de construction à Quimper, l'autre étoit chargé de sel pour Fécamp.

(Signé) CAFFARELLI.

## No. LXXVIII.

*Lieut.-General Lake to the Marquess Wellesley.*

(Private.)

MY LORD: Kaunga, Sept 8th, 1803.

We arrived here this morning, and found a very strong little fort, which would have caused delay and trouble had not the troops evacuated it the day after the fall of Alighur, when they declared they would not wait for our attack; I trust this idea prevails throughout the country. The town of Kaunga is in a most flourishing state, very few of the people have left it, and they will return immediately when they find their property secured; indeed our conduct at Coel, and to the country we have marched through, has given them the greatest confidence in the British Government.

I think when you hear the secret manner in which things have been conducted you will be much pleased, it is quite a new work in the army, and has succeeded hitherto wonderfully well. I think to be very near Delhi in three more marches. I expect to find some difficulty in procuring boats, but flatter myself that will, like many others, be surmounted.

I wait with great impatience for a report from Colonel Macan, who will, should he come up with these horsemen, if I am not very much mistaken, do well.

Believe me, my dear Lord,
your firmly attached and faithful servant,
G. LAKE.

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## No. LXXIX.

*General Orders, by the Governor-General in Council, No.* 1.

Fort William, September 8, 1803.

The Governor-General in council having received from Major-General the honourable Arthur Wellesley, the official account of the reduction of the important fortress of Ahmednuggur, by the forces under the command of that officer, is

pleased to signify the high approbation with which his Excellency in council has observed the judgment, promptitude, and skill, manifested by Major-General Wellesley, in directing the operations of the forces under his command on that critical occasion.

His Excellency in council is pleased to direct Major-General Wellesley to notify to the officers and troops under his command, that the Governor-General in council has derived the most cordial satisfaction, from the distinguished alacrity, gallantry, and spirit which they have displayed in the attack upon the Pettah, and in the subsequent siege of the Fort of Ahmednuggur; and the Governor-General in council has remarked with particular approbation, the conduct of Lieut.-Colonels Harness, Wallace, and Maxwell, of Captain Beauman of the artillery; of Captain Johnson of the engineers; and of Captain Heitland of the pioneers.

The Governor-General in council deeply laments the loss of Captains Grant and Humberstone, of Lieutenants Anderson and Plenderleath, and of the brave soldiers who fell in the succesful contest of the 8th of August. The memory of those gallant officers and soldiers, who have fallen with honour in the public service, will be regarded with affection and respect, by their Sovereign and their country.

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## No LXXX.

*General Orders, by the Governor-General in Council, No. 2.*

Fort William, September 8th, 1803.

The Governor-General in council is pleased to offer his most cordial thanks and congratulations to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, upon the distinguished ability, energy, and success of the conduct of the forces under his Excellency's personal command, in the judicious and gallant attack, of the forces under the command of M. Perron in the vicinity of Coel, on the 29th of August.

His Excellency in council has received with the most sincere pleasure, the Commander-in-Chief's report of the zeal, activity, and steadiness displayed by the officers and men, and of the meritorious services of the staff, on that important occasion.

The Governor-General in council is pleased to direct the Commander-in-Chief, to signify to the officers and men employed in the action of the 29th of August, that the conduct of the army on that day has obtained the high approbation of his Excellency in council; has confirmed the reputation and honour of the British arms in India; and has secured the most important advantages to the cause of the allies, in the prosecution of the war, and in the speedy establishment of permanent peace.

By command of his Excellency
the Governor-General in council,
L. Hook,
Sec. to the Govt. Mil. Dept.

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## No. LXXXI.

*The Right Hon. Lord William Bentinck to the Marquess Wellesley.*

(Private)

Fort St. George, Sept. 9th, 1803.

My Lord, [Received at Fort William, Sept. 25th, 1803.]

I received from Lieutenant-Colonel Hoghton the honour of your Excellency's letter of the 1st of August.* I beg leave to express my very sincere acknowledgements for the sentiments of kindness and assistance so necessary to the very existence of my government which that letter contains, and I beg to be permitted to add, that it was not possible to convey those sentiments in any manner so flattering and agreeable to my own personal feelings.

I have laid open to that officer without reserve every feeling and opinion of my mind, not only upon the subject of those points which he was more particularly directed to enforce upon my attention, but also of the general state of affairs in this settlement.

I feel confident that Lieutenant-Colonel Hoghton will do full justice to the feelings of admiration and grateful respect, with which I in common with every Englishman have contemplated the uninterrupted progress of the great and glorious events which have marked the administration of your Excellency in

* See p. 254.

India. It is impossible not to see that the British power has been for the first time established upon a sure and solid basis, and that the British name has risen to a degree of elevation hitherto unknown in the annals of its history. A review of all the considerations of wisdom and policy which suggested and prepared for execution, the present system of operations against the Mahratta chieftains, still more strongly confirms a just pride in the national superiority; and allow me here to say, that your Excellency will always find me happy in receiving your orders, and zealous in the execution of them.

One of the principal points to which Lieutenant-Colonel Hoghton adverted by your instructions, has been to the nature of the relation between the supreme Government, and the subordinate Presidencies as expressed in your Excellency's correspondence with Lord Clive, when his Lordship first assumed the Government of Fort St. George. Upon this subject I shall only remark, that I think it impossible not only with regard to the spirit and letter of the act of Parliament, but also to the necessity of perfect obedience accompanied by hearty co-operation, that there can be honestly any difference of opinion. It is as clear on the other hand that the co-operation from the inferior Presidencies must be effectual only in proportion as the head of the executive Government may be supported by the supreme power in Bengal. I cannot but feel extremely gratified by the most satisfactory assurances of assistance and support.

I am quite aware of the arduous and important task which I have undertaken. The divided state of this Government, and the opposition and counteraction which my noble predecessor received, are circumstances much to be lamented, and which tend to destroy all the vigour and efficiency so imperiously requisite in the management of this great unsettled territory.

The history and causes of intrigue and disaffection which have unfortunately prevailed here, are better known to your Excellency than to myself. I cannot flatter myself that they will immediately disappear. The only system of conduct which can oppose itself with success to such attacks, must be founded upon a steady and determined resolution to do what is right, uninfluenced by party or prejudice, careless and fearless of the event. From the moment I cannot retain my

situation consistently with my own honour, character and comfort, I will resign it.

I feel it unnecessary to trespass any longer upon your Excellency's time. I have communicated to Lieutenant-Colonel Hoghton my sentiments upon every subject. The very inadequate state of military defence in this settlement, under the circumstances of the very considerable French force assembled at the Mauritius, seems to me at this moment the most important subject for consideration.

I have the honour to be,
with the greatest respect,
Your most obedient and very humble servant,
W. BENTINCK.

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## No. LXXXII.

*Lord Castlereagh to the Marquess Wellesley.*

(Most Secret.)

London, May 14, 1803.
[Received Sept. 11, 1803.]

MY DEAR LORD,

The messenger who reached us this morning from Paris has enabled me at length to relieve your Lordship from any further suspense on the question of peace or war. The alternative, I have to announce to you, calls upon us for new exertions. We resume hostilities, however, with Malta in our hands; Martinique, as we have reason to hope, in a weak state; and the French colonies, generally, ill provided. Their navy has been getting rather worse than better since the peace, being chiefly employed in transporting troops to the West Indies, and I do not understand that their arsenals have been replenished. If another struggle was unavoidable, it is satisfactory that circumstances did not deprive us of Malta before the conduct of the Chief Consul rendered it indispensable that we should make him feel that the peace was not made by us in the spirit of submission.

The papers which will on Monday be laid before Parliament by the King's command, and which are herewith transmitted, contain so detailed a view of every thing that has

passed since the conclusion of the definitive treaty between the two governments, as also collaterally with other courts, as to render any explanation from me unnecessary. I trust you will be of opinion that we have borne a great deal with patience and forbearance, but without submitting to any unbecoming sacrifice, and that to have borne still more without taking our stand, and leaving the option of war with France on terms reasonable in themselves, and in their nature strictly arising out of her own conduct, would have been to invite encroachment and insult, whilst we were depriving ourselves of the means of successful resistance. His Majesty's ministers considered that in firmness alone they could hope for any useful interval of peace, and they were satisfied that in temporizing any longer, they were more likely to weaken their case, as well as the country, than to find any occasion so favourable for bringing the question fairly to an issue.

We commence the war with advantage, as far as foreign stations are concerned. We are strong in the Mediterranean, and in the West Indies. At home, notwithstanding unfavourable impressions which have prevailed in respect to the naval equipments, we have eighteen sail of the line ready to go to sea to-morrow, and nearly as many in forwardness.

The militia has been assembled successfully in both countries, and the spirit of the people, as far as it has yet been tried, is such as we could wish. Of this, however, we shall be better able to judge when the causes of the rupture have been explained to them, and when the budget for the war is submitted to Parliament. I am persuaded that the system of finance which it is in contemplation to adopt, will appear to you the only wise one at the outset of such a contest. It is proposed to lay on at once all the taxes which shall be necessary for a war of seven or eight years; and in addition to that amount, which will be requisite to provide for the interest and sinking fund of the sum to be raised by loan in each year, it is intended to raise by a war tax a large proportion of the supplies within the year. This will impose at the outset about ten millions a-year in taxes, consisting of two funds, one temporary, the other permanent, if the war should last long enough to consume it. This must at first be felt by the country as a severe blister, and they will smart under it; but when they have experienced and known the worst, they may

then look their difficulties in the face with confidence, and are likely to exhibit a more resolute temper than could be hoped for under the annual irritation of a succession of new taxes.

In looking to the state of India, I can feel nothing but confidence whilst it is under your Lordship's care. Every day affords me fresh proofs of the vigour and wisdom of your councils, and in proportion as I acquire information on the variety of interesting subjects connected with your Government, I am the more deeply impressed with the value and extent of your efforts in the public service.

The important advices just received, which come down as late as the end of January, from Bombay, lead me to entertain sanguine hopes that your Lordship will have pacified the Mahratta empire before this despatch can reach you. The subsidiary treaty concluded with the Peishwa under your instructions, coupled with the former arrangement made with the Guicowar Rajah, have placed our authority in that quarter of India, where it was peculiarly exposed, on the most satisfactory footing. It affords me great pleasure to observe that the consent of the Peishwa has been obtained to the Guicowar cessions in the neighbourhood of Surat, so as to remove any doubts which before might have been entertained with regard to the validity of those cessions under the treaty of Salbey. I trust I shall soon have it in my power to congratulate your Lordship on having perfected the only great work remaining incomplete, towards the pacification of India and the solid establishment of the British dominion in that part of the globe.

In looking to the preservation and improvement of this splendid empire, at the outset of a new war, I am confident your Lordship will feel most anxious to suffer this event to break in, as little as is consistent with real security, upon the frame of those measures which you have so uniformly had in view, and so successfully brought to maturity, for restoring the finances of the Company, and for relieving their affairs from the heavy pressure of Indian debt.

What character the war may not assume in its progress, it would be presumption at this moment to decide. But I think your Lordship will feel, with me, that in no quarter can the exertions of France be made with so little rational hope of

success, as in the East. Her means of operating from Europe are very limited and inadequate. If she ever felt that her position in Egypt brought our Indian possessions more within her grasp, in that prospect she is disappointed. India presents nothing to her view but British power, and until there are distinct indications of a different policy, I cannot but deem it safe to consider that the First Consul must abandon any intention of disturbing us in that quarter.

Deprived of the means of effectually annoying us in our foreign possessions, it is against the body of the empire that he will direct all his efforts. We have every reason to be convinced that such is his determination, as it is his obvious policy, and that he will make invasion the great feature of his exertions, determined to risk every thing in the attempt.

Having stated to your Lordship the general considerations upon which our arrangements in India are to be formed, I feel little more necessary on my part. Their application in detail cannot be so well placed as in your Lordship's hand. You will perceive in my budget statement I have reasoned on the effect of war as going to absorb all surplus revenue. I wished to avoid encouraging too sanguine impressions; but when I advert to what the state of surplus revenue was during the early years of the late war, and compare our present situation in point of security with what it could then be deemed to be, I cannot but flatter myself with a much more favourable result. India has already exhibited the striking fact of resources not deteriorated even by a war expenditure (the increase of assets having kept pace with the augmentation of debt). I trust your Lordship will now display the still more gratifying instance of resources capable, even in the midst of hostilities, of producing an actual amelioration of the Company's affairs.

I have lately had under my consideration the state of the revenues of the Carnatic, and the claims of the creditors of the Arcot family, both native and European. With a view of ascertaining to what extent the claims of creditors of any description can reasonably be urged against the Company now in possession, I have recurred to the principles of Sir Archibald Campbell's treaty, and examined what the expense is, which may fairly be chargeable for the military defence of the Carnatic, calculating the same either on the revenues and expense

generally of our settlements in India, or on the separate revenues and charges of Fort St. George. In the latter case, after deducting the share of military charge proportionate to the revenues of the Carnatic, and the payments to the present Nabob and his family, the residue, exclusive of any provision for civil charge distinct from expenses of collection, would not exceed £100,000 per annum.

If the calculation be made upon the revenues and charges of our possessions at large, the residue will be more considerable; as well as I can recollect, about £180,000 per annum, but in neither of these calculations is any allowance made for increased charge in war.

What has occurred to me as the best mode of terminating this long contested and painful subject, is to recur to your Lordship's offer to the Nabob and creditors when at Madras, viz. that so soon as the present fund of 6,21,000 pagodas is liberated, which will happen early in 1804, that one half shall go to liquidate the debt due to the Company, the other half to satisfy the demands of individuals. This will give the creditors an annual charge of about £125,000 a-year upon the revenues of the Carnatic, whilst the Company will be in the receipt of about eighteen lacs of clear revenue, after all payments made to the Nabob and his family, instead of the old subsidy of nine lacs.

From the moment a distinct fund is assigned, the Company have no longer an interest in the question of distribution. It will certainly be necessary for them to lend their aid to some system of investigation, which shall do justice, as far as possible, between the several claimants, until it shall be ascertained what debts shall ultimately be allowed, and with what rate of interest they shall be permitted to be made up. No guess can be formed in what proportion the fund will be competent to satisfy them.

Mr. Fordyce has shown me a list of claims, which, with the interest as charged by the respective creditors, falls little short of four millions sterling, and I conclude a large additional debt is owing to natives, whose demands certainly stand upon at least as good grounds as those of our countrymen.

When the sums to be allowed shall once be ascertained, I conceive the best mode will be to issue debentures for the

gross amount, bearing such rate of interest as the fund of £125,000 will admit of. By making the debentures transferable, they will be easily negotiated, and when they find their level in the market in point of value, the Company, if they think fit to relieve the Carnatic from this charge, can buy up these securities at the market price.

The Chairs concur with me in opinion on this subject, and will bring the arrangement before the Court, as soon as the pressure of more urgent business will permit.

I have also communicated with them fully on the necessity of sending your Lordship instructions without delay relative to the College. I shall not resist any intimation on their part of a desire to reserve the whole or any points of the question as matter for future deliberation, but shall confine my interference to a revocation of the former orders, as far as they go to a dissolution of the institution, and shall also decline concurring in any material alteration of the establishment, till the Court of Directors and his Majesty's ministers can have the advantage of communicating with your Lordship in person on this important measure.

I cannot conclude this despatch without apprizing your Lordship that the French Government, in consideration of a pecuniary arrangement, has agreed to make over Louisiana to America. This happened pending our negotiation, and afforded strong proof in itself of the expectation of a rupture with us.

Believe me, my dear Lord,
with great regard, very sincerely yours,
CASTLEREAGH.

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## No. LXXXIII.

*Lord Hobart to the Marquess Wellesley.*

(Most Secret.)

Downing Street, May 16, 1803.
[Received Sept. 11, 1803.]

MY LORD,

The discussions between his Majesty's Government and that of the French Republic having terminated in the recall of his Majesty's ambassador from Paris, I herewith transmit a copy of the King's message to both houses of Parliament,

announcing the rupture of the negotiation, and the recommencement of hostilities.

I have, in consequence, received the King's commands to signify to your Lordship his Majesty's pleasure that you adopt without delay such measures as you may deem most effectual for the capture of any French ships or vessels, or of any forts or possessions which the French may have in India, and for giving the most complete protection to the trade and dominions of the Company.

As the French army are now in actual possession of Holland, and as his Majesty will feel himself under the necessity of acting hostilely against the Batavian republic, unless the Government of that country (which is extremely improbable) should be able to induce the French Government forthwith to withdraw their forces, and to permit that state to observe neutrality, I am further directed to signify to your Lordship his Majesty's pleasure that you do cause to be detained all Dutch ships and property, and that you do without delay take possession of all the settlements belonging to the Batavian Government on the continent of India in trust, and under an explanation that they will be restored in case the Batavian Republic shall remain neutral.

In the event of hostilities with this country, I am to desire that so soon as you shall have recovered the important position of Cochin, you proceed with the utmost expedition to destroy all fortifications thereof; and in the like event you will be authorized to take measures for the recovery of the Dutch settlements in the eastern seas lately in our possession; but it is not intended that any extended or expensive expedition either against the Mauritius or Batavia, should be undertaken without special orders from home.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,
your Lordship's most obedient,
humble servant,
HOBART.

## No. LXXXIV.

*Lieut.-General Lake to the Marquess Wellesley.*

Head Quarters, Camp opposite Delhi,
half-past Seven P.M. Sept. 11, 1803.

My Lord, [Received at Fort William, Sept. 23, 1803.]

I have the satisfaction to inform your Lordship, that after a march of eighteen miles this morning, I learnt that the enemy in great force under Mr. Louis, had crossed the Jumna from Delhi, with the intention of attacking us.

When we had encamped, we found our outposts were attacked by a body of the enemy. On reconnoitring to our front, I found that the enemy's whole army were drawn up in order of battle, I immediately ordered out the whole line, and advanced to attack them in front.

The enemy opposed to us a tremendous fire from a numerous artillery, which was uncommonly well served, and caused us considerable loss in officers and men, but I have the satisfaction to add, that our advance under a most heavy cannonade, and actual charge of the enemy, at about one hundred paces distant, caused a most precipitate retreat, and left in our possession the whole of their artillery.

The cavalry pursued the fugitives to the Jumna, making great havock, and numbers were drowned in attempting to cross.

In short, I have only to express my entire approbation of the gallantry of the troops under my command during the whole of this most brilliant action, and shall have the honour to detail it more particularly to-morrow, which the lateness of the hour prevents me doing at present.

The whole army was under arms from three this morning till this moment.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,
Your Lordship's
Most faithful humble servant,
G. Lake.

## No. LXXXV.

*Lieut.-General Lake to the Marquess Wellesley.*

Head Quarters, Camp, Delhy Ghaut, Sept. 12, 1803.

My Lord, [Received Sep. 24th, 1803.]

My letter of yesterday will have informed your Lordship of the total defeat of the force under Mr. Lewis. The lateness of the hour prevented my detailing the operations of the day as fully as I could have wished.

I cannot find terms sufficiently strong to express the high sense I entertain of the gallant services performed by the whole of the officers and men in the army under my command.

When the length of our march (upwards of eighteen miles) is considered, the fatigue the whole army underwent, and that we were exposed to a most galling fire from the enemy of grape and chain shot, while advancing in line, the operations of yesterday must ever reflect the highest credit on all descriptions of troops engaged; and cannot fail of striking the enemy with the dread of our army, and prove to them, that opposition to such superior discipline, and courage, is useless.

To Major-General Ware, who commanded the right wing, and to the honourable Major-General St. John, who commanded the left, I feel myself under infinite obligations. The former, I am sorry to say, received a very severe contusion while advancing with the right wing.

Major-General St. John was opposed to the enemy's right, the steadiness and ability displayed by the honourable the Major-General, quickly surmounted every difficulty, and forced the enemy to retire in disorder with very heavy loss.

To Colonel St. Leger, who commanded the cavalry, my warmest praises are due, the steadiness and gallantry of the whole corps, both Europeans and natives, under a formidable fire of artillery, does them infinite honour.

After the gallant and steady charge of his Majesty's 76th regiment, led by Captain Boyce, and the whole of the infantry line, who advanced to within one hundred paces of the enemy without taking their firelocks from their shoulders, when they fired a volley, and rushed on with the bayonet with a determination nothing could resist, had forced the enemy to aban-

don their formidable artillery, Colonel St. Leger, with the cavalry under his command, moved rapidly forward, when a general slaughter ensued; by a well-timed manœuvre of the Colonel's in intercepting their retreat to the Jumna, much execution was done; the enemy's confusion was such, that many were drowned, in attempting to cross the river.

To Colonel Horseford, and every officer of the corps of artillery, I feel myself infinitely indebted for their meritorious exertions on this occasion.

The number of the enemy's guns already collected, is between fifty and sixty, and I expect many more before the evening. I shall have the honour to forward a regular return of the enemy's ordnance to-morrow.

I have to lament the loss of many officers and men killed and wounded in this action, returns of which shall be transmitted for your Lordship's information.

From the extreme heat and fatigue, that both officers and men experienced, I have to regret the loss of Major Middleton of the 3d native cavalry, and Cornet Sanguine of the 27th light dragoons, as well as of several European soldiers, who fell from the effects of the sun.

I have to lament the loss of Captain Robert McGregor, (Persian Interpreter in the field,) who fell when advancing in a most gallant style.

The consequences of this victory are the evacuation of the city and forts of Delhi, and the dispersion of the enemy in all directions.

At the earnest request of his Majesty, who is anxious to put himself under the protection of the British Government, I shall cross the river with my army, as soon as a sufficient number of boats can be procured.

My staff, as usual, conducted themselves to my entire satisfaction, and merit my warmest approbation.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,
Your Lordship's
Most faithful humble servant,
G. Lake.

Killed by the effects of the sun—Major Middleton, 3d, native cavalry; Cornet Sanguine, 27th, light dragoons. Killed in action—Lieutenant Hill, 12th, native infantry; Lieutenant Preston, 15th, native infantry; Lieutenant Alden, and Captain McGregor. Wounded—Captain Covell,

27th light dragoons; Cornet Crowe, Cornet Mather, 2nd, native cavalry; Cornet Swindell, 3d, native cavalry; Lieutenant McDonald, 76th, foot; Lieutenant Wrottesley, 2nd.; Captain Matthews, artillery.

The above is the most correct return that has yet been received.*—G. L.

## No. LXXXVI.

*Lieut.-General Lake to the Marquess Wellesley.*

My Lord, September 12th, 1803.

It is with the most heartfelt satisfaction that I now congratulate you upon the attainment of your wishes. The action of yesterday was so decisive and proved a superiority so completely, that I have not a doubt all the chieftains will come in to our standard. Louis having plundered Delhi with the few troops he had left, and taken himself and all his vagabonds off this morning, will I trust, destroy all confidence in Frenchmen. Where he is gone I know not, but I rather believe towards Agra. I imagine that the few men he has with him will go to their own homes. I really do think the business was one of the most gallant actions possible; such a fire of cannon has seldom been seen if ever, against which our men marched up within one hundred yards without taking a firelock from off their shoulders, when they gave one volley, charged instantly and drove the enemy; then they opened ranks and let the cavalry through, who did their duty in the most gallant and judicious manner possible; indeed their conduct was remarkable throughout the day. From having detached so large a body of troops to the ceded provinces, we were yesterday most considerably outnumbered, but his Majesty's 76th regiment did set such an example that could not fail of inspiring every creature with zeal, energy, and spirit. I do not think there could have been a more glorious day, but as I may be thought partial, I will say no more, but leave it to others to relate the fact, exaggerate I think they cannot.

Now my dear Lord, I hope you will agree with me that the destruction of Perron's troops and power was the first object. Added to which, allow me to state my reasons for coming on to Delhi, which were as follow—I had certain information that Louis was making all the use possible of the

* See Appendix for complete returns.

King's name, and of his royal prerogative, and I thought it most probable that many persons with the concealed design of taking advantage of the present times, but absolutely in obedience to the King's mandate, might either join Louis or spread over the Company's provinces for the sake of plunder. Another reason for coming to Delhi, was considering the character of Mr. Louis more active, and perhaps more zealous than Mr. Perron, and considering also his personal connection with the Seiks, I was decidedly of opinion, that the crushing of these political intrigues, and the subversion of his French connection were primary objects, and that nothing would be so likely to accomplish the above objects as the sudden appearance of the army at the capital of Delhi, and I am happy to say, that my conjectures were not ill-founded, as is clearly proved by the flight of Mr. Louis, the departure of the Seiks, and the strong desire of his Majesty for our troops to march into Delhi that he may be placed under our protection. The army will pass the moment the boats come from the other side. Another consideration was, that if the enemy were active, vigorous, and enterprising, our provinces are much at his mercy; the movement of my army to Agra might save the lower part of the Doab, but the upper part, together with Rohilcund, would have been exposed to the depredations of Louis's detachment, and as he possessed Saharunpore, and probably expected co-operation from the Rohillas, he would probably have overrun Rohilcund with greater facility than Perron could carry his depredations to any considerable extent.

It so happens that from all I can learn, and by a letter just received from Mr. Leycester, I do not believe at this moment any commotion is likely to take place, particularly after the event of yesterday. I shall most undoubtedly see the King of Delhi this night or to-morrow morning, when I understand he intends going through the form of delivering the country over to the British Government. Your Lordship may depend upon my attending to your instructions respecting his Majesty. Mr. Mercer is not yet arrived, but I imagine soon will, as by a letter this day received from him, his negotiation seems in a most forward state.

I have this moment learnt, that the remaining part of Louis's army have dispersed in different directions, and that the coun-

try people are so enraged at their plundering them, that they have retaliated by plundering them since they have separated, and killed a great many of them.

I cannot, my dear Lord, avoid saying in the most confidential way that, in the event of a foreign foe coming into this country, without a *very great addition of force in Europeans*, the consequences will be fatal, as there ought always to be one European battalion to four native ones, this at least I think necessary. I have seen a great deal of these people lately, and am quite convinced without King's troops very little is to be expected, in short the infantry of this army as well as cavalry should be new modelled, as I will convince your Lordship when I am so fortunate as to conduct you to Delhi, which I sincerely hope will be very shortly. I am not clear which way I shall move next; but rather think it may be toward Agra, which place must fall upon our approach. I apprehend the Seiks if assured of our not interfering with their government, will enter into a treaty of amity with us, and would ensure the capture of the fort called Hansi, late George Thomas's, provided we would promise to destroy it, which in my opinion would be a good thing; I believe at present there are a great many of Perron's guns in it, which might be got by this means, and which I shall endeavour to do without trouble or difficulty.

I trust all your endeavours will be crowned with success, and remain,

My dear Lord,
Your faithful and attached servant,
G. Lake.

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## No. LXXXVII.

*Lieut.-General Lake to the Marquess Wellesley.*

Head Quarters, Camp, near Delhy Ghaut, Sept. 13th, 1803.

My Lord, [Received at Fort William, Sept. 25th, 1803.]

For your Lordship's information, I have the honour to enclose a list of the killed and wounded, officers and men, of the army under my command, in the action of the 11th instant.*

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* See Appendix.

Your Lordship will perceive that our loss has been very great; but when I consider that we moved on against an immense artillery, of nearly one hundred pieces of cannon, and many of a very large calibre, under as heavy a fire as I have ever been witness to; and that this fire was directed against a line, consisting, on the most correct calculation, of not more than four thousand five hundred men, including cavalry, artillery and infantry; and that we were opposed by upwards of four times that number; it is no longer a matter of surprize.

It is necessary to remark, that we had only one brigade of cavalry, consisting of the 27th light dragoons, and the 2d and 3d regiments of native cavalry; the other brigades being detached for the protection of our own provinces.

The more I reflect on the glorious affair of the 11th, the more forcibly I feel the bravery and intrepidity displayed by every individual composing my army. I cannot find words to express my feelings on this occasion, nor can I sufficiently lament the loss of many brave fellows who have fallen.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,
your Lordship's most faithful humble servant,
G. LAKE.

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## No. LXXXVIII.

*Lieut.-General Lake to the Marquess Wellesley.*

Head Quarters, Camp, Delhy, Sept. 14th, 1803.

MY LORD, [Received Sept. 26th, 1803.]

I have the honour to inform your Lordship that the army this morning commenced crossing the Jumna. I trust the whole will be on the opposite bank by the evening of the third day from hence.

In consequence of the delay occasioned in preparing the necessary presents, I shall not visit his Majesty until the 16th instant.

I have the pleasure to inform your Lordship that Colonel Macan has reported to me, that he took possession of the fort of Firozabad on the 9th instant.

My letter of the 7th will have informed your Lordship of M. Perron's application for leave to pass through the Ho-

nourable Company's territories, on his way to Lucknow. I have the honour to inform your Lordship that M. Perron, accompanied by Messrs. Beckett and Fleury, passed Sarsnee on the 12th instant; the latter gentleman, who with some difficulty joined M. Perron, informed Colonel Ball, that the horse he had under his command had dispersed.

I learn from all quarters, that the dispersion of the force that opposed me on the 11th, is most complete; and I expect shortly to have it in my power to inform your Lordship, that Mons. Bourquain, alias Louis, and the other French officers in his army, have delivered themselves up, as they have alreadv requested to be allowed to throw themselves upon the protection of the British Government.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,
vour Lordship's most faithful humble servant,
G. LAKE.

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## No. LXXXIX.

*General Orders, by his Excellency the most Noble the Governor General in Council.*

Fort William, Sept. 15th, 1803.

The Governor General in Council, under the strongest impressions of public gratitude, notifies to the army his unfeigned admiration of the distinguished conduct of the forces employed under the personal command of his Excellency General Lake, in the gallant and successful assault of the strong fort of Ally Ghur on the 4th instant.

The proposals of surrender offered by the Commander-in-Chief to the garrison immediately after the retreat of M. Perron's forces, afford the most convincing proof that the humanity of the British character is intimately connected with that spirit of alacrity and valour, which marked the Commander-in-Chief's judicious resolution to meet the obstinacy of the enemy by an immediate assault of the place.

The judgment and energy manifested by the Commander-in-Chief in the plan of the attack, correspond with the intrepidity, spirit, and perseverance of his brave officers and soldiers, in executing the orders of their able and gallant

General; and the glorious result of the assault has considerably augmented the reputation of the British name and the honour of the British arms in India.

The Governor General in Council is pleased to direct the Commander-in-Chief to express the particular and most distinguished approbation with which his Excellency in Council has viewed the courage, firmness, and ability, displayed by the honourable Lieut.-Colonel Monson in leading the attack, under circumstances of the utmost degree of difficulty and danger. A strong sense of the interests of the public service, and a desire to witness a continuance of the glorious success of the British arms in India, render the Governor General in Council sincerely anxious that this excellent officer, (repeatedly distinguished by his conduct in various exigencies of the service) may speedily be enabled to resume the command of his gallant corps, and to augment his claims upon the gratitude and applause of his country.

The Governor General in Council also directs the Commander-in-Chief to signify to Lieut.-Colonel Browne, of the 1st battalion 4th regiment native infantry, and to all the officers of that battalion, that his Excellency in Council entertains the highest sense of their meritorious exertions, and warmly approves their honourable services.

The Governor General in Council also desires that his particular approbation may be signified to Major M'Leod of the 76th regiment, to Captain Shipton of the artillery, and also to Lieut.-Colonel Horseford, Captains Robertson and Greene.

It is with the greatest satisfaction that the Governor General in Council expresses his applause of the bravery, discipline and steadiness, of the men of his Majesty's 76th regiment, and of the corps of artillery, as well as of all the soldiers, who were employed on this brilliant service.

The loss of Captain Cameron, Lieutenants Fleming, Browne, Campbell, St. Aubin, and Turton, is deplored by the Governor General in Council. Their country, their friends, and their King, will however receive consolation for that loss, in reflecting upon the glory of their atchievements, and upon the public advantage of their illustrious example.

The Governor General in Council directs the Commander-in-Chief to signify to Mr. Lucan the approbation with which

his Excellency in Council has remarked the services rendered by that gentleman to the cause of his native country, in the spirited exertion of British courage and public zeal. It is highly satisfactory to his Excellency in Council to observe this meritorious example of a just attention to the duty which every British subject owes to the British Government in India. The Governor General in Council will not fail to reward the services of Mr. Lucan, in such manner as shall be recommended by the Commander-in-Chief.

The Governor General in Council relies with confidence on the approved character of this army, and of the Commander-in-Chief, that their unabated magnanimity, skill, and perseverance, will be attended with a continuance of success, proportionate to the justice of our cause, and to the superiority of our arms.

By command of his Excellency the most Noble
the Governor General in Council,
L. Hook, Sec. to Govt. Mil. Dept.

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## No. XC.

*Lieut.-General Lake to the Marquess Wellesley.*

Head Quarters, Delhy, Sept. 15th, 1803.

My Lord, [Received Sept. 28th, 1803.]

I have the pleasure to inform your Lordship, that Messrs. Bourquain, Geslin, Guerinmier, Del. Perron, and Jean Pierre, yesterday delivered themselves up prisoners.

They reside for the present in the fort under a guard. I shall however dispatch them in a few days under an escort to Futty Ghur, from whence they will embark for the Presidency.

I have the honour to inform your Lordship, that I intend paying my first visit to his Majesty to-morrow morning.

I have the honour to be, &c.

G. Lake.

## No. XCI.

*Lieut.-Colonel Harcourt to Captain Armstrong, Acting Military Secretary to the Governor-General.*

SIR, Camp at Manickapatam, Sept. 16th, 1803.

I have the greatest satisfaction in stating to you for the information of his Excellency the most noble the Governor-General, that I shall not be detained at this place beyond to-morrow, when I shall move towards Jaggernaut, having in two days passed a river not fordable, near a mile in breadth, with all the troops, camp equipage, stores and cattle, &c. I have also landed from the transport vessels two 18-pounders, with their carriages, &c.

If it had not been for uncommon exertion from all corps, each individual and each department generally, I could not possibly have so expeditiously effected this operation.

I shall march to-morrow to Nursingapatam, and from thence, on the following day, to Jaggernaut.

I have the satisfaction to acquaint you, for the information of his Excellency the most noble the Governor-General, that although I am encamped in the midst of a highly cultivated country, surrounded by villages, whose inhabitants have not deserted them, or who having, at the moment of our first taking possession of this part of the Province of Cuttack, left their houses, are already returned to them, I have not received a single complaint. My bazaar is supplied by the native inhabitants, and a degree of confidence and security is manifested, and I trust, from the measures I have adopted, is completely experienced and established, which leaves me no more reason to doubt the continuance of that confidence than I have to doubt the continuance of the security.

I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your most obedient servant,
G. HARCOURT, Lieut. Col.

## No. XCII.

*Lieut.-General Lake to the Marquess Wellesley.*

Head Quarters, Camp, Delhi, Sept. 17th, 1803.

My Lord, [Received Sept. 30th, 1803.]

I have the honour to inform your Lordship, that in consequence of the hour fixed upon by his Majesty, I yesterday, attended by the chief officers of the army, waited on his Majesty at his palace in the fort.

Akber Shah, his majesty's eldest son, came to my camp to conduct me.

His Majesty received me seated on his throne, when the presents were delivered, and the forms usual on those occasions were observed.

His Majesty and the whole Court were unanimous in testifying their joy at the change that has taken place in their fortunes.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,
Your Lordship's
Most faithful humble servant,
G. Lake.

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## No. XCIII.

*Lieut.-General Lake to the Marquess Wellesley.*

My Lord, Delhi, Sept. 17th, 1803.

Yesterday was passed according to the usual forms in waiting upon the King, making and receiving presents from his Majesty, when every thing was properly conducted on both sides.

The crossing our troops is a most tedious operation from the scarcity of boats, and will prevent my moving towards Agra before the 22d instant, on which day, or the day after, I shall hope to begin my march, and when that fort is taken I shall have little to do but to settle the country, at present of course we must adjust some little disorders in different parts; however, they are so trifling that they are easily checked.

The want of rain must make the collections very uncertain, and if we have not some, the consequences will be fatal, as a famine is to be apprehended.

I have engaged some irregular force this day under some Sirdars lately in the service of Perron; two of them are of high character in that line, and I believe to be depended upon, at least as much if not more than any we can get. The state of the case my dear Lord is, the immense tract of territory we have gained requires a great, I may say, a very great force to keep, and at this time it must be supposed there are numbers of people that will avail themselves of the unsettled state of the country to sow dissensions, and endeavour either to throw the country unto confusion, or take possession of land and property of others, besides various reasons they may have for committing depredations, such as a dislike to any change of government, or old jealousies and animosities towards their neighbours. All these considerations render a very large force necessary, and as from my little army it is impossible for me to detach any more into the interior of the now acquired part of the Doab, it becomes necessary to arrange matters for the protection and tranquillity of it, and I see at present no substitute for supplying the place of our troops, but having that description of people which are most likely to keep the people in order. You may depend upon it I will not have one man more than is necessary.

The rapidity of our march and loss in action, will with wounded and sick have weakened my army very considerably, many of which cannot be replaced, and those men that are to be got in this country, Sepoys I mean, will require time to be made soldiers. I really think when peace is restored, and we have nothing to think of but internal arrangements that our army is not by any means equal to the number of posts that ought to be occupied to prevent depredations, which we are always liable to and which must be guarded against.

After this is done, there ought always to be a disposable force, and I would have that respectable and not very small; if your Lordship comes to see your new territories, which I sincerely hope you will, I am convinced you will see the necessity of always keeping a very large army upon this frontier. I entreat your Lordship if possible, to come up this season if all is quiet enough to allow you to leave Calcutta. I perceive by the letter from the Court of Directors, that they still incline to reduce two regiments of native cavalry, when in my

opinion they ought to raise several more, they also talk of one regiment of European cavalry for Bengal, in my opinion, two *at the least* is necessary, and my firm opinion is, that five regiments of English infantry is necessary in the Bengal army, and those kept complete; I have seen the good effects of the King's troops, and am most thoroughly convinced that without a large proportion of them in this army, our possessions in this country cannot be secure.

When I have a little leisure, I will if your Lordship chooses it, write an official letter upon the subject, though perhaps it may be better to delay it till I can exactly ascertain the number of points we ought to have posts at.

I think we can have but little dependance in the Sebundy corps;* here and there from the exertion of a particular man commanding them they will exert themselves, but in general I fear they imagine themselves stationary, get into habits of their own, and get connected too much with the inhabitants; but although I have said thus much, I should be sorry if any alteration took place respecting these corps till I can have some private conversation with your Lordship. I think it is possible the new plan of your Lordship in forming provincial battalions may prove much more useful from being under martial law, but the same objection still exists in the men becoming too intimately connected with the natives of that country in which they are raised.

I suspect nothing but regular battalions will answer the purpose of keeping the country in order, and they, as I told you in a former letter, require much alteration in their system which is radically bad.

I imagine Agra will cause us but little trouble and if I dared to divide my army, it would not be necessary for me to go there, but I have so many reasons which I shall not commit to paper, but keep them for your private ear, for being with them that I am determined not to separate them.

The army, I am happy to say, are in high spirits, and I flatter myself ready to do anything I ask of them. Their good humour, patience, and readiness to obey any orders of mine is delightful and most satisfactory, and gives me the greatest confidence in them.

I hear Monson is going on well, he is a most excellent man

* Police.

and incomparable officer. I cannot express how much, I admire his conduct at Alighur.

If we could get hold of those brigands from the Deccan, not a Frenchman would be left in the country.

Believe me, my dear Lord,
With real attachment most truly yours,
G. LAKE.

I forgot to say, that I looked upon the strong fort at Hansi to be ours, as there are very few persons in it, and the person who commands, has sent to say, he will give it up to me if I can send troops, which will be difficult, he therefore will keep it, as the people he has in it are entirely his.

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## No. XCIV.

*Lieut.-Colonel Harcourt to Captain Armstrong.*

SIR, Camp at Jaggernaut, Sept. 18, 1803.

I beg you will be pleased to state to his Excellency the Most Noble the Governor-General, that we have this day taken possession of the city of Jaggernaut.

Upon application from the chief Brahmins of the Pagoda, I have afforded them guards (of Hindoos) and a most satisfactory confidence is shewn by the brahmins, priests, and officers of the Pagoda, and by the inhabitants of Jaggernaut, both in their present situation, and in the future protection of the British Government.

From the general good conduct of the troops under my command, and from the strict attention which has been paid to my orders for preventing all interference with the inhabitants and natives, framed under the express injunctions of his Excellency the Most Noble the Governor-General, not a single complaint has been made to me; though I have, by every practicable means, invited a direct communication of the least deviation from this important duty.

I humbly beg leave to congratulate his Excellency the Most Noble the Governor-General on this important acquisition to the British possessions in India.

I have the honour to be, Sir,
your most obedient and humble servant,
G. HARCOURT.

## No. XCV.

*Lieut.-General Lake to the Marquess Wellesley.*

My Lord, Delhi, Sept. 23, 1803.

I have been honoured with your letters of the 10th instant, both of which have been most gratifying to my feelings, and I can assure your Lordship that the army have been highly pleased and flattered by your very handsome order respecting them. I really want words to express how sensible I am of your kindness and friendship to me upon all occasions, and most particularly so for the high opinion you entertain of my son, and your good intentions towards him. He has been with the King, and exceedingly well received by him; but I did not send him in the first instance, and his Majesty has honoured him with a title. I could not leave him with the King, as from his being so young a major, he could not command; and indeed I have no one in this army at all equal to the situation but Lieut.-Colonel Ochterlony, (whose loss about myself I shall feel most severely) who I have left for the purpose of attending to his Majesty and commanding the troops; I have the firmest reliance upon his probity, honour, and good sense, and think his manners with the natives appear to be well calculated for the responsible post I have placed him in. He is the only man that I have seen since I came to India that I could repose much confidence in, but I feel perfectly secure of him, which you may easily imagine from knowing how I am situated in regard to confidential people; he has been a great relief to me, and of course the parting from him will be severely felt by me. However, I must resign him for a moment for the public good, and not think of my own private interests. I believe nothing I could have said to my son, or given him, would have made him happy in being left here; on the contrary, I am convinced, although he would readily have acquiesced in any wish of mine, he would have been wretched if left behind the army. I really do think he is a most promising officer; indeed, I may say, (though a father) without partiality, that he is far beyond any thing I could have expected at his years, and that in my opinion, with a little more experience, with the love he has for his profession, he will make a figure in history as a

soldier. He is of amazing use to me in the field, and were I not prevented, from delicacy, I should mention his name in very high terms in all my despatches.*

I shall move for Agra to-morrow, and hope before fifteen days are at an end, to report it yours.

It affords me great satisfaction to see by a despatch from Captain Armstrong that my movements have been precisely as you wished, and am most happy that events have been so favourable, and have only to pray God they may continue so.

I have held a Durbar this morning for all the nobles of the Court, and others, who were, I hope, pleased with their reception; they declare themselves attached to the English, which we most wish to be the case, and believe it; they of course are like the king, much reduced in circumstances. I am this evening to take leave of his Majesty.

Believe me ever, my dear Lord,
your attached and faithful servant,
G. Lake.

## No. XCVI.

*The Hon. Major-General Wellesley to the Marquess Wellesley.*

Camp at Assye, Sept. 24, 1803.
[Received Oct. 30, 1803.

My Lord,

I was joined by Major Hill with the last of the convoys expected from the river Kistna on the 18th, and on the 20th was enabled to move forward towards the enemy, who had been joined in the course of the last seven or eight days by the infantry under Colonel Pohlman, by that belonging to Begum Sumroo, and by another brigade of infantry, the name of whose commander I have not ascertained. The enemy's army was collected about Bokerdun, and between that place and Jaffierabad.

I was near Colonel Stevenson's corps on the 21st, and had a conference with that officer, in which we concerted a plan to attack the enemy's army with the divisions under our com-

* Had the life of this promising young officer been spared, he would probably have realized his father's expectations, but he fell at Roliça in Portugal, on the 17th of August, 1808.—[*Ed.*]

mand on the 24th in the morning, and we marched on the 22nd, Colonel Stevenson by the western route, and I by the eastern route round the hills between Budnapour and Jalna.

On the 23rd I arrived at Naulniah, and there received a report that Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar had moved off in the morning with their cavalry, and that the infantry were about to follow, but were still in camp at the distance of about six miles from the ground on which I had intended to encamp. It was obvious that the attack was no longer to be delayed; and having provided for the security of my baggage and stores at Naulniah, I marched on to attack the enemy.

I found the whole combined army of Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar encamped on the bank of the Kaitna river, nearly on the ground which I had been informed that they occupied. Their right, which consisted entirely of cavalry, was about Bokerdun, and extended to their corps of infantry, which were encamped in the neighbourhood of Assye. Although I came first in front of their right, I determined to attack their left; as the defeat of their corps of infantry was most likely to be effectual; accordingly I marched round to their left flank, covering the march of the column of infantry by the British cavalry in the rear, and by the Mahratta and Mysore cavalry on the right flank.

We passed the river Kaitna at a ford beyond the enemy's left flank, and I formed the infantry immediately in two lines, with the British cavalry as a reserve in a third, in an open space between that river and a nullah running parallel to it. The Mahratta and Mysore cavalry occupied the ground beyond the Kaitna on our left flank, and kept in check a large body of the enemy's cavalry which had followed our march from the right of their own position.

The enemy had altered the position of their infantry previous to our attack; it was no longer, as at first, along the Kaitna; but extended from that river across to the village of Assye upon the Nullah, which was upon our right. We attacked them immediately, and the troops advanced under a very hot fire from cannon, the execution of which was terrible. The picquets of the infantry, and the 74th regiment, which were on the right of the first and second lines, suffered par-

ticularly from the fire of the guns on the left of the enemy's position near Assye. The enemy's cavalry also made an attempt to charge the 74th regiment at the moment when they were most exposed to this fire, but they were cut up by the British cavalry, which moved on at that moment. At length the enemy's line gave way in all directions, and the British cavalry cut in among their broken infantry; but some of their corps went off in good order, and a fire was kept up on our troops from many of the guns from which the enemy had been first driven, by individuals who had been passed by the line under the supposition that they were dead.

Lieut.-Colonel Maxwell, with the British cavalry, charged one large body of infantry, which had retired, and was formed again, in which operation he was killed; and some time elapsed before we could put an end to the straggling fire, which was kept up by individuals from the guns from which the enemy were driven. The enemy's cavalry also, which had been hovering round us throughout the action, was still near us. At length, when the last formed body of infantry gave way, the whole went off, and left in our hands ninety pieces of cannon.

'This victory, which was certainly complete, has, however, cost us dear. Your Excellency will perceive by the inclosed return, that our loss in officers and men has been very great; and in that of Lieut.-Colonel Maxwell and other officers, whose names are therein included, greatly to be regretted.'

I cannot write in too strong terms of the conduct of the troops; they advanced in the best order, and with the greatest steadiness, under a most destructive fire, against a body of infantry far superior in numbers, who appeared determined to contend with them to the last, and who were driven from their guns only by the bayonet; and notwithstanding the numbers of the enemy's cavalry, and the repeated demonstrations they made of an intention to charge, they were kept at a distance by our infantry.

I am particularly indebted to Lieut.-Colonel Harness, and Lieut.-Colonel Wallace, for the manner in which they conducted their brigades; and to all the officers of the staff for the assistance I received from them. The officers commanding brigades, nearly all those of the staff, and the mounted officers of the infantry had their horses shot under them.

I have also to draw your Excellency's notice to the conduct of the cavalry commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Maxwell, particularly that of the 19th dragoons.

The enemy are gone off towards the Adjuntee Ghaut, and I propose to follow them as soon as I can place my captured guns and the wounded in security.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,
with the greatest respect,
your Excellency's most obedient,
and faithful humble servant,
ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Colonel Stevenson arrived this morning at Bokerdun, and I imagine that he will be here this evening.

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## No. XCVII.

*Lord Hobart to the Marquess Wellesley.*

Downing Street, 2nd May, 1803.
[Received 25th September, 1803.]

MY LORD,

I am commanded by the King, to signify to you his Majesty's most gracious permission to accept, and to wear the honour conferred upon your Lordship by the Grand Signior, in the order of the Crescent of the first rank; and I am further commanded to desire that your Lordship will notify the same gracious permission to Major-General Baird, and to the other officers who have received similar honours from the Ottoman Court.

The King has also approved of your Lordship having worn the insignia of the said order, and of your having authorized the officers above-mentioned to wear the respective badges transmitted to them by the Grand Signior, until his Majesty's pleasure should be made known to you.

In executing these his Majesty's most gracious commands, I cannot refrain from offering to your Lordship my sincere and cordial congratulations upon this distinguished mark of his sublime Highness's just appreciation of the important services rendered by your Lordship's government, to the allied cause in Egypt.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,
your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,
HOBART.

## No. XCVIII.

*The Marquess Wellesley to Lord Hobart.*

My Lord, Fort William, September 25th, 1803.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatch of the 2nd of May, 1803, signifying to me his Majesty's most gracious permission to accept, and to wear the order of the Crescent of the first rank, conferred upon me by the Grand Signior.

I request your Lordship to submit to his Majesty the dutiful sense of gratitude with which I have received this distinguished mark of his Majesty's favour.

I have received with great satisfaction his Majesty's approbation of my conduct, in having authorized Major General Baird, and the other officers, who have received similar honours from the Ottoman Porte, to wear the respective badges transmitted to them by the Grand Signior until his Majesty's pleasure should be made known to me. In conformity to his Majesty's commands, I have communicated in public orders to the officers above-mentioned, the notification of his Majesty's gracious permission to accept, and to wear the honours conferred on them respectively by the Ottoman Porte.

I cannot conclude this letter without requesting your Lordship to accept the expression of my most cordial acknowledgments for the obliging manner in which you have been pleased to signify to me his Majesty's most gracious commands on this occasion.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Wellesley.

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## No. XCIX.

*The Marquess Wellesley to Lord Hobart.*

(Official and Secret.)

My Lord, Fort William, Sept. 25th, 1803.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatch noted in the margin,* and of the copy which is enclosed of his Majesty's message to both Houses of

* Dated 17th May, 1803; received 11th September, 1803.

Parliament, announcing the rupture of the negotiation with the French Government, and the recommencement of hostilities.

2. In obedience to his Majesty's commands signified in your Lordship's letter, I have issued the necessary orders for the capture of all French ships and vessels in India, and have adopted the most effectual measures within my power for the protection of the trade and dominions of the Company.

3. My despatch of the 1st of August, 1803,* will have apprized your Lordship that, until that time, I had deemed it to be necessary to withhold the restitution of all forts and possessions on the Continent of India conquered from the French during the war.

4. Having received no further intimation of the station, destination, or designs of General De Caen, nor any advice from Europe, which could justify any change of my former determination, all the forts and possessions of the French on the Continent of India conquered during the war, still remain in the hands of the British Government, under the operation of my orders of the 24th of November, 1802, and 9th of July, 1803, to which my despatch of the 1st of August, 1803, referred.

5. In consequence of my instructions to Lord Clive of the 9th of July, 1803, (of which a copy is enclosed to your Lordship in my despatch of the 1st of August, 1803,) I entertain no doubt that Lord William Bentinck has compelled M. Birrot and the French troops at Pondicherry, to surrender as prisoners of war, and has adopted the necessary measures with respect to such subjects of France as may have been found within the limits of his Lordship's government, immediately upon receiving a copy of his Majesty's commands of the 17th of May, 1803.

6. His Majesty's pleasure respecting the detention of Dutch ships and property, under the reservations stated by your Lordship will be strictly obeyed. With regard to the settlements belonging to the Batavian Government, on the Continent of India, no commissary, or public officer authorized by that government to claim the possession of any of those settlements having yet arrived in India, all the settlements on

* See Appendix.

the Continent of India conquered from the Dutch during the war, actually remain in the possession of the British Government.

7. Your Lordship will observe that even if a claim had been preferred by any commissary, or other public officer, duly authorized to demand possession of any of the settlements of the Batavian Government on the Continent of India, my orders of the 24th of November, 1802, and of the 9th of July, 1803, to which I have already referred, would have prevented the restitution of any such settlements to the Batavian Government, until his Majesty's further commands could have been received.

8. In the actual state of affairs in India, the security of the Company's possessions will demand the immediate demolition of the fortifications of Cochin, and although I have not yet transmitted any special instructions to the Government of Fort St. George on that subject, I entertain a confident expectation that the vigilance of Lord William Bentinck will have induced his Lordship to anticipate my opinion with regard to that important position. Your Lordship may rely on a full and early communication of my sentiments and proceedings respecting Cochin, and I am satisfied that you will sanction the justice and policy of those considerations, which demand the immediate demolition of the fortifications of that place.

9. Of the Dutch settlements in the Eastern Seas, conquered during the war, the possession of Malacca has been retained under the general operation of my instructions, but restitution of the Moluccas has been made to certain persons acting in the name of the Batavian Republic, under circumstances which will require your Lordship's special notice, and will form the subject of a separate despatch. It does not appear to me to be practicable to make any attempt to recover the Moluccas at the present moment, but your Lordship may rely upon my most earnest exertion to accomplish his Majesty's commands in this respect at the earliest practicable period of time.

10. The same considerations which prevent in the present crisis any attempt against the Moluccas, must necessarily preclude any extended or expensive expedition against the Mauritius or Batavia.

11. Your Lordship may, however, be assured that, even in the probable event of an early and prosperous termination of the existing contest between the British Government in India and the confederated Mahratta chieftains, I shall not attempt to undertake any expedition either against the Mauritius or Batavia.

12. No expedition could be undertaken against either the Mauritius or Batavia with any prospect of success unless the armament should be formed upon a scale of such extent as should be superior to the strength of the fortifications and garrisons of the places to be attacked.

13. Your Lordship is fully apprized that any armament formed upon such a scale against either of those strong places must be of considerable extent, and that it must consequently involve a degree of expense proportioned to the important objects which it must be calculated to accomplish.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

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## No. C.

*The Governor General in Council to the Honourable the Secret Committee of the Honourable the Court of Directors.*

HONOURABLE SIRS, Fort William, Sept. 25th, 1803.

1. In our address to your Honourable Committee of the 1st of August,* the Governor-General in Council communicated to your Honourable Committee the state of the negotiations between the British Government and Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and the Rajah of Berar, at the date of our latest advices from the Resident at Scindiah's court. The disposition manifested by those chieftains at that period of time, afforded the strongest indication of a resolution on their part to persist in their refusal to comply with the just and reasonable demands of the British Government by withdrawing their armies from the menacing position which they had occupied on the frontier of the Nizam. The Resident, however, continued to employ every practicable endeavour to effect a change in the sentiments and conduct of those chieftains, but

* See p. 255.

without success; and the negotiation finally terminated by the departure of the Resident from the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah on the 3d of August.

2. The result of these negotiations having now placed the British Government in a state of war with the confederated chieftains, the Governor-General in Council deems it proper, with a view to enable your Honourable Committee to form a judgment of the hostile disposition of those chieftains and of the unavoidable necessity of resorting to arms for the defence and security of our rights and interests, and those of our allies, to state the progress of the late discussions between the Resident and the confederates with as much detail as the compass of a despatch overland will admit.

3. It is necessary to apprize your honourable Committee in this place, that on the 17th June the Governor-General received information, which his Excellency considered to be authentic, that Dowlut Rao Scindiah had addressed letters to Ghunnee Behauder and Himmut Behaudur (the officers exercising the chief authority on the part of his Highness the Peishwa in the province of Bundelcund) requiring them to be prepared to co-operate with the confederated Mahratta armies in hostile measures against the British possessions, and that Dhurrum Rao, the commanding officer of a considerable body of horse which had been despatched by Scindiah in the month of April to Kalpee, a station on the north-western bank of the Jumna contiguous to the British territories, had received orders from Scindiah to the same effect.

4. On receipt of this information, the Governor-General deemed it proper to direct the Resident to require Dowlut Rao Scindiah to acknowledge or to disavow those orders; and accordingly at a conference between the Resident and Dowlut Rao Scindiah, holden on the 16th July, the Resident stated the substance of that information to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and required him to declare whether he had actually issued orders of the nature described.

5. In reply Dowlut Rao Scindiah assured the Resident, in the most solemn manner, that he had never issued such orders either to the Peishwa's officers in Bundelcund, or to

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* See p. 277.

Dhurrum Rao, and that the latter chieftain had been especially directed to respect the British territories.

6. The amicable tenor of the language and behaviour of Dowlut Rao Scindiah at this interview, induced the Resident to renew the subject of Scindiah's return to Hindostan; in answer to the Resident's observations on that subject, Scindiah's principal minister replied, that as soon as Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar should receive favourable answers to the letters which they had lately addressed to the Governor-General, those chieftains would repair to their respective countries.

7. The Governor-General having declared in his letters to Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, that the British Government had no intention to disturb the established order of the Mahratta state, and those chieftains having distinctly acknowledged that the treaty of Bassein contained no stipulations injurious to their rights, the assurance which the letters of those chieftains required, that the British Government and the Peishwa entertained no designs to subvert the engagements subsisting between his Highness and the feudatory chieftains of the Mahratta empire, had been in fact anticipated; and the confirmation of it could not justly be considered by those chieftains to be in any degree necessary for the security of their just rights and interests.

8. This declaration however, and the manner in which it was delivered, appeared to the Governor-General to afford a more satisfactory indication than those chieftains had manifested, of a disposition to comply with the demands of the British Government. These favourable impressions were corroborated by an explicit acknowledgment, publicly made by Dowlut Rao Scindiah to the Resident on that occasion, that the treaty of Bassein not only contained no stipulations injurious to the general interests of the Mahratta feudatories, but afforded to them additional security. This declaration also induced the Governor-General to hope, that if the separation and return of the confederate armies to their respective territories, really depended on the assurances which Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar had required from the Governor-General, the satisfaction which the honourable Major-General Wellesley, under the powers vested in him

by the Governor-General's instructions of the 26th June, would be enabled to afford to those chieftains on the point in reference to the Governor-General, would induce them to manifest the proof which the Governor-General had demanded of the sincerity of their amicable professions, and would be a test of their sincerity.

9. The Governor-General also had reason to expect that in the apparent temper of those chieftains at that period of time, the firm and amicable remonstrances and declarations which Major-General Wellesley, in a letter to the Resident under date the 18th of July, written on the receipt of the Governor-General's instructions of the 26th June, directed the Resident to make to Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, would induce those chieftains to comply with the just and moderate requisitions of the British Government.

10. In that letter Major-General Wellesley apprized the Resident of the powers vested in him by the Governor-General's instructions of the 26th of June, and desired the Resident to communicate to Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, the delegation of those powers to Major-General Wellesley, and to state to those chieftains that Major-General Wellesley was prepared to attend to their interests, and to enter into negotiations with them on any points affecting those interests; but that it was indispensably necessary that those chieftains should previously withdraw their troops from the menacing position which they occupied on the frontier of the Nizam's dominions, and return to their usual stations in Hindostan and Berar, in which event Major-General Wellesley would also withdraw the troops under his command. Major-General Wellesley further instructed the Resident to intimate to Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, that those chieftains having declared that they had no intention to obstruct the execution of the treaty of Bassein, or to march to Poonah, or to invade the territories of the Nizam, their refusal to separate their armies, and to retire to their usual stations, would be inconsistent with those declarations, and a proof of their insincerity; and Major-General Wellesley accordingly directed the Resident to renew that requisition, and to apprize those chieftains that their compliance with it afforded the only means of preserving peace between them and the British Government. Major-General Wellesley provided

against the objection which Dowlut Rao Scindiah might eventually urge to the immediate return of his army to Hindostan, founded on the difficulty of crossing the rivers Taptee and Nerbuddah at that particular season, by observing that those difficulties were by no means insurmountable, and that at all events his army could retreat without difficulty to Burhaunpore, where he might make arrangements for their passage over the Nerbuddah. Major-General Wellesley at the same time observed that no objection of a similar nature could be urged by the Rajah of Berar to the immediate return of his army to Berar, and signified to the Resident that if the Rajah of Berar should return towards Nagpore, and if Scindiah should adopt the measures above described preparatory to his crossing the Nerbuddah, Major-General Wellesley would be satisfied; but should those chieftains be resolved to maintain their position on the Nizam's frontier, the Resident was directed to apprize them that he had received Major-General Wellesley's orders to quit the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah without delay.

11. Under this aspect of affairs the Governor-General deemed it expedient to issue instructions to his Excellency the commander-in-chief in Oude, calculated to adapt the course of his Excellency's proceedings to the eventual alternative either of peace or war.

12. With a view to connect the several stages of the negotiation between the Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the confederated chieftains, it is proper to apprize your honourable Committee, that on the 9th of July, after the delivery of the letters from those chieftains to the address of the Governor-General, the Resident applied to the honourable Major-General Wellesley for his opinion with regard to the course of proceeding which it would be advisable for the Resident to pursue in the actual crisis of affairs. In reply to this reference, and previously to Major-General Wellesley's being apprized of the powers vested in him by the Governor-General's instructions of the 26th of June, that officer stated it to be his opinion, founded on the instructions and the sentiments of the Governor-General, and on the actual state of circumstances, that those chieftains should be required to retire with their armies within the limits of their respective territories without further delay. Major-General Wellesley

at the same time addressed a letter to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, containing a requisition to that effect.

13. That letter distinctly states the grounds on which Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar were required to return with their armies to their respective territories, and this just and incontrovertible statement was accompanied by a corresponding offer on the part of Major-General Wellesley to withdraw the troops under his command from their advanced position, and by the assurance which those chieftains had required as the condition of their entire acquiescence in the arrangements concluded between the British Government and the Peishwa.

14. Your honourable Committee will not fail to deduce a conclusion highly favourable to the equity and liberality of these concessions, by contrasting the circumstances under which the confederated chieftains assembled their armies in the position from which they were required to retire with the motives and objects which had regulated the movement and position of the British troops. The proceedings of the confederated chieftains were manifestly of a menacing and aggressive nature, and the position of their united armies on the frontier of our ally, enabled them to carry into immediate execution the hostile designs which the conduct and the language of those chieftains had previously indicated. The movement of the British troops, as far as it respected the Rajah of Berar and Dowlut Rao Scindiah, was purely defensive. The condition of his Highness the Peishwa's Government would alone have justified and required the march of the British subsidiary force from Poonah.

15. Under these circumstances those chieftains were not entitled to any corresponding concessions on our part, and their refusal to comply, unconditionally with the requisitions of Major-General Wellesley, would have justified an immediate resort to arms. The offer of Major-General Wellesley, therefore, to withdraw the troops under his command from the vicinity of Ahmednuggur, and the assurances with which it was accompanied, afforded the most unequivocal proof of the pacific intentions of the British Government, and deprived those chieftains of every pretext for continuing to maintain their armies in their united and menacing position on the frontier of our ally.

16. The Resident transmitted Major-General Wellesley's letter to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, with a message calculated to enforce the representations which it contained, and intimating that the proposition of Major-General Wellesley, to withdraw the British forces whenever Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar should retire with their armies to their respective territories, afforded a satisfactory proof of the pacific intentions of the British Government, and that under this assurance, the continued refusal of those chieftains to comply with the just demands of the British Government, would be a public and manifest demonstration of the insincerity of their professions, and of the hostility of their designs. The Resident also directed the attention of Dowlut Rao Scindiah to the assurance afforded at the close of Major-General Wellesley's letter, and signified to that chieftain, that the declaration which that letter contained, on the point on which the two chieftains had expressed their solicitude was such as to leave them no plea for delaying their march towards their respective dominions.

17. Major-General Wellesley's letter and the representation which accompanied its delivery appeared to produce a favourable impression on the mind of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, who immediately despatched his principal minister to the camp of the Rajah of Berar for the purpose of consulting that chieftain on the subject.

18. The Resident also despatched his native secretary to the Rajah of Berar with a message similar to that which he had sent to Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

19. The Rajah of Berar did not manifest a disposition to comply with Major-General Wellesley's requisition, and referred the decision of the question to the result of a conference with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, which accordingly took place on the 21st of July, and on the ensuing day the Resident addressed a note to Dowlut Rao Scindiah demanding a reply to Major-General Wellesley's letter. To this note no answer was returned.

20. The Resident having subsequently received Major-General Wellesley's letter of the 18th of July, addressed memorials to Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar in the terms prescribed by Major-General Wellesley in answer to those memorials. The Resident was informed by both

Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, that their reply to Major-General Wellesley's requisitions still depended on a conference between those chieftains, and Dowlut Rao Scindiah at the same time invited the Resident to a conference on the 25th of July, in consequence of a message previously conveyed to him by the Resident desiring an interview.

21. At this conference the Resident repeated to Dowlut Rao Scindiah all the arguments and observations stated in Major-General Wellesley's instructions, and again urged Dowlut Rao Scindiah's compliance with Major-General Wellesley's requisitions.

22. In reply to this demand the following objections were urged by Dowlut Rao Scindiah's principal minister on the part of that chieftain. That the forces of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar were encamped in their own territories; that those chieftains had solemnly promised not to ascend the Adjuntee Pass, nor to march to Poonah; that they had already given to the Governor-General assurances in writing that they never would attempt to subvert the treaty of Bassein, which assurances were unequivocal proofs of their amicable intentions; that they proposed to despatch vakeels to his Highness the Peishwa for the purpose of obtaining from his Highness an assurance similar to that which they had lately received from the Hon. Major-General Wellesley; and lastly, that the treaty at that time under negotiation between Scindiah and Holkar was not completely settled, and that until it should be finally concluded, Dowlut Rao Scindiah could not return to Hindostan.

23. In answer to these objections the Resident referred to Major-General Wellesley's declaration, that it was impossible to confide in the promises and assurances of the confederated chieftains whilst their armies occupied a position unnecessary to their security, and menacing the frontier of our ally the Nizam. The Resident further observed, that if Dowlut Rao Scindiah derived any just advantage from his present position or if the continuance of his army in that position was in any degree necessary for the defence of his own possessions, due allowance would be made for the exigency of the case; but it was manifest that Dowlut Rao Scindiah had no enemies in that quarter, and that far from deriving any advantage from

his present position, he incurred an intolerable expense, and was exposed to the greatest inconvenience in his actual situation; that his continuance, therefore, in that situation, could only be ascribed to hostile designs against the British Government or its allies. The Resident also reminded Dowlut Rao Scindiah that he had long since apprized that chieftain and the Rajah of Berar that the Governor-General could yield no credit to the sincerity of their promises unless those chieftains returned to their respective capitals. The Resident further remarked that Major-General Wellesley having been vested with full powers for the conduct of political and military affairs, the assurance afforded by Major-General Wellesley in his letter to Dowlut Rao Scindiah was as valid and binding as if it had been given by the Governor-General himself; that Major-General Wellesley, however, would not object to the despatch of vakeels to the court of Poonah on the part of the confederated chieftains, provided those chieftains immediately retired with their armies from the frontier of the Nizam's dominions. Finally, the Resident observed, that Boorhaunpore was a much more eligible situation than the frontier of the Nizam's dominions for prosecuting any negotiation which might be depending between Dowlut Rao Scindiah and Jeswunt Rao Holkar (who at that time occupied a position between the Taptee and Nerbuddah) and the Resident concluded by insisting on an immediate and distinct reply to the requisition of Major-General Wellesley.

24. The minister appeared unable to answer the preceding arguments and observations, and endeavoured to evade the further discussion of the subject, by promising to afford the satisfaction required in the course of a few days. The Resident replied that Major-General Wellesley's letter having been delivered five days before, a sufficient time had been allowed for deliberation, and that under these circumstances the Resident could not submit to further procrastination on the part of Dowlut Rao Scindiah. This declaration produced a further discussion between the Resident and Dowlut Rao Scindiah; but that chieftain and his ministers having at length solemnly assured the Resident that he should receive a distinct and satisfactory reply on the 28th of July in the presence of the Rajah of Berar, the Resident consented to wait until that day for their final decision.

25. The Governor-General in council requests your honourable Committee's attention to the explicit declaration of Dowlut Rao Scindiah respecting the depending negotiation with Jeswunt Rao Holkar. The avowed object of that negotiation was to induce Jeswunt Rao Holkar to form a junction with the confederated armies. It was manifestly unconnected with any apprehension on the part of Dowlut Rao Scindiah for the security of his dominions against the designs of Jeswunt Rao Holkar; had that been the object, it was obviously the interest of Dowlut Rao Scindiah to proceed with the utmost expedition for the defence of his northern dominions against the apprehended designs of Holkar, who at that time occupied a position between the rivers Taptee and Nerbuddah. The plea, therefore, urged by Dowlut Rao Scindiah, for maintaining his position on the frontier of the Nizam's dominions, was a manifest indication of the intention of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar to obtain the junction of Jeswunt Rao Holkar for purposes hostile to the British Government and its allies, and confirmed the opinion, that the object of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar in protracting their discussions with the Resident, was to secure the junction of Jeswunt Rao Holkar previously to the commencement of hostilities with the British Government, and to enter upon a contest with the advantage of a considerable accession of force and of a season more favourable for the movements and operations of the confederated armies.

26. Under these circumstances no reliance could be placed on the promises and amicable professions of the confederated chieftains, unaccompanied by the separation and return of their armies to their respective territories in Berar and the north-west of Hindostan.

27. With regard to the observation of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's ministers, that the armies of the Rajah of Berar and Dowlut Rao Scindiah were actually encamped within their own territories, it may be remarked that the state of their possessions in that quarter did not require the presence of those armies for the purpose either of establishing the internal tranquillity of those possessions, or of providing for their defence against any external attack. That necessity had never been urged by either of those chieftains, nor could any such argument have been justly maintained.

28. The right of the British Government, therefore, to require Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar to remove their armies from the menacing position which they occupied on the frontier of the Nizam's dominions, and in which they had formed a junction for the purpose avowed by Scindiah, of eventual war with the Company and its allies, could not be affected by the circumstance of their being encamped within the territory belonging to either of those chieftains.

29. With respect to the necessity asserted by those chieftains of obtaining from the Peishwa assurances similar to those which they had received from Major-General Wellesley, those chieftains were aware that under the provisions of the treaty of Bassein the guarantee of the British Government afforded sufficient security against any violation of subsisting engagements on the part of his Highness; and those chieftains must have been satisfied that in the actual state of our relations to the Peishwa's government, his Highness did not possess the power of injuring the acknowledged rights of the Mahratta feudatories without the aid and concurrence of the British Government.

30. These manifest subterfuges tended to increase the necessity of requiring an immediate compliance with the demands of Major-General Wellesley.

31. In consequence of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's solemn promise to the Resident to deliver a distinct and satisfactory reply to his demands on the 28th of July, the Resident sent a message on that day desiring to be informed at what hour it would be convenient for Scindiah to grant the promised audience.

32. In reply to this message, the Resident was informed, that on that day a conference was to be holden between Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar; that it was not proper for the Resident to attend at that conference, but that he should be apprized of the time which should subsequently be appointed for his attendance.

33. Your honourable Committee will not fail to remark the indignity offered to the Representative of the British Government by Scindiah on this occasion; after having promised to return a decided answer to the Resident on the subject of the depending question of peace or war with the Company and its allies in the presence of the Rajah of Berar on a specific

day, Dowlut Rao Scindiah not only neglected to desire the presence of the Resident at the meeting intended to be holden for such an avowed purpose on that day between Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, but openly prohibited the attendance of Colonel Collins; and without assigning any pretext for a further delay, or even apologizing for so flagrant a violation of promise postponed the proposed answer on the important question at issue to an indefinite period of time.

34. The Resident replied to this intimation by animadverting on Dowlut Rao Scindiah's violation of his promise, and by apprizing that chieftain, that he should wait until noon of the succeeding day for an explicit answer, and that in the event of his being disappointed, the Resident would despatch his advanced tents on the road to Aurungabad, and proceed himself on the following day.

35. In consequence of this declaration, the 29th of July was appointed for an interview between the Resident and Dowlut Rao Scindiah; and the Resident being desirous of making another effort to induce Scindiah to comply with the demands of the British Government, consented to postpone his departure and to attend Dowlut Rao Scindiah at the time appointed.

36. The principal topics of this conference consisted in a repetition of the former discussions; the minister declared that Dowlut Rao Scindiah must again consult the Rajah of Berar before he could return a decided answer to Major-General Wellesley's requisitions, and concluded by requesting the Resident to postpone his departure for two or three days more. The Resident then informed Dowlut Rao Scindiah, that he was satisfied that the object of this evasive conduct on the part of that chieftain was merely to gain time for the accomplishment of some particular purpose; that the Resident had been positively directed by Major-General Wellesley to quit the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah when he should have reason to be convinced of the resolution of the confederated chieftains to maintain their position on the frontier of the Nizam's possessions; and that the Resident would accordingly commence his journey to Aurungabad on the morning of the 31st.

37. The Resident immediately addressed a memorial to the Rajah of Berar, stating to that chieftain the substance of

his late communications with the Court of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and apprizing him of his determination to quit Scindiah's camp on the 31st of July, unless he should previously receive a satisfactory reply to Major-General Wellesley's requisitions.

38. On the night of the 30th of July the Resident received a note from Dowlut Rao Scindiah acknowledging the receipt of a copy of the Resident's memorial addressed to the Rajah of Berar, and requesting that the Resident would meet him at the tents of the Rajah of Berar on the following day, for the purpose of a further discussion of the depending questions.

39. To this note the Resident returned a verbal reply, signifying that he would transmit an answer from the place to which he proposed to march the following day. The Resident, however, being prevented by heavy rain from commencing his journey agreeably to his intention on the 31st, and having received from the Rajah of Berar a request similar to that which had been conveyed to him by Dowlut Rao Scindiah, the Resident complied with their united solicitations and met those chieftains on the evening of that day at the tents of the Rajah of Berar.

40. At this conference the same discussions which had passed on the former interviews were renewed, but were followed by several successive propositions on the part of those chieftains.*

41. Their first proposition was, that the united forces of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar should retire to Boorhaunpoor, and that the honourable Major-General Wellesley should withdraw the British troops to their usual stations. Your honourable Committee will not fail to remark the insidious nature of this proposition, which required that the British army should abandon the means which it possessed, in its actual position, and in its embodied state, of opposing a seasonable resistance to any hostile attempts on the part of the confederated chieftains, whilst those chieftains retired with their united armies to a short distance from the frontier of our ally, prepared to take advantage of the approaching favourable season, and of the absence and disper-

* See p. 274.

sion of the British forces for the successful prosecution of their military operations.

42. This unreasonable proposition being decidedly rejected by the Resident, the confederated chieftains next proposed that the Resident should appoint a day for the march of the respective forces of those chieftains from the place of their encampment, and that the Resident should pledge the faith of the British Government for the retreat of the army under Major-General Wellesley on the day on which the armies of the confederates should commence their return to their usual stations.

43. It is manifest that this proposition afforded no better security for the actual return of the armies of those chieftains to their usual stations, than a precarious dependance on those promises and professions which they had so repeatedly violated, independently of which consideration the Resident was not authorized to pledge the faith of Government to an arrangement inconsistent with the instructions which he had received from Major-General Wellesley.

44. Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar finally proposed that they should request Major-General Wellesley by letter to specify a day for withdrawing his army and for the removal of the confederated armies from their position on the Nizam's frontier, and that on the day so specified those chieftains would assuredly commence their march. Those chieftains further stated that they would in the same letter request Major-General Wellesley to specify the time when the forces under his command might be expected to reach their usual stations, and that the confederates would so regulate their marches as to arrive at their usual stations precisely at the same period of time.

45. This proposed modification of Major-General Wellesley's requisition evidently diminished the security to be derived from the previous separation and departure of the confederated armies, but those chieftains having declared that unless Major-General Wellesley should consent to that proposition, they could not retire consistently with a due regard to the honour and dignity of their respective governments, the Resident, after some discussion, consented to refer the proposition to the consideration of Major-General Wellesley, and to remain in Dowlut Rao Scindiah's camp until an answer

should be received, provided that letters from Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar to Major-General Wellesley to the effect proposed were sent to the Resident for transmission before noon on the following day.

46. On a review of the long and uniform course of systematic evasion and faithless policy recorded in the preceding detail, your honourable Committee will receive without surprize the information of an additional instance of violated faith and insincerity on the part of those chieftains on this occasion.

47. The ultimate proposition of those chieftains was distinctly "that on the day on which Major-General Wellesley should withdraw his troops from the station then occupied by the British army, those chieftains should separate their armies and commence their return to their respective territories in Berar and the north of Hindostan;" but in direct violation of the terms of that proposition, those chieftains transmitted letters to the Resident, addressed to Major-General Wellesley,* proposing to continue their armies united, and to limit their retreat to the neighbouring station of Boorhaunpoor, according to the terms of the proposition which had been fully discussed and positively rejected by Colonel Collins.

48. The Governor-General in council considers this gross violation of sincerity and public faith to be an additional instance of indignity offered by those chieftains to the British Government in the person of its Representative.

49. On the receipt of the Rajah of Berar's letter to the effect above described, the Resident made immediate arrangements for quitting the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and commenced his march towards Aurungabad on the 3rd of August.

50. The preceding detail affords a convincing proof of the justice, moderation, and forbearance which have regulated the conduct of the British Government during the course of the late important discussions with Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, and will satisfy your honourable Committee that the conduct of those chieftains has been actuated by a systematic design to employ the resources of their combined power and influence for the subversion of an arrangement founded on

* See General Wellesley's letter of the 6th of August. p. 273.

principles of undisputed equity and of acknowledged security to the rights and independance of those chieftains, at the hazard of a contest with the united power of the British Government and its allies; and that the object of their professions of amity, and their disavowal of any design to obstruct the execution of the treaty of Bassein, was to induce the British Government to abandon the arrangements and preparations necessary for the security of our rights and interests, or to suspend the prosecution of them until a change of season, and an accession of force should enable those chieftains to pursue their unwarrantable designs, with improved advantages and a better prospect of success.

51. The belief that those chieftains entertained designs hostile to the British Government at the earliest stages of negotiation between the Resident and Dowlut Rao Scindiah, is supported by the information which the Governor-General has from time to time received of the proceedings of that chieftain.

52. In a letter from the Resident dated 28th of February, and received on the 22nd of March, the Resident apprized the Governor-General in council that Ambajee Inglia (one of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's principal ministers) had informed one of the Resident's native agents, that orders had been issued to General Perron directing him to place the army under his command in a state of preparation for the field, with a view to an eventual rupture with the British Government.

53. At that time Ambajee Inglia was supposed to possess the greatest influence over the mind of Scindiah, whose proceedings were said to be principally regulated by the councils of that chieftain; it appeared highly improbable, therefore, that Ambajee would have communicated these orders to the Resident's agent if they had really been issued.

54. This circumstance induced the Governor-General to discredit the despatch of those orders, and to believe that the object of the communication was merely to discover the views and intentions of the British Government with respect to Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

55. Adverting also to the established power and ascendancy of the British Government in India, to the comparative weakness even of the combined power of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and of the Rajah of Berar, and to the peculiar disadvan-

tages under which those chieftains must enter upon a contest with the British arms, it could not reasonably be supposed that Dowlut Rao Scindiah meditated any hostile designs against the British Government, and this obvious consideration induced the Governor-General to discredit the rumours which at that time prevailed of the confederacy which that chieftain and the Rajah of Berar have since actually formed, for purposes hostile to the interests of the British Government. These indications of an hostile disposition on the part of those chieftains, therefore, did not appear to the Governor-General to be sufficiently manifest to warrant the immediate adoption of corresponding measures of precaution on the part of the British Government.

56. The concurrent testimony of facts, and the state of M. Perron's military force, however, which have subsequently been ascertained, induced the Governor-General to give entire credit to the information which the Resident communicated in the month of March respecting the despatch of orders to General Perron to the effect above described, even at that early stage of our negotiations with Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

57. In a letter from the Resident dated the 14th of June, and received on the 6th of July, the Resident transmitted a paper of intelligence from his agent at Delhi, stating that messengers from Dowlut Rao Scindiah had lately come to the Rohilla chieftain, Gholaum Mahomed Khan, who resides at Nadown, and letters had been received by that chieftain from General Perron inviting him to proceed with his followers towards the station of General Perron's army by the way of Suharunpore, for the purpose of exciting commotions in the Jaghire of Rampore, and assuring him of ample support both from Scindiah and General Perron, and that General Perron had clandestinely addressed letters to the principal persons residing in the Jaghire, and other places, urging them to employ their exertions in disturbing the tranquillity of the Company's possessions.

58. Notwithstanding Scindiah's solemn disavowal of the orders said to have been issued by his authority to the commanding officer of the body of horse despatched from Scindiah's camp to the north-western frontier of the Company's territories, and to the Peishwa's officers in Bundelcund for

the prosecution of hostile operations against the British territories, as noted in the 3rd paragraph of this letter, the Governor-General in council is induced, by the many instances of insincerity manifested by that chieftain, by the general tenor of his conduct, by the authenticity of the source of the Governor-General's information upon those subjects, and by circumstances which have subsequently been ascertained, to give entire credit to the intelligence originally received relative to those acts of aggression on the part of Scindiah.

59. Those facts were communicated to the collector of Allahabad by the express direction of Himmut Bahâdur (one of the Peishwa's officers in Bundelcund) to whom the letters of Scindiah were said to have been addressed, and who had previously transmitted proposals to the Governor-General for the transfer of that province to the authority of the British Government. The intelligence of the invitation to Gholaum Mahomed Khan from Dowlut Rao Scindiah and General Perron was corroborated by information repeatedly received and communicated to the Governor-General by the Resident at Lucknow and the agent of the Governor-General in the ceded provinces of Oude of the preparations of Gholaum Mahomed Khan for the avowed purpose of complying with the suggestions which he had received from Scindiah and General Perron to excite disturbances in the district of Rampore, and to disturb the tranquillity of the Vizier's and the Company's dominions; and on the 26th of July copies of letters from Dowlut Rao Scindiah to Gholaum Mahomed Khan and Bumboo Khan (the son of the late Nujeeb ou Dowlah, who occupies a territory in the vicinity of Suharunpore) declaring the intention of Scindiah to commence a war of aggression against the British power, and instigating that chieftain to co-operate with the forces of General Perron against the British possessions, were received by the Governor-General from Mr. Leycester, the collector of Moradabad, to whom they had been transmitted by Bumboo Khan.

60. A translation of those documents is enclosed for your honourable Committee's notice.*

61. Combining the tenor of those documents with the facts and arguments above stated, the Governor-General in council

* See p. 206.

entertains no doubt of the actual despatch of letters, in the terms of those documents, to the chieftains to whom they are stated to have been addressed by Dowlut Rao Scindiah. The Governor-General has, however, deemed it proper to adopt measures for the purpose of procuring the originals of those important papers.

62. Your honourable Committee will observe that these documents tend to confirm the original information received of the actual transmission of instructions from Scindiah to the Peishwa's officers in Bundelcund, and the communication of orders to Dhurrum Rao to the effect described in the third paragraph of this despatch. Those documents also state the nature of the directions issued by Scindiah to General Perron for the prosecution of hostilities against the British possessions.

63. It appears from a passage in those documents that the letters of Scindiah to Gholaum Mahomed Khan and Bumboo Khan, were written subsequently to the march of Dowlut Rao Scindiah from Boorhaunpore on the 4th of May; but the despatch of messengers to Gholaum Mahomed Khan and the transmission of the instructions to General Perron, under which that officer addressed letters to the principal persons in Rampore and other places as noticed in the 57th paragraph, must be referred to an earlier period of time. The complete state of preparation in which the army of General Perron was actually placed, is a corroborative evidence of the actual transmission of orders to that officer to the effect described in the 52nd paragraph of this letter.

64. These facts reciprocally confirm each point of the evidence of Scindiah's hostile projects, and combined with information at various times communicated by the Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, of the proceedings of that chieftain with the repeated rumours of the formation of an hostile confederacy between Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar and Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and with the tenor and result of the Resident's negotiations, must be considered to amount to full proof of the alleged design of subverting the alliance formed between the British Government and the Peishwa.

65. These proceedings of Dowlut Rao Scindiah indicate not merely the resolution of that chieftain to oppose the exe-

cution of the treaty of Bassein by force of arms, but collectively and separately constitute acts of hostility against the British Government.

66. At no period of time since the departure of the Peishwa from his capital have the transactions of the British Government been such as to justify even precautionary measures of military preparation on the part of Scindiah. From those transactions no argument could arise to justify the adoption of measures either of hostility or precaution on the part of the confederated chieftains, unless such an argument could be deduced from a denial of the right of his Highness the Peishwa to contract defensive engagements with a foreign state without the participation of the feudatory chieftains of the Mahratta empire, or from a conviction that the engagements actually concluded with his Highness were injurious to the acknowledged rights of those chieftains.

67. Various precedents might be adduced of the exercise of that right by his Highness the Peishwa in his negotiations with the British Government, and the uniform course of the political and military proceedings of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and of his predecessor Mahdajee Scindiah, affords numerous instances of the exercise of a similar right on the part of those chieftains, independently of the Peishwa, to whose authority they have invariably acknowledged obedience.

68. This question has been fully discussed in the Governor-General's instructions to the Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, dated the 3d of June.

69. The treaty of Bassein is purely defensive, and not only contains no stipulations injurious to the rights of the feudatory Mahratta chieftains, but provides additional security for those rights.

70. In the course of the negotiations between the Resident and Dowlut Rao Scindiah, that chieftain maintained that in his capacity of guarantee to the treaty of Salbye, he ought to have been consulted previously to the conclusion of engagements with the Peishwa. The Resident successfully opposed that operation by the arguments stated in the Governor-General's instructions of the 11th of February, and maintained the right of the Peishwa to conclude engagements without the participation of the feudatory chieftains, upon the obvious principles of acknowledged supremacy, and approved and

established precedent; and at a conference between Scindiah and the Resident on the 23d of March, on the subject of the engagements concluded with the Peishwa, Dowlut Rao Scindiah abandoned that ground of argument, and merely contended that the Peishwa ought to have apprized that chieftain of the terms of the treaty concluded between his Highness and the British Government.

71. At that period of time the details of the treaty of Bassein had not been communicated to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, but he was informed that it was purely of a defensive nature, and on that occasion Scindiah assured the Resident, in the most unequivocal terms, that he had no intention to attempt the subversion of any engagements concluded between the British Government and the Peishwa, yet measures of decided hostility against the British Government were adopted by Dowlut Rao Scindiah in the ensuing months of April and May.

72. No military preparations founded on a distrust of that chieftain's pacific disposition were commenced on the part of the British Government, until the close of the month of June, and even the army under the command of Major-General Wellesley, did not commence its march from Poonah until the beginning of that month.

73. It is manifest therefore, that the hostile measures pursued by Dowlut Rao Scindiah against the British Government, have been adopted on grounds distinct from any denial of the Peishwa's right to contract his late engagements with the British Government, from the alleged existence of any stipulation in those engagements injurious to the rights of the Mahratta feudatories, and from any apprehension of the effect of any measures either of precaution, or of apparent hostility on the part of the British Government.

74. The conduct of Dowlut Rao Scindiah towards the Peishwa during a long course of time antecedent to the Peishwa's degradation from the musnud of Poonah, and the views which that chieftain and the Rajah of Berar are known to have entertained, with respect to the supreme authority of the Mahratta state, afford the means of forming a correct judgment of the motives which may have rendered those chieftains desirous of subverting the treaty of Bassein, although they had admitted that treaty to be equitable in its general

principle, and to furnish additional security for the just rights of the feudatory chieftains of the Mahratta empire, and especially for their own.

75. The whole course of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's proceedings, since his accession to the dominions of Mahdajee Scindiah, has manifested a systematic design of establishing an ascendancy in the Mahratta state upon the ruins of the Peishwa's authority.

76. The government in the person of the Peishwa had long been placed under a degrading subjection to the oppressive control and unwarrantable usurpation of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, who had remained with a numerous army in the vicinity of the Peishwa's capital for a considerable period of time.

77. The usurpation of Scindiah existed in full force at the commencement of the last war between the Company and Tippoo Sultaun, and the undue influence of Scindiah in the Mahratta empire in that crisis, not only deprived the British Government of every benefit from the nominal alliance of the Peishwa at the commencement and during the progress of the war, but afforded positive encouragement to the cause of Tippoo Sultaun, and menaced the Nizam's dominions previously to the expulsion of the French from Hyderabad in October, 1798, and subsequently in 1799 while the Nizam's contingent was actually employed with the British army in the common cause of the triple alliance against Tippoo Sultaun.

78. At that time Scindiah was restrained from the actual invasion of the Nizam's dominions by the direct interposition of the British Government; his influence however, and the terror of his violence and supposed power continued to rule the Court of Poonah, and to alarm the Court of Hyderabad, until the exigency of his affairs in the north of Hindostan, occasioned principally by the successful progress of Jeswunt Rao Holkar's arms, compelled Dowlut Rao Scindiah to retire from Poonah for the protection of his own territories.

79. The complete establishment of Holkar's authority at Poonah by the defeat of Scindiah's troops required the utmost exertion of Scindiah's power against that active and successful enemy.

80. Had Scindiah succeeded in subverting the power of

Holkar, it cannot be doubted that he would have taken advantage of that success for the complete establishment of his own undue authority in the state of Poonah. He would probably have reinstated the Peishwa Bajee Rao in the government or would have raised another to the musnud, to be the pageant of his own power, or would have usurped the supreme ministerial authority in his own name, if the disposition of the other chieftains of the Mahratta empire should have encouraged an expectation of their acquiescence in that ambitious project.

81. The uniform tenor of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's conduct, the invariable principles of Asiatic policy, and the personal character, habits and disposition of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, preclude the supposition that he would have abandoned the absolute power which he would have acquired by the subversion of Holkar's usurpation, and would have adopted the liberal policy of restoring the exiled Peishwa to the exercise of the established authority of the empire.

82. In the moment of alarm which succeeded the signal success of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, Dowlut Rao Scindiah indirectly solicited the co-operation of the British Government, under the pretext of restoring the Peishwa's authority. He probably expected that the aid of a detachment of British troops would have insured his success against Holkar, without controlling his project of restoring his own undue ascendancy at Poonah on a more secure and extensive basis. It now appears that the active and powerful exertions employed by the British Government at the express solicitation of his Highness the Peishwa, for his Highness's complete restoration to the musnud of Poonah, were neither desired nor expected by Dowlut Rao Scindiah. The actual re-establishment of the Peishwa in the government of Poonah under the exclusive protection of the British power and the conclusion of engagements calculated to secure to his Highness the due exercise of his legitimate authority on a permanent foundation, deprived Dowlut Rao Scindiah of every hope of accomplishing the objects of his ambition, injustice and rapacity, so long as that alliance should be successfully maintained.

83. This statement of facts sufficiently explains the anxiety of Dowlut Rao Scindiah to effect the subversion of an arrangement, the justice and equity of which he was compelled

to acknowledge, and for that chieftain's unprovoked prosecution of hostile designs against the British Government and its allies.

84. Adverting to the manifest design of Dowlut Rao Scindiah to aggrandize his power by annexing the dominion and resources of the Peishwa to his own, your honourable Committee will concur in the expediency of supporting an arrangement calculated to preclude the dangerous consolidation of the power and resources of two rival branches of the Mahratta state, in the hands of an ambitious and enterprizing chieftain, whose disposition is hostile to the British Government, and whose dominion has been established and maintained on the most vulnerable part of our north-western frontier in Hindostan, by a formidable military force under the exclusive command of French officers.

85. The motives which must be supposed to have influenced the Rajah of Berar in combining his power with that of Dowlut Rao Scindiah for the subversion of the alliance concluded between the British Government and the Peishwa, were manifestly similar to those which actuated the conduct of Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

86. The Rajah of Berar has always maintained pretensions to the supreme ministerial authority in the Mahratta empire, founded on his affinity to the reigning Rajah of Satara, and in the course of a conference with the native Secretary of the Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah on the 10th of June,* the Rajah of Berar distinctly avowed those pretensions.

87. Convinced that the permanency of the defensive alliance concluded between the British Government and the Peishwa, would preclude all future opportunity of accomplishing the object of his ambition, the Rajah of Berar appears to have been equally concerned with Dowlut Rao Scindiah in the subversion of that alliance.

88. Although the views ascribed to those chieftains were manifestly incompatible with the accomplishment of their respective designs, the removal of an obstacle which would effectually preclude the success of either chieftain in obtaining an ascendancy at Poonah, constituted an object of com-

* See p. 170.

mon interest to both. It appears also to be highly probable that those chieftains, sensible that the combination of their power afforded the only prospect of subverting the alliance concluded between the British Government and the Peishwa, agreed to compromise their respective and contradictory projects, by an arrangement for the partition of the whole power and dominion of the Mahratta state.

89. But whatever may have been the specific objects of Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, the operation of the treaty of Bassein was evidently calculated to preclude the accomplishment of any ambitious projects on the part of those chieftains, and to confine their power and authority within the just limits of their respective dominions.

90. Under this view of the subject, a sufficient cause will be discovered of the hostile conduct of those chieftains, although no just ground of complaint should even have been alleged by them against the British Government, nor any design imputed to us in any degree injurious to the security of the acknowledged rights and independence of Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar.

91. The inability of those chieftains to allege any ground of complaint against the British Government or its allies, affords the most unequivocal proof of the justice and moderation of our proceedings.

92. The mere junction of the armies of Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar upon the frontier of the dominions of our ally, for any purpose unconnected with the security of the rights of those chieftains, would have compelled the British Government to demand the removal of those armies from that menacing position, and would have required the adoption of measures of precaution on our part; and the refusal of those chieftains to comply with that demand, would have justified an appeal to arms, for the security of our interests and those of our allies. Under actual circumstances, no other security for the pacific conduct of those chieftains could have been accepted, than such as should deprive them of the power of prosecuting with success the designs which they manifestly entertained against the rights and interests of the British Government and its allies.

93. The Governor-General in Council deems it proper in this place to state, in a distinct and connected form, the lead-

ing facts of the late transactions, which have terminated in a dissolution of the relations of amity between the British Government and the confederated chieftains, Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar.

94. When his Highness the Peishwa had been compelled by the violence and usurpation of a subject of his Government to abandon his capital, his Highness solicited and obtained the aid of the British power for the restoration of his authority, and concluded engagements with the British Government calculated to secure his Highness's rights and independence against the hostile designs of any foreign or domestic enemy. Those engagements not only contained no stipulations injurious to the just rights of the feudatory chieftains of the Mahratta empire, but provided additional security for the unmolested exercise of those rights.

95. After Dowlut Rao Scindiah had distinctly expressed his concurrence in the propriety of the measures adopted by the British Government for the restoration of the Peishwa's authority, and had been assured by the Resident, in the name of the British Government, that those engagements were merely of a defensive nature; and after Dowlut Rao Scindiah had abandoned the untenable assertion that the Peishwa did not possess the right to conclude such engagements without the concurrence of the Mahratta feudatories, that chieftain persisted in soliciting the junction of the Rajah of Berar with the whole body of his forces, for the purpose of eventually employing their united power and resources to subvert the arrangements concluded between the British Government and the Peishwa; and in conformity to Dowlut Rao Scindiah's solicitation, the Rajah of Berar commenced his march for the purpose of effecting the proposed junction of their numerous armies in a menacing position on the frontier of the ally of the British Government.

96. Your honourable Committee will not fail to observe, that these measures were not adopted by those chieftains with a view to the defence of their rights and interests, against any apprehended design on the part of the British Government to injure or invade them, nor to the protection or internal settlement of their possessions in the vicinity of the Nizam's dominions. Those measures were avowedly con-

certed for the express purpose of enabling those chieftains to carry into effect their eventual resolution, to undertake a war of aggression against the British Government and its allies.

97. Under these indications of hostility on the part of those chieftains, the British Government merely required that they should retire with their armies to their usual stations in Berar and the north of Hindostan, proposing that the British army in the Deccan should also retire in a similar manner.

98. At the moment when Dowlut Rao Scindiah, after being apprized of all the stipulations of the treaty of Bassein, acknowledged that it contained no provisions injurious to the rights of the feudatory chieftains, that chieftain publicly declared to the Resident,* that the question of peace or war with the British Government, depended upon the result of a conference with the Rajah of Berar, whose arrival at the head of the whole body of his forces in the vicinity of Scindiah's camp, was then daily expected.

99. The Governor-General in council requests your honourable Committee's attention to the hostile and insulting nature of this declaration. Occupying a position with the whole body of his forces near the frontier of our ally, Scindiah publicly declared in open Durbar, to the representative of the British Government, that he awaited the arrival of the Rajah of Berar at the head of a numerous army on the frontier of the dominions of our ally, for the purpose of deciding whether the united arms of those confederated chieftains should be employed in the prosecution of a war of aggression against the British Government and its allies. The armies of these chieftains effected the proposed junction, and the chieftains met for the purpose, avowed by Scindiah, of deciding "whether it should be peace or war with the Company." After the junction of their armies, those chieftains continued by systematic delays and evasions, to withhold any declaration with regard to the nature of their designs during a period of two months, and although at the expiration of that period of time, the confederated chieftains disavowed all intention of obstructing the complete execution of the treaty of Bassein,

* On the 28th of May.

they refused to abandon the arrangement avowedly adopted and the position occupied for the eventual prosecution of hostilities against the British Government.

100. It is proper to observe, that during the whole course of the negotiation between the Resident and Dowlut Rao Scindiah, that chieftain and the Rajah of Berar employed their most assiduous endeavours to induce Jeswunt Rao Holkar to unite in the confederacy, and to form a junction with the allied armies; and those chieftains even assigned the depending negotiation with Jeswunt Rao Holkar as a cause for maintaining their united armies in the position from which they were required to retreat.

101. From the preceding detail the following facts are established—

First. That according to the evidence of facts, and to the distinct avowal of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and the Rajah of Berar, those chieftains had no cause of complaint against the British Government, nor any reason to apprehend that their just rights and interests were exposed to hazard, by the arrangements concluded between the British Government and the Peishwa.

Secondly. That the junction and continuance of the armies of those chieftains on the frontier of the Nizam, was avowedly unnecessary for any purpose connected with the security of their rights, or with the protection or internal arrangement of any part of their territorial possessions.

Thirdly. That the general conduct and language of those chieftains indicated designs of an hostile nature against the British Government and its allies, the Peishwa and the Nizam; and that Scindiah had distinctly declared, that he and the Rajah of Berar meditated eventual war.

Fourthly. That those chieftains assembled their armies in a menacing position on the frontier of our ally the Nizam, for the purpose of enabling them eventually to carry those designs into execution.

Fifthly. That those chieftains proceeded to acts of direct hostility, by a public and insulting menace of war against the British Government, and by various preparations and arrangements, hostile to the British Government and its allies, not only without any cause of complaint deducible from the measures and proceedings of the British Government, or of its

allies, but under a distinct acknowledgment of the inoffensive nature of our arrangements with the Peishwa, and an avowed conviction of our pacific intentions.

Sixthly. That the hostile nature of the proceedings of those chieftains and their repeated violation of public faith, precluded all reliance on their promises and professions, and rendered it the duty of the British Government to require the separation and return of their armies to their respective territories, as the only security to the rights and interests of the British Government and its allies, against the meditated designs of those confederated chieftains.

Seventhly. That this requisition was accompanied by a proposal to withdraw the British army from its advanced and commanding position at Ahmednuggur in the Deccan, and that such a proposal was not only an incontrovertible proof of the just and pacific views of the British Government, but furnished ample security to the confederated chieftains against the possibility of any danger which could be apprehended by them from their compliance with our requisition.

102. The preceding statement sufficiently demonstrates the equity of the arrangements concluded with the state of Poonah, and the justice and moderation manifested by the British Government in carrying those arrangements into effect. It may however, be expedient to submit to your honourable Committee, some observations with regard to the general policy of the alliance which has been concluded between the British Government and the Peishwa, and to the period of time, at which that important arrangement was accomplished.

103. The grounds on which the policy of concluding subsidiary engagements with the state of Poonah, similar to those which were concluded with the Nizam on the 1st of September 1798 is founded, were originally stated in the Governor-General's instructions to the Resident at Hyderabad, under date the 8th of July 1798 of which a copy was transmitted to your honourable Committee with our despatch of the 23d of August 1798 and that subject was resumed in our despatch of the 18th of January 1800 which communicated to your honourable Committee the details of the unsuccessful negotiations between the British Government and the Peishwa, for the conclusion of subsidiary engagements after the

termination of the war with Tippoo Sultaun; and those principles were further detailed in the Governor-General's separate letter to your honourable Committee, under date the 9th of June 1800.

104. Your honourable Committee on various occasions has intimated to the Governor-General in council, your concurrence in the principles of that policy, and in the 22d paragraph of your honourable Committee's despatch of the 10th of September 1800, your honourable Committee expressed your approbation of the basis of the proposed arrangements with the state of Poonah. Your honourable Committee on that occasion signified to the Governor-General in council your opinion, that with a view to secure the important objects of those arrangements, the subsidiary force stationed at Poonah, should not be less than 6,000 regular infantry, with the usual proportion of artillery.

105. The Governor-General's acceptance of the propositions of the Court of Poonah in 1799, for subsidizing a force consisting of two battalions of native infantry, was founded on the expectation that such an arrangement must necessarily lead to the introduction of a subsidiary force on a more enlarged scale.

106. The extent of the subsidiary force actually stationed with his Highness the Peishwa, is conformable to the intimation of your honourable Committee; and at the express desire of the Peishwa, the amount of the subsidiary force to be stationed at Poonah, has been augmented since the conclusion of the treaty of Bassein, by the addition of a regiment of cavalry; it will be desirable to augment the detachment at Poonah still further, until it shall be equal to that at Hyderabad, which now consists of one regiment of European infantry, six battalions of native infantry, and two regiments of native cavalry.

107. The general defensive engagements concluded with the Nizam, in the year 1800, and subsequently proposed to the acceptance of the Peishwa, were founded on the same principles, and were calculated to provide improved means of accomplishing the original objects of the projected system of alliance between the British Government and the states of Hyderabad and Poonah.

108. The detail of the improved arrangements at Hydera-

bad, was communicated to your honourable Committee in our despatch of the 31st of August, 1800.

109. Although the Governor-General in council has not been honoured by any intimation of your honourable Committee's sentiments on the subject of the arrangements concluded at Hyderabad in October 1800, your honourable Committee's previous concurrence in the principles, on which those arrangements were founded, and in the importance of the objects to which they were directed, has satisfied the Governor-General in council, that your honourable Committee would approve the resolution of the Governor-General, to avail himself of any favourable opportunity of reviving the negotiation for the conclusion of defensive and subsidiary engagements with the state of Poonah, similar to those which were concluded with the Nizam in the month of October, 1800.

110. The progress of events both in Europe and in Asia since that period of time, has tended to urge the expediency of the proposed alliance with his Highness the Peishwa, and the endeavours of the Governor-General have accordingly been assiduously employed for the accomplishment of that desirable arrangement.

111. The Governor-General's instructions to the Resident at Poonah, of the 23d of June, 1802,* a copy which accompanied the Governor-General's despatch to your honourable Committee of the 24th of December 1802,† contains a review of the various unsuccessful attempts of the British Government to engage the Peishwa's consent to the proposed alliance; and of the considerations, which rendered the improvement of our political connection with the state of Poonah, an object of essential importance to the complete security of the British empire in India.

112. The justice of those considerations was confirmed, and the policy of accomplishing the proposed alliance, was augmented by the events which subsequently occurred in the Mahratta empire.

113. After the power of the Peishwa had been annihilated by the success of Holkar against the united arms of the Peishwa and Dowlut Rao Scindiah, it could not be expected

* See p. 12. † See p. 3.

that his Highness would have been restored to the efficient exercise of his authority, either by Jeswunt Rao Holkar, or by Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

114. The design of the former chieftain to engross the whole power and authority of the state of Poonah, was demonstrated by his actual usurpation, and by the project which he formed and endeavoured to accomplish, of placing on the musnud of Poonah a new Peishwa, or of restoring Bajee Rao to the musnud, under circumstances which would have secured to Holkar the whole military power, and civil authority of the state. It cannot be doubted, that motives of ambition and of inveterate enmity against Dowlut Rao Scindiah would in that event have induced Jeswunt Rao Holkar to direct his arms against the possessions of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and the accession of military power and resources which Holkar would have acquired by the permanent establishment of his authority in the state of Poonah, would probably have enabled him to prosecute his views of conquest with success.

115. If the arms of Dowlut Rao Scindiah had ultimately triumphed over those of Holkar, the power and resources of the state of Poonah, together with those of Holkar, would have been added to his own.

116. Adverting to the consideration stated in the preceding paragraph, your honourable Committee will not fail to appreciate the peculiar danger to which the British interest would have been exposed, by such an accession of power in the hands of Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

117. No ultimate issue of the distractions at that time existing in the Mahratta empire could reasonably be supposed, which would not have consolidated under one head, a degree of power and dominion dangerous to the British Government, to the extent in which the balance of contending interests in the Mahratta empire should have been disturbed, and in proportion to the means which a power so consolidated would possess, of eventually co-operating with the Government of France in hostile designs against the British empire in India.

118. Those convulsions in the state might possibly have continued for some time, and might have afforded a temporary security to the British Government against any hostile designs on the part of the Mahrattas, either singly or united with an European power. But the effects of such confusion must

speedily have extended to the contiguous dominions of our ally the Nizam, and ultimately to those of the Company, and would have compelled the British Government to engage in the contest.

119. The establishment of Holkar's power at Poonah, would probably occasion demands on the part of that chieftain upon his Highness the Nizam; but even under a contrary supposition, it is demonstrable from the state of the country, that Holkar could not long have maintained an army in the Deccan, without invading the dominions either of the Nizam, or of the Company.

120. The territory around Poonah, to a considerable extent, having been entirely desolated by the troops of Holkar, that chieftain would have been compelled to invade the territories of the Nizam, or to penetrate into the country situated to the southward of the river Kistna for the subsistence of his numerous troops and followers.

121. The adoption of the latter alternative would have retarded for some time the predatory incursions of Holkar's troops into the territory of the Nizam or of the Company. But when the immediate resources of the Peishwa's southern provinces should have been exhausted, Holkar would have been compelled to draw the means of subsistence for his troops from the plunder of the Company's contiguous territories, on the resources of which we must principally have depended for the supply of our troops in the contest which that irruption would have rendered inevitable. If, therefore, the British Government had not adopted measures for the restoration of the Peishwa's authority, either the Company's territories, or those of our ally the Nizam, would have been exposed to all the evils of war, while neither the Company nor the Nizam under such circumstances could have possessed the means which both now command, of averting the war from their own dominions, and of accelerating its prosperous conclusion by a vigorous system of attack upon the enemy.

122. The restoration of the Peishwa, therefore, under the protection of the British power, was a measure indispensably requisite for the defence, not only of the territories of our allies, but of our own possessions bordering the Mahratta dominions in the peninsula of India.

123. The continuance of the existing convulsions in the Mahratta empire would have afforded a favourable opportunity to the Government of France for the successful prosecution of its favourite object of establishing a dominion within the peninsula of Hindostan, by the introduction of a military force to aid the cause of one of the contending parties; and the views of France would have been favoured by the strength of M. Perron's forces established in the Doab of the Jumna and Ganges, at Agra, Delhi, and in the Punjab, and by the facility of communicating with the maritime possessions retained by Scindiah in Guzzerat. The security and tranquillity of the British empire in India, therefore, might ultimately have been endangered, as much by the effects of a protracted warfare in the Mahratta state, as by the immediate consolidation of a dangerous extent of power and dominion in the hands of one of the contending parties.

124. While the views of the Government of France shall be directed to the establishment of its authority within the peninsula of Hindostan, it is manifestly the policy of the British Government to accomplish such a system of alliances with the powers of India as may preclude the occurrence of those internal convulsions which would afford to France the most favourable opportunity of effecting her ambitious purpose. Independently of this consideration, the prosecution of such a system of alliance is prudent and advisable in the degree in which the tranquillity and prosperity of our dominion is endangered by the disturbed and distracted condition of neighbouring states.

125. The restoration of the Peishwa, therefore, to the just exercise of his authority under the protection of the British Government, and the conclusion of defensive and subsidiary engagements with his Highness, afforded the only means of precluding the dangers to be apprehended, either from the consolidation of a formidable power, or from the continuance of the distractions in the Mahratta empire.

126. In a letter which the Governor-General addressed to the honourable the Court of Directors, under date the 3d of August, 1799, containing a review of the interests, the power, and disposition of the several states of India under the change produced in the relative condition of those states by the conquest of Mysore, the Governor-General expressed his opinion

that a consolidation of the powers of the Mahratta empire was highly improbable, and that it would require a most violent exercise of injustice and oppression on our part to dispose the suspicious and cautious counsels of the Court of Poonah to favour the progress of a French force in India.

127. That opinion was amply justified by the situation of affairs in the Mahratta empire at that period of time; since that time, however, the internal condition of the Mahratta empire has suffered a material change.

128. The ascendancy which Scindiah had then established in the state of Poonah was not such as to menace the actual dissolution of the constitutional form of the Mahratta empire, or to produce a civil war amongst its component branches; and the contending interests of the several feudatory chieftains appeared to afford a sufficient security against any dangerous consolidation of the Mahratta power.

129. Since that time a new power has arisen in the Mahratta state, under the direction of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, which acquired sufficient strength to endanger the stability of all the principal feudatory states, and was actually directed to the subversion of the constitutional form of the empire.

130. If the progress of the contest which ensued between that chieftain, the Peishwa, and Dowlut Rao Scindiah, had not been checked by the seasonable interposition of the British power for the restoration of the Peishwa's legitimate authority, it is reasonable to conclude that in the moment of extreme danger the Peishwa, or either of those chieftains, would have been disposed to accept the aid of a French force for the support of his cause, and that the contest would either have terminated in the consolidation of a formidable power in the Mahratta state, accompanied by the complete establishment of the authority of France in the peninsula of India, or would have required the interposition of our arms after the aid of the French had actually strengthened one of the belligerent powers, and had consequently increased the difficulty, expense, and hazard of the war.

131. The security, therefore, which the British Government might be supposed to derive from a balance of power and interests among the Mahratta states, and from the jealousy which the Mahratta nation has uniformly entertained of the influence and ascendancy of any European power,

ceased to exist, and that security has been still further diminished by the augmented solidity and actual independence which the French force in the service of Dowlut Rao Scindiah has gradually acquired since the termination of the war with Tippoo Sultaun.

132. After the expulsion of the Peishwa from his capital, not only the Peishwa, but Dowlut Rao Scindiah and Jeswunt Rao Holkar afforded the most unequivocal proof that the characteristic jealousy of the Mahratta states would not have deterred those chieftains from having recourse to the aid of France if an opportunity should have occurred in any crisis of affairs in which their danger or their interest should have suggested the expediency of such a measure.

133. The Peishwa directly solicited and obtained the aid of the British power for the restoration of his authority, Dowlut Rao Scindiah indirectly invited our co-operation ostensibly for the same purpose, and Jeswunt Rao Holkar in his own name and in that of Amrut Rao signified his consent to the terms of alliance which had been proposed to the Peishwa on the condition of our support.

134. If the danger or the interest of those chieftains was so urgent as to induce them to seek the aid and alliance of an European state, of which the established power, extensive dominion, and unrivalled ascendancy in India had been the peculiar object of the jealousy and apprehension of the Mahratta states, it may reasonably be supposed that in such a crisis of affairs any of those chieftains would have been still more disposed to accept the aid of a military force from the French, who, being destitute of any regular establishment in India, could not in the same degree with the British Government be an object of jealousy and apprehension to the native powers, and especially to the Mahrattas.

135. If, therefore, the British Government had refused to the Peishwa the aid which he solicited, it is reasonable to conclude that his Highness would have availed himself of any opportunity which might have occurred for obtaining the assistance and co-operation of a French military force, and the peace existing at that time with France, might have afforded a favourable opportunity to the French power in India for aiding the Peishwa or any of the contending parties

in the Mahratta empire. Admitting, however, that the characteristic jealousy of the Mahratta nation might deter any of the Mahratta chieftains from accepting the aid of a considerable body of European troops furnished by the Government of France, it cannot be doubted that in a situation of emergency any of those chieftains would be disposed to receive into their service a number of French adventurers to be employed in improving the discipline of their armies, and in augmenting the strength and efficiency of their military establishments. The evils which have arisen from the employment of French officers in the service of the native powers have been abundantly manifested in the gradual establishment of the formidable French force in the dominions of his Highness the Nizam, which was happily dissolved under the operation of the treaty concluded with his Highness in the year 1798, and in the growth and extension of the force lately under the direction of M. Perron.

136. In the actual situation of affairs no argument unfavourable to the policy of our engagements with the Peishwa could justly be deduced from the jealousy with which the other Mahratta states might be expected to contemplate the establishment of the British influence in the state of Poonah. The dangers which eventually menaced the security of the British dominion in India under the circumstances above described, far exceeded any which could be apprehended from the effects of that jealousy, and could only have been averted by the interposition of the British power for the restoration of order and tranquillity in the Mahratta state.

137. From the preceding remarks it appears that the acknowledged policy of contracting defensive and subsidiary engagements with the state of Poonah was never so urgent as at the moment when those engagements were actually concluded, and the course of recent transactions in the Mahratta empire (as detailed in the several despatches from the Governor-General to your honourable Committee) combined with the relative power of the British Government and of the confederated chiefs, with the commanding position of our armies, and with the exposed condition of the territories of Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar at that period of time, constituted a crisis of affairs apparently favourable to the pacific accom-

plishment of that arrangement, or to the complete success of our arms in the event of opposition on the part of Scindiah or the Rajah of Berar.

138. The Governor-General in council now proceeds to state to your honourable Committee the progress of the British arms in the contest in which this Government has been unavoidably involved with the confederated Mahratta chieftains.

139. The compass of this despatch will not admit the immediate communication to your honourable Committee of the detailed instructions issued by the Governor-General to his Excellency the commander-in-chief on the several points of political arrangement described in the Governor-General's despatch to his Excellency of the 27th of July. Those details will be transmitted to your honourable Committee by a sea conveyance: it is sufficient to state on the present occasion that every measure has been suggested and adopted which the judgment of the Governor-General in council could devise for the successful accomplishment of those arrangements.

140. On the 7th of August his Excellency the commander-in-chief commenced his march with the main body of the British army in the ceded provinces from Cawnpore.

141. On the 28th of August the commander-in-chief received a letter from General Perron indicating a desire on the part of that officer to effect an arrangement which might preclude the necessity of an actual contest between the British forces and those under the command of General Perron. It is proper to apprize your honourable Committee that General Perron had some time before preferred an application to the British Government for permission to enter the British territories, in prosecution of his intention to retire from the service of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, with which application the Governor-General immediately complied. Subsequent events, however, prevented General Perron from availing himself of that permission. The commander-in-chief replied to General Perron's letter by desiring him to despatch a confidential agent to his Excellency for the purpose of conferring on the subject of General Perron's letter. A person on the part of M. Perron accordingly met the commander-in-chief on the morning of the 29th of August, but having evaded the pro-

positions of the commander-in-chief for the surrender of M. Perron, he departed without effecting any arrangement.

142. On the 29th of August the British army arrived in the vicinity of Coel, the principal station in the territory under the authority of General Perron. The forces of General Perron were drawn up in a strong position near the Fort of Allyghur, and were immediately attacked by the British army with the utmost degree of skill, gallantry, and spirit. This vigorous attack compelled the enemy to retreat, after a very slight resistance.

143. On the 4th of September the fort of Allyghur, hitherto deemed impregnable, was attacked and carried by assault, by a detachment from the British army.

144. Your honourable Committee will unite with the Governor-General in council in applauding the extraordinary activity, valour, and perseverance displayed by the British troops on this memorable occasion.

145. To enable your honourable Committee to form a judgment of the importance of this acquisition, we have the honour to annex to this despatch copies of letters which were found in the fort after its capture.

146. On the 7th of September the commander-in-chief received a letter from General Perron, renewing his application for permission to retire within the Company's territories, with which application the commander-in-chief, with his usual judgment and promptitude, deemed it proper immediately to comply.

147. The Governor-General considered the retirement of General Perron in the present crisis of affairs to be an event highly favourable to the success of the British arms, and to the interests of the British Government in India. The defection of that officer, may be expected to relieve the surrounding states and chieftains, from the dread which they entertained of his power, and to encourage them to manifest the desire which they are generally believed to entertain, of emancipating themselves from the control of the Mahratta power, by co-operating with the British forces. This event must also diminish the confidence which the native powers of India, have been accustomed to repose in the fidelity of their French officers.

148. On the 8th of September the Fort of Koorja, which the commander-in-chief represents to be of considerable strength, was evacuated.

149. The Governor-General in council has the highest satisfaction in transmitting to your honourable Committee the accompanying printed copies of letters* from his Excellency the commander-in-chief, dated the 11th, 12th, and 13th of September, containing the important intelligence of the entire defeat of the Mahratta army under the command of M. Louis, in the vicinity of Delhi. The glory of this most brilliant and decisive victory has not been exceeded by any of the numerous achievements which have established the reputation of the British arms in this quarter of the globe.

150. By this distinguished success the French force established in the dominions of Dowlut Rao Scindiah may be considered to be completely destroyed. Your honourable Committee will not fail to appreciate the importance of this event under the actual renewal of war between Great Britain and France.

151. The Governor-General in council has the further satisfaction of apprizing your honourable Committee that the inhabitants of the Mahratta territory through which the British army has passed, have uniformly testified the utmost joy at the success of our arms, and have been active in furnishing supplies and provisions to the British troops.

152. Several of the chieftains, subjects or tributaries to the Mahratta Government, have expressed to the commander-in-chief their desire to place themselves under the protection of the British Government, and to co-operate with the British forces; and every reason exists to justify an expectation that their example will be followed by many of the Seik chieftains and others, whom the power and ascendancy of General Perron in that quarter of India had compelled to yield a reluctant acquiescence in the requisition of that officer for the aid of their respective forces in the present contest.

153. Rajah Runjeet Sing, the Rajah of Lahore and the principal amongst the Seik chieftains, has transmitted proposals to the commander-in-chief for the transfer of the territory belonging to that nation south of the river Sutledge, on

* Advertisements of the 23rd, 24th, and 25th of September.

the condition of mutual defence against the respective enemies of that chieftain and of the British nation.

154. His Majesty Shah Allum has manifested the utmost solicitude to avail himself of the protection of the British power, and your honourable Committee will anticipate from the contents of the commander-in-chief's despatch of the 12th of September, the probability that his Majesty's person and authority will speedily be entrusted to the defence of the British power, and that the honourable Company will soon obtain in the eyes of all the native states of India, the distinguished honour which must attend the deliverance of that aged and unfortunate monarch from a condition of the utmost degree of misery and degradation, and his restoration under the protection of the British Government to a state of dignity, competency and comfort.

155. The Governor-General in council is happy to inform your honourable Committee that no event has occurred to counterbalance these brilliant successes. Five companies of sepoys under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Coningham, occupied a small frontier post at Shekohabad. That inconsiderable body of troops was attacked on the 2nd of September by a numerous detachment of cavalry under the command of a Frenchman named Fleury, and succeeded in compelling the enemy to retreat, but being again attacked on the 4th of September by the same superior force, and having nearly expended its ammunition, the party of British troops capitulated to the enemy. On the receipt of this intelligence his Excellency the commander-in-chief detached a considerable body of cavalry and infantry to oppose the Mahratta troops under the command of M. Fleury, and the Governor-General in council has since had the satisfaction to learn that the approach of that detachment, combined with the fall of the fortress of Allyghur, induced M. Fleury to retire precipitately with the troops under his command across the Jumna; those troops have since dispersed.

156. The Governor-General in council now proceeds to communicate to your honourable Committee the course of military operations on the western side of India.

157. The honourable Major-General Wellesley who occupied a position within one march of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's fortress of Ahmednuggur, having received intelligence of the

issue of the Resident's negotiation, commenced his march towards that fortress on the 8th of August, and the same day attacked and carried by escalade the fortified town of Ahmednuggur. On the 10th of August the batteries of the British army opened against the fort, which was surrendered on the 12th instant. For the details of this brilliant and important success, the Governor-General in council has the honour to refer your honourable Committee to the enclosed publication,* issued by the authority of the Governor-General in council, and the accompanying printed copy† of Major-General Wellesley's despatch to the Governor-General of the 12th of August.

158. The possession of this fortress is of peculiar importance to the prosecution of our military operations, by securing the communication with Poonah, and by affording a depôt for supplies of provisions and military stores.

159. In the interval of time between the 12th and 21st of August, the date of the latest advices from that officer, Major-General Wellesley took possession of all the districts dependent on Ahmednuggur, yielding an estimated annual revenue of six lacs, thirty-four thousand rupees; those districts were placed under the temporary management of a British officer.

160. On the 21st of August, a part of the force under the command of Major-General Wellesley had crossed, and the remainder was crossing the river Godaveree, on its march towards the enemy, and eventually to form a junction with the subsidiary force of Hyderabad under the command of Colonel Stevenson, which occupied a position near Jafirabad.

161. By the latest advices from the armies of the confederated chieftains, it appears that those chieftains had despatched their heavy baggage to Boorhanpore, and were moving towards the Budowlee pass, one of the passes into the territories of the Nizam.

162. The following is the amount of the respective forces of the Rajah of Berar, and Dowlut Rao Scindiah, assembled near the Nizam's frontier on the 5th of July—

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* General Orders, 29th of August; see p. 282.

† General Orders, 8th of September; see p. 296.

*Forces of Scindiah.*—Cavalry, 18,500; infantry, 11 battalions, matchlock men, 500; heavy ordnance, 35; field pieces, 170.

*Forces of the Rajah of Berar.*—Cavalry, 20,000; infantry, 6,000; field pieces, 35; rocket men, 500; camel guns, 500.

163. The foregoing statement includes troops of every description. The Governor-General in council has reason to believe, that the number of the confederated forces has been considerably diminished by desertion, in consequence of the scarcity of provisions.

164. The force under the immediate command of Major-General Wellesley, consists of 1,731 European and native cavalry, * 6,999. infantry, † exclusive of European artillerymen, and 653 pioneers, of the establishment of Fort St. George, 2,400 cavalry belonging to the Rajah of Mysore, and about 3,000 Mahratta horse. Two battalions of sepoys were detached in the month of July with a large convoy of treasure, bullocks, and grain, from the army under the command of his Excellency Lieut.-General Stuart, to the army of Major-General Wellesley. The British force remaining at Poonah for the protection of that capital, consists of 1,778 infantry and artillery. ‡

165. The forces under the command of Colonel Stevenson, consist of the whole of the subsidiary force, amounting to 7,920 infantry, cavalry, and artillery; § and about 16,000 men, cavalry and infantry of his Highness the Nizam's troops.

166. The Resident at Poonah will receive instructions to communicate to your honourable Committee, the progress of the operations of the British armies to the date of his latest

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* Cavalry.—H. M.'s 19th light dragoons, 384; 4th, 5th, and 7th, regiments native cavalry, 1347—total 1731. Artillery, 173.

† Infantry.—H. M.'s 74th regiment, and H. M.'s 78th regiment, 1368; first battalion 2nd, N. I.; first battalion 8th, N. I.; second battalion 12th, N. I.; second battalion 18th, N. I.; and third regiment N. I., 5631.—Total 8903. With 357 Madras artillery lascars, and 653 Madras pioneers.

‡ H. M.'s 84th regiment, five companies, 470; European artillerymen, 93; native infantry, 1215.—Total 1778. With 117 Bombay lascars, and a small park of artillery.

§ Cavalry.—3rd, and 6th, regiments native cavalry, 909; artillery, 120. Infantry.—H. M.'s Scotch brigrade, 778; second battalion 2nd, N. I., first battalion 6th, N. I., second battalion 7th, N. I., second battalion 9th, N. I., and 11th, regiment N. I., 6113.—Total 7920. With 276 gun lascars, and 212 pioneers.

advices, at the period of time when this despatch shall reach Poonah.

167. The most active measures have been adopted under the orders of the Governor-General, for the occupation of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's sea-port of Baroach; and the Governor-General in council confidently hopes, that the information from Bombay of the capture of that important place will accompany this despatch.

168. By the latest advices it appears, that Jeswunt Rao Holkar still maintained his position between the rivers Taptee and Nerbuddah; there is no reason to believe that the Rajah of Berar and Dowlut Rao Scindiah, have succeeded in their endeavours to obtain the co-operation of that chieftain.

169. In our despatch of the 1st of August, the Governor-General in council informed your honourable Committee, that the attention of the Governor-General was directed to the formation of an arrangement for the occupation of the province of Cuttack. For this purpose a part of the northern division of the army under the Presidency of Fort St. George, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Campbell, was ordered to be holden in readiness to proceed on that expedition from Ganjam,* and a detachment consisting of two companies of his Majesty's 22nd regiment of foot, and a part of the 20th Bengal regiment was despatched from Bengal, to reinforce the tooops under Lieut.-Colonel Campbell's command; the whole of that force consists of 565 Europeans of his Majesty's and the honourable Company's troops, 2,200 sepoys, and a party of native cavalry consisting of fifty men.

170. The Governor-General also directed a detachment consisting of 500 Bengal volunteers, and twenty-one artillerymen, with four six-pounders to proceed by sea, under the command of Captain Morgan, for the purpose of occupying Balasore; and another detachment has been formed at Jelasore, under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Ferguson, consisting of 835

* Force assembled at Ganjam.—Cavalry, 50; Artillery—Bengal, 50, Madras, 12; Infantry—H. M.'s 22nd regiment, two companies, 203; Madras European regiment, 300; 20th Bengal N. I., 600; 9th Madras N. I., 600; 19th Madras N. I., 1,000—total 2815. Sent from Bengal to Balasore by sea.—Bengal volunteers, 500; artillery 21—total 521. At Jelasore.—Cavalry, with two gallopers, 84; artillery, 22; native infantry, 835—total 941; with 50 gun lascars.

sepoys, and eighty-four men of the Governor-General's body-guard, for the purpose of advancing into the province of Cuttack, and forming a junction with the detachment at Balasore, when the state of the intermediate country, or the progress of the main army shall favour that movement. This detachment is supported by a force of 1,400 sepoys, assembled at Midnapore under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Fenwick.

171. It is proper to inform your honourable Committee, that in consequence of a severe illness which prevented Lieut.-Colonel Campbell from proceeding with the army, the Governor-General despatched Lieut.-Colonel Harcourt, of his Majesty's 12th regiment, his Lordship's Military Secretary, to Ganjam, for the purpose of taking the command of that army.

172. On the 8th of September, the troops under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Campbell commenced their march from Ganjam. On the 11th of September, Lieut.-Colonel Harcourt arrived at Ganjam and took the command of the troops, Lieut.-Colonel Campbell continuing in a state of health which rendered him unable to move with the expedition.

173. On the 14th instant, the British troops conducted by Lieut.-Colonel Harcourt, took possession of Manikapatam without any resistance on the part of the Mahratta troops, who fled on the approach of our army.

174. From that station Lieut.-Colonel Harcourt despatched a letter to the principal Bramins of the pagoda of Juggernaut encouraging them to place the pagoda under the protection of the British troops.

175. On the 16th instant, a favourable answer was received from the Bramins, and a deputation was sent to the British camp to claim the protection which had been offered by Lieut.-Colonel Harcourt.

176. On the 18th instant, the army encamped at Juggernaut; the Mahratta troops which were there stationed fled on its approach.

177. The inhabitants of the country subject to the Mahratta Government through which the British troops have passed, have manifested the utmost degree of satisfaction at their approach.

178. On the 21st instant, the detachment under the command of Captain Morgan landed at Balasore, and succeeded

in occupying that station after a very slight resistance on the part of the enemy.

179. From the accounts which have been received with regard to the troops of the Rajah of Berar in the Province of Cuttack, there is no reason to suppose that these troops are either numerous or formidable, nor is it probable that they can receive any considerable reinforcements from Berar, while Major-General Wellesley's operations engage the attention of the Rajah for the defence of his person and of his capital; at all events it may be expected, that the introduction of any additional force into the Province of Cuttack will be effectually prevented by the previous occupation of the passes leading into that province, either by the British troops, or by the chieftains occupying the territory on the frontier of Cuttack, whom we may be enabled to conciliate to the interests of the British Government.

180. The Governor-General in council entertains a hope that the officers of the Rajah of Berar, may be induced to surrender the possession of that province to the British power without a contest; and the Governor-General has adopted measures calculated to produce that desirable event; under any probable circumstances, however, the Governor-General in council confidently anticipates the complete and speedy success of the expedition against the province of Cuttack.

181. In our despatch of the 1st of August,* the Governor-General in council apprized your honourable Committee of the expected death of his Highness the Nizam.

182. The event took place on the 6th of August; his Highness's eldest son Mirza Secunder Jah was immediately proclaimed successor to the Soobahdary of the Deccan; on the 7th of August, Mirza Secunder Jah formally took his seat on the musnud, to which he was conducted by the Resident at Hyderabad, and by Rajah Ragotim Rao, the deputy of his late Highness's prime minister Azim ul Omra, and received the congratulatory presents of all the principal officers of his government at Hyderabad.

183. On that occasion, the Resident at Hyderabad was received by his Highness with the most distinguished honours as the representative of the British Government in India,

* See p. 255.

and his Highness publicly delivered to the Resident an instrument under his Highness's seal, acknowledging the obligation of the treaties subsisting between the British Government, and the state of Hyderabad.

184. The Governor-General had previously directed the Resident to require from Secunder Jah the delivery of an instrument to that effect, as the first act of that Prince's Government, and his Highness assented to that requisition with the utmost readiness.

185. Rajah Ragotim Rao on that occasion, suggested the demand of a corresponding engagement on the part of the British Government, which suggestion the Resident properly rejected. The Governor-General in council however, being of opinion that a voluntary act of recognition on our part, would tend to conciliate the confidence of Secunder Jah, and would produce an impression on the minds of his subjects, and of the several princes and chieftains of India, and particularly on the mind of his Highness the Peishwa, highly favourable to the credit of our justice, moderation, and public faith, deemed it expedient to execute an engagement in terms corresponding with the instrument delivered by Secunder Jah, and an instrument to that effect was accordingly executed by the Governor-General in council under the seal of the honourable Company, and transmitted to the Resident, with directions to deliver it to his Highness the Soobahdar in the most public and formal manner.

186. The Governor-General in council has great satisfaction in stating to your honourable Committee, that the event of his Highness the Nizam's death has not occasioned any interruption of the public tranquillity, and that the accession of Mirza Secunder Jah has been generally and cheerfully acknowledged by the younger sons of his late Highness, and by all the officers and subjects of his Highness's Government.

187. The preservation of tranquillity at this crisis must be ascribed principally to the position of our armies, under the command of Major-General Wellesley and Colonel Stevenson, and of a considerable detachment from the army, under the personal command of his Excellency Lieut.-General Stuart, which his Excellency, under the orders of the Governor-General despatched towards the southern frontier of the

Nizam's dominions, for the purpose of eventually proceeding to Hyderabad, if the situation of affairs should render such a movement expedient or necessary for the preservation of tranquillity, or for securing the regular order of succession on the death of the Nizam.

188. Adverting to the known designs and proceedings of the confederated chieftains with relation to the British Government, to the intrigues which they had long carried on at the Court of Hyderabad, with a view to dissolve the connection subsisting between the British Government and the state of Hyderabad, and to the position of their united armies on the frontier of the Nizam's dominions, it can scarcely be doubted that unless the movements of their armies had been checked by the position of the British troops, those chieftains would have taken advantage of the event of the Nizam's decease, to excite commotions in the state of Hyderabad, and to disturb the regular order of succession by affording the aid of their troops in support of the known pretensions of Ferreedoon Jah, (the younger brother of Secunder Jah) to the musnud of Hyderabad.

189. The expected event of his Highness the Nizam's decease, and the opportunity which that event might afford to the confederated chieftains in the actual position of their armies to prosecute their injurious designs, furnished an additional reason for requiring those chieftains to withdraw their armies from the menacing position which they occupied on the frontier of the Nizam's dominions.

190. The Governor-General in council deems it proper to transmit to your honourable Committee, an extract from a despatch from the Resident at Poonah, detailing propositions on the part of his Highness the Peishwa, for the transfer to the honourable Company of a part of his Highness's possessions in the Province of Bundlecund, yielding an estimated annual revenue of thirty-six lacs of rupees, in lieu of the territory ceded by his Highness in the southern quarter of his dominions, and of a part of the cessions in the vicinity of Surat, and other proposed modifications of the treaty of Bassein.

191. The Governor-General in council considering those proposed modifications of the treaty of Bassein to be a con-

siderable improvement of the terms of that treaty, with reference to the interests of the British Government, has assented to the Peishwa's propositions.

192. Your honourable Committee will observe with satisfaction, that these propositions from the Peishwa afforded an unequivocal proof of the sincerity of his Highness's disposition to adhere to the principles and spirit of the alliance happily concluded between his Highness, and the British Government.

193. In conformity to the plan of operations and political arrangements contained in the Governor-General's instructions to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, of the 27th of July, (of which a copy accompanied our despatch of the 1st of August,) a considerable detachment of British troops was assembled near Allahabad, for the purpose of co-operating with the force under the command of Himmut Bahâdur (one of his Highness the Peishwa's principal officers in Bundlecund) in the occupation of that province, agreeably to the proposals which that officer some time since transmitted to the British Government, as noted in the 59th paragraph of this despatch; and the Governor-General has received information that the detachment has crossed the river Jumna, and entered the province of Bundlecund.

194. The Governor-General in council has every reason to expect the pacific introduction of the Company's authority into the province of Bundlecund, and the late cession of a part of the Peishwa's possessions in Bundlecund may be expected greatly to facilitate the accomplishment of that object.

195. Adverting to the brilliant success and rapid progress of the British arms in the present contest with the confederated Mahratta chieftains, to the accumulated and seasonable pressure of an active and skilful system of military operations on all the most valuable points of their resources and dominions, and to the probable issue of the various political arrangements adopted on this occasion for the purpose of securing the co-operation, or neutrality of the several states and chieftains, whose power and resources might be employed in support of the enemy's cause, the Governor-General entertains a confident expectation of the early conclusion of peace

with those chieftains on terms, which shall deprive them of the means of disturbing the tranquillity of our possessions, and of impairing the efficiency and stability of our alliances.

196. Under the prosperous issue of such a general pacification, we expect that with a considerable augmentation of the lustre and glory of the British arms in India, we shall witness the accomplishment of a comprehensive system of alliances and political connection in Hindostan and the Deccan, calculated to promote the general tranquillity of India, and to secure on the most permanent foundations the interests and dominions of the honourable Company, against the hostile attempts of any native or European power, and especially to protect the north-western frontier of Oude, and to destroy the last remnant of French influence in India.

We have the honour to be,
Honourable Sirs,
with the greatest respect,
Your most obedient and faithful servants,
WELLESLEY.
G. H. BARLOW.
G. UDNY.

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## No. CI.

*Lord Castlereagh to the Marquess Wellesley.*

(Most Secret.)

London, April 28, 1803.
[Received Sept. 27, 1803.]

MY DEAR LORD,

I think I may now safely venture to assure your Lordship, in confidence, that you will receive very shortly orders from the Court of Directors suspending their former directions for the abolition of the College of Fort William, and directing you to continue it on its present establishment till further notice. Whatever it may be ultimately wise to do with this valuable institution, I have not thought it expedient, after all that has passed on this subject, to press for more than the revocation of their former orders. This will restore the whole to the footing on which it stood previously to the despatch of Jan. 1802. Whatever difference of opinion may prevail as to the best mode of accomplishing an object, in the necessity

of which all are agreed, namely, providing means for the education of the junior civil servants of the Company, your Lordship may rely that no further step will be taken in Europe which can disturb the existing arrangement, till the Government at home shall have the advantage of communicating fully with you, and of availing themselves, on your Lordship's return, of your advice and assistance. I shall take care to have copies of the Court's orders forwarded to the subordinate presidencies, that no unnecessary delay may occur in forwarding the writers to Fort William from Fort St. George and Bombay.

The despatch relative to the liquidation of debt has been delayed from some legal doubts which have been raised as to the instructions therein contained being within the provisions of the Act of 1793. This is a mere question of form, which will easily be disposed of. The more substantial arrangements for carrying our purpose into effect, I am happy to acquaint your Lordship, are in forwardness. Above a million of silver has already been shipped in the present season for India and China, and a supply to the extent of £600,000 more is absolutely secured.

It is not our intention in any degree to relax or limit our efforts in this most important object. The Chairs are now as much alive to the policy of the measure as I could wish them, and co-operate cordially with me in all my views for the reduction of the foreign debt. What can be procured, your Lordship may rely on receiving, and after the close of the present season, the interval before the ships of the next season are under despatch shall be employed in collecting the most liberal supply of bullion that can be obtained.

I am sorry to observe that the state of the treasury at Canton will divert so large a proportion as half a million of this supply from the immediate service of India; but this will collaterally relieve the Bengal treasury, and I trust that with above a million in the present season, and the prospect even of a larger amount in the ensuing year, your Lordship will be enabled to put our plan so far in a process of execution as will ensure its ultimate success.

I have directed a copy of my budget to be sent you, and I shall be anxious to hear that you partake in the confidence I have ventured to express, that with due exertions at home in

the transmission of silver, the liquidation of debt may be effected in peace to the extent of two millions, and in war, of one million a-year.

I am, my dear Lord,
with great regard, very sincerely yours,
CASTLEREAGH.

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## No. CII.

*Lieut.-General Lake to the Marquess Wellesley.*

MY LORD, Oorwuly, Sept 29th, 1803.

Your letter of the 15th instant reached me last night, couched in such terms of friendship and flattering approbation of my conduct as to leave me quite destitute of words to express my feelings and sensations upon the occasion, and I can only assure your Lordship that although I may be deficient in language to thank you for your abundant kindness towards me, my heart overflows with gratitude, and will, as long as I draw breath, ever glow with the warmest sentiments of attachment and affection for the confidence and powers you have so liberally and fully entrusted and reposed in me, and of which I trust you will never have cause to repent.

I accord with your Lordship in thinking that the honour and interest of our country must certainly console us for the loss of so many brave men, when we consider the advantage of their achievements.

It affords me very peculiar satisfaction to perceive your Lordship approves so entirely of my conduct in the capture of Alighur, as I stood alone in my opinion respecting the attack. I am now more than ever convinced it was perfectly right, as a long siege would have lost the country, and cost us, I do most firmly believe, a considerable number more lives.

I used every endeavour to avoid the effusion of human blood, which is a source of great satisfaction to my mind, as I think no man in my situation should wantonly throw away the lives of his own men, or inhumanly butcher those of his enemy. These sentiments will, I trust, plead my excuse to

my God and my country, and entitle me to a continuance of your friendship and affection.

I have the honour to be, my dear Lord,
your most attached and devoted servant,
G. LAKE.

P. S.—The rain has been so excessive all day, that we could not move. It is a blessing we must all rejoice at, as the thoughts of a famine are, by this seasonable relief, entirely flone away.

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## No. CIII.

*The Marquess Wellesley to Lieut.-General Lake.*

(Private.)

MY DEAR SIR, "Soonamookee" off Barrackpore, Sept. 30, 1803.

I avail myself of the first moment of my recovery from sickness to offer you my most cordial congratulations on the glorious victory of the 11th, and on its decisive and propitious consequences. An event more honourable to the British arms never occurred in any part of the world, and in India the conduct and result of the action stand without parallel. Much as I feel indebted to the merits of your army, justice, universal consent of all parties, and the plain evidence of indisputable fact concur to point my principal attention to your matchless energy, ability, and valour. You have formed the army to this illustrious and extraordinary achievement, and to your personal exertion must be attributed the promptitude, skill, and irresistible intrepidity which marked our operations on that memorable day. The result must be the utter extinction of the last vestige of French influence in India, the defeat of the ambitious and rapacious views of the Mahratta confederates, and a speedy peace with ample indemnity and security to the allies. You are entitled to the highest honours and rewards which your country and your king can bestow; from me as the representative of both in India, you will receive every testimony which I can afford in my public capacity of my admiration of your conduct, and of the high value and consideration which I attach to your eminent services. My

private gratitude cannot be expressed; nor is it possible to form a hope of discharging such a debt according to my estimation of its extent. My life, however protracted, could not furnish the means of satisfying my sentiments on this occasion. But whatever can be expected from the most cordial, firm and zealous respect, affection, and attachment, must ever be commanded by you from me, and from every person connected with me.

My former instructions and your several despatches leave me little to communicate to you in the form of instruction; I have, however, commenced an official reply to your letters, which was interrupted by severe pain, but will be resumed this day or to-morrow. I entirely approve all your proceedings as stated in your despatches down to the 15th instant, the date of your last despatch received. You will receive details of our success in Cuttack, of the fall of Broach by assault on the 29th of August, and of Major-General Wellesley's advanced position and expectations. On the 8th of September nothing decisive had happened in that quarter. But your astonishing success was not then known to Scindiah or the Berar man.

I wish early measures to be adopted for settling the revenues of the countries which you have conquered. Your powers enable you to name commissioners for that purpose. I recommend Mr. Cunninghame, of Etawah, as one, Mr. Stacey, of Cawnpore, is also a very good and brave man. You will consider the necessity of any addition to the native infantry on this establishment with reference to the following considerations.

First. The relief of the detachment now serving at Hyderabad, from Fort St. George; my intention being that the army of Fort St. George, as soon as may be practicable, should be applied entirely to the separate use of that government, viz. in the Circars, the districts ceded by the Nizam, the Carnatic, Tanjore, &c. Malabar, Canara and Mysore; that Bombay should furnish troops for itself, for the subsidiary force at Poonah, and for Guzerat, and that Bengal should furnish troops for our present provinces, and for the subsidiary force at Hyderabad.

This arrangement is subject to a question respecting the

native cavalry, of which two regiments are required for Hyderabad, and one for Poonah.

You will consider whether the cavalry for Hyderabad shall be furnished from Madras or Bengal, and whence the Poonah regiments shall be furnished.

A further question arises with reference to the peace with Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar.

If at the peace we retain the King, Delhi, Agra, and a line of defence south and west of the Jumna, with the Doab and Bundelcund, we must furnish from Bengal a subsidiary force for the King, and troops sufficient to occupy the conquered countries in addition to our present territories in that quarter. If we retain Cuttack, we must furnish troops, (and a strong force it must be) for the defence of that valuable and most important possession. With these general suggestions, which I shall detail more particularly hereafter, I leave you to decide the propriety of raising new corps of native infantry, and if you should think that the necessity of such a measure is at all urgent, you will issue your orders for raising one or two new regiments; and I will take care to give you regular authority with a proper date, as soon as I shall learn that you have proceeded to raise the corps.

If the war should continue, it will be necessary to invade Berar as early as possible in November; my idea on that subject was, to connect the invasion of Berar with the relief of the force at Hyderabad. The subsidiary force at Hyderabad now consists of five battalions of native infantry, one regiment of European infantry, and two regiments of native cavalry, with a due proportion of artillery.

I apprize you generally of my notions for your consideration. A few days will enable me to write more fully to you.

I have delayed my general order on the occasion of the glorious victory of the 11th, until I can publish the account of the interview which you must have had with the Emperor on the 16th, intending to connect the glory of the battle of Delhi with the interesting circumstance of the deliverance of the house of Timur from bondage and degradation.

By an overland despatch now about to depart, and a sea conveyance also prepared, I shall transmit to England the

most ample testimonies of your honourable services. It is my intention to submit my opinion on this subject in direct personal addresses to the King, the Prince of Wales, and the Duke of York, independently of the ordinary official communications.

Ever, my dear Sir,
Yours, most faithfully and affectionately,
with the most cordial esteem and attachment,
WELLESLEY.

P. S.—Half-past four, P. M., your despatches of the 17th received.

## No. CIV.

*The Hon. Major-General Wellesley to the Marquess Wellesley.*

MY LORD, Camp, Sept. 30, 1803.

I have the honour to enclose an account of the ordnance taken from the enemy in the action of the 23rd instant. I have reason to believe that there are still four more guns, which were thrown into the river by the enemy in their retreat.

We have taken seven stand of colours, and the enemy lost all their ammunition, although the tumbrils having blown up, some during the action, and others during the succeeding night, we have got nothing but the shot. The ordnance is very fine; but I have destroyed the iron guns, and shall put the brass guns in a place of security.

The enemy lost twelve hundred men killed in the field of battle, and their wounded are scattered in all parts of the country. It is reported that Jadoon Row, Scindiah's principal minister, received a wound, of which he died the day before yesterday. Their army are in the greatest confusion, and retiring to Burhaunpore. Colonel Stevenson has followed them down the Adjuntee Ghaut, and I propose to descend the Ghauts as soon as I shall have placed the wounded soldiers in security.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,
with the greatest respect,
your Excellency's most obedient,
and faithful humble servant,
ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

## No. CV.

*General Orders, by the Governor-General in Council.*

Fort William, October 1st, 1803.

The returns* received by the Governor-General in council of the ordnance taken on the field of battle near Delhi, on the 11th of September, 1803, have completed the official statement of the military operations conducted under the personal command of his Excellency General Lake, from the 29th of August, to the 18th of September.

In reviewing the rapid and brilliant success of our arms within that period of time, every loyal subject of the British empire must be animated by the most zealous emotions of just pride, national triumph, and public glory.

The Governor-General in council has already expressed the sentiments of gratitude, and admiration with which he contemplates the conduct of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, and of the officers and troops under his Excellency's personal command, in the action of the 29th of August, and in the gallant assault of the fortress of Alyghur on the 4th of September.

His Excellency in council highly approves the judicious and early movement of the army after that important success towards the principal station of the enemy's infantry and artillery, and the position whence the most speedy relief might be afforded to the unfortunate representative of the house of Timur, and to his Majesty's royal family.

The decisive victory gained in the battle of Delhi, on the 11th of September, justified the firm confidence reposed by the Governor-General in council in the bravery, perseverance, and discipline of the army, and in the skill, judgment, active spirit and invincible intrepidity of their illustrious commander.

The glory of that day is not surpassed by any recorded triumph of the British arms in India, and is attended by every circumstance calculated to elevate the fame of British valour, to illustrate the character of British humanity, and to secure the stability of the British empire in the East.

The Governor-General in council acknowledges with the

* These returns are given in the Appendix.

most cordial satisfaction, the distinguished services of Major-General Ware, and of the honourable Major-General St. John, in the action of the 11th of September; and directs the Commander-in-Chief to signify his particular approbation of the conduct of Major-General Ware, in the command of the right wing of the British army, and of the conduct of the honourable Major-General St. John in the ability and steadiness which he displayed in the command of the left wing, by surmounting every difficulty, and by forcing the right wing of the enemy to retire in disorder with heavy loss.

The Governor-General in council also directs the Commander-in-Chief to notify to Colonel St. Leger, and to the corps of cavalry employed on this honourable occasion, the high approbation with which his Excellency in council has received the report of their gallantry and firmness, and of the peculiar skill manifested under the able command of Colonel St. Leger, in their judicious, rapid and decisive movements during the action, and after the flight of the enemy had commenced. His Excellency in council contemplates with great satisfaction the advanced state of discipline of the native cavalry of Bengal, and the splendid proofs which that corps has afforded of its efficiency in active service against the numerous artillery of the enemy.

The conduct of Captain Boyce, and of his Majesty's 76th regiment, is noticed with the warmest applause by the Governor-General in council: the high reputation established by that respectable corps in various services of difficulty and danger in India, appeared in the battle of Delhi, with a degree of lustre which has never been exceeded even by British troops. His Excellency in council signifies his most distinguished approbation of the firmness and intrepidity of the officers and men of the native infantry, who, with his Majesty's 76th regiment, at the point of the bayonet, forced an enemy, considerably superior in numbers, from a powerful and well served artillery, and opened the way for the successful charge of the cavalry. The conduct of the native troops on this memorable day, reflects the highest honour upon the discipline of the army of Bengal, and confirms the confidence of the Governor-General in council, in the diligence, skill, and courage of the officers of this establishment, and in the eminent character of our native soldiers.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Horsford and the artillery, the Governor-General in council repeats the public testimony of approbation which that meritorious corps has uniformly deserved in every exigency of the service.

To the staff of the army the Governor-General in council is happy to express the satisfaction with which he learns, that they continue on all occasions, to merit the warmest approbation of the Commander-in-Chief.

The Governor-General in council sincerely laments the loss of Major Middleton, Captain McGregor, Lieutenant Hill, Lieutenant Preston, Cornet Sanguine, and Quarter-Master Richardson; and of the brave soldiers who fell in the exemplary exertion of deliberate valour, and disciplined spirit at the battle of Delhi. The names of these brave men will be commemorated with the glorious events of the day on which they fell, and will be honoured and revered, while the fame of that signal victory shall endure.

In testimony of the peculiar honour acquired by the army under the personal command of his Excellency General Lake, the Governor-General in council is pleased to order, that honorary colours, with a device properly suited to commemorate the reduction of the fortress of Alyghur on the 4th, and the victory obtained at Delhi on the 11th of September, be presented to the corps of cavalry and infantry, European and native, respectively employed on those glorious occasions; and that a public monument be erected at Fort William to the memory of the brave officers and men, European and native, who have fallen in the public service during the present campaign.

The honorary colours granted by these orders to his Majesty's 27th regiment of dragoons, and to the 76th regiment of foot, are to be used by those corps while they shall continue in India, or until his Majesty's most gracious pleasure be signified through his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

In concluding his orders on this memorable occasion, the Governor-General in council is pleased to direct, that the public thanks of the Supreme Government of the British possessions in India be given to his Excellency General Lake, Commander-in-Chief of his Majesty's and of the honourable Company's forces in India, who, with unexampled alacrity, eminent judgment, and indefatigable courage, under extraor-

dinary difficulties, has prepared the army of Bengal for the field; has conducted it by a rapid succession of glorious victories to the complete defeat of a powerful enemy; and has maintained the honour of the British name in India, by a humane attention towards the inhabitants of the conquered provinces, and by a due respect and reverence towards the unfortunate representative of the house of Timur, and towards his Majesty's royal family.

His Excellency the most noble the Governor-General in council, Captain-General and Commander-in-Chief of all the land forces serving in the East Indies, is pleased to direct, that these orders be publicly read to the troops under arms at every station of the land forces in the East Indies, and that the European officers of the native corps do cause the same to be duly explained to the native officers and troops.

By command of his Excellency the most noble
the Governor-General in council,
L. HOOK,
Sec.ᵗ to Govᵗ. Mil. Dept.

By command of his Excellency the Captain-General and Commander-in-Chief of the land forces.
J. ARMSTRONG,
Acting Military Secretary.

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His Excellency the Governor-General in council has received authentic advices of the capture of the fort and city of Baroach, by assault on the 29th of August, by the troops under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Woodington.

Authentic intelligence has also been received of the capture of the Fort of Jalnapore, by the troops under the command of Colonel Stevenson.

By command of his Excellency the Governor-General in council.

J. LUMSDEN,
Chief Secᵞ. to the Govᵗ.

## No. CVI.

*Lieut.-General Lake to the Marquess Wellesley.*

My Lord, Head Quarters, Camp Choma, Oct. 1st, 1803.

I have the honour to enclose for your Lordship's information, extract of a letter* just received from Colonel Vandeleur, reporting the arrival of Colonel Duderneg, Messrs. Smith and Lapenet, in his camp.

No French officer of any consequence now remains in Scindiah's service, and those who do, would, I have reason to believe, willingly avail themselves of any opportunity of putting themselves under our protection.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,
Your Lordship's
most faithful humble servant,
G. Lake.

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## No. CVII.

*The Marquess Wellesley to Lieut.-General Lake.*

Sir, Barrackpore, Oct. 8th, 1803.

By your Excellency's despatch, No. 51, I am informed that a sum of six lacs of rupees, the property of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, had been lodged in the hands of M. Drugeon commanding Scindiah's troops at Delhi for the payment of the army of that chieftain; that of this sum 60,000 rupees had been actually disbursed by M. Drugeon to the troops of the enemy, and that the residue was deposited by M. Drugeon on the approach of the British army, in the hands of Shah Nowauze Khan, treasurer to his Majesty.

The original sum of six lacs of rupees, as well as the residue of that sum after deduction of the disbursement made to the troops of the enemy, was certainly the public property of the enemy, and any part of that property captured in the hands of M. Drugeon, or of any officer, soldier, or subject of the enemy, would unquestionably have been adjudged lawful prize to the British Government.

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* *Extract referred to :—*

*Camp Muttra, the 30th September*, 1803.

Colonel Duderneg, and Messrs. Smith and Lapenet, having quitted Scindiah's service, came into camp this day.

The fraudulent transfer of the enemy's property to the hands of the officers of his Majesty Shah Alum, at the time of the approach of the British army, could not change the nature of that property, or exempt it from the right of the captors, who had defeated the enemy's troops in the battle of Delhi, and in consequence of that glorious victory, had captured the city and fortress of Delhi, occupied at that time by a division of the enemy's army.

No circumstance appeared to warrant a suggestion that this deposit could have been intended for the service of his Majesty; although placed in the hands of the chief officer of his Majesty's treasury: it is not stated to have been deposited in his Majesty's treasury for his Majesty's service. The state of indigence and misery to which his Majesty, his royal family, and household, had long been reduced by the Mahratta power, the degraded and destitute condition to which the imperial house of Timur had been subjected under the officers of Scindiah, and the deplorable situation in which your Excellency found the Emperor upon your entrance into Delhi, excluded the possibility of a supposition that M. Drugeon intended to contribute so large a sum to relieve the sufferings of Shah Alum, and of his impoverished court. The object of the deposit was evidently to elude the rights of the conquerors, and to cover the property of the enemy in the hands of his Majesty's officers, and under the royal name, without the authority or knowledge of the Emperor, and without any intention of alleviating his Majesty's urgent distress.

Concluding therefore, that the residue of the original sum of six lacs of rupees, deposited by M. Drugeon in the hands of Shah Nowauze Khan continued to be really the public property of the enemy, the right to that property appears to me to have been vested in the British Government by the conquest of Delhi.

Under these circumstances, it was your Excellency's duty to claim the sum of money in question, and I entirely approve your Excellency's conduct in having claimed it, and in having observed in the mode of preferring your claim, the respect and attention which you have uniformly manifested towards the unfortunate Emperor.

His Majesty, Shah Alum, having been pleased to offer to the army as a donation, the sum of money claimed by your

Excellency in right of conquest, your Excellency could not have declined to accept that offer without injury to his Majesty's dignity, unless at the same time you could have relinquished altogether the claim on the part of the British Government to that part of the property of the enemy.

Your Excellency in my judgment, would not have been justified in relinquishing that claim without the express authority of the Governor-General in council, and as it is probable that the form of donation adopted by his Majesty was more agreeable to him than any other mode of restitution which could have been proposed by the British Government, I entirely approve your Excellency's conduct in having accepted the restitution of the property of the enemy to the lawful captors in the form proposed by his Majesty.

I entirely approve your Excellency's discretion and judgment manifested in detaining the treasure delivered into your charge, for the ultimate determination and instructions of the Governor-General in council.

The treasure being unquestionably lawful prize, I should not have deemed myself warranted in any stage of the transaction (under the circumstances stated by your Excellency, and enumerated in this despatch) to have authorized you to withhold the assertion of the claim of the British Government to obtain the enemy's property from the hands in which it had been concealed; the limited amount of the sum combined with the memorable events which attended the conquest, would have rendered me peculiarly anxious to secure it for the purpose of granting to the army a reward earned by a degree of exertion and merit which had never been surpassed.

Having therefore considered in council the circumstances stated by your Excellency, I have passed the enclosed order, and I hereby authorize and direct your Excellency to consider the treasure amounting to five lacs and 40,000 rupees, received as a donation from his Majesty, but being really the property of the enemy, to be prize money granted by the authority of the Governor-General in council to the army, in testimony of the high sense entertained by the Governor-General in council of the discipline, perseverance, fortitude, and zeal, displayed by that gallant army during the present glorious campaign.

I have the honour to be,

WELLESLEY.

[Enclosure.]

*General Orders, by the Governor-General in Council, dated the 8th of October*, 1803.

The Governor-General in council having received from the Commander-in-Chief, a report of the treasure being the property of the enemy captured at Delhi, after the brilliant victory of the 11th of September, to the amount of five lacs, and 40,000 rupees, deems it to be the duty of this government to anticipate the sanction of his Majesty, and of the honourable the Court of Directors for the distribution of this sum, as a testimony of the applause and gratitude with which the British Government views the exemplary valour, discipline, zeal and firmness, displayed by the army under the personal command of his Excellency General Lake, during the present glorious campaign, and the memorable battle of Delhi.

His Excellency in council accordingly authorizes and directs the Commander-in-Chief to make an immediate distribution of the sum above-mentioned to the troops under his personal command, in such proportions as may be conformable to the usage of the British service in similar cases.

The Commander-in-Chief will be pleased to determine, and to name in public orders the several corps or divisions of the army, which are to participate in this distribution, and also to determine and publish the general rules by which the shares of the respective officers and soldiers are to be apportioned, and the Commander-in-Chief will be pleased to report his proceedings in the execution of these instructions to the Governor-General in council.

All ordnance, ammunition, and military stores, taken in the battle of Delhi, or since the commencement of the campaign, are to be reserved entire for further instructions.

The general principle of these orders will constitute the rule of the proceedings of the Governor-General in council, with respect to all prize which may be captured by the British troops in the progress of the war. The Governor-General in council will not fail to afford to the zeal, gallantry, and energy of the army employed in services of arduous labour and peril, and remote from their sovereign, and their country,) the most liberal and prompt encouragement, which may appear to be compatible with the rights of the Crown and of the Company, and with the due principles of discipline, public order, and just economy.

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## No. CVIII.

*Lieut.-General Lake to the Marquess Wellesley.*

Head Quarters, Camp before Agra, 10th October, 1803.

My Lord, [Received 21st October, 1803.]

Finding it impossible to make approaches against this place, as long as the seven battalions of the enemy, who remained

here, were in possession of the town of Agra, of an encampment with a large number of guns on the glacis, and of the ravines with which the south and south-west face of the fort is surrounded, I determined to dislodge the enemy from the town, and occupy the ravines this morning, which will answer as trenches, and afford complete cover for carrying on our works.

With this view I ordered Brigadier-General Clarke, who was encamped with his brigade in the rear of the town, to take possession of it, at the same time that three battalions advanced to occupy the ravines.

The attacks have succeded, and the town as well as the ravines are now occupied by our troops.

Lieutenant-Colonel McCullock, Major Haldane, and Captain Worseley, led the battalions that advanced on the ravines. Every praise is due to those officers, who performed every thing required of them, with the greatest alacrity and steadiness.

I am sorry to say, that a number of men have been killed and wounded as well as officers, owing to their high spirit and anxiety to possess themselves of the enemy's guns; they quitted the ravines and gained the glacis, driving the enemy from their position; in effecting which, from being close under the fort, they were exposed to a very heavy fire.

My thanks are due to the honourable Major-General St. John, for his spirited conduct in advancing at the head of the second battalion of the 2nd native infantry, which I found it necessary to order up to support the attack.

Brigadier-General Clarke, in his attack on the town, met with considerable resistance; which by the gallant conduct of the officers and men under his command was at length surmounted. I feel myself under particular obligations to Lieutenant-Colonel White, who commanded five companies of the 16th regiment native infantry, for his judicious and gallant conduct on this day.

I feel myself under the greatest obligations to Lieutenant-Colonel Gerard, Adjutant-General, who undertook to point out to Lieutenant-Colonel McCullock the road he was to pursue, and I am sorry to report that in the performance of this duty he received a very severe contusion; but I trust it will not be attended with any serious consequences.

Major Thomas, of the 14th native infantry is, I am sorry to add, very severely wounded; his exertions throughout this day were most meritorious.

Lieutenant Hay of the artillery, who went with a detachment of that corps to bring off the enemy's guns, merits my approbation for his successful exertions in this service.

To Mr. Lucan's information and exertions on this occasion, as well as on every other, I feel myself much indebted.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,
your Lordship's most faithful humble servant,
G. LAKE.

P. S. A list of the guns taken shall be forwarded to-morrow.

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## No. CIX.

*Lieut.-General Lake to the Marquess Wellesley.*

(Private and most Confidential.)

MY LORD, Camp, before Agra, Oct. 10, 1803.

I fear you will think I have been very tardy in attacking Agra, which I have delayed some days in hopes of being able by negotiation, to prevail upon the garrison to surrender, and likewise to bring over seven or eight battalions of sepoys posted without side, in the town and ravines, situations so strong, that I was certain an attempt upon them would cause us much loss. Finding there was no chance of bringing these obstinate rebels to reason, and being fearful delay might cause seventeen battalions (which came from the Deccan lately) to come to their relief, I determined to drive them from their strong holds this morning, which has been accordingly effected. I employed sepoys only (as I cannot spare Europeans) who behaved uncommonly well. Colonel Clarke's brigade consisted of the second battalion of the 9th native infantry, one of the 12th, and five companies of the 16th, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel White. The business was severe, and I understand from Colonel Clarke, that he was obliged to return to the camp with the two battalions; but that Lieutenant-Colonel White maintained his ground and kept possession of the town, and that Colonel

Clarke is gone on with a battalion to reinforce him. Lieutenant-Colonel White has great merit, and I believe Colonel Clarke behaved extremely well. We shall begin our batteries this night, and as the ground is very favourable, I have no doubt they will be completed so as to begin the breach the morning after to-morrow; after which a very few hours will put us in possession of the fort. The troops of the enemy have fought most desperately; I understand they are supposed to be the best Perron had, and they were so advantageously posted, that it was almost impossible to get at them. The ravines make the best of trenches, so that we can work under cover immediately. The place will not stand ten hours breaching I think, and I do not imagine they will evacuate it till we storm, which from the vast height of the wall, is impossible to do without breaching.

The sepoys have behaved excessively well, but from my observation this day, as well as on every other, it is impossible to do great things in a gallant and quick style without Europeans; therefore, if they do not in England think it necessary to send British troops in the proportion of one to three sepoy regiments, which is in fact as one to six, they will stand a good chance of losing their possessions if a French force once get footing in India. You may perceive by the loss of European officers in sepoy regiments, how necessary it is for them to expose themselves, in short every thing has been done by the example and exertions of officers, and without which we had not been where we are. This day has nearly I think, put an end to the brigades. We have also I fear lost many men, but I will write more to-morrow.

I remain, my dear Lord,

With real affection and sincerity,

Your devoted servant,

G. Lake.

I flatter myself we are going on well with the native powers. My time is so much occupied, that I trust you will excuse my saying more at present.

G. L.

I think we have been most fortunate in all our undertakings, and are bound to look up to Providence with admiration, thankfulness and gratitude.

## No. CX.

*Lieut.-General Lake to the Marquess Wellesley.*

(Private.)

MY DEAR LORD, Camp before Agra, Oct. 11, 1803.

Your letter of the 30th ult. has quite overpowered me, and left me with a most grateful and feeling heart totally void of utterance. Was I to write till doomsday it would be totally impossible for me to express my sensations upon reading your letter, and can only say in return that my life will be too short to convince you by my attachment to you and yours how sincerely I partake in every circumstance that affords you satisfaction and pleasure, and if by any exertion of mine in carrying your wishes into effect, it can have in any degree proved to the world the expediency of your measures adopted upon such sound policy and judgment, I shall, to the day of my death, rejoice in the utmost that any act of mine can have added to the lustre of your high and exalted character, both public and private. It is so absolutely impossible for me to express my feelings, that I can only beg you to judge of my heart by your own, and I am certain you will believe the truth of my assertion. Your kindness has completely debilitated me, and made me shed so many tears of joy, that I feel myself entirely unequal to any other part of your letter, unless it is that in consequence of the power you invested me with to raise one or two regiments, I have instantly issued orders for the raising of them, being thoroughly convinced that exclusive of every other concern mentioned in your letter, we cannot keep our present territory without the assistance of these corps. You cannot conceive what a tract of country at this moment lies exposed to the invasion of any enterprizing freebooter. Where Holkar is, I know not, having heard no more since I sent you Mr. Gardner's letter; however, as I have no doubt of being able, by the fourteenth at latest, to send you an account of the fall of Agra, I flatter myself that my army will be able to give a tolerable good account of him.

Pray excuse my saying any more, as my nerves are quite unstrung by your affectionate attention, which must ever be

remembered with the greatest gratitude and heartfelt satisfaction by your attached and faithful friend and servant,

G. LAKE.

Be assured I will treat Col. Lightwych as you wish me, and I believe he is convinced of my intention on this head. My order only goes to the recruiting for two regiments; I shall, therefore, beg your Lordship's orders as soon as convenient; believe me, we cannot do without them.

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## No. CXI.

*Extract from the Calcutta Gazette.*

October 13th, 1803.

On the 6th of September, a detachment of British troops, under the command of Lieut.-Colonel P. Powell, crossed the Jumna, and entered the province of Bundelcund.

On the 16th of September Lieut.-Colonel Powell was joined by Rajah Himmut Bâhâdur, with his forces.

The united detachments reached the river Cane on the 23d of September. The troops of Shumshere Bahâdur were encamped on the opposite bank of the river in considerable strength.

Having reduced several forts in the vicinity of his camp, and having established the British authority in the territory lying between the Jumna and the Cane, Colonel Powell, accompanied by Himmut Bahâdur, crossed the latter river on the 10th of October.

The following extract of a letter from Colonel Powell is published by command of his Excellency the most noble the Governor-General in council.

*Lieut.-Colonel Powell to Lieut.-Colonel J. Gerard, Adjt.-General.*

*Head Quarters.*

SIR,—In my despatch of yesterday his Excellency the commander-in-chief will have been informed of my having crossed the Cane river, and of the communication which immediately thereupon took place betwixt the Nawaub Shumshere Bahâdur and myself.

After the despatch of my letter of yesterday, I received another intimation from Shumshere's vakeel, informing me of

his master's being forced by the persuasion of his sirdars, to risk an engagement with the detachment under my command.

This morning I accordingly made the necessary arrangements for meeting him. At half-past ten o'clock the detachment, after a most fatiguing march of six hours over a very uneven country, came in sight of Shumshere's army, drawn out in line of battle upon this ground, and their camp all struck. Shumshere's line covered a great extent, and as it was advantageously posted, and they appeared advancing, I had every expectation of a general action. I advanced in columns of battalions, within 1200 yards of the enemy. I deployed into line with an intention of advancing in that form as far as the ground would permit. But just as the line was formed, a gun of Rājah Himmut Bahâdur's was fired, which was mistaken as a signal for opening our guns, which immediately commenced a cannonade. After five minutes firing the guns were again limbered, in consequence of heavy ploughed fields, which rendered it impossible to get them along by the drag ropes. When advanced 500 yards more, our guns recommenced firing. Those of the enemy had till now continued playing upon our line with little or no effect, but soon after our guns opened the second time, those of Shumshere ceased firing, whereupon our guns were again limbered, and the whole line advanced as fast as possible, upon which Shumshere's army began to retire; I therefore ordered Captain Webber with the squadron of cavalry and galloper, with 500 of Rajah Himmut Bahâdur's horse, to pursue the enemy, which they did for three miles, and got within reach of firing upon them with the galloper, which opened upon a body of 1500 horse with great effect, when they continued to retreat at too great a speed for their pursuers to come up with them, whose horses from being twelve hours saddled were completely jaded.

Our loss, as far as I have learned, does not exceed eight or ten natives killed and wounded; but amongst the casualties I am sorry to inform you, that Captain Farley Smith is included: he was killed by the first cannon shot from the enemy.

At two o'clock, P. M., I encamped on the spot where Shumshere's camp stood, and it is my intention to pursue him

to-morrow morning to the place where I understand he is gone.

I have further to desire you will report to his Excellency that the behaviour of the whole of the detachment during this day, was such as to merit my entire approbation. The following are the articles taken from the enemy: two small guns, two tumbrils, with ammunition, fourteen horses, and ten gun bullocks.

The Rajah has had seventeen men, and sixteen horses, killed and wounded. The loss of the enemy I have not yet ascertained.

I have the honour to be, Sir,
your most obedient servant,
G. Powell,
Lieut.-Colonel commanding Bundelcund.

Camp at Capsah, Oct. 13, 1803.

Accounts have been since received, that Shumshere Bahâdur has crossed the river Betwah, and evacuated the province of Bundelcund.

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## No. CXII.

*Lieut.-General Lake to the Marquess Wellesley.*

Head Quarters, Camp before Agra, Oct. 13th, 1803.

My Lord,

I have the satisfaction to inform your Lordship that the battalions who were opposed to us in the affair of the 10th instant, came over last night, and are now encamped near us.

Their number is about 2,500.

I have reason to believe that their compliance with my terms, was chiefly owing to the severe loss and complete defeat they experienced in the affair of the 10th instant. By their own accounts the loss they sustained was upwards of 600 killed.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,
your Lordship's most faithful,
humble servant,
G. Lake.

## No. CXIII.

*Lieut.-General Lake to the Marquess Wellesley.*

Head Quarters, Camp before Agra, Oct. 14th, 1803.

MY LORD, [Received Oct. 25th, 1803.]

I have the honour to inform your Lordship, that about noon yesterday I received note No. 1, addressed to the officer commanding in the trenches; in consequence of which I ordered all firing to cease till four in the evening, and in my answer No. 2, desired a confidential person might be sent to my camp.

About two o'clock, Colonel Sutherland, whom they liberated from confinement for that purpose, arrived in my camp with letters Nos. 3 and 4.

As it appeared their wish that I should send an officer into the fort, I requested Captain Salkeld to accompany Colonel Sutherland thither with my replies Nos. 5 and 6, to explain to the garrison the terms on which they would be allowed to surrender.

Captain Salkeld saw all the native chiefs, and found that they were not decided in their opinions on the subject. They started several difficulties, and whilst he was endeavouring to remove these, the firing from the fort recommenced, without any evident cause, which induced him to return to camp.

Being desirous, from motives of humanity, to induce them to listen to my terms, a messenger entrusted with a letter from me was again sent this morning. They have refused, however, all intercourse, from which I am inclined to think that their only object yesterday was to gain time.

My grand batteries will open on the morning of the 16th, and I have reason to think that soon afterwards a practicable breach will be effected.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,
your Lordship's most faithful,
humble servant,
G. LAKE.

[Enclosure 1.]

*To the officer commanding opposite Mader Ghur.*

SIR, Oct. 13th, 1803.

The fort demands a cessation of hostilities, and are going to send terms to camp.

G. W. HESSING.

[Enclosure 2.]

*To Colonel G. W. Hessing, &c.*

Head Quarters of the British Army,
Oct. 13th, 1803.

Sir,

Hostilities will cease till four o'clock this evening, before which time a confidential person is expected to be sent into camp with the terms proposed. If he does not arrive before that hour hostilities will recommence.

The person who comes will be treated with every attention, and allowed to return in perfect safety.

I have the honour to be, Sir,
your obedient humble servant,
G. A. F. Lake, Mil. Sec.

[Enclosure 3.]

*To his Excellency General Lake, Commander-in-chief, &c.*

Fort of Agra, Oct. 13th, 1803.

Sir,

We have the honour to inform your Excellency, that notwithstanding the past violent and unwarrantable proceedings of the people of the fort, they have at last become a little more reasonable, from our repeatedly telling them that any further resistance on their part would avail them nothing, but, on the contrary, would exasperate your Excellency and the troops under your command, so as to exterminate the whole of them if a storm took place. Their commandants have consequently come to us this forenoon in a body, and requested of us to forward to your Excellency the accompanying proposal for the surrender of the fort, to which their respective names are affixed.

Should any unforeseen deviation from their proposal take place, as we are still their prisoners, we hope your Excellency will not impute to us the blame.

Their proposal is to deliver up the fort, guns, stores, &c. to your Excellency, at any time after the receipt of this you may think proper; protection to themselves and private property, after delivering up the Sircar's arms and property; and be allowed to remain in the city, or to go wherever their families may be.

We have the honour to be, Sir,
your Excellency's most obedient, humble servants,
G. W. Hessing, H. Sutherland.

[Enclosure 4.]

All the officers of the Fort of Akberabad* give in writing the following engagement:

Whereas a misunderstanding had taken place with Colonel George William Hessing, at the instigation of the sepoys, all the officers and sepoys do give in writing this engagement, that we will implicitly abide by whatever the said Colonel may adjust on our part with General Lake for the

* The name given to Agra by the Emperor Akber.

security of our lives, properties, effects, and honour. We have agreed to invest the said Colonel with full powers for this purpose. This engagement is correct. Dated the 25th Jemmaudee-oo-Saunee 1218, (11th or 12th of October.) Signed by fifteen officers, Mahomedans and Hindoos.

[Enclosure 5.]

*To Colonel George Hessing, and Mr. Sutherland.*

Head Quarters, British Camp,
Oct. 13th, 1803.

GENTLEMEN,

Your letter has been received.

On the terms proposed in the last paragraph of your letter, I allow the garrison to march out with protection to themselves and private property. After delivering up the sircar's arms, treasure, or any other public property, those who belong to the city may remain there, the others allowed to go where their families may be.

I have the honour to be, Gentlemen,
your obedient humble servant,
G. LAKE.

[Enclosure 6.]

His Excellency General Lake engages that all the officers and sepoys who are within the fort of Akberabad, shall be allowed to proceed in the most honourable manner with their clothes whithersoever they may chuse. No interruption whatever will be given to those officers and sepoys, their families and children. But all arms and military weapons, muskets and guns, carts and carriages, and treasure which may be within the fort, shall belong to the Company.

They (officers, &c.) shall not be allowed to carry out of the fort any money or effects of the above description.

The officers, &c. are required to specify in writing the hour at which they may determine with the bearer of this engagement to surrender the fort, in order that the British troops may enter the fort.

God is witness to the sincerity of this engagement.

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## No. CXIV.

*General Orders by the Governor-General in Council.*

Fort William, Oct. 14th, 1803.

The Governor-General in council derives great satisfaction from the intelligence which he has received of the reduction of the fort and city of Baroach, on the 29th of August, and of the ability, promptitude, and gallantry with which that important service was accomplished by the brave officers and troops under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Woodington, of the establishment of Bombay.

His Excellency in council highly approves the conduct of Lieutenant-Colonel Woodington in his judicious and spirited exertions for the early reduction of the place; in directing the operations of the siege; in his seasonable determination to assault the fort; and in the disposition which he made of the troops under his command with a view to secure the rapid success of that gallant attack.

The Governor General in council signifies his particular approbation of the valour and judgment manifested by Major Cuyler of His Majesty's 86th regiment, throughout the service at Baroach, and in commanding the storm of the fort, and by Captain Richardson of the same corps in leading the assault. His Excellency in council also observes with particular satisfaction the conduct of Captain Cliffe of the engineers of Bombay.

To all the officers and troops, European and native, employed on this honourable occasion, his Excellency in council signifies his high commendation.

The Governor-General in council laments the loss of Captain W. Semple of His Majesty's 86th regiment, killed on the 26th of August, and of the few brave men who fell before Baroach. It is a great satisfaction however to observe, that an acquisition so important, should have been secured with the loss of only one officer, and of so few soldiers.

In bearing a due testimony to the merits of the officers and troops, employed in the reduction of Baroach on the 29th of August, the Governor-General in council remarks, that on the same day, distinguished by the commencement of the victorious career of the army of Bengal, under the personal command of His Excellency General Lake, upon the frontier of Oude, the army of Bombay at the western extremity of the Peninsula of India, effected a service of the most arduous nature, with a similar spirit of alacrity and courage.

In the course of an extensive and complicated system of military operations, the glorious success of our arms since the commencement of this war has been uniform in every part of India. The able and gallant officers and troops of His Majesty's service, and of the several establishments of the three Presidencies, have been actuated by equal sentiments of public spirit and honour, and have co-operated with equal

ardour and success, in an united effort to accomplish the just objects of the allies. The Governor-General in council confides in the justice of our cause, in the unanimous zeal of the three Presidencies, and in the continued co-operation of their respective resources and power, that the views of the confederate chieftains will be speedily frustrated by the complete restoration of peace and tranquillity to the provinces of Hindostan and the Deccan, which have been disturbed by the ambition and violence of the enemy.

The Governor-General in council directs, that copies of this order be transmitted to the Right Honourable the Governor in council at Fort St. George, and to the Honourable the Governor in council at Bombay, to be published to the army of those presidencies respectively.

By command of his Excellency
The Most Noble the Governor-General in Council,
L. Hook,
Secretary to the Government, Military Department.

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## No. CXV.

*Lieut.-Colonel Harcourt to Captain Armstrong.*

Laul-Baug Fort, Cuttack, Oct. 15th, 1803.

Sir, [Received Oct. 22nd, 1803.]

I had the honour of briefly stating to you yesterday, for the information of his Excellency the most noble the Governor-General, that the fort of Barrabutty had been taken by assault by a part of the troops under my command, directed to perform this service under the orders of Lieut.-Colonel Clayton, of the 20th Bengal regiment. I now have the honour to acquaint you, for his Excellency's information, with the further details of this operation.

On the night of the 12th a spot was fixed on for a twelve-pounder battery, distant about 500 yards from the outer gate of the fort. This battery was completed on the night of the 13th, and the twelve-pounder placed in it, together with two howitzers and two six-pounders, the whole of which opened their fire on the morning of the 14th. By eleven o'clock in

the forenoon most of the defences on the south face of the fort, against which our fire was directed, were taken off, the enemy's guns silenced, and every appearance promised success: upon which I directed Lieut.-Colonel Clayton to advance with one six-pounder, and a party of artillery men, 200 Europeans from his Majesty's 22nd, and the Madras European regiment, and 400 sepoys from the 20th Bengal, and the 9th and 19th regiments of Madras Native Infantry. The party had to pass over a narrow bridge, and under a very heavy but ill-directed fire of musketry from the fort, to which they were exposed for forty minutes. They at length succeeded in blowing open the wicket, (the remaining part of the gate having been fortified with thick masses of stone). Having once accomplished this, the party entered singly, and although they met with considerable resistance whilst entering the fort, and passing two other gates, the British troops were soon completely victorious.

I cannot too highly praise the conduct of Lieut.-Colonel Clayton, and that of the officers and troops under his command: the whole party manifested a degree of persevering steadiness and bravery that does them infinite honour.

The fort of Barrabutty is of considerable strength, and with the exception only of the bridge over which our party passed, is inaccessible, as it is surrounded by a ditch from 35 to 135 feet broad, and 20 feet depth of water in it.

I am happy to acquaint you that our loss has not been considerable, but I have to report with regret that Capt. Kenny, of the 19th regiment Madras Infantry, Captain Hurlstone, of his Majesty's 22nd regiment, and Lieut. Faithful, of the Bengal Artillery, are wounded, though not dangerously; their conduct was highly meritorious, as well as that of every other officer on the storming party.

Returns of the killed and wounded are enclosed.*

I cannot omit expressing in the strongest manner the high sense I entertain of the services of Capt. Blunt, field-engineer, who has been throughout our campaign, indefatigably active; and of Capt. Hetzler, of the Bengal Artillery, whose well directed fire from the battery was of eminent service.

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* See Appendix.

The loss of the enemy within the fort was very considerable, and many were drowned in the ditch, when endeavouring to escape.

I should not omit mentioning that a stand of colours of the enemy was taken by the detachment of his Majesty's 22nd regiment, a second stand of colours by the 20th Bengal regiment, a third by the 9th Madras native regiment, and a fourth by the 19th Madras native regiment; and for the disposal of which I hope to be honoured with his Excellency's commands.

The zealous and efficient services of Major of Brigade Thompson demand my warmest acknowledgments, and I must further beg leave to report to you for his Excellency's information, that the general conduct of the whole force under my command has been such as to merit the most favourable representation of their services to his Excellency's notice.

I have the honour to be, &c.

GEORGE HARCOURT,

Lieut.-Colonel commanding in Cuttack, and Mil. Sec. to his Excellency the Most Noble the Governor-General.

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## No. CXVI.

*Lieut.-General Lake to the Marquess Wellesley.*

Head Quarters, Agra, Oct. 18th, 1803.

MY LORD, [Received Oct. 28th, 1803.]

I have the pleasure to inform your Lordship, that the important fortress of Agra, termed by the natives the key of Hindostan, capitulated last night, and the garrison, consisting of between five and six thousand men, marched out at noon this day, when the place was immediately occupied by our troops under the command of Brigadier-General Macdonald.

The only terms required by the garrison, were protection to their persons and private property, which was agreed to on my part.

I attribute the early surrender of this place to the great

impression our breaching batteries, which opened yesterday morning within 350 yards, made on the walls, and which would have caused a practicable breach in a few hours more battering.

To Colonel Horsford, of the artillery, and Capt. Wood, of the corps of engineers, as well as to every officer in those two corps, I feel myself under great obligations for their unremitted exertions on this occasion, and to which I principally attribute my early success against this place.

I have the pleasure to say, our loss since the construction of the batteries, has been very trifling. Three European artillery men, and three Golundauze killed, are the only casualties.

A return of the ordnance, stores, &c. found in the fort, I shall have the honour to forward for your Lordship's information to-morrow.*

I have the honour to be, my Lord,
your Lordship's most faithful,
humble servant,
G. LAKE.

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## No. CXVII.

*Lieut.-General Lake to the Marquess Wellesley.*

(Private.)

MY DEAR LORD, Agra, Oct. 1803.

It is not possible for me to express what I feel in congratulating you upon the surrender of this fort, and rejoice that it has been in my power to put your Lordship in possession of the key to Hindostan. It gives me great pleasure to think that we were not obliged to storm, as from the intricate passages in the fort, and the strong garrison, composed of the most desperate cast of men, we must have lost a number of most valuable lives, particularly Europeans, which cannot be spared.

The gaining of this place has relieved my mind exceed-

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* See Appendix.

ingly, as it liberates my army so completely. The effect this will have upon the minds of the natives is beyond all description, as they imagine this fort could have held out a long time.

It fills my heart with joy when I consider that I have been able to contribute in any degree to your happiness and comfort, by carrying into effect your judicious and wise counsels. That you may live long to enjoy all the honours and dignities your country can bestow, is the most sincere wish of

My dear Lord,

your affectionate and devoted servant,

G. LAKE.

The garrison declared that the guns from our battery yesterday, and the shells were not to be borne, and that in short, there is no possibility of standing against the British troops.

Excuse haste.

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## No. CXVIII.

*The Marquess Wellesley to Lieut.-General Lake.*

SIR, Fort William, October 19th, 1803.

1. Your Excellency has probably received the communication of Rajah Ambajee's overtures for consolidating his interests with those of the Company, through the channel of Colonel Collins's newswriter, stationed in the camp of Ambajee, Ambajee having lately despatched that person to Futtehgurh for the express purpose of communicating his proposals to your Excellency.

2. I deem it proper however to transmit to your Excellency a memorandum of the communication made to the Persian Secretary upon this subject by Salaum-Oolla-Khan, a near relation of Enaum-Oolla-Khan, the person through whom Rajah Ambajee has conveyed his present overtures; and to state to your Excellency my sentiments with regard to the general principles on which I shall be disposed to conclude engagements with Ambajee for establishing the proposed connection between him and the British Government.

3. I am not informed of the exact limits of the territories

under the authority of Ambajee, but a considerable portion of the former possessions of the Rana of Gohud being included in those territories, a compliance with the precise terms of Rajah Ambajee's proposals, would be incompatible with the arrangement proposed to be concluded with the Rana of Gohud and other of the Jaut chieftains. The progress of the negotiation with the Rana of Gohud may have precluded by considerations of justice and good faith, the propriety of receding from the conclusion of the projected arrangement with the Rana, even if it should be desirable on any ground of policy to abandon that object. In such an event it will be necessary to devise such an arrangement with Ambajee as may satisfy that chieftain without injury to the claims of the Rana of Gohud, and without defeating the design of establishing the independence of the Rana of Gohud.

4. It may perhaps be practicable to assign to Rajah Ambajee an additional portion of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's territory as an equivalent for that part of the Rana of Gohud's former possessions at present occupied by Ambajee, which it may be necessary to transfer to the independent authority of the Rana of Gohud under the proposed arrangement with that chieftain. It is probable also, that Ambajee may be satisfied with a limited extent of territory under the terms of independence and of exemption from the payment of tribute or revenue upon which I am disposed to guarantee his future possessions; and that he will readily yield the possession of the lands and forts which we must require from him, if he can by such a concession secure his independence and his property, and be relieved from all future interference in his estates, and from all charges and taxes whatever, excepting merely the obligation of rendering military aid and service in time of war.

5. The accurate information which your Excellency may acquire with regard to the territories under the authority of Ambajee, will probably enable your Excellency to suggest an arrangement satisfactory to that chieftain and to the Rana of Gohud.

6. I deem it however to be indispensably necessary that the fortress of Gwalior and the passes from the Deccan into Hindostan situated in that quarter should be garrisoned by British troops.

7. I am disposed to guarantee Ambajee in the fullest independent possession of such territory as may be assigned to him, without exacting from him any revenue, payment, or tribute whatever, excepting a subsidy proportioned to the extent of any military aid which may be afforded to him under the terms of the engagements to be contracted with that chieftain.

8. The only conditions which I deem it necessary to require from Ambajee, in return for the guarantee of his possessions by the British Government is, that Ambajee be required to co-operate with us in the present or in any future contest with the Mahratta power, or with any other state in Hindostan and the Deccan, and that Ambajee engage to assist the British Government to the extent of his power and resources in repelling any eventual invasion on the part of France; that he be required to dismiss all European officers and soldiers, French or others now in his service, and to engage not to employ any European officer or soldier hereafter without the consent of the British Government, and that he be required to furnish a stipulated force of cavalry whenever it shall be demanded by the British Government.

9. These are the general principles upon which I am inclined to form a connection with Ambajee; your Excellency however will modify the details of these proposed terms, according to actual or eventual circumstances, in such manner as may appear to your Excellency to be most conducive to the public interests.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

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## No. CXIX.

*General Orders, by the Governor-General in Council.*

Fort William, October 22d, 1803.

The Governor-General in Council notifies to the army his high approbation of the meritorious services of the officers and troops employed under the able conduct of Lieut.-Colonel George Harcourt, in the expedition prepared under the special orders of his Excellency in Council, for the occupation of the valuable province of Cuttack.

His Excellency in Council observed with great satisfaction the judgment, skill, and firmness, manifested by Lieut.-Colonel Harcourt, in directing the movement of the division of the troops, which entered the province of Cuttack from Ganjam.

The difficulties opposed to the progress of the troops by the peculiar nature of the country, by the period of the season, and by the resistance of the enemy, were surmounted by Lieut.-Colonel Harcourt, and by the brave officers and troops under his command, with the same spirit of gallantry and perseverance, which has secured the success of every operation of the British army in every part of India during this glorious campaign.

The Governor-General in Council highly approves the judicious arrangements prepared by Lieut.-Colonel Harcourt, for the siege and assault of the fort of Barrabutty at Cuttack, and the spirited exertion by which that important service was executed with success and honour on the 14th instant.

His Excellency in Council directs Lieut.-Colonel Harcourt to signify his distinguished approbation of the merits of Lieut.-Colonel Clayton of the Bengal 20th regiment native infantry, who commanded the attack, and of the steadiness and bravery of all the officers and troops employed in the assault of the fort.

It affords considerable satisfaction to the Governor-General in Council to remark, that this important service has been effected with so little loss, and his Excellency trusts that Captain Hurlstone of his Majesty's 22d regiment, Captain Kenny of the 19th regiment of Madras native infantry, and Lieut. Faithfull of the Bengal artillery, will speedily be restored to the public service, in which their courage and resolution have already been distinguished.

The Governor-General in Council expresses his sense of the activity, zeal, and useful services of Captain Blunt, field engineer in Cuttack, and also of the conduct of Captain Hetzler of the Bengal artillery.

The colours taken in the assault of the fort of Cuttack by the detachments of his Majesty's 22d regiment, the 20th Bengal native regiment, and the 9th and 19th Madras native regiments, are to be publicly displayed in the fort of Cuttack, and afterwards lodged in the principal building in the fort,

with an inscription signifying the names of the corps by which the standards were respectively taken from the enemy.

His Excellency in Council expresses the satisfaction with which he has noticed the zealous and efficient services of Major of Brigade Thompson.

During the advance of the force, under the immediate direction of Lieut.-Colonel Harcourt from Ganjam, the conduct of the officers and troops employed at Balasore under the command of Captain Morgan of the 7th Bengal native regiment, and of that which marched from Jelasore under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Ferguson of the same regiment, merits the public approbation of his Excellency in Council.

The Governor-General in Council particularly approves the firm and skilful conduct of Captain Morgan, in directing the disembarkation of the troops at Balasore, and in the judicious occupation and maintenance of that position. His Excellency in Council also expresses his just sense of the meritorious and useful assistance rendered by Captain P. Grant of the 16th regiment of Bengal native infantry, in the execution of every branch of the service at Balasore, and in aiding the progress of Lieut.-Colonel Ferguson's detachment.

Great advantage has been derived to the success of our arms in Cuttack from the respect which has been uniformly observed by Lieut.-Colonel Harcourt, and by all the officers and troops under his immediate command, as well as by the detachments co-operating from Balasore and Jelasore, towards the religious establishments in Cuttack, and from the exemplary humanity with which the lives and private property of the inhabitants and the sanctity of the temples and institutions of the Brahmins have been protected from violation.

The Governor-General notices with peculiar pleasure the merits of Lieut.-Colonel Harcourt, and of the officers and troops serving in Cuttack in this respect, as tending to maintain the honour of the British character, and to conciliate the confidence and attachment of the inhabitants of that valuable province.

By command of his Excellency the most noble
the Governor-General in Council,
L. Hook, Sec. to the Govt. Mil. Dept.

## No. CXX.

*Lieut.-General Lake to the Marquess Wellesley.*

(Private.)

Agra, October 22d, 1803.

MY LORD, [Received Nov. 1st, 1803.]

Your Lordship will this day receive an official letter respecting the subject of prize-money taken in the fort of Agra, amounting to twenty-four lacs of rupees, treasure I understand, for the payment of the troops, at least Colonel Hessing and all the European officers belonging to Mr. Perron declare that they do conceive this money to be public, and not private property: however it appears of very little consequence whose property it may have been, as it was clearly in the possession of the troops in the fort, who had confined the commandant Colonel Hessing and all European officers, and who did conceive it their property for the payment of their troops, and did, when leave was granted to them to quit the fort with their private property, leave this treasure as public property belonging to the fort. I, therefore, can see it in no other point of view than legal prize-money; if I am wrong, or have acted contrary to your wishes, I shall be most miserable. I can only say, that whatever may be my share it will not be touched, but left in the hands of the paymaster till your Lordship's pleasure is known, and ready to be paid whenever you like. The army certainly expected the money, or I would not have given it them, and I think they had deserved it. I hate all money concerns, and sincerely wish I had nothing to do with this; I have ever held money in most sovereign contempt, and shall I am sure do so to the end of my life. I have only to hope I have done nothing which can displease your Lordship, as that would take from me all the satisfaction I have received from our late successes.

I hope to be able to leave the place in perfect security by the 25th instant.

I trust you will excuse haste when I tell you it is now seven o'clock, and I have not had one moment to myself since five o'clock this morning. I believe the fall of Agra has completely astonished the natives and convinced them we are most superior to them. The fort is much more formidable

than I had any idea of, and I am convinced, as is every one that has seen it, that had we been obliged to storm, with the numbers in the fort, that we should have lost a most amazing number of men. We have been fortunate all the way through, and I think more particularly so in this instance.

Believe me, my dear Lord,
with every sentiment of affection and esteem,
ever most faithfully and sincerely yours,
G. LAKE.

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## No. CXXI.

*The Hon. Major-General Wellesley to the Marquess Wellesley.*

Camp, Ferdapore, October 24th, 1803.
[Received December 14th, 1803.]

MY LORD,

1. I have the pleasure to inform your Excellency, that Col. Stevenson took possession of the city of Boorhanpoor, without opposition, on the 16th instant; he marched to Asseer-Ghur on the 17th, took possession of the Pettah on the 18th, opened a battery against the fort on the 20th, and obtained possession of it on the morning of the 21st. I have not yet received a detailed account of the manner in which Colonel Stevenson obtained possession of this important fortress, or whether he sustained any loss in the attack of the Pettah on the 18th, or of the fort.

2. After I had arrived at Poolmery, about sixteen miles north from Aurungabad, I found that the enemy did not advance to the southward, as I had been informed they first intended, and in the night of the 15th, I received a particular account of the disposition of their troops, baggage, &c. which convinced me that they intended to interrupt Colonel Stevenson's operations at Asseer-Ghur.

3. I therefore marched on the 16th to the northward, and descended the Ghaut on the 19th. Scindiah had moved to the northward, but he halted as soon as he found I had returned; and he was yesterday at Aboon on the Taptee. The Rajah of Berar has separated from him, and, it is said, has gone towards Chandore. I suspect that the report has been circulated with a view to draw me to the southward again; but as Colonel Stevenson has got possession of Asseer-Ghur,

and is fully equal to any thing that can be sent against him, it is my intention to reascend the Ghaut immediately.

4. Sixteen officers and serjeants belonging to the Campoos* have joined Colonel Stevenson, under your Excellency's proclamation of the 29th of August. I will hereafter send a list of their names, and an account of the pay each is to receive. The infantry retired towards the Nerbuddah when Colonel Stevenson approached Boorhanpoor, and by all accounts it is completely destroyed and disorganized. It is impossible to form it into corps again, and it is not probable that it will ever be of any service to Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

5. I have directed Colonel Stevenson to leave a garrison in Asseer-Ghur, and to deliver the districts depending upon that fortress to the charge of the servants of the Soobah of the Deccan. Your Excellency will observe, that this is the last of the possessions of Dowlut Rao Scindiah in the Deccan; and the operations of the troops will now be directed against those of the Rajah of Berar.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,
with the greatest respect,
your Excellency's most obedient and
faithful humble servant,
ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

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## No. CXXII.

*Major-General Nichols to the Honourable Jonathan Duncan, Esq.*

HONOURABLE SIR, Bombay, Sept. 27, 1803.

The enclosed is a copy of a letter from Colonel Murray, giving cover to one from Lieutenant-Colonel Woodington, respecting the capitulation of Powaughur.†

I have the honour to be, &c.
O. NICHOLS, M.G.

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* A corruption of "camp."—A denominaton given by native states to camps, or corps of regular troops.

† These documents as also many others in this work are given for the sake of placing on public record, the valourous deeds of our armies in the East, at a crisis of the greatest importance.—[*Ed.*]

[1st. Enclosure.]

*To Major-General Nicholls.*

SIR, Head Quarters, Baroda, Sept. 21, 1803.

I have the honour to enclose a letter which I received this morning from Lieutenant-Colonel Woodington. It is necessary to inform you, that the delay of this important communication arises from the miscarriage of the Colonel's letter, although sent in duplicate.

Colonel Woodington highly praises the zeal and activity of the troops under his command, and to judge by their success, the praise is well merited.

Colonel Woodington has in a most particular manner requested, that I should lay the meritorious services of Serjeant Moore, of his Majesty's 86th regiment, before you. He led the forlorn hope at the assault of Broach, and behaved with the utmost gallantry on that occasion. Major Cuyler speaks highly in favour of his general character.

I have the honour to be, &c.

J. MURRAY, Colonel.

[2d. Enclosure.]

*To Colonel Murray, Commanding the Forces in the Guzerat.*

SIR, Baroda, Sept 21, 1803.

In consequence of your communication to me last night, that you had not received my official communication on the surrender of Powanghur by capitulation, I have the honour to address you again on the subject.

After a breach had been effected in the wall of the inner fort, as also that another was almost practicable in a tower at the angle of the outer fort, the garrison offered to capitulate on the morning of the 17th, on condition of being protected in their persons and private property. To these terms I agreed, on condition of immediately taking possession of the breach in the inner wall with a company of sepoys; they however tacked other stipulations to the capitulation, viz. that I should agree to pay them the arrears due from Scindiah, and that two of the Commanders of the Guicowar cavalry with me (amounting to about 300 horse) should sign the agreement. To these latter articles I would on no account agree, and it was not until four p. m. when they found from our continuing to batter that I would admit of no delay, that they agreed to the original terms, which were immediately carried into full effect, by their evacuation of the fort and mountain of which we took possession.

If this had not taken place I had made the necessary arrangements for storming both breaches on the morning of the 18th, and I conceive that the garrison were intimidated from a knowledge that, if they opposed us on our entering the breaches, their communication with the upper fort would be cut off, and they had no other way to escape than the road which led down by our battery.

Could they have obtained possession of the upper fort, or Balla Killa, at the top of the mountain, I am inclined to think it utterly impregnable.

I have left Captain Cliffe of the Engineers, to take a plan and view of the forts and works on the mountain, which I doubt not, from his known abilities, will be ably executed.

It is with the greatest pleasure, that I embrace this opportunity of submitting for your notice, the merits, zeal, and great exertions of all ranks on this service.

I have the honour to be, &c.
H. Woodington, Lieut.-Colonel.

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## No. CXXIII.

*Lieut.-General Lake to the Marquess Wellesley.*

(Private.)

My Lord, Camp Kerowly, Oct. 28th, 1803.

It is with the most heartfelt satisfaction I take up my pen to congratulate you upon the signal victory gained by General Wellesley over Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar. We have had rumours of it for some days, but cannot obtain any decided accounts of it. One report is, that Scindiah had fled into the Fort of Aseer with only seven horsemen; if that be true, his sun is set. The Berar Rajah will feel the operations in Cuttack, and lament his folly in contending with the British Government, and will of course sue for peace. Nothing ever gave me greater or more real pleasure than hearing that General Wellesley had so completely defeated the army of Scindiah with his own troops, unassisted by Colonel Stevenson, from being confident what joy you must have received from it, as well as its being done by a King's General: this you will allow to be a national pride in a British officer, without any disparagement to any other.

I had intended to have marched immediately towards Gwalior, and in my way to the Chumbul to have destroyed the remains of some of Duderneg's brigade in that direction; but upon finding the day before yesterday that they had begun their march to this side, I determined to intercept them, which I have not been able to do exactly; and I have been obliged to halt this day for a very heavy fall of rain last night, that made the roads so bad as to prevent my moving this morning. I shall march to-morrow morning, and hope very shortly to be able to give a very good account of them,

it is not clear what their intention is, except plundering the country, whether they incline to go towards Delhi or Jeypore, whichever route they take, we shall soon be with them. They have no leader, and one day they talk of coming in to us, another day they have some other scheme, and no one will take them into their service, consequently they cannot exist long. They are very few in number, and short I believe of ammunition, therefore your Lordship need not be the least uneasy about them. Ambajee's vakeel is now in camp, he arrived this morning, and you shall know by to-morrow's post what his terms are. I know his character perfectly, and I shall be very cautious in trusting to his faith; he has it not in his power to do mischief, he has no troops, and I do not think wishes for any, as these fellows of Dudernegg's offered their services to him, which he refused. The moment I have settled these gentry, if Ambajee does not give up Gwalior, I shall turn my hand that way, and have little doubt of its being an easy conquest.

That you may live long to enjoy all the honours and thanks from your country you are justly entitled to, with every private comfort and happiness you can experience, is the sincere wish, my dear Lord, of him who is

With affectionate regard and esteem
Faithfully your's,
G. LAKE.

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## No. CXXIV.

*The Marquess Wellesley to Lieut.-General Lake.*

(Private.)

Fort William, despatched by Express, at half-past Seven, P.M. Oct. 29, 1803.

MY DEAR SIR,

Your happy success at Agra has afforded me the most cordial satisfaction. This is the fruit of your glory in the field. I have remarked that your humane and generous heart has suffered severely even in the midst of your victories for the necessary loss of gallant British blood, which must attend such extraordinary efforts of valour; but I trust you now receive the best consolation for the fall of those whom you have lamented, in reaping the full benefit of their example

and noble deeds; and in securing Agra the most important single object of the war, without effusion of blood, and by the mere lustre and terror of your name. This is the most grateful result of the triumph of our arms; nor can a more convincing proof be afforded of the humane and just policy of that promptitude, decision, and energy, which marked your conduct in the commencement of the war. I am persuaded that many lives have been saved by the early sacrifice of a few brave men, whose early gallantry has struck terror into the hearts of the enemy. I have considered the fall of Agra as the most propitious event of this wonderful and immortal campaign, and I have received your notification of the surrender of the key of Hindostan as the signal of general rejoicing.

You will have shared my sentiments on the noble and splendid victory, gained by my brother on the 23d of September. His official account of the action has not yet reached me, but I have received authentic accounts of all the particulars of that glorious day, which have been forwarded to you by express; he is worthy to command under your orders: and I should almost have believed that he must have received them from Delhi, before he fought the battle of Assaye. His official return of ordnance taken on the field, amounts to ninety-eight pieces of artillery. I have sent you the only official letter yet received from him.

You have now actually accomplished every point of my instructions in the few weeks which have intervened between the 29th of August, and the 17th of October. If the successes of your operations stood alone, they would astonish all Asia; but combined with the blows struck in every other quarter, it is impossible to convey to you an adequate idea of the splendour of your fame in this part of the world. With all the sanguine temper of my mind, I declare that I could not have hoped for a completion of my plans at once so rapid and so secure. I must now send you fresh instructions, as you have reached the limits of all my first ideas.

You will excuse the delay of my official despatches, when you reflect that I am compelled every hour to look all around India, and at this moment am endeavouring to despatch to England an adequate representation of your merits and services.

I am particularly anxious to send you an order for the

distribution of prize, I hope to be able to furnish it to-morrow, in the meanwhile, you may assure the army that I will grant all within my power, and even stretch that power to the utmost for their interest.

I shall issue a general order comprehending your operations from the battle of Delhi, to the fall of Agra, on Monday.

Ever, my dear General,

Yours affectionately,

With sincere respect and confidence,

WELLESLEY.

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## No. CXXV.

*General Orders, by the Governor-General in Council.*

Fort William, October 30, 1803.

The Governor-General in council has this day received from Major-General the Honourable Arthur Wellesley, the official report of the signal and splendid victory obtained by the troops under the personal command of that distinguished officer, on the 23d of September, at Assye in the Deccan, over the combined armies of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar.

At the close of a campaign of the most brilliant success and glory in every quarter of India, this transcendent victory demands a testimony of public honour, equal to any which the justice of the British Government in India, has ever conferred on the conduct of our officers and troops in the most distinguished period of our military history.

The Governor-General in council highly approves the skilful plan formed by Major-General Wellesley on the 21st of September, for precluding the escape of the enemy, and for reducing their combined army to the necessity of hazarding a general action.

His Excellency in council also signifies his most cordial approbation of the magnanimity, promptitude, and judgment with which Major-General Wellesley determined upon the instantaneous attack of the enemy on the 23d of September.

During the severe action which ensued, the conduct of Major-General Wellesley united a degree of ability, of pru-

dence, and of dauntless spirit, seldom equalled, and never surpassed.

The Governor-General in council signifies his warmest applause of the exemplary order and steadiness with which the troops advanced under a most destructive fire, against a body of the enemy's infantry, considerably superior in number, and determined to oppose a vigorous resistance to our attack. The numerous infantry of the enemy were driven from their powerful artillery at the point of the bayonet, with an alacrity and resolution truly worthy of British soldiers, and the firmness and discipline manifested by our brave infantry, in repelling the great body of the enemy's cavalry, merit the highest commendation.

The Governor-General in council has remarked with great satisfaction, the gallant and skilful conduct of the cavalry, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Maxwell, and particularly of his Majesty's 19th regiment of light dragoons, a corps distinguished in India by a long and uninterrupted course of arduous service, and of progressive honour.

His Excellency in council directs Major-General Wellesley, to signify to all the officers and troops employed on this glorious occasion, and especially to Lieutenant-Colonel Harness and to Lieutenant-Colonel Wallace, who commanded brigades, and to the officers of the staff, the high sense entertained by the Governor-General in council of their eminent and honourable services.

The important benefits resulting from the triumph of our arms in the battle of Assye, are not inferior to the splendour of the action. The immediate consequences derived from the exertions of that day have been the complete defeat of the combined army of the confederate chieftains; an irreparable blow to the strength and efficiency of their military resources, especially of their artillery, in the Deccan; the expulsion of an hostile and predatory army from the territory of our ally the Soubahdar of the Deccan; and a seasonable and effectual check to the ambition, pride, and rapacity of the enemy.

The prosperous result of these advantages must be accelerated by the auspicious progress of our arms in other provinces of India, and it may reasonably be expected that, the decisive victories gained at Delhi and Assye, on the 11th and

23d of September, will speedily compel the enemy to restore peace to Hindostan, and to the Deccan.

The achievements of our commanders, officers, and troops during this campaign, and especially in the signal victories of Delhi and of Assye, must inspire a general sentiment of just confidence in the vigour of our military resources, and in the stability of our dominion and power. Our uniform success in frustrating every advantage of superior numbers, of powerful artillery, and even of obstinate resistance opposed by the enemy, constitutes a satisfactory proof of the established superiority of British discipline, experience, and valour; and demonstrates, that the glorious progress of our arms is not the accidental result of a temporary or transient advantage, but the natural and certain effect of a permanent cause.

From these reflections consolation is to be derived for the loss of those lamented and honoured officers and soldiers who, animated by the gallant spirit of their General, and emulating the noble example of his zeal and courage, sacrificed their lives to the honour and interests of their country.

The Governor-General in council greatly regrets the loss of Lieutenant-Colonel Maxwell of his Majesty's 19th dragoons, who fell at the head of the British cavalry, bravely charging a large body of the enemy's infantry. With the utmost concern his Excellency in council records the names of the valuable and excellent officers, who have fallen with glory at the battle of Assye, in atchieving the complete defeat of the enemy, and in establishing the triumph of the British arms in the Deccan. Lieutenant-Colonel Maxwell, Captains R. Boyle, H. Mackey, D. Aytone, A. Dyce, R. Macleod, and T. Maxwell, Captain-Lieutenants Steele and Fowler, Lieutenants Bonomi, Griffith, J. Campbell, J. M. Campbell, J. Grant, R. Neilson, L. Campbell, M. Morris and J. Douglas; Lieutenants Brown, Mavor, Perrie, and Volunteer Tew.

In testimony of the high honour acquired by the army under the personal command of Major-General Wellesley, at the battle of Assye, the Governor-General in council is pleased to order, that honorary colours, with a device properly suited to commemorate that signal and splendid victory, be presented to the corps of cavalry and infantry employed on that glorious occasion. The names of the brave officers

and men who fell at the battle of Assye will be commemorated, together with the circumstances of the action, upon the public monument to be erected at Fort William, to the memory of those who have fallen in the public service during the present campaign.

The honorary colours granted by these orders to his Majesty's 19th regiment of dragoons, and to the 74th and 78th regiments of foot, are to be used by those corps while they shall continue in India, or until his Majesty's most gracious pleasure be signified through his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

His Excellency the most noble the Governor-General, Captain-General and Commander-in-Chief of all the land forces serving in the East Indies, is pleased to direct, that these orders be publicly read to the troops, under arms, at every station of the land forces in the East Indies, and that the European officers of the native corps do cause the same to be duly explained to the native officers and troops.

By command of his Excellency the most noble
the Governor-General in council,
L. Hook,
Sec. to Gov$^{t}$. Mil. Dep$^{t}$.

By his Excellency the Captain-General and
Commander-in-Chief of the land forces.
J. Armstrong,
Acting Military Secretary.

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## No. CXXVI.

*The Governor-General in Council to the Honourable the Secret Committee of the Honourable the Court of Directors.*

Honourable Sirs, October 31, 1803.

The unavoidable delay in the despatch of the *Packet* overland, enables the Governor-General in council to communicate to your honourable Committee, by the present opportunity, the accounts which we have received of the progress of our arms, since our last address to your honourable Committee.

On the 12th of September, the army, under the personal direction of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, commenced crossing the river Jumna. In consequence of the total defeat of the army under the command of M. Louis

Bourquain on the 11th of September, the whole of the French and Mahratta force dispersed, leaving to the British troops the undisputed passage of the Jumna.

Conformably to the permission granted to General Perron, that officer attended by his secretary, Mr. Beckett, and by Mr. Fleury, passed into the Company's territories, and has since arrived at Lucknow, whence he will shortly proceed to the Presidency. General Perron was attended by his body-guard consisting of near 400 horse. On the 14th M. Louis Bourquain, and four of his officers, surrendered themselves prisoners of war to the Commander-in-Chief at Delhi.

On the 16th, his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief attended by the principal officers of the British army waited on the unfortunate Emperor Shah Allum, at the royal palace, in the Fort of Delhi.

On that occasion his Majesty's eldest son, Mirza Akber Shah, proceeded to the British camp, and conducted his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to the presence of his Majesty, who received his Excellency seated on his throne.

His Majesty and the whole of his court testified the utmost joy at the events which have placed his Majesty and the royal family, under the protection of the British Government.

The attention of the Governor-General is now directed to the formation of a permanent arrangement for the future maintenance of the dignity and comfort of his Majesty and the royal family, on principles calculated to provide for the exigency with the least practicable inconvenience to the honourable Company, and with the greatest advantage to the reputation of British justice, and liberality, and to secure the important benefits to be derived from the connection which will now be renewed between his Majesty, and the British power in India.

The Governor-General having received from his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, returns of the ordnance captured in the Fort of Alygur on the 4th of September, and of the artillery taken on the field of battle near Delhi, on the 11th of September, which completed the official statement of the military operations conducted under the personal command of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, from the 29th of August, to the 18th of September, the Governor-General in council issued general orders, under date the 1st of October,

expressing the sentiments of applause and admiration with which the British Government has contemplated the rapid and brilliant success of the British arms, under the distinguished conduct of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, and the extraordinary valour and exertions of the officers and troops by which that success was atchieved.

On the 24th of September, his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief marched from Delhi with the army under his command in the direction of Muttra and Agra, leaving Lieutenant-Colonel Ochterlony to attend the person of the Emperor Shah Allum; and for the protection of Delhi one complete battalion and five companies of infantry, together with a corps of Mahrattas, then raising under the superintendance of two officers, British subjects, who quitted the service of Scindiah at the commencement of the war.

On the 30th of September, M. Dodernique, a French officer in the service of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, commanding a brigade of Scindiah's troops, surrendered himself to Colonel Vandeleur, who had arrived at Muttra with a detachment of British troops from Futtygur. M. Dodernique was accompanied by a British subject, and by a French officer in Scindiah's service. His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief received notice on the 1st of October, of the intention of Mr. Brownrig, and of three more officers, British subjects belonging to the corps under the command of Mr. Brownrig, to surrender themselves at the earliest opportunity.

The Governor-General in council has the satisfaction to inform your honourable Committee, that no French officers of any consideration now remain in the service of the confederated Mahratta chieftains.

On the 2d of October, the army under the command of his Excellency General Lake arrived at Muttra. The Governor-General in council deems it to be a testimony due to the exemplary discipline and good conduct of the British troops, to insert in this place an extract from his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief's letter to the Governor-General, of the 2d of October, describing the impression produced on the minds of the inhabitants of the country between Delhi and Muttra, by the order and regularity of the troops during their march through that territory.

"*It is with a mixed sentiment of pride and pleasure that*

*I inform your Lordship, that all the inhabitants of this place, who for a time fled, returned to their habitations last night, on perceiving that no ravages had been committed by the troops, which I attribute to the particular attention payed by Colonel Vandeleur to this circumstance."*

*"I am informed from all quarters that the inhabitants behold with astonishment, this proof of the discipline and good conduct of the army, all declare that hitherto it has been unknown in Hindostan that a victorious army should pass through a country without destroying by fire, and committing every excess the most injurious to the inhabitants; but on the contrary from the regularity observed by us, our approach is a blessing, instead of bringing with it as they at first feared all the horrors of war attended by rapine and murder; that their cattle remain in their fields without being molested, and the inhabitants in their houses receive every protection."*

*"I cannot find words to express to your Lordship the pleasure I have received from this account. The favourable opinion the inhabitants have formed of us from these circumstances cannot fail of producing the most beneficial consequences."*

On the 9th of October his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief concluded a treaty of general defence and guarantee with the Rajah of Bhurtpoor, one of the principal chieftains of the tribe of Jauts whose country is situated in the vicinity of Muttra and Agra.

The Governor-General in council having entirely approved the terms of that treaty, has ratified it; a copy is enclosed for your honourable Committee's information.*

In consequence of the conclusion of this engagement the Rajah of Bhurtpoor has despatched to the British camp, a detachment of 1,200 cavalry to co-operate with the British army.

The character and influence of that chieftain in the north-western quarter of Hindostan, renders his alliance an object of considerable inportance to the interests of the British Government.

The Governor-General in council entertains a confident expectation, that the Rajpoot and other chieftains in that

* See Appendix.

quarter will shortly be induced to connect their interests with those of the British Government, and if necessary to co-operate with the British troops against the enemy.

On the 4th of October the army under the command of his Excellency General Lake, arrived before Agra; a summons was immediately sent demanding the surrender of the fort to which no answer was returned. The Mahratta officers in the fort had confined all the Europeans stationed there, and the greatest confusion was said to prevail within the fort. A body of the enemy's troops consisting of seven battalions being encamped under the walls of the fort, it became necessary to dislodge that force before the operation of the siege could be commenced. The Commander-in-Chief accordingly appointed a detachment of British troops under the command of Brigadier General Clarke for that duty, and on the 10th of October, the British detachment attacked and completely defeated the force of the enemy.

By this success, the British troops obtained possession of the town of Agra, and were enabled to commence operations for the siege of the fort.

On the 12th of October the battalions of the enemy which were opposed to the British troops on the 10th of that month surrendered to the Commander-in-Chief; their number amounted to about 2,500.

On the following day, the Governor of the Fort of Agra solicited a cessation of hostilities for the purpose of negotiating the terms of capitulation, and despatched an European officer to the British camp, with a letter signed by the principal officers in the fort, stating the conditions on which they were disposed to surrender it; his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief immediately despatched a British officer into the fort for the purpose of finally adjusting the terms of the capitulation, but while that officer was actually engaged in the negotation the firing from the fort recommenced, and the British officer returned to camp.

On the 17th the breaching batteries opened against the fort with great effect, and on the evening of the same day the garrison capitulated and surrendered the celebrated Fort of Agra to the British troops.

The acquisition of the important fortress of Agra, added to our possession of Delhi and Muttra, has completed the re-

duction of the territory of Scindiah situated on both banks of the Jumna.

The enemy being entirely repulsed on the north-western frontier of Oude, no event has occurred to disturb the tranquillity of our possessions since the incursion of the detachment under the command of Mr. Fleury, of which the details were communicated in our despatch to your honourable Committee of the 25th of September.* Some internal disturbance has arisen in consequence of outrages committed by the Zemeendar of Tutteea, who has for some time been in a state of rebellion against the British Government; these disturbances however were entirely quelled, and several of the rebels were in custody for trial by the civil power on the 21st of October.

Gholaum Mahomed Khan the Rohilla chief, who, at the invitation of Scindiah and of M. Perron, had advanced with a body of troops to Coonjpoorah, a town situated on the river Jumna to the northward of Delhi, with the intention of crossing that river and of proceeding towards Rampore, on receiving intelligence of the battle of Delhi, and the total defeat of the army under the command of M. Louis Bourquain immediately retreated with the utmost expedition, and was deserted by a considerable part of the troops which he had collected.

The Governor-General in council deems it proper in this place to insert an extract from a letter from Mr. A. Seton, the political agent of the Governor-General in the ceded provinces, dated the 18th of September, describing the impression produced on the minds of the inhabitants of our north-western provinces by the brilliant victory obtained by the army under the command of his Excellency General Lake, over the troops conducted by M. Louis Bourquain on the 11th of September in the vicinity of Delhi.

"*It is impossible to express the astonishment which has been raised amongst all ranks of natives by the brilliant success of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief on the 11th instant; at first the intelligence was not believed, and when confirmed was only believed to be admired. The beneficial effects of so glorious and so complete a victory gained*

* See p. 370.

*under circumstances of such difficulty, must be almost beyond calculation. The language of the natives is that their admiration is divided between two objects, and that they know not which to extoll most,—British valour, or British humanity.*"

The Governor-General in council now proceeds to communicate to your honourable Committee, the progress of operations in the province of Cuttack, which we have the satisfaction to inform your honourable Committee have terminated by the capture of the town and fort of Cuttack, and the consequent subjection of the whole of that valuable province to the British authority.

Our despatch of the 25th of September, contains the communication of the progress of the British army under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Harcourt from Ganjam to Juggernaut, and of the occupation of that place by the British troops.

The inundated state of the country prevented the march of the army under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Harcourt from Juggernaut, until the 24th of September. During the first day's march, the advanced corps of the army were several times engaged with parties of the enemy's troops who were repulsed with loss.

An action subsequently took place between an advanced detachment of the British troops and a party of the enemy near Muckundpore, in which the latter was defeated with considerable loss.

No further resistance was opposed to the progress of the British army until its arrival at Cuttack on the 10th of October, but the inundated state of the country and the rise of the rivers greatly retarded the march of the troops.

The town of Cuttack was immediately occupied by the British troops without opposition.

Our despatch of the 25th of September, also contains the information of the occupation of Balasore by a detachment of troops which proceeded from Fort William by sea, under the command of Captain Morgan.

On the 30th of September, Captain Morgan detached two companies under the command of Lieutenant Slye, towards Soorong twenty miles south of Balasore, for the purpose of dislodging a party of the enemy stationed near that

place, and of opening the communication in the direction of Cuttack.

On the 1st of October the detachment under the command of Lieutenant Slye, attacked and defeated the enemy which was posted at a village a short distance north of Soorong, and the troops of the enemy stationed at Soorohg, subsequently retreated to the southward. The detachment under Lieutenant Slye having been reinforced by another company from Balasore, occupied Soorong on the 3d of October without further opposition.

In our despatch of the 25th of September, the Governor-General in council has communicated to your honourable Committee, the formation and destination of a detachment under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Fergusson, at Balasore.

On the 4th of October the whole of the detachment under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Fergusson, arrived at Balasore without any opposition.

On the 10th of October the detachment under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Fergusson marched from Balasore in consequence of orders from the Governor-General, directing that officer to proceed for the purpose of forming a junction with the army under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Harcourt at Cuttack; and on the 15th of October that detachment arrived near Budruck, a village situated near half way between Balasore and Cuttack.

The inhabitants of the province of Cuttack afforded every assistance to the British troops on their march, and expressed the utmost satisfaction at the prospect of being speedily relieved from the oppressions to which they had uniformly been subjected by the Mahratta Government, and of being placed under the protection of the British power.

On the 19th of October the Governor-General received the satisfactory intelligence of the capture of the strong fort of Barrabutty, or Cuttack, on the 14th, by assault.

The Governor-General in council contemplates with sentiments of the highest approbation the distinguished zeal and ability of the British officers, and indefatigable perseverance and alacrity of the British troops in surmounting the extraordinary difficulties which the nature of the country of Cut-

tack, and the inclemency of the season opposed to the progress and operations of an invading army.

The Governor-General in council desires to offer to your honourable Committee his congratulations on the success of the British arms in the province of Cuttack, by which the whole of that valuable and highly productive province has been annexed to the honourable Company's dominions, the frontier of Bengal materially strengthened, and the continuity of your possessions between the presidencies of Bengal and Fort St. George, ultimately secured.

On the 3rd of October the Governor-General in council had the satisfaction to receive despatches from Bombay, notifying the assault and capture of the important seaport of Baroach, on the 29th of August, by a detachment under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Woodington.

By the capture of this important sea port, its dependant territory estimated to yield an annual revenue of more than eleven lacks of rupees, has been subjected to the authority of the British Government.

The Governor-General has had the satisfaction to receive advices from the honourable Major-General Wellesley, containing the important intelligence that on the 23rd of Sept. an action took place near the Adjuntee Pass, in the Deccan, between the forces under the command of the honourable Major-General Wellesley, and the main body of the combined army of the confederated chieftains. After a most severe engagement the enemy was completely defeated, and ninety-eight pieces of cannon were taken on the field of battle by the British troops at the point of the bayonet; our loss in this signal and splendid victory has been great.

The Governor-General in council solicits the particular notice of your honourable Committee, and of the honourable Court of Directors, to the distinguished merits of the honourable Major-General Wellesley, and of the officers and troops under his command in that extraordinary exertion of British discipline, valour, and skill.

The satisfaction with which the Governor-General in council contemplates the late rapid and glorious success of the British arms in every direction in which they have been opposed to the enemy's forces, is augmented by the reflection,

that under the pressure of accumulated defeat, with aggravated loss of resources, power, reputation, military strength, and dominion in every quarter of India, the confederate chieftains must speedily be compelled to accede to such reasonable terms of pacification as shall sufficiently provide for the safety of our allies, for the future security of the honourable Company's possessions, and for the permanent establishment of tranquillity in Hindostan and the Deccan.

The Governor-General in council cannot close this despatch without expressing to your honourable Committee in the strongest terms the sentiments of high respect, admiration, and gratitude, with which he contemplates the energy and perseverance, the military skill, judgment, and invincible intrepidity manifested by his Excellency General Lake, commander-in-chief, under extraordinary difficulties, in preparing the army of Bengal for the field, in conducting it by a rapid succession of glorious victories to the complete defeat of a powerful enemy, and in maintaining the honour of the British name in India by a humane attention towards the inhabitants of the conquered provinces, and by a due respect and reverence towards the unfortunate representative of the house of Timur, and towards his Majesty's royal family.

The glory of this uninterrupted success is not surpassed by any recorded triumph of the British arms in India, and has been attended by every circumstance calculated to elevate the fame of British valour, to illustrate the character of British humanity, and to secure the stability of the British empire in the east. The Governor-General in council therefore earnestly recommends the conduct of General Lake to the most distinguished approbation and applause of the East India Company, and to the gracious favour of his Majesty; nor has any officer in the most brilliant periods of our history in India displayed the high qualifications requisite for the arduous station of commander-in-chief, with more honour to the military reputation, or with more advantage to the political interests of the British nation in the east.

The public duty of the Governor-General in council also demands a testimony of justice to the conduct of the honourable Major-General Wellesley. The attention of your honourable Committee has already been solicited to the merits of Major-General Wellesley in conducting the British troops

from the frontier of Mysore to Poonah, in establishing his Highness the Peishwa upon the musnud, and in the reduction of the important fortress of Ahmednuggur. The conduct of Major-General Wellesley in the exercise of the extensive political and military powers, vested in him by the Governor-General in council, also deserves the highest approbation of your honourable Committee, and of the honourable the Court of Directors.

At the close of a campaign of the most brilliant success, and glory, in every quarter of India, the transcendant victory obtained at Assye in the Deccan, on the 23d of September, appeared to the Governor-General in council to demand a testimony of public honour, equal to any which the justice of the British Government in India has ever conferred on the conduct of our officers and troops in the most distinguished period of our military history.

The Governor-General in council highly approved the skilful plan formed by Major-General Wellesley on the 21st of September, for precluding the escape of the enemy, and for reducing their combined army to the necessity of hazarding a general action.

His Excellency in council also signified his most cordial approbation of the magnanimity, promptitude, and judgment with which Major-General Wellesley determined upon the instantaneous attack of the enemy on the 23d of September.

During the severe action which ensued, the conduct of Major-General Wellesley united a degree of ability, of prudence, and of dauntless spirit, seldom equalled and never surpassed.

The important benefits resulting from the triumph of our arms in the battle of Assye, are not inferior to the splendour of the action. The immediate consequences derived from the exertions of that day have been the complete defeat of the combined army of the confederate chieftains; an irreparable blow to the strength and efficiency of their military resources, especially of their artillery, in the Deccan; the expulsion of a predatory and hostile army from the territory of our ally the Soubahdar of the Deccan; and a seasonable and effectual check to the ambition, pride and rapacity of the enemy.

Under these circumstances the Governor-General in council is induced to recommend the conduct of the honourable Major-General Wellesley to the particular approbation of the

honourable Court of Directors, and to the gracious notice of his Majesty.

In the course of an extensive and complicated system of military operations, the glorious success of our arms since the commencement of this war has been uniform in every part of India. The able and gallant officers and troops of his Majesty's service, and of the several establishments of the three Presidencies have been actuated by equal sentiments of public spirit and honour, and have co-operated with equal ardour and success, in an united effort to accomplish the just objects of the allies. The Governor-General in council confides in the justice of our cause, in the unanimous zeal of the three Presidencies, and in the continued co-operation of ther respective resources and power, that the views of the confederate chieftains will be speedily frustrated by the complete restoration of peace and tranquillity to the provinces of Hindostan and the Deccan, which have been disturbed by the ambition and violence of the enemy.

We have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.
G. H. BARLOW.
G. UDNY.

P. S. The Governor-General has received on this day, a despatch from the honourable Major-General Wellesley, under date the 6th of October, containing intelligence that on the 5th of October Major-General Wellesley had received a letter from the enemy's camp signed by Ballajee Koonjur, requesting that Major-General Wellesley would despatch a British officer, together with an officer of the Soubahdar of the Deccan to the enemy's camp, for the purpose of negotiating terms of peace between the allies and the confederated Mahratta chieftains.

Ballajee Koonjur was originally despatched by his Highness the Peishwa from Bassein, to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, for the purpose of explaining to that chieftain the nature of the engagements concluded between the Peishwa and the British Government; but with the accustomed versatility and treachery of a Mahratta politician Ballajee Koonjur has subsequently attached himself to the service of Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

Major-General Wellesley judged it to be expedient to decline a compliance with this request for the despatch of a British officer, and of an officer of the Soubahdar of the

Deccan to the camp of the confederates; first, because in the application of Ballajee Koonjur no reference is made to the authority, either of Dowlut Rao Scindiah or the Rajah of Berar, and consequently it is not certain that the application proceeds from either of those chieftains, either or both of whom might hereafter disavow the act of Ballajee Koonjur; and secondly, because the presence of a British officer in the enemy's camp at that moment, would have tended to raise the spirits of the enemy's troops, and to prevent their dispersion, and would have been represented by the enemy as an attempt on our part to sue for peace.

The Governor-General in council entirely approves the judgment and prudence manifested by Major-General Wellesley in refusing to comply with the request of the enemy, and is satisfied that the duplicity and debased art of the Mahratta councils would have perverted the acquiescence of Major-General Wellesley in this insidious proposition, to the purpose of impairing the reputation of our arms and power.

The Governor-General in council however, is inclined to believe that the ambition, pride, and rapacity of the confederate chieftains have received such a check, as must compel them to abstain from the prosecution of their inordinate designs; and we therefore expect to receive early intelligence of the disposition of the confederate chieftains to despatch directly from their respective authorities, to the British camp, an embassy, duly authorized to negotiate the terms of peace conformably to Major-General Wellesley's proposition.

WELLESLEY.
G. H. BARLOW.
G. UDNY.

## No. CXXVII.

*The Marquess Wellesley to Lord Hobart.*

MY LORD, Fort-William, November 1st, 1803.

1. In every quarter of India the officers and troops employed in the course of this war, have displayed the most exemplary conduct under circumstances of considerable difficulty and danger. The merits of the army were however eminently conspicuous in the gallant and successful assault of Allighur, and in the glorious and memorable battles of Delhi and Assye.

2. Te conduct of the troops engaged in those actions demanded an extraordinary testimony of my approbation. I accordingly directed in my orders of the 1st and 30th of October, that the corps employed in the capture of Allighur and in the victories at Delhi and Assye should bear in their respective colours an honourary device properly suited to commemorate those important events, and to perpetuate the peculiar honour acquired by the troops under the personal command of his Excellency General Lake, and of the honourable Major-General Wellesley on those occasions.

3. In this remote quarter of the British empire it is requisite on important occasions, to confirm the zeal, courage, and discipline of the army, by the immediate expression of the public approbation of the executive government. The salutary effect of public honours would be lost in a considerable degree, if delayed until orders could be received from England.

4. I should however have been desirous to have received the previous sanction of his Majesty for the grant of honorary devices to be worn in the colours of the regiments of his Majesty's army, which were engaged at Allighur, at Delhi and Assye, but your Lordship will feel that it would have been extremely unjust to have excepted his Majesty's regiments from the reward conferred upon achievements, in which those regiments had borne a most conspicuous part.

5. I request your Lordship to solicit his Majesty's gracious approbation and public confirmation of the grant of honorary devices to be borne in the standards and colours of the regiments of his Majesty's army, which are named in the Governor-General's orders to which I have referred.

6. Your Lordship will remark, that I have reserved the confirmation of these honorary grants for the ultimate pleasure of his Majesty, and that I have limited their operation to India; but I request your Lordship to submit to his Majesty my humble hope that his Majesty will be graciously pleased to permit those corps to retain after their return to Europe, the honorary distinctions granted for their services in India.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

## No. CXXVIII.

*Minute by the Governor-General.*

Fort William, Nov. 1st, 1803.

The Governor-General is sincerely concerned that any circumstances should require the departure of Captain James Salmond, from India.

On the return of Captain Robinson, late Military Auditor General, to Europe, at the close of the year 1800, the zeal, ability, and honour, which had been manifested by Captain Salmond in the discharge of the functions of Military Secretary to the Governor-General, induced the Governor-General to consider Captain Salmond to be the fittest person to succeed Captain Robinson in the important office of Military Auditor General, and the public records bear ample testimony that the duties of that laborious and invidious station could not have been committed to any person possessing qualifications for the trust, superior to those of Captain Salmond.

The high estimation in which the services of Captain Salmond are held by this government, has been stated in a late general letter from the Governor-General in council, to the honourable the Court of Directors. The Governor-General however, deems it to be an act of justice to Captain Salmond to record in this place, a declaration of the sense which he entertains of the advantage which has been derived to the public service from the zeal, fidelity, knowledge, and talents of this meritorious public officer now on the eve of his embarkation for Europe. The Governor-General has derived the greatest assistance from Captain Salmond, not only in revising the various and complicated branches of the military establishment of this Presidency, with a view to the regulation of the military charges, but in the introduction of several useful improvements for facilitating the system of military accounts, and for correcting defects in the supply and movement of the army.

Captain Salmond's distinguished services had recommended him to so high a place in the Governor-General's confidence and esteem, that the Governor-General directed Captain Salmond during the last year to visit the settlements of Madras and Bombay, for the purpose of examining the mili-

tary regulations, and the existing system for the ordering and management of the army in all its branches at those Presidencies, in order to prepare the means of introducing every practicable degree of improvement in the regulations of the army throughout India. Captain Salmond's report upon this subject after his return to Bengal, evinces the diligence, ability, and integrity with which he discharged the important trust committed to him.

Under all these circumstances the Governor General in the most earnest manner recommends Captain Salmond to the notice of the honourable the Court of Directors, as a public officer who has rendered essential service to the Company in the discharge of a most arduous trust, and whose conduct ranks him with the most respectable of his predecessors, and affords a useful example for the imitation of his successors in the important office of Military Auditor General.*

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## No. CXXIX.

*Lieut.-General Lake to the Marquess Wellesley.*

Camp, four miles to the westward of Lasswary,
November 1st, 1803.
[Received November 13th, 1803.]

My Lord,

I have the honour to inform your Excellency, that I marched from Agra the 27th ultimo, in pursuit of the Mahratta force, which was composed of the brigades which had been detached from the Deccan in the early part of the campaign, and of a few battalions which had effected their escape from Delhi. I was the more anxious to defeat this corps from its being furnished with a numerous artillery. Owing to the detention the army met with from a heavy fall of rain, it was not until the 29th that it reached a camp to the westward of Futtipoor. From intelligence I received here of the rapid manner in which the Mahratta army was moving, I determined to leave the heavy artillery, with a proper detachment of infantry for its protection, and to pursue the enemy by forced marches, in the hope of being able the more speedily to come up with him. On the 31st, the army encamped at a

* Captain Salmond on his return to Europe, was appointed by the Court of Directors to the important office of Military Secretary to the Court of Directors.—[*Ed.*]

short distance from the ground which the enemy had quitted the same morning. Possessed of this intelligence, I resolved to make an effort to overtake him with all the cavalry of the army, in the intention of delaying him by a light engagement, until the infantry should be able to come up. To this end the cavalry marched at twelve last night, and having performed a distance of more than forty miles in twenty-four hours, came up with the enemy this morning soon after day-break. From the sudden manner in which I came upon the enemy, I ventured to make an attack with the cavalry alone, supported by the mounted artillery, but finding him too advantageously posted to hope for complete success without too much risk, I drew the cavalry out of reach of cannon shot, and waited the arrival of the infantry. Soon after their arrival, I made a general attack upon the enemy's position, the result of which I have the satisfaction of informing your Excellency has been a complete, though I sincerely lament to add, dear bought victory. The enemy were totally defeated, with the loss of all their cannon, tumbrils, and baggage; but this important advantage has only been gained by the loss of many valuable officers, the principal of whom are, Major-General Ware, Colonel Vandeleur, Major Griffiths, Major Campbell the Deputy Quarter Master General, and my Aide-de-Camp Lieutenant Duval, who gloriously fell in this honourable contest.

I have not been able to ascertain the exact account of our loss in killed and wounded, returns of which, with a detailed account of this important affair, I shall have the honour of transmitting to your Excellency by the first opportunity.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,
Your Lordship's
Most obedient humble servant,
G. LAKE.

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By authentic advices received from camp, it appears that the victory was most complete and glorious. All the enemy's battalions are cut up, or taken, and near seventy guns, their whole baggage, bazars, &c. are in our possession. The Commander-in-Chief had two horses killed under him; and Major Lake severely, but not dangerously wounded.

By command of his Excellency the most Noble
the Governor General in Council,
J. LUMSDEN, Chief Sec. to the Govt.

## No. CXXX.

*Lieut.-General Lake to the Marquess Wellesley.*

Head Quarters, Camp near Lasswary, Nov. 2, 1803.

My Lord, [Received Nov. 15, 1803.]

In my despatch of yesterday's date, I did myself the honour to state for your Lordship's information, some particulars of the march of the army from Agra to the camp it now occupies, together with the general result of the action which took place yesterday. I now have the honour to send your Excellency a more detailed account of that affair.

After a forced march of twenty-five miles, which was performed by the cavalry in a little more than six hours, I came up with the enemy, who appeared to be upon their retreat, and in such confusion, that I was tempted to try the effect of an attack upon him with the cavalry alone. By cutting the embankment of a large reservoir of water, the enemy had rendered the road very difficult to pass, which caused a considerable delay in the advance of the cavalry; of this the enemy had availed himself to take an advantageous post, having his right upon a rivulet, which we had to cross, and his left upon the village of Lasswary; the whole of his front was amply provided with artillery. I was prevented from discovering this change in the situation of the enemy by the quantity of dust which, when once clear of the water, totally obscured him from our sight; I therefore proceeded in the execution of my design, by which I hoped to prevent his retreat into the hills, and secure his guns; directing the advanced guard and first brigade commanded by Colonel Vandeleur, upon the point where I had observed the enemy in motion, but which proved to be the left of his new position; the remainder of the cavalry I ordered to attack in succession, as soon as they could form after passing the rivulet.

The charge of the advanced guard under Major Griffiths, and that of the first brigade led by Colonel Vandeleur, was made with much gallantry; the enemy's line was forced, and the cavalry penetrated into the village; they still, however, continued to be exposed to a most galling fire of cannon and musketry, which, as it was impossible under such circumstances to form the squadrons for a fresh attack, determined

me to withdraw them. The guns which had fallen into our hands could not be brought away from the want of bullocks. In this charge Colonel Vandeleur fell, mortally wounded; in him the service has lost a most valuable officer.

The attacks of the other brigades were conducted with the same spirit, but after taking several of the enemy's guns, being still fired upon without being able to discover the enemy, they retired in good order, retaining possession of a part of the artillery. In the performance of this service, the third brigade, consisting of his Majesty's 29th regiment, and the 4th regiment of native cavalry, under the command of that meritorious officer, Colonel Macan, met my entire approbation.

The infantry having marched at three A. M. arrived upon the banks of the rivulet about eleven o'clock. After so long a march it was absolutely necessary to allow some time for the men to refresh themselves, during which time the enemy sent in to say that if certain terms were allowed them, they were willing to surrender their guns. Anxious to prevent the further effusion of blood, I directed a letter to be written, acquiescing in their proposals, and allowing them an hour to decide; in the mean time the several columns for the attack were formed. The infantry formed in two columns upon the left; the first, composed of the right wing under the command of Major-General Ware, was destined to gain the enemy's right flank, which he had thrown back since the morning, leaving a considerable space between it and the rivulet, and to assault the village of Lasswary; the second, composed of the left wing, under Major-General St. John, was to support the first column. The third brigade of cavalry under Colonel Macan was to support the infantry; the second brigade under Lieut.-Colonel Vandeleur was detached to the right, to be ready to take advantage of any confusion in the enemy's line, and to attack him upon his retreat; the brigade under Colonel Gordon composed the reserve, and was formed between the second and third brigades. As many of the field pieces as could be brought up, with the gallopers attached to the cavalry, formed four different batteries.

At the expiration of the time which I had allowed the enemy to decide, I ordered the infantry to advance: as soon as they became exposed to the enemy's guns, the four batteries commenced their fire, and continued to advance, though

opposed by a great superiority, both in number and weight of metal.

When the 76th regiment, which headed the attack, had arrived at the point from which I intended to make the charge, they were so much exposed to the enemy's fire, and losing men so fast, that I judged it preferable to proceed to the attack with that regiment, and as many of the native infantry as had closed to the front, to losing time in waiting until the remainder of the column should be able to form, the march of which had been retarded by impediments in the advance.

As soon as this handful of heroes were arrived within reach of the enemy's canister shot, a most tremendous fire was opened upon them. The loss they sustained was very severe, and sufficient alone to prevent a regular advance; at this moment the enemy's cavalry attempted to charge, but were repulsed by the fire of this gallant body; they, however, rallied at a short distance, and assumed so menacing a posture, that I thought it advisable to order them to be attacked by the cavalry; this service fell to the share of his Majesty's 29th regiment, commanded by Captain Wade, (Major Griffith having at that instant been unfortunately killed by a cannon shot,) and was performed with the greatest gallantry, and in a manner which entitles Captain Wade, and every officer and soldier in the regiment to my warmest acknowledgements. The remainder of the first column of infantry arrived just in time to join in the attack of the enemy's reserve, which was formed in the rear of his line, with its left upon the village of Lasswary, and its right thrown back.

About this time Major-General Ware fell dead, his head being carried off by a cannon shot. He was a gallant officer, and one whose loss I deeply lament. On his death the command of this column devolved upon Colonel Macdonald, who, though wounded, continued to acquit himself in this important command very much to my satisfaction.

The enemy opposed a vigorous resistance to the last, and it was not until he had lost his guns that he abandoned his post. Even then his left wing did not fly, but attempted to retreat in good order; in this, however, they were frustrated by his Majesty's 27th regiment, and the 6th regiment of native cavalry, under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Vande-

leur, who broke in upon the column, cut several to pieces, and drove the rest in prisoners, with the whole of the baggage.

Severe as the loss has been which we have sustained in the achievement of this complete victory, that of the enemy has been far greater. With the exception of upwards of 2,000, who have been taken prisoners, (of which number I have only detained the principal officers, amounting to forty-eight), I have reason to believe that very few escaped the general slaughter.

It would be a violation of my feelings were I to close my despatch without bearing testimony to the gallant conduct of Major Macleod, and Captain Robertson, of his Majesty's 76th regiment, and of every officer and soldier of that inestimable corps, in the attack of the village of Lasswary. Major Gregory, too, at the head of the second battalion of the 12th regiment of native infantry, in the same service, displayed a conduct highly meritorious.

In the list of those officers who particularly distinguished themselves, I cannot omit the names of Lieut. Wallace, of his Majesty's 27th regiment, who was entrusted with the command of a battery of gallopers, nor that of Lieut. Dixon, of the 6th regiment of native cavalry, who was employed in the same service.

The whole of my staff upon this, as upon every former occasion, are entitled to a large share of praise, and to my warmest gratitude. The zeal which they displayed upon this memorable day is too plainly proved by the enclosed returns of the killed and wounded.* I have sustained a great loss by the death of Major William Campbell, the deputy quarter-master-general, and by that of my aid-de-camp, Lieut. Duval, of his Majesty's 19th Light Dragoons, who was a young man of great promise.

Herewith I have the honour to enclose returns of the ordnance and colours which were captured upon this occasion.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,
your Lordship's most faithful,
and humble servant,

G. Lake.

* See Appendix.

P. S. In the hurry which I wrote my despatch of yesterday's date, I fear I did not explain to your Lordship, that the enemy's corps which we have defeated, comprised the whole of the fifteen regular battalions which had been sent from the Deccan under the command of Monsieur Duderneg, and two battalions of the same description which had escaped from Delhi. I therefore have the satisfaction of congratulating your Excellency upon the annihilation of the whole of the regular force in Scindiah's service, commanded by French officers. G. L.

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## No. CXXXI.

*Lieut.-General Lake to the Marquess Wellesley.*

(Secret.)

My Lord, Camp, Lasswary, Nov. 2d, 1803.

I sent you last night an account of our having at length completed the defeat of all the force belonging to Perron or Scindiah on this side India, which has been effected by great fatigue, difficulty, and severe loss, however it is an object of such importance to destroy these battalions effectually, that I felt it incumbent upon me to use every exertion in my power, and which I never could have done had it been delayed one hour longer, they would have escaped entirely, and from what I learn they were upon their way to join Taunteeah,* at any rate we never could have caught them. These battalions are most uncommonly well appointed, have a most numerous artillery, as well served as they can possibly be, the gunners standing to their guns until killed by the bayonet, all the sepoys of the enemy behaved exceedingly well, and if they had been commanded by French officers, the event would have been, I fear, extremely doubtful. I never was in so severe a business in my life or any thing like it, and pray to God I never may be in such a situation again; their army is better appointed than ours, no expense is spared whatever, they have three times the number of men to a gun we have, their bullocks, of which they have many more than we have, are of a very superior sort, all their men's knapsacks and

* One of Scindiah's Chiefs.

baggage are carried upon camels, by which means they can march double the distance; we have taken all their bazar, baggage, and every thing belonging to them, an amazing number of them were killed, indeed the victory has been decisive. The action of yesterday has convinced me how impossible it is to do any thing without British troops, and of them there ought to be a very great proportion. The returns of yesterday will, I fear, prove the necessity of what I say too fully. I could not write to you my dear Lord, the various occurrences of the week, the wound of my dear son, rendered me totally unfit for any thing, but I thank God, his wound is less severe than I at first believed, when I first saw him upon receiving it it almost unmanned me, but the alarming crisis when it happened obliged me to quit him, and look to the troops, who at that time wanted every assistance I could give them; we fortunately succeeded in carrying our point, by which means I think we shall have destroyed all the force that can now oppose us. I think, without exception, yesterday was the most anxious day I ever experienced, for had we been beaten by these brigades, the consequences attending such a defeat must have been most fatal. These fellows fought like devils, or rather heroes, and had we not made a disposition for attack in a style that we should have done against the most formidable army we could have been opposed to, I verily believe, from the position they had taken, we might have failed. As it is, I feel happy in having accomplished all your wishes, except Gwalior, which I trust we shall get possession of by treaty with Ambajee, the fall of these brigades will bring him to terms immediately, and will have an effect upon all the different Rajahs who have been looking very much to the proceedings of them, and I suspect many were encouraging them to stand out for some time, and gave them hopes of assistance if they did not absolutely give it them.

I feel great satisfaction that my son is going on well, has no fever, and no doubt of his having the use of his knee. I fear it will be impossible for me to send this evening a detailed account of the action, but hope to be able to send it off to-morrow very early.

I do not think it will be possible for me to move from hence before the fifth on account of my wounded men, and other

circumstances; I shall then turn towards Gwalior, in order to arrange matters with Ambajee. I will let you know more of my motions instantly, and remain,

ever, my dear Lord,
with unfeigned and sincere attachment,
your devoted servant,
G. LAKE.

I hope you will come to this part of the world, as I long to shew it you.

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## No. CXXXII.

*The Hon. Major-General Wellesley to the Marquess Wellesley.*

MY LORD, Camp at Cheese-kair, Nov. 2, 1803.

After I had sent off my despatch to your Excellency of the 24th of October, I received authentic accounts, that the Rajah of Berar had passed through the hills which form the boundary of Candeish, and had moved towards the river Godavery. I therefore ascended the Adjuntee Ghaut on the 25th, and continued my march to the southward on the 26th, and passed Aurungabad on the 29th.

2. The Rajah had advanced gradually to the eastward, and was at Lakeegaun, about twenty miles north from Puttun, when I arrived at Aurungabad, and between that night and the night of the 31st, during the whole of which time I was in his neighbourhood, he moved his camp five times.

3. On the 31st, he detached a body consisting of 5,000 horse, to endeavour to intercept a convoy consisting of 14,000 bullocks, which was going forward to join the troops on the frontier. This convoy was protected by three companies of the 2d, of the 3d Madras native infantry, with two 3-pounders under Captain Baynes; which detachment, with 400 Mysore horse, has for some time been employed in convoying grain from the districts south of the Godavery to my camp, and by a company from the subsidiary force, and two companies from the corps serving at Hyderabad, under the command of Captain Seton.

4. They had marched from the Godavery on the morning of the 31st, and reached Umber, where they were attacked, and they succeeded in beating off the enemy, and in securing the convoy, which arrived in safety in my camp yesterday,

notwithstanding the great superiority of numbers by which they were attacked.

5. I have the honour to enclose copies of the reports of this action which I have received from Captain Baynes; upon which I have to observe, that it affords another instance of what can be done, by disciplined infantry, determined to do their duty, against very superior numbers of cavalry.

6. I beg leave also to take this opportunity to draw your Lordship's notice to the Mysore cavalry under Bishnapah Pundit. This corps, which consists of 2,000 men, have performed all the light troops duties of this division of the army, since I was detached from the Toombudra in the month of March last. They have performed the duties with the utmost cheerfulness, and a zeal which I have never before witnessed in troops of this description. They have frequently been engaged with the enemy's light troops, have always conducted themselves well, and have lost many men and horses.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,
your Excellency's most obedient and faithful
humble servant,
ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[Enclosures.]

*To Captain Barclay, Deputy Adjutant-General, &c.*

SIR, Umber, Oct. 31st, 1803.

I beg you will report to the honourable Major-General Wellesley, that I was attacked this day about two o'clock P. M. by about four or five thousand horse. They came on at first as if determined to charge, but, receiving a few shot from our guns, they retired, and though they frequently came near us, as if to charge, and some of them within musket shot, they were always driven back. Our loss is one European wounded, two Sepoys wounded, and some Mysoreans killed and wounded, besides a few (perhaps three) horses killed. The loss of the enemy is much greater, particularly in horses. I beg you to say to the General, that I shall take post till I receive his instructions. I write this by moonlight, which will, I hope, apologize for haste. We were under arms till about sunset; at which time they were out of sight.

THOMAS BAYNES,
Captain commanding a detachment.

*To Captain Barclay, Deputy Adjutant-General, &c.*

SIR,—I last night had the honour to inform you, that I had repulsed a body of Bhounselah's* horse, and have now (for the information of the honourable Major-General Wellesley) to make you more fully informed of the circumstances.

* Rajah of Berar's.

I arrived with my convoy about twelve o'clock, and encamped near the town, with my right flank to it, and my rear protected by a hill. At two o'clock P.M. the attack began (without more than ten minutes warning of their approach) by throwing great numbers of rockets and advancing upon our left: this obliged me to change my front by wheeling to the left; at the same time some of them were within musket shot. I then opened my guns, which stopped their approach; they at this time moved round, as if to gain the rear, where the Brinjarees were. This movement obliged me to detach a party to cover them, and having previously posted a company on the hill in my rear, my line became very small: to prevent their knowing my exact strength, I drew up the Mysore horse in our line. They came on repeatedly as if to charge, but were always stopped by our guns. They continued to rocket us till dark, when they retired. I am sorry to add that one hundred of the Gram bullocks were carried off, and some Brinjaree bullocks (perhaps one hundred) while at grass.

THOMAS BAYNES,
Captain commanding a detachment.

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## No. CXXXIII.

*Lieut.-General Lake to the Marquess Wellesley.*

(Private.)

MY LORD, Camp, Laswary, Nov. 3d, 1803.

My official despatch of the action upon the 1st accompanies this, by which you will perceive our loss has been considerable, very particularly so in Europeans, and I can only repeat, unless they will keep feeding us from England, the service here cannot be carried on. I have been nursing the 76th regiment ever since the battle of Delhi till now, when they have unfortunately suffered most severely; the remains of them I shall take the greatest care of, for what I should do without them, God only knows.

I really do believe there never was so complete a victory, as every thing belonging to these battalions is in our possession, and there does not appear to remain a vestige of a battalion formed by the French faction on this side India. The slaughter has been extremely great; I believe very few have escaped, if we may judge by the number of bodies lying within some distance of our camp. I shall as soon as I can move my wounded men, begin my march towards that doubtful character, Ambajee, but I shall in the first instance proceed but slowly, as I wish to impress the Rajah of Jeypore

with an idea, that, if he does not come to terms shortly, I may pay him a visit. All I mean by this is to alarm him into some decisive measure; he seems at present to be playing a very suspicious game.

I have this moment been informed that these troops were upon their march to join Taunteah, who had invited them, with a promise of subsisting them. If they had ever got there, I apprehend Delhi would have been their object; fortunately they are better disposed of. I trust this affair will meet with your approbation. The seventeen battalions were nearly complete, and they had Mahratta horse under one of their chieftains, which is said to have amounted to five thousand, whether more or not I dont know. They certainly appeared in numbers, but they are a most despicable foe. I am happy to say that my son is doing well, had a good night's rest, free from fever, and as little pain as could be expected; it will, of course, if all goes right, be some time before he recovers the use and strength of his limb. The sensation I felt upon seeing the accident is not to be described, as you, my dear Lord, may easily imagine.

Believe me, my dear Lord,
with the most affectionate regard and esteem,
faithfully yours,
G. Lake.

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## No. CXXXIV.

*The Hon. Major-General Wellesley to the Marquess Wellesley.*

Camp, Nov. 6th, 1803.
[Received Nov. 30th, 1803.]

My Lord,

I now proceed to give your Excellency a detailed account of Colonel Stevenson's operations against Asseer-Ghur.

On the 16th October, he advanced to Asseer-Ghur, and encamped three miles south of the fort. The remains of the enemy's infantry had fled towards the Nerbuddah on the preceding day, in the state in which I reported them to be, in my letter of the * 24th October; and Colonel Stevenson therefore determined to attack Asseer-Ghur.

On the 18th, he reconnoitred the fort, attended by a squa-

* Not received.

dron of cavalry, and the native picquets of the infantry; and having seen a favourable opportunity, attacked the Pettah and carried it, and made a lodgement within one hundred and fifty yards of the lower wall of the fort. In the evening he reinforced the troops in the Pettah by a battalion.

On the 19th, all the preparations were made for carrying on the siege; and two batteries were ready to open at two o'clock in the afternoon of the 20th; one to breach the upper wall, and another, of four brass twelve-pounders, to destroy the defences of the lower wall.

On the 18th, Colonel Stevenson had sent a flag of truce to the Killedar* to summon him to surrender the fort, to which message he did not receive a decided answer. The communication was continued; but Colonel Stevenson did not relax his operations against the fort, as there was reason to believe that the negotiation was carried on, only to give time to Dowlut Rao Scindiah to come to its relief. Before opening his batteries, Colonel Stevenson apprized the Killedar of the terms on which he should surrender the fort; which were, that the garrison should march out with their private property, and be allowed to go where they might think proper, and that their arrears should be paid to the amount of twenty thousand rupees.

After the batteries had opened about an hour, a white flag was shewn from the walls of the fort, which was the signal which had been agreed upon, in case the terms should be accepted; hostages were sent down, and an engagement made that the fort should be delivered up on the following morning. It was accordingly evacuated; the garrison carried off their property in security, and received the sum agreed to be paid to them.

Colonel Stevenson mentions in high terms the conduct of the officers and troops under his command; and I cannot omit to take this opportunity of expressing to your Excellency my sense of the merits of Colonel Stevenson, and of the body of troops under his command. Upon every occasion I have received from the Colonel the most cordial and zealous assistance; and the troops under his command are in the highest state of discipline and order, and fit for any service in which they can be employed.

* Commandant of the fort.

On the 16th, nine officers, four serjeants, and one matross, formerly in the service of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, delivered themselves up to Colonel Stevenson, under your Excellency's proclamation of the 29th August.

I have the honour to enclose a list of their names, and a copy of the order issued by Colonel Stevenson to provide for their subsistence. Lieutenant Stuart also delivered himself up at Poonah in the end of the last month. I have called for accounts of the regulated pay and allowances which those persons received in the service of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, which I shall hereafter have the honour of transmitting to your Excellency.

I have the honour to enclose a return of the killed and wounded of the troops under the command of Colonel Stevenson, during the operations against Asseer-Ghur.* Hereafter I shall have the honour of transmitting returns of the ordnance, stores, grain, and other property, captured in that fort.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,
with the greatest respect,
your Excellency's most obedient,
and faithful humble servant,
ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

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## No. CXXXV.

*The Marquess Wellesley to his Royal Highness the Prince of Wales.*

SIR, Fort William, Nov. 9th, 1803.

Having understood from Lieut.-Colonel Monson that it was your Royal Highness's pleasure that I should occasionally submit to you such intelligence respecting the affairs of India as might appear to merit your Royal Highness's notice, I have the honour to transmit to Mr. Tyrrwhitt by this despatch a series of gazettes, comprehending the official reports of our late rapid and splendid success in India against the confederate forces of Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, with their French artillery and French officers.

By Major Nicolson, who proceeds to England in the course of a few days, I propose to have the honour of soliciting your

* See Appendix.

Royal Highness's attention to a more particular and detailed statement of this glorious triumph of the British arms.

In this first communication, however, I am anxious to offer my congratulations to your Royal Highness upon the brilliant and highly useful services of General Lake. His masterly operations, his unexampled alacrity, and honourable zeal, the judgment, skill, and promptitude of decision, which he has manifested in every crisis of difficulty or danger, combined with his irresistible spirit of enterprise and courage, entitle him to the gratitude and admiration of every loyal British subject, and of every heart and mind which can feel for the honour, or can understand the interests of the British empire.

Your Royal Highness's gracious disposition towards my family will induce you to receive with pleasure the official report of the memorable and decisive victory gained by the forces under the command of Major-General Wellesley, on the 23rd of September, and I am persuaded that in addition to public sentiments, your particular favour will incline your Royal Highness to read with satisfaction the accounts of the noble and gallant spirit, and distinguished ability, with which my brother has seconded the victories of his illustrious commander-in-chief.

Intending to have the honour of addressing your Royal Highness by Major Nicolson, I shall now request you to accept the sincere assurance of the sentiments of gratitude and attachment, with which I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your Royal Highness's most dutiful,
and faithful servant,
WELLESLEY.

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## No. CXXXVI.

*Lieut.-General Lake to the Marquess Wellesley.*

(Private and most Secret.)

Camp at Pahisser, Nov. 14th, 1803.
12 coss (about 24 miles) from Futtehghur-sicri,
nearly due west.

MY LORD,

I have to acknowledge your kind and affectionate letter respecting the fall of Agra, which is so replete with such warm and flattering expressions, that it is absolutely impos-

sible for me to convey my sentiments in such language as could in any way prove the sensations I feel, or the effects they have had upon a heart most truly grateful for the liberal conduct and unbounded confidence and friendship with which you have so nobly treated me, and which never can be forgotten as long as I have life.

I every day experience more fully the advantages gained by the victory on the 1st, the consequences attending it are beyond all calculation; it has quieted the country, it has brought the Rajah of Jeypore and all his wicked and traiterous advisers to reason, they are now upon their march to my camp. In short, the whole of these people will now come in, as they find they have neither hopes of a rallying point, or fear from their neighbours. It certainly was a severe business, and from circumstances unforeseen and unexpected, more than it might have been expected; however, thank God, our success was complete in securing every article that belonged to these battalions. We had but six very weak battalions of sepoys, and five companies of sepoys, besides the 76th regiment, which was very weak. Our cavalry was superior in numbers to theirs I rather believe, in every other particular of course much so in the extreme. A very small part of my infantry was, from accident, only engaged, as you will perceive by the official letter upon that affair, which caused the business to fall heavier upon the 76th, who behaved most gloriously. If I thought the war was to continue, I should be tempted to ask for the remainder of the European regiment, or some of the 22nd, but as I have no doubt that Scindiah means to make peace, from having lost all his resources, I trust we shall have nothing more to do in this part of the world. I propose forming all the dismounted dragoons into a little battalion, particularly those of the 8th, who have had but little practice in the riding way, added to which, very many of the horses they had from the Vizier are rendered unserviceable, either from age, or from having been for many years unaccustomed to work.

I mention my intention respecting this regiment in confidence to your Lordship, but would not wish any thing to be said upon the subject, as it might only cause ill-natured remarks, and which I am very anxious should be avoided.

You do me but justice in supposing that I participate most sincerely with you, my dear Lord, in the glorious victory ob-

tained over Scindiah, and do most heartily hope he (Major-General Wellesley) may reap every benefit and honour from it he so richly deserves, and which must be so truly satisfactory and gratifying to your feelings.

It is with extreme pleasure I inform you that my son is doing better than could possibly have been imagined; he has no fever, sleeps well, is free from pain, and in most excellent spirits, and I have no doubt will do perfectly well.

I trust and hope matters are drawing to a conclusion, and that you feel most happy in having accomplished all your plans in a most satisfactory manner to yourself, and to the world at large, and that you may reap the esteem and applause of your king and country for having added such valuable acquisitions to the British Government, and by your counsels and wisdom having rescued Hindostan from the power of France, and by that means saved our great and flourishing possessions in India from the claws of that rapacious tyrant, the First Consul, into which, if you had not adopted and pursued the most wise and vigorous measures, they must very shortly have fallen. Believe me, I have the most heartfelt satisfaction in having in any degree contributed in the glory you have gained, and have only to pray that you may live long to enjoy all the honours and dignities you are so justly entitled to, and that you will ever consider me,

My dear Lord,

as your affectionate and faithful servant,

G. LAKE.

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## No. CXXXVII.

*The Marquess Wellesley to Lord Hobart.*

(Secret.)

MY LORD, Fort William, Nov. 15th, 1803.

1. In my despatch No. 12, of the 20th June, I had the honour to apprize your Lordship of the measures which I deemed it expedient to adopt for the protection of the Portuguese settlements in India and China.

2. I have now the satisfaction to inform your Lordship, that a British garrison has occupied the important fortress of Goa, with the entire concurrence of the Portuguese Government of that settlement.

3. In conformity to my instructions to the Right Honourable Lord Clive, and to his Excellency Lieut.-General Stuart, of which copies were enclosed in my despatch of the 20th of June, Lord Clive and General Stuart adopted immediate measures for assembling a force in the vicinity of Goa, to be prepared to act as circumstances might require.

4. In the interval of time which elapsed while this force was preparing, Sir William Clarke endeavoured by arguments founded on my instructions of the 18th of May, to induce the viceroy to consent to the admission of a British garrison into Goa.

5. The Viceroy having at length consented to that measure, Sir W. Clarke ordered the British detachment which had been assembled for that purpose to advance to Goa, at which place it arrived on the 3d September.

6. The British force which at present occupies Goa, in the judgment of Sir W. Clarke, is insufficient for the complete defence of that place. It is not in my power in the present crisis of affairs in India, to apply a larger force to the defence of Goa, but it is my intention to reinforce the British garrison of that place as soon as troops can be spared from other quarters, where their services are more immediately necessary.

7. In the meanwhile, no prospect appears of an early attempt against Goa by the French powers, and as the attention of Vice Admiral Rainier has been particularly directed to the defence of Goa, and a considerable part of the squadron under his Excellency's command, is now stationed off the Coast of Malabar, I entertain no apprehension for the safety of Goa.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

## No. CXXXVIII.

*The Marquess Wellesley to Lieut.-General Lake.*

(Private.)

MY DEAR SIR, Barrackpore, Nov. 18th, 1803.

My last private letter was written under the supposition that the fall of Agra had terminated your difficulties and dangers, and finally crowned your honours in this campaign; but your despatch containing the recital of the glorious and most decisive victory of the 1st of November, afforded a new

cause of my admiration and gratitude, and has opened a fresh source of honour for you and your army. I certainly expected that the force collected near Agra would give you some trouble; but I was not prepared for an action so splendid, nor for so formidable an opposition. Your judgment in pursuing this force meets my cordial approbation. Your apprehensions for the safety of Delhi were most wise and just; but even if Delhi had been safe, it would have been necessary to destroy this force, before you proceeded further to the southward. The action is one of the most brilliant of which I have ever read the relation. Your personal exertions in it surpass all praise, all example, and all honour and glory acquired by any Commander of an army, whose actions have reached my knowledge. Your safety in the midst of such perils reminds me of Lord Duncan's private account of the battle of Camperdown, in which describing his own situation in the midst of the general slaughter he said, "*God covered my head in the day of battle.*" The dreadful and distracting event of your heroic son's wound in your presence in the heat of action, and in the most urgent and critical moment of your own public duty, was such a trial as heaven has seldom given to human fortitude. The mere emotion of natural affection would have rendered this trial almost insupportable to any parent; but in addition to the ties of blood, your son possesses your confidence and respect; in his danger you must have felt at once that you were exposed to the loss of your dearest relation, of your best officer, of the true image of your own courage and military spirit, of him who had been your firmest support in all your recent difficulties and dangers, and in whom you must have contemplated the surest pledge of transmitting to later times a just memorial of your own fame. No scene equal to this trial ever was presented to my imagination, nor do I believe it is to be paralleled in all history. With such parental affection as I know you to possess, and with such just sentiments as you entertain of your son's merits and high promise, I declare to you solemnly, that your resolution under such a blow, your instant return to the attack of the enemy, and the alacrity and ardour with which you prosecuted the glorious victory of that day, constituted such a variety of extraordinary and affecting circumstances, that I could not command strength of mind to read your letter in public. May you never again be subjected to so excruciating a pang;

and may the same Providence, (that has suffered your gallant son to be wounded on the field of battle before the eyes of his father, and has rescued him from death, and even from injury, to enhance the joys of his father's triumphs) preserve him, to emulate his father's example and to secure a succession of hereditary glory to his family, and of victory and fame to his country.

It is impossible not to suffer severe grief in reading the sad list of the killed and wounded on the 1st of November. The names of Vandeleur and of poor Griffith affected me most in the list of killed, the former on account of his high professional character, and the latter on account of my long acquaintance with him. The loss however is not great when compared with the force and artillery opposed to us, and it appears to be of still inferior magnitude, when compared with the brilliancy of the action, and with its solid and substantial benefit to the common cause. The impression made by the glory of that day, and above all, my dear Sir, I must say, by your conduct in it, surpasses all imagination.

I am now employed in despatching Colonel Nicholson, who I hope will be liberated in three or four days; I am highly pleased with him, he takes charge of my despatches, of which I will send copies to you immediately.

I write to you by Major-General Fraser, most sincerely congratulating you on this last unexpected and unrivalled success, and hoping that *your* danger is at an end.

I remain, my dear Sir,
with the greatest attachment and respect,
your faithful, most obliged and
affectionate servant,
WELLESLEY.

I grieve for the loss of my poor friend *Old Port.** I have lately received some fine horses from Arabia; one, if not two of which I hope will be serviceable to you, I shall immediately endeavour to send one to you. W.

I shall not publish my general orders respecting Agra and the last victory until Lieutenant-Colonel Nicholson is despatched.

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* The name of the General's favourite charger, which was killed under him at the battle of Lasswary; he was given to the Commander-in-Chief by the Governor-General.

## No. CXXXIX.

*The Marquess Wellesley to Lieut.-General Lake.*—(Extract.)

(Private.)

MY DEAR SIR, Barrackpore, Nov. 18th, 1803.

In consequence of the state of your Excellency's forces, I have ordered the whole of the Company's European regiment immediately to Allahabad to wait your orders. The prospect of affairs in Cuttack is so favourable, that I expect to be able to return the two companies of the 22d now employed there to the regiment at Fort William, under this expectation I have ordered two flank companies of the 22d to Mirzapore, there to wait your orders in General Deare's camp. I am now employed in using every effort to relieve the 22d at Fort William by a regiment from the other side of India. If I can succeed in this arrangement, I will send the whole 22d regiment to join your army. In the meanwhile we must manage as well as our limited means will permit.

If the war should continue and that no force should appear near the Doab, or the right bank of the Jumna, I think it might be advisable to make an irruption into Berar and to seize Nagpore; or (if the Rajah of Berar should make a separate peace, and Scindiah be infatuated enough to prosecute the war) to seize Ougein and Scindiah's territories in Malwa. In such an event I would not wish you to leave the limits of Delhi, Agra, Gwalior, and the passes from the Deccan, unless you should choose to visit Bundelcund where a good officer is wanted, and where we shall require vigilance and early exertion. You will probably detach a force towards Nagpore or Malwa, as the case might happen, and you would remain to protect the grand acquisitions where nothing but your presence can give us security or tranquillity. In the event of forming a detachment of any considerable force, I recommend General Fraser to your consideration, I confidently hope that you might trust him safely; in addition to his other good qualities, I believe him to be really steady and honourable, without any alloy of rapacity or avarice. If you detach towards Bundelcund, he will also answer very well. Bundelcund, Calpy and that vicinity, are now highly important provided you are safe from Delhi to Agra.

The principle of all my plans of war is exactly the same

with that which appears to be your leading principle in action. To commence the attack and to compel the enemy to a defensive system. In this view it must be determined whether it would be more prudent to prosecute the war by advancing towards Nagpore or Ougein from Gwalior, or to stand fast in Hindostan and to leave the prosecution of the war to the southward to the army under General Wellesley. I think that we ought not to advance towards the southward beyond Gwalior and the passes, until Bundelcund, Bogglecund and Calpy, shall be perfectly secured. After those points shall have been determined, the general state of the conquests in Hindostan must regulate your plans. If all be safe from Gwalior to Mirzapore, and from Agra to Delhi, and from Delhi to Benares, by Rampoor, Lucknow and Allahabad, a forward movement to the southward would relieve General Wellesley and finish the war; but such a movement is not to be hazarded without full consideration. On the other hand the enemy must not be permitted to hope that we cannot advance from the northward. If Holkar should mix in the war, you must look to the destruction of his force as a primary object; and it may perhaps be most advisable to draw him to the northward at a distance from his resources which are very much limited. I believe his present objects to be neutrality with regard to the main contest, and plunder of every neutral power, together with pilfer of the belligerent powers. He will rush into the war if he perceives or if he imagines that he perceives any attainable object of avarice or ambition. I expect to hear that he has moved towards the Rajpoots, for the purpose of levying his usual annual exaction, together with what was usually exacted by Scindiah and M. Perron; in that effort I think it would not be an object to us to check him, unless the Rajpoots should cordially enter under our protection.

It is now extremely desirable that General Wellesley should be apprized of your plans as soon as possible. He is in possession of the cypher, and you will try to communicate with him in cypher through Hindostan, sending copies to me for transmission through Cuttack.

Ever, my dear Sir,
with the greatest attachment and respect,
yours most sincerely and affectionately,
WELLESLEY.

## No. CXL.

*The Marquess Wellesley to Lord William Bentinck.*

My Lord, Barrackpore, Nov. 19th, 1803.

I am extremely apprehensive that your Lordship may suppose that my answer to your very flattering and acceptable letter of the 9th of September, transmitted by Lieut.-Colonel Hoghton, has been delayed beyond the bounds of proper respect and attention to your kindness. This delay, however, has been occasioned by my desire to write to your Lordship the most ample details on every topic connected with the subject of your letter, and on various objects of importance which I am anxious to bring under your notice. In hourly expectation of being relieved in some degree from the pressure of the very severe duties which have demanded my entire attention since the arrival of Lieut.-Colonel Hoghton from Fort St. George, I have postponed my acknowledgments of your Lordship's letter, with the hope of being able to annex to my reply several documents which might have afforded you full information on the great political and military operations now depending in various parts of India. But the extreme urgency of those operations, added to the necessity of transmitting despatches to the Government at home, has really deprived me of the means of submitting to your Lordship the information which I am desirous of communicating to you; in the mean while you have been regularly, and I trust with all possible expedition, advised of every important event which has come to my knowledge; and I have directed Capt. Sydenham to furnish your Lordship with many details which cannot enter into an official despatch.

Copies of all my most important despatches are now preparing for your Lordship, and will be forwarded to you by an early opportunity. Your Lordship's indulgence will pardon any occasional delay or interruption of my correspondence, when you advert to the labour of my situation, which not only requires the constant attention of my mind to a most extensive and complicated system of civil and military affairs in India, but also the regular transmission to England of a detailed

narrative of all my proceedings, with the principles on which they are founded, and the objects to which they are directed. Even now it is impossible for me to attempt to reply to your Lordship's highly satisfactory letter in a manner adequate to express the pleasure which I derived from it, and the confidence with which it has inspired me respecting the success and honour of your Government.

I am extremely happy to learn that I had adopted in my first communication with your Lordship a mode of conveying my sentiments which proved acceptable to you. Your Lordship may be assured that my sincere desire will always be, that not only the substance, but the manner of every communication from me to you and to your Government, should be conformable to your wishes.

Lieut.-Colonel Hoghton has stated to me the result of your Lordship's sentiments on the several points which he had the honour to submit to you in my name, and he has also informed me of the general tenor of your Lordship's opinions respecting the state of affairs at Fort St. George.

Your Lordship's judgment on all those subjects entirely corresponds with my sentiments and views, and accords with my opinion of the nature of the public interests, and of the duties of the public service entrusted to your immediate charge.

Your Lordship has expressed your approbation of the system of policy which I have deemed it to be my duty to pursue in India, in terms which demand my most cordial gratitude, and which must contribute to animate me with additional zeal in the maintenance of the great cause in which we are engaged.

Your sentiments on the subject of the Mahratta confederacy have been gloriously confirmed by the splendid success of our arms in this memorable campaign.

The steadfast support and active co-operation which your Lordship's truly British spirit, sound judgment, and hereditary integrity and honour lead me to expect from your Government, will confirm my confidence of complete and speedy triumph in this war, and I trust that I shall be enabled at an early period of time to furnish you with irresistible proofs of the justice, necessity, and correct policy of the war, as well as

of the certainty of its ultimate and honourable success, and of the beneficial consequences which must ensue from the issue of the contest.

Your Lordship may be confident that my support of your administration will be firm, active, and unqualified; and that I shall ever be ready to contribute every aid in my power to your success.

It will be my greatest satisfaction to render a just tribute of merit on every occasion to your Lordship's services, and to bear the most public testimony to every claim which the progress of your exertions shall found upon the gratitude and applause of your country.

I entertain a sanguine hope that the principles by which you propose to regulate your conduct, and the firm, but conciliatory system which you intend to establish, will dispel all opposition, or frustrate its projects.

In the course of a few days I expect to be able to reply to all your Lordship's recent official despatches; the arrival of some of your letters was much retarded by the interruption of the Dawk in the province of Cuttack, and by the long passage of the vessels from Ganjam to Calcutta. Your Lordship may wish to know that I entirely approve your conduct respecting the French at Pondicherry, the demolition of the fortifications at Cochin, and your several military arrangements stated in those despatches, and in general of all your proceedings.

Lieut.-Colonel Nicholson arrived a few days ago from General Lake's army, and I am now employed in finishing the voluminous and important despatches with which that officer is to be charged for the Government at home.

This circumstance will, I trust, excuse any omission or inaccuracy in my present communications to your Lordship.

Your Lordship's kindness to Captain Sydenham is highly satisfactory to me; you will find him in every sense worthy of your confidence and esteem, and a most valuable public officer. I shall derive the greatest pleasure from his appointment to the office of Town-Major of Fort St. George. But in the present extreme exigency of public affairs, his able and active services are so useful to me, that I must solicit your Lordship's permission to retain him at Fort William until I

can be relieved in some degree from the weight of my actual duties.

I have the honour to be,
with great respect and esteem,
My Lord,
your Lordship's most faithful,
and humble servant,
WELLESLEY.

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## No. CXLI.

*The Marquess Wellesley to Lord Hobart.*

(Secret.)

MY LORD, Fort William, Nov. 20th, 1803.

1. My despatch of the 20th of June was written under the supposition of the continuance of peace between his Majesty and the French Republic.

2. Various circumstances, however, having prevented the transmission of that despatch* to your Lordship, until the renewal of hostilities with France had actually been announced in India, I still deem it to be advisable to forward it to you in its original form, conceiving that your Lordship would be enabled by that mode of communication to exercise your judgment without embarrassment on every subject connected with the situation of the French and Batavian republics in India at the restoration of peace.

3. In concluding a treaty of peace with the French and Batavian republics at the close of the present war, I am confident that your Lordship will give to my suggestions whatever weight may be justly due to them, and that if the result of peace should restore the French and Dutch to their settlements on the Continent of India, your Lordship will provide timely regulations to preclude the inconveniencies to which I have solicited your notice.

4. It will probably appear to your Lordship to be expedient to take an early opportunity of passing such acts of Parliament as may be necessary for the purpose of preventing any difficulty with regard to the administration of civil and criminal justice to French subjects in India, in time of peace.

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* See Appendix.

5. All the questions (excepting that which relates to the administration of justice) stated for your Lordship's consideration in my despatch of the 20th of June must be determined by his Majesty's pleasure, and by the result of such arrangements as may be concluded with the French and Batavian republics at the close of the war.

6. The course of events in India within the last three months has, however, furnished matter of serious observation with regard to the views of France in India, and to the means by which a formidable French interest may be founded among the native powers. Whatever may have been the construction adopted in England of the convention of 1787, with regard to the nature of the French establishments in India, the circumstances which attended the arrival of Monsieur Binot and of Monsieur De Caen at Pondicherry, together with the general conduct of the French landed at Pondicherry, since the conclusion of the peace of Amiens, have evidently demonstrated that it was the intention of France to establish a military and political power in India.

7. This intention will appear manifest to your Lordship, by referring to the annexed statement of the establishment formed by the French Government for the occupation of the French settlements on the Continent of India.* This establishment actually departed from France in the month of March, 1803, the greater part of it is now at the isle of France, under the command of Monsieur De Caen, and the remainder has been embarked from Madras for France, under the command of M. Binot, according to the terms granted to the French, who landed at Pondicherry in the month of June.

8. Your Lordship will observe that the basis of the French establishment as it arrived in India, was absolutely of a military description, and that the French Government actually appointed for the service of India, a military staff, constructed upon an extensive scale, and capable of furnishing officers for a considerable army. The intentions of the French, with regard to the repair of their former fortifications, or to the construction of new works, were not declared, but the nature of the establishment which arrived in India leads to the necessary inference that it was the intention of France to avail herself

* See Appendix.

of every opportunity to strengthen and extend her military resources and power in India.

9. The transfer of the civil and military government of the Carnatic to the hands of the Company, opposed great difficulties to the political intrigues of the French who arrived under Monsieur Binot, and these difficulties were further enhanced by the situation in which that division of the French troops was placed, under the doubtful state of the negotiations depending between his Majesty and the French Government.

10. The vigilance of the Government of Fort St. George, aided by these advantages, rendered all communication between the French at Pondicherry and the native powers of India, nearly impracticable, but abundant reason exists to justify my opinion that the French arrived in India with the most hostile spirit, and with an anxious solicitude to avail themselves of every opportunity of founding among the native powers a system of political intrigue, and ultimately of rival influence, for the purpose of impairing the British power in this quarter of the globe.

11. From the information which has reached me, I entertain no doubt that it was the intention of the French Government to have spread the emissaries of political intrigue and military adventure throughout all the native courts and camps to the utmost practicable extent; and I am convinced that all the questions supposed in my despatch of the 20th of June would have arisen immediately upon the restitution of the French settlements.

12. In order to afford your Lordship an opportunity of forming your judgment with respect to the political and military projects entertained by the French who arrived in India in consequence of the peace of Amiens, I have the honour to enclose two papers, of which the first was obtained at Pondicherry, by Lieut.-Colonel Cullen, the officer appointed to conduct the restitutions on the coast of Coromandel. It was drawn up by Monsieur Le Febre, formerly an officer in the French service at Pondicherry, who accompanied Monsieur De Caen to India, and who at the period of time when this paper was obtained by Colonel Cullen, was aid-de-camp to Monsieur Binot. The memoir was presented to the First Consul of the French republic, and is stated by Colonel Cullen to have been

considered at Pondicherry as a secret paper, and to have been obtained with difficulty.* The second paper was addressed to me by M. Muller, who states that he held the rank of chef-de-brigade in the French army. He arrived in Calcutta soon after the accounts of the renewal of hostilities between Great Britain and France reached this presidency. Having declared that he had it in his power to disclose important information to this Government respecting the designs of France, and being desired to communicate that information in writing, he addressed to me the letter which I have now the honour to enclose.†

13. Although these papers contain propositions in many respects absurd and chimerical, they sufficiently indicate the spirit of those who composed and approved them. Even the execution of some of these projects may not be deemed so visionary, after a full consideration of the state of the native armies, as it might appear upon the first view.

14. The causes and events of the contest in which the British Government in India is now engaged with two chieftains of the Mahratta empire, have furnished sufficient proof of the formidable power which may be raised by French adventure, and by an enterprizing spirit in the armies and dominions of the native powers.

15. Your Lordship's attention will certainly be directed to the despatches addressed during the last six months to the Secret Committee, and to the Court of Directors by the Governor-General separately, and by the Governor-General in council, and you will not fail to notice the rapid and dangerous growth of the military resources of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, under the direction of Monsieur Perron, or rather the rapid and dangerous growth of the military resources of the French in India, under the nominal authority of Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

16. That the predatory state founded by Monsieur Perron on the banks of the Jumna had not yet to my knowledge been formally connected with the present Government of France, will not be deemed by your Lordship's judgment a circumstance to affect my view of the danger to be apprehended from the formation and growth of such a power in India.

* See Appendix. † See Appendix.

That power was fully prepared to afford efficient and cordial support to the French cause in India, and to meet the projects of France with adequate alacrity and zeal.

17. The origin and progress of M. Perron's civil and military authority are indeed to be ascribed to the disorder and confusion of the Mahratta empire, to the weakness and corruption of the councils of Scindiah, and to the decline of his real interests and just dominion. The chiefs and commanders of this French state were also mere military adventurers, and its resources were derived from licentious conquest and boundless depredation. These features of its character may not, however, appear of so peculiar a nature as to have rendered it altogether unworthy of adoption by the present rulers of France.

18. Your Lordship will remark with reference to the political projects of France in India, the advantage which M. Perron and his band of French adventurers derived from the abuse of the nominal authority of the unfortunate emperor Shah Aulum.

19. M. Perron had obtained the exercise of sovereign authority over a territorial dominion, of which the annual revenue amounted to nearly two millions sterling, and he had negotiated and concluded treaties and alliances with several of the inferior states in his own name.

20. These circumstances, combined with the observations submitted to your Lordship in my despatch of the 20th of June, will convey to you my serious apprehension of the dangers which must menace the British interests in India at the restoration of peace with the French and Batavian republics, unless an efficacious system of restraint can be established for the purpose of limiting their political and military power in India.

21. In contemplating the return of peace with France, your Lordship will pardon any emotion of my zeal for the prosperity of interests which have been committed to my charge for so many years, and under such an accumulation of difficulties and dangers. You will therefore receive with indulgence the expression of my ardent hope that the success of his Majesty's arms in the present war may entirely exclude the French and Batavian republics from any possession or settlement upon the continent of India.

22. The exclusion of the French and Dutch power from the Continent of India would be attended with advantages to the tranquillity and happiness of our native subjects, and to the vigour, efficiency, and stability of our Government in this vast and splendid empire, which would be cheaply purchased by considerable sacrifices in other quarters of the globe.

23. The importance of these flourishing possessions to the general prosperity of his Majesty's dominions, is now sufficiently appreciated. And the British empire in India has acquired a degree of stability which cannot be shaken by France in time of war, while our military establishments shall be maintained upon an adequate scale of efficiency and vigour; the season of peace with France will be more dangerous to the British interests in India than that of war, if the French be permitted to return to the continent of India, with any means of extending their territorial possessions, or of founding a military or political power.

24. It will be difficult, if not impracticable, to admit the French to return to the Continent of India without opening to them the sources of rival power. No restriction can be imposed which can frustrate every effort of the restless spirit of French intrigue under the advantages of an established Government, and with the privileges which must be attached to such an establishment. No degree of vigilance in the local government, therefore, nor even the acknowledged ascendancy of the British influence can entirely exempt us from disturbance and danger, if the French Government be restored to a fixed settlement on the Continent of India.

25. The Batavian republic, and consequently the Dutch interests in India are now considered to be subject to France: if any alteration should be accomplished in the relations between France and Holland, the nature of that change will regulate the degree of danger to be apprehended from the return of the Dutch Government to the Continent of India.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

## No. CXLII.

*Lieut.-General Lake to the Marquess Wellesley.*

My Lord, Camp, Pahisser, Nov. 24th, 1803.

I have been made extremely happy that your Lordship approved my despatch to the Duke of York,* and feel much gratified by your allowing my aid-de-camp, Major Nicolson, to carry over your despatches to England, and for sending him in the packet. Believe me, my Lord, I cannot sufficiently express how sensible I am of your attention to me upon all occasions, and have only to assure you that nothing shall be wanting on my part to carry into effect every wish and plan of yours.

I congratulate you most sincerely on the capture of Boorhaunpoor, and I think from the report I have just received by the way of Jeypoor, that the fort of Assyghur fell on the 25th or 26th of October into the hands of the British, at which I rejoice most heartily. The embassadors of Jeypoor will, without doubt, arrive in my camp to-morrow, and I trust the negotiation will turn out to your Lordship's satisfaction. Ambajee's principal man I expect in a day or two, whose impatience to get to me, makes me think his master is in earnest, and will come to the terms. If my conjecture is right, I shall feel much at liberty, as I can then have nothing to do but watch the different turns of Holkar, whose conduct appears so uncertain that I cannot help looking at him with a jealous eye. I have every reason to believe that he has settled the contribution of Odypore for 40 lacs of rupees, from which sum is to be deducted the money already taken from the Ranah's country, as well as a compensation for the damage done to the several villages, ten lacs to be given immediately in ready money, the remainder to be paid by instalments. Khundeh Row his vakeel arrived at Jeypoor on the 18th instant, and had an audience, in which he delivered his letters, enforcing at the same time the immediate necessity of complying with the substance of them, and entreated the Rajah as an Hindoo to reflect on the fatal consequences that must result to the religion should the British become masters.

* See Appendix.

The Rajah referred him to the ministers, who, with the exception of Sumboo Row Sing, gave him encouragement that his negotiation should be amicably settled. Such is my information. Sumboo Row Sing is the only respectable man in the Durbar, and has great weight I understand among the Rajpoot chiefs, and is, I believe, much inclined to the British Government. I find the ministers are seriously alarmed, and wish for an alliance, but these people are in general so dilatory, and have so little energy, and by all accounts so little sincerity, that if fear don't operate most forcibly, which I think it will, the negotiation may be some time pending, but you may rest assured they shall not be suffered to procrastinate matters long, as I shall do every thing in my power to bring them to a hasty conclusion.

I cannot reconcile the conduct of Holkar, for if he had intended hostile measures against the British Government, he might have annoyed me most seriously, and made my approach to Agra very difficult by joining the battalions that had arrived under Duderneg and Louis, instead of which he has waited till the whole of these are destroyed, one may say annihilated, and then talks of oversetting the British. I can scarcely believe it possible such an idea could have entered into his head, for by all accounts he is a shrewd, sensible man, with an extraordinary firm mind, and supposed to be ever watchful, and ready to seize a good opportunity for carrying his plans into effect; should he therefore be the man, as represented, he surely cannot have any intention to attack us when we have the entire possession of Hindostan, the strong fortress of Agra, and very many chieftains on this side India entirely with us. It is altogether incomprehensible. I think it not improbable that his plan may be to frighten these timid people at Jeypoor into giving him a sum of money, which they might be foolish enough to do, to prevent his coming nearer them; however, I must endeavour to keep them from adopting such a measure, and shall hope to give you a favourable account of my conference with these people to-morrow.

I am happy to say my son is going on extremely well, and has quitted his bed this day for a chair, and suffers no inconvenience but from the stiffness of the joint, which I trust will in time wear off, and give him the free use of his limb; of

course that must be a work of some time, and I must be truly grateful to the Almighty for his miraculous escape.

I grow most impatient for letters from England, as I think we may expect answers to those that were sent with your brother.

Believe me, my dear Lord,
with every sentiment of gratitude and esteem,
your faithful and attached servant,
G. LAKE.

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## No. CXLIII.

*The Hon. Major-General Wellesley to the Marquess Wellesley.*

Camp at Parterly, Nov. 30th, 1803.
[Received Dec. 23d, 1803.]

MY LORD,

I have the honour to inform you that I attacked the armies of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar yesterday afternoon, on the plains of Argaum in this neighbourhood, with the division of the army under my immediate command, and the subsidiary force serving with the Soubah of the Deccan, under Colonel Stevenson, and completely defeated the enemy, having taken from them their cannon, ammunition, &c. &c., and destroyed vast numbers of them.

I have reason to believe that the loss which I have sustained upon this occasion has not been great. No officer has been killed, and but few wounded.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,
with the greatest respect,
your Excellency's most obedient,
and faithful humble servant,
ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

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## No. CXLIV.

*The Hon. Major-General Wellesley to the Marquess Wellesley.*

Camp at Parterly, Nov. 30th, 1803.
[Received Dec. 25th, 1803.]

MY LORD,

Having found that the Rajah of Berar was moving towards his own territories, that the body of troops he had with him

was but small, and decreasing in numbers daily, and not likely to do much mischief to the territories of the Soubah of the Deccan, I descended the Ghauts by Rajoora* on the Sindpauna in order to support and cover Colonel Stevenson's operations against Gawil-ghur in Berar.

Colonel Stevenson had equipped his corps at Asseer-Ghur for the siege of that fort, and had marched to Ballapore, where he was joined on the 24th by the Brinjarries, and other supplies which had been saved from the enemy by Captain Baynes's affair at Amber; and he marched forward on the 26th.

Your Excellency has been informed, that on the 23d I had consented to a suspension of hostilities with the troops of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, in this quarter and Guzerat. The condition on which this agreement depended, viz. that Scindiah should occupy a position twenty coss to the east of Elichpour had not been carried into execution; and Scindiah was encamped at Sersooly, about four miles from the camp of Munnoo Bappoo,† which was at this place. The army of the former consisted only of cavalry; that of the latter was cavalry, a great part, if not the whole of Ragojee Bhooslah's regular infantry, and a large proportion of artillery.

In the course of the 28th, the vakeels from Dowlut Rao Scindiah urgently pressed me not to attack these troops; but I informed them repeatedly, that there was no suspension of arms with Ragojee Bhooslah; and none with Scindiah till he should comply with the terms of his agreement: and that I should certainly attack the enemies of the Company wherever I should find them.

Colonel Stevenson's division and mine both marched to this place yesterday; the Colonel having with great prudence and propriety halted on the 28th at Hattee Andorah, to enable me to co-operate in the attack of the enemy. We found on our arrival that the armies of both chiefs had decamped; and I could perceive, from a tower in Parterly, a confused mass, about two miles beyond Sersooly and Scindiah's old camp, which I concluded to be their armies in march.

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* Rajoora is in latitude 19.8 N., and longitude 76.19 E., situated on the small river Sindpauna near its confluence with the Godavery.

† Brother to the Rajah of Berar.

The troops had marched a great distance on a very hot day, and therefore I did not think it proper to pursue them, but shortly after our arrival here, bodies of horse appeared in our front, with which the Mysore horse skirmished during a part of the day; and when I went out to push forward the picquets of the infantry, to support the Mysore cavalry, and to take up the ground of our encampment, I could perceive distinctly a long line of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, regularly drawn up on the plains of Argaum, immediately in front of that village, and about six miles from this place, at which I intended to encamp.

Although late in the day, I immediately determined to attack this army. Accordingly I marched on in one column, the British cavalry leading, in a direction nearly parallel to that of the enemy's line; covering the rear and left by the Mogul and Mysore cavalry.

The enemy's infantry and guns were in the left of their centre, with a body of cavalry on their left. Scindiah's army, consisting of one very heavy body of cavalry, was in the right, having upon its right a body of Pindaries and other light troops. Their line extended above five miles, having in their rear the village and extensive gardens and enclosures of Argaum, and in their front a plain, which however was much cut by water-courses, &c. &c.

I formed the army in two lines: the infantry in the first, the cavalry in the second, and supporting the right; and the Mogul and Mysore cavalry the left, nearly parallel to that of the enemy; with the right rather advanced to press upon the enemy's left. Some little time elapsed before the lines could be formed, owing to a part of the infantry of my division which led the column having got into some confusion. When formed, the whole advanced in the greatest order; the 74th and 78th regiments were attacked by a large body (supposed to be *Pathâns*) and all these were destroyed. Scindiah's cavalry charged the 1st battalion 6th regiment, which was on the left of our line, and were repulsed; and the whole line retired in disorder before our troops, leaving in our hands thirty-eight pieces of cannon and all their ammunition.

The British cavalry then pursued them for several miles, and destroyed great numbers, and took many elephants and camels, and much baggage. The Mogul and Mysore cavalry

also pursued the fugitives, and did them great mischief. Some of the latter are still following them; and I have sent out this morning all of the Mysore, Mogul, and Mahratta cavalry, in order to secure as many advantages from this victory as can be gained, and complete the enemy's confusion.

For the reasons stated in the commencement of this letter, the action did not begin till late in the day, and, unfortunately, sufficient day-light did not remain to do all that I could have wished; but the cavalry continued their pursuit by moon-light, and all the troops were under arms till a late hour in the night.

I have the honour to enclose a return of our loss in this action.* The troops conducted themselves with their usual bravery. The 74th and 78th regiments had a particular opportunity of distinguishing themselves, and have deserved and received my thanks. I am also much indebted to Colonel Stevenson, for the advice and assistance I received from him; to the honourable Lieut.-Colonel St. Leger for the manner in which he led on the British cavalry; and to Lieut.-Colonels Wallace, Adams (who commanded Lieut.-Colonel Harness's brigade, the latter being absent on account of severe indisposition), Haliburton, Macleane, Pogson, and Major Huddlestone, who commanded brigades of cavalry and infantry; to Major Campbell commanding the 94th regiment; to Captain Beauman commanding the artillery with the division under my immediate command; to Captain Burke, commanding the artillery with the subsidiary force; and to the officers of the staff with my division, and belonging to the subsidiary force.

I have also to inform your Excellency, that the Mogul cavalry under Salabut Khan, and the Mysore cavalry under Bistnapah Pundit, distinguished themselves. The former took a standard from Scindiah's troops.

The Mahratta cavalry were not engaged, as the person who went to them with orders, missed his road. Amrut Rao was not in the action, as he had encamped some distance in my rear on the 28th, and he could not march the whole dis-

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* See Appendix.

tance to Parterly yesterday morning; but he sent for orders as soon as he heard that I intended to attack the enemy.

I propose to march to-morrow towards Gawil-ghur, and I shall lose no time in attacking that place.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,
your Excellency's most obedient
and faithful humble servant,
ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

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## No. CXLV.

*The Marquess Wellesley to Lord Hobart.*

(Official and Secret.)

MY LORD, Fort William, Nov. 30th, 1803.

1. Although the control of the Government of Ceylon is no longer in the hands of the Governor-General in council, that island having been rendered independent of the Company's authority on the 1st of January 1802, I deem it to be my duty to submit to your Lordship a statement of my conduct with regard to the affairs of Ceylon.

2. The causes of the existing war in Ceylon having been officially announced in a declaration published by his Excellency the Governor of Ceylon at Colombo, on the 29th of January 1803, which must have reached your Lordship, together with every information necessary to explain that document, it would be superfluous to enter into any consideration of the origin of hostilities with the King of Candi; nor do I conceive myself to be either authorized or required in my official capacity to pass any judgment upon the justice or necessity of that war.

3. My knowledge of the ability, integrity and public zeal of Mr. North induces me to conclude that the war originated in justice and necessity; but my entire ignorance of the particular causes and motives of the war beyond the facts stated in the declaration, would render me unable to offer any opinion upon the subject, even if the relative situation of the two Governments had not suggested the propriety of my silence. It appears to me however to be requisite to request your Lordship's attention to a letter from the Governor-General in council to the Governor of Ceylon, under date the

28th of May 1800, of which I have the honour to annex an abstract for the purpose of apprizing your Lordship of the general sentiments of the Governor-General in council, with relation to the course of policy to be observed in Ceylon.

4. It is further my duty to acquaint your Lordship, that the first intimation public or private, which I received relative to the war in Ceylon was derived from the accidental perusal of the Ceylon Gazette of the 29th of January 1803, containing his Excellency the Governor's declaration. Previously to that time I had received no notification official or private, of the approach or prospect of hostilities in Ceylon.

5. On the 3d of March 1803, the Governor-General in council received a despatch from the Governor of Ceylon, under date the 5th of February 1803, stating that "it was impossible for Mr. North to reduce within the bounds which he had intended, the pecuniary assistance which Mr. North must solicit from the Governor-General in council for the month of February, and that for that month at least," Mr. North apprehended "he could not avoid doubling the sum of £5,000 to which he ought to have restricted his drafts on the treasury" at Fort William. Together with this despatch, Mr. North transmitted to the Governor-General in council copies of his letter to the Government of Fort St. George, of the 30th January 1803; of his Excellency's declaration published at Colombo, on the 29th of January 1803; of Articles of Convention proposed to the King of Candi; and of his Excellency's instructions to Major-General Mac Douall.

6. The encrease of the drafts on the supreme Government of India, is stated by Mr. North to have been occasioned by the war in which the Government of Ceylon was engaged at that period of time with the King of Candi, and Mr. North's letter of the 5th of February 1803, received on the 3d of March 1803, was the first official or private intimation which the Governor-General received from the Government of Ceylon of the prospect, causes, or existence of hostilities in that island.

7. In the letter to Lord Clive of the 30th of January 1803, of which a copy was transmitted to me on the 5th of February, and received on the 3d of March, Mr. North states his hope that "he shall not have occasion to trouble Lord Clive for any troops, unless the Government of Ceylon should be

obliged to make a second campaign, which, considering his present force, the moderation of his views, and the disposition of the principal head men; and the people in general in the Candian territories, (who were desirous of co-operating with the British troops, or at least of not acting against them) Mr. North trusted was not probable.

8. It is no part of my duty to submit to your Lordship my sentiments either with respect to the conduct of the war in Ceylon, or to the negotiations and treaties in which the first campaign appeared to have terminated, and your Lordship must have received ample details relative to those transactions from the Governor of Ceylon.

9. On the 14th of May, I received a despatch from Mr. North under date the 19th of April, in which (adverting to the possibility of a renewal of hostilities having taken place in Europe, and to the diminution of the strength of the garrison of Trincomalé, in consequence of the garrisons and detachments stationed in the town and territory of Candi, and of a severe sickness which had prevailed in the island) Mr. North expresses a wish that I should despatch a reinforcement to the garrison of Trincomalé.

10. At this period of time the expected reinforcements of engineers and artillery from Europe had not reached the island of Ceylon, and Mr. North particularly states his hope that the favourable state of affairs in the interior of the island, combined with the diminution of the sickness which had lately prevailed throughout the country, would enable him to apply almost all the military force under his government for the purpose of repelling any external attack.

11. At the period of time when I received Mr. North's despatch of the 19th of April 1803, the state of the season prevented the embarkation of troops from Bengal to Ceylon: nor did the state of intelligence from England then justify an expectation of a renewal of the war with France, your Lordship's instructions of the 16th of November, having reached me on the 8th of May.

12. On the 5th of June I received from Mr. North a despatch under date the 9th of May 1803, announcing the "very great probability of a speedy termination of the war in the Island of Ceylon, together with the permanent acquisition of considerable advantages to the British Government." Mr.

North transmitted to me at the same time a copy of his despatch to your Lordship of the 4th of May 1803, together with its enclosure, for the purpose of conveying to me the full detail of his proceedings.

13. In Mr. North's despatch to me of the 9th of May, of which a copy is enclosed for your Lordship's information, Mr, North states that "the great facility which the possession of the road, and of Fort Mac Douall gave him of directing all his force to any one point which might be threatened, had very materially increased his means of defence against an invading foe."

14. Mr. North at the same time expressed his wish, that in consequence of the critical situation of Trincomalé, the Governor-General in council should adopt measures for "strengthening that garrison by a small detachment of native troops from Bengal in case of a war with France."

15. In this state of my information with respect to the affairs of Ceylon on the 5th of June 1803, I had every reason to suppose that the government of that Island did not require any re-inforcement of troops for the purpose of prosecuting the war against Candi; and that in the event of a renewal of hostilities with France, Mr. North's requisition for troops would be confined to "a small detachment of native troops from Bengal," for the purpose of strengthening the garrison of Trincomalé.

16. At that season of the year the prevalence of the south-west monsoon precluded the possibility of re-inforcing the troops at Ceylon from Bengal, even if the exigency of the case had appeared to require an early re-inforcement of the troops on that island; but the Governor of Ceylon had confined the expression of his anxiety for a re-inforcement to the case of a renewal of hostilities with France, and even in that event had declared that the means of defence against an invading foe were considerably encreased by the general state of affairs in Ceylon, and that he required no other re-inforcement even in the event of war with France, than a small detachment of native troops from Bengal to be applied in strengthening the garrison of Trincomalé.

17. My despatches to your Lordship of the 20th of June 1803, and 1st of August 1803, will have apprized you that on the 5th of June 1803, my information with regard to the

probability of a renewal of the war with France, was not of a nature to require me to hazard the embarkation of native troops for the relief of Trincomalé from Bengal, at the most unfavourable season of the year. The same motives dissuaded me from issuing orders to the Governments of Fort St. George or Bombay, for embarking native troops for the relief of Trincomalé, and it also appeared to me that under all the circumstances of the case, if a renewal of hostilities with France should occur, the garrison of Trincomalé might be relieved with as much expedition from Bengal as from either of the other Presidencies.

18. On the 5th of June 1803, your Lordship's instructions of the 16th of November 1802, continued in full force in India, and until authentic intelligence had convinced me that a change had taken place in the favourable state of affairs between his Majesty and the Republic of France, indicated by the tenor of your Lordship's instructions, I could not consider the early renewal of hostilities with France to be an event so probable, as to justify any diversion of the troops from any of the Presidencies for the sole purpose of resisting an attack from the French.

19. I therefore determined to await the course of events, expecting that even in the course of a renewal of hostilities with France, the French would not be enabled to make any attack upon the garrison of Trincomalé before that place could be relieved either from Bengal or Fort St. George.

20. On the 28th of July 1803, I received from Mr. North a despatch under date the 2d of July, communicating to me "the afflicting intelligence" of the violation by the Candians of the truce concluded with the Candian Government, and of the melancholy events which ensued.

21. As your Lordship must be in possession of every document connected with those lamentable transactions, I shall offer no observation upon them.

22. On the 29th of July, a detachment of his Majesty's 10th regiment amounting to 282 rank and file, embarked by my direction from Fort William with orders to proceed to Fort St. George. The Governor in council of Fort St. George was at the same time instructed in the event of the services of the detachment not being required at Fort St. George to direct it to proceed to Trincomalé. The Governor

in council accordingly ordered the detachment to proceed to Trincomalé, at which port it arrived on the 2d of October.

23. On the 29th of July, although my orders had been issued for augmenting the native corps to a war establishment, those orders had not yet taken such effect as to enable me to detach a corps of native troops from Bengal, without impairing our means of meeting the existing crisis of affairs with the Mahratta chieftains.

24. Your Lordship is apprized of the danger of attempting to embark native troops from Bengal, unless they may have enlisted under express conditions for that purpose, or may have offered their voluntary services. It was therefore impracticable consistently with the demands for the service against the Mahrattas to embark any detachment for Ceylon, until a corps of volunteers could be completed beyond the extent of the force required for the prosecution of operations against the Mahrattas.

25. The season also continued to be unfavourable for the voyage, and the detachment of the 10th regiment which embarked at Fort William on the 29th of July, did not arrive at Fort St. George until the end of September, and at Trincomalé until the 2d of October.

26. I accordingly determined to embark a corps of native troops in addition to the detachment of the 10th regiment as soon as such a corps could be spared, and as the immediate service against the Mahrattas would admit of such a detachment, expecting that this detachment from the more favourable state of the advancing season, would arrive at Trincomalé nearly as soon as the detachment of the 10th regiment.

27. Accordingly on the I issued orders to the officer commanding the expedition against the Province of Cuttack, to embark a detachment of the native troops under his command as soon as circumstances would admit, for the purpose of proceeding to the Island of Ceylon, and in conformity to those orders Lieutenant-Colonel Harcourt on the 28th of September detached from the Province of Cuttack 500 Bengal volunteers with cannon, and a large proportion of stores and ammunition. This detachment was ordered to proceed to Fort St. George, and eventually to Trincomalé, according to the orders which the officer commanding the detachment of volunteers might receive from the Government

of Fort St. George. Lieutenant-Colonel Harcourt at the same time in conformity to the tenor of my original orders recommended to the Government of Fort St. George, to order the detachment of Bengal volunteers to proceed to Trincomalé, and I also intimated my desire to the Government of Fort St. George, that the Bengal volunteers should be directed to proceed to Trincomalé, unless absolutely required for the service of the Presidency of Fort St. George.

28. The Government of Fort St. George accordingly ordered the detachment of Bengal volunteers to proceed to Trincomalé, and the detachment sailed from Madras for Trincomalé on the 15th of October.

29. In addition to this re-inforcement, the Government of Fort St. George has detached two companies of his Majesty's 34th regiment to Trincomalé, for the purpose of strengthening the European force on the Island of Ceylon.* I have also directed a detachment of 300 Madras sepoys (who were returning from the Moluccas, and unable to reach Fort St. George by sea, on account of the north-east monsoon) to proceed to Trincomalé, and to remain there until orders shall be received from the Government of Fort St. George.

30. If circumstances should appear to require a further re-inforcement of the native troops on the Island of Ceylon, I shall be prepared to furnish an additional corps of volunteers as the season shall advance. In the meanwhile I have not hitherto entertained any apprehension of an attack from the French upon the Island of Ceylon; the amount, condition, and station of the French force in this quarter of the globe since the renewal of hostilities with France, having appeared to me to render an attack from that force upon the Island of Ceylon utterly impracticable.

31. The actual state of the French force at the Mauritius, together with that of the Batavian Republic in the eastern seas, does not appear at present to menace any early attempt against any of the British possessions in India, and recent

* Total re-inforcements to Ceylon from the 29th of July to the 9th of November 1803 —Detachment of His Majesty's 10th regiment, 282; detachment of His Majesty's 34th regiment, 137; Bengal volunteers, 500; Madras sepoys, 300.

accounts from the Island of Ceylon (as stated in the Ceylon Gazettes no official advices having been received by me from the Government of Ceylon since ) announce a favourable change in the internal state of that island.

32. Your Lordship must be aware of the extreme difficulty of allotting a larger portion of European troops from the continent of India for the service of Ceylon, in the present incomplete state of his Majesty's regiments in India; but you may rely on my anxious endeavours to maintain the force at Ceylon in the most respectable condition compatible with the state of our military establishments, and with the indispensable exigencies of the service on the continent of India.

33. At the same time it is my duty to apprize your Lordship, that I concur in the justice of the opinions given by Lieutenant-General Stuart, and Major-General Mac Douall (which must have reached your Lordship) that the military establishment allotted for Ceylon is not sufficient for the protection of that island in time of war with France and Holland, if the actual condition of those powers should furnish them with the means of attacking Ceylon. The state of the fortifications of the island also requires your Lordship's attention, especially of the works at Trincomalé; and I have received the strongest complaints of the defective state of the buildings for the accommodation of the troops.

34. In submitting these circumstances to your Lordship's consideration, it is not my intention to impute blame to the present Governor of Ceylon; for whom I entertain the most sincere esteem and regard. The entire separation of the government of that island from the control of the general government of India, exempted his Excellency from the necessity of receiving my sentiments previously to the conclusion of treaties with the King of Candi, or to the commencement of war, and it may justly have appeared superfluous to his Excellency to resort in any degree to a power, which had recently been divested of all authority over Ceylon, and which could not be responsible for any act of the government of that island.

35. The state of the military establishments, fortifications, barracks and cantonments, on the island, is not to be attributed to the Governor of Ceylon, who I sincerely believe has omitted no endeavours to strengthen the military defences of

the island, by a diligent and judicious use of the limited means which he possessed.

36. The events however which have passed in Ceylon, have occasioned serious reflections in my mind with regard to the security of that valuable possession, and to the operation of the present constitution of its government upon the general interests of the British empire in India.

37. The separation of the government of Ceylon from the control of the general government of India, always appeared to me to be a measure of the utmost danger to this empire. Accordingly at an early period of time, I submitted my opinion upon the subject to the President of the Board of Commissioners for the affairs of India in a secret letter dated 10th of May 1801, of which I have the honour to enclose a copy for your Lordship's information.

38. The separation of Ceylon from the Government-General, was however deemed advisable; and the consequences which have resulted from that measure appear to me to have confirmed the justice of those apprehensions which I expressed in my letter to the President of the Board of Commissioners in May 1801.

39. Under the new constitution, treaties have been concluded, and a war has been undertaken by the government of Ceylon without the previous knowledge of the Government-General; the expences of that war however, have been supplied in the first instance by the Government-General; and the calamities which have attended the progress of the war, have occasioned demands for troops from the Government-General. Whether the war in Ceylon could have been altogether avoided, whether its commencement could have been postponed to a more convenient season, or whether its conduct could have been improved, and an early and honourable peace established upon permanent foundations, are questions, which it is neither my present duty nor intention to examine; but is evident that every arrangement connected with these questions might have been formed with greater advantage under the direct authority of the power which must ultimately furnish the supplies for war, and provide the securities for peace. Had the government of Ceylon remained subordinate to this government, the war in that island, if deemed necessary, would have been undertaken after a deliberate

preparation of sufficient resources, and after a full consideration of the most effectual mode of applying them. This government could not have been taken by surprize with respect to the actual commencement of the war, or to its result; and an opportunity would have been afforded of apportioning at an early period of time to the service in Ceylon such aid, as might have appeared on a just comparison of objects and means to be compatible with due attention to other branches of the service in India, or to be indispensably necessary for the safety of Ceylon.

40. The independence of Ceylon has placed all these considerations beyond the reach of the Governor-General in council, who was unapprized of the approach of war in Ceylon until it had actually commenced, and of the probable demand for considerable reinforcements in Ceylon, until a war on the continent of India had limited the means of furnishing them.

41. The operation of treaties and political arrangements concluded by the separate authority of his Majesty's Government of Ceylon may materially affect the general interests of the British empire in India, even in those cases which may not immediately involve the issues of peace and war. His Majesty's instructions together with the Company's charter, and the various acts of regulation appear to preclude the Governor of Ceylon from the right of concluding treaties, or of making war with any of the continental states of India, or with any state situated beyond the limits of the island of Ceylon. It is perhaps doubtful whether the Governor of Ceylon possesses even within the limits of that island, the same powers relative to peace and war, which are granted by special Act of Parliament to the Governor-General in council within the limits of the Company's charter. These points certainly require full and distinct explanation by the highest authority; but whatever may be the legal right of the Governor of Ceylon with regard to these questions the practical operation of the new constitution of Ceylon has been amply proved by the experience of the last year.

42. Even if the political powers of the government of Ceylon be limited to the island, the nature of treaties concluded with the King of Candi, or with his ministry, nobility, or other authorities in the island may be contrary to the general policy pursued by the Company's Government in

India, and may therefore prove injurious to the British character and influence on the Continent of India, and among such insular states in these seas as may have formed or solicited connections with the Company.

43. The king of Candi is particularly venerated by the Court of Ava, and a considerable degree of sanctity is attributed in the Burmese dominions to the character of the king of Candi, and to the island of Ceylon, whence the Burmahs derive the source of their mythology, and of their religious institutions. The conduct of the British Government, therefore, towards the king and kingdom of Candi, and the general tenor of the policy pursued in the island of Ceylon is important to the reputation of the Company's Government on the Continent of India, in proportion to the importance of the Burmese empire in the general scale of Asiatic powers. To your Lordship's intimate knowledge of the affairs of India, it is unnecessary to add more detailed facts or arguments to prove that the operation of any system of treaties, alliances, or political or diplomatic arrangements pursued towards the native states and subjects within the limits of the island of Ceylon, cannot be confined to the coasts of that island, even if such system should exclude the contingency of war in Ceylon.

44. If treaties or political systems concluded with the native states or powers in Ceylon should involve the issue of hostilities, although the theatre of the war may in the first instance be confined to Ceylon, it is evident that even the first and most limited operation of such a war must affect the finances, as well as the general security of the British empire in India.

45. The charges of war in Ceylon must be defrayed from Bengal. If the war should prove unfortunate in Ceylon, troops and every military resource must be supplied from Bengal. Even in the most favourable supposition, troops occupied in hostile operations within the island of Ceylon, (omitting all consideration of the fatality of the climate,) not only become inapplicable to any purposes of general defence on the Continent of India, but are withdrawn from the protection of the coasts and maritime forts of the island. The danger will be aggravated, if, at the same moment, the Company's government shall be engaged in war upon the Continent of India, and shall be unable to supply troops for the

support of a war in Ceylon, or for the defence of the forts and coasts of that island, deprived of the aid of its proper military establishments.

46. In the event, therefore, of an existing war with France, Holland, or with any power capable of attacking Ceylon, the existence of an internal war in the island may convert that bulwark of our Indian empire into a powerful instrument of offensive war in the hands of our enemies; and the consequences of a treaty concluded by a governor of Ceylon within the limits of that island may endanger the whole fabric of this vast empire.

47. The situation of the Governor-General under the circumstances described will be duly appreciated by your Lordship. Ignorant of the approach or causes of war, he may be suddenly required to furnish resources for its prosecution at a moment when the exigencies of his own government, and the general service of the empire in India may preclude the possibility of affording adequate supplies either of money or men. Without power to direct the conduct, or to check the progress of hostilities, he may be compelled to abide their consequences, and to remain an inactive and helpless spectator of the perils of his own government, of the disgrace of the British name and arms, and possibly of his own reputation and honour, involved in the result of counsels and operations contradictory to his judgment, and exempt from his control.

48. On the other hand, the Governor of Ceylon, by the practical operation of the present constitution of the island, exercises the sole prerogative of making war within that island, but must depend for the means of prosecuting war upon an authority which he cannot control.

49. The legislature has vested in the Governor-General in council, subject to the control in England, the sole power of making war against any native state on the Continent of India. The same principle requires that the Governor-General in council should possess similar powers with regard to war in Ceylon. The wisdom of the legislature has provided an unity of executive power as the most effectual security for the British empire on the Continent of India, and has determined that the authority invested with the sole power of disposing of all the resources necessary for the pro-

secution of war, should also possess the sole power of making war, and that no provincial, local, or subordinate authority should be enabled to involve the general interests of the empire in the expense and hazard of hostilities.

50. The same principles have been wisely established with regard to the political powers of the Supreme Government on the Continent of India, and it has been determined by Parliament that the Governor-General in council, who alone can be competent to form a comprehensive view of the interests affected by treaties or by wars with the native states, shall alone be competent to conclude treaties, or to make war. But under the existing constitution of the island of Ceylon, your Lordship will observe that the order and system established for the general government of India are absolutely reversed. The Governor of Ceylon exercises the exclusive authority of concluding treaties, of making war, and of conducting military operations in the island, without the power of furnishing supplies, either of men or money, beyond the fixed establishment of the island; while the Governor-General in council is required to furnish supplies of men and money for the prosecution of war in Ceylon, without possessing any power of controlling the origin, conduct, or progress of the war, which may, however, deeply affect the security, interests and honour of the general government of India.

51. The island of Ceylon, however, cannot be excluded from the general operation of these wise and salutary principles, unless it be also excluded from the general system of the British civil and military government in India. But that island has justly been termed the bulwark of our empire in India; it is therefore an essential part of our strength, and the due administration of its civil and military government is of the utmost importance to the defence of all our dominions in India. No security for that administration can be so effectual as the uniform operation of the same authority which has been extended over every other branch of the British possessions; nor can an argument be adduced to prove the importance of Ceylon, which will not also demonstrate that its interests are inseparably blended with those of the empire on the Continent, and that its government cannot be separated from the general control without hazard to the safety both of that empire, and of the island of Ceylon.

52. The entire military establishment of India ought to be applicable to the general defence of the whole empire. The subdivision of that establishment, and the separation of our general strength into detachments subjected to independent commands, and appropriated to exclusive provincial and local services, must impair the general efficiency of our army, by destroying the unity of our military power.

53. The same principle applies with equal force to the civil authority which, in an empire of such magnitude and extent, cannot be separated from the military power without the hazard of confusion.

54. In reviewing these considerations, your Lordship will anticipate the regret and concern with which I have learned that not only the civil and military government of the island of Ceylon are to remain independent of the general superintendance and control of the Governor-General in council, but that the military establishments of that island are to be entirely disjoined from the chief command of the forces on the Continent of India; and that the allowances and other regulations respecting the military establishments are to be framed in Ceylon upon principles different from those established at any of the presidencies on the Continent of India.

55. The effect of this arrangement will entirely remove the military establishments at Ceylon from the superintendance and control of the general officer commanding in chief his Majesty's and the Company's forces in India.

56. Every sentiment of public duty requires me to submit to your Lordship my most serious apprehension of the evil consequences which must result to the discipline and efficiency of the military forces in Ceylon, if exempted from the salutary control of the officer holding the chief command in India.

57. Every facility should be afforded to the employment of the military establishment of Ceylon in purposes of general defence in India, whenever the exigency might require such an effort. But the entire separation of the civil and military authorities, and the difference of the regulations and constitutions of the separate military establishments will oppose difficulties nearly insuperable to the employment on the Continent of India of any part of the military establishment of Ceylon, and especially of his Majesty's regiments.

58. On the other hand, the same causes will oppose nearly equal difficulties to the employment of any portion of the military establishments of the Continent of India, and especially of his Majesty's regiments in the island of Ceylon, in the event of any exigency which might demand a reinforcement of the troops on that island. The utmost confusion and disorder might be expected to result from the conflicting authorities which must be mixed in conducting any military operations on that island, which should demand the aid of troops from the Continent of India. It might even become a question whether the Governor-General would be justified in exposing the army destined to defend the British empire in India, to be wasted in the prosecution of petty wars in Ceylon (of which the cause and issue might be equally doubtful,) under a system of management calculated to injure the discipline, to break the spirit, and to destroy the health of the troops. In the present state of the government and military command in Ceylon, it is doubtful whether the governments or commanders-in-chief on the Continent of India could retain any power over troops landed in Ceylon, and whether those authorities could in any degree control the discipline or operations of their own troops within the island, or could limit the objects to which the services of such troops should be applied, or the time or mode of recalling such troops to the Continent of India, or of embarking them for distant service.

59. The independence of the government and military command of Ceylon would considerably embarrass the Government-General in the prosecution of operations against the remaining possessions of the French and Dutch to the eastward of the Cape of Good Hope, or in any eventual expedition against the Cape of Good Hope, or against Egypt, or against various places in these seas, or even in any transfer of troops from the several maritime garrisons in India. Your Lordship is intimately acquainted with the advantages which the ports of Ceylon offer for assembling troops and ships, and for completing every necessary depôt in the preparation of such services. The Government-General repeatedly derived important advantages from the full command of those ports during the last war. In the present state of the island it would not be possible to use its ports and resources with

similar effect. A considerable portion of the value of Ceylon in time of war is therefore actually suspended by the existing constitution of the government of that island.

60. Your Lordship is apprized of the nature and extent of the military commission with which his Majesty was pleased to honour me under date of the 7th of August, 1800. By the terms of that commission I have hitherto understood that I possessed the general command over all the land forces serving in Ceylon, as well as over those serving in every other part of the East Indies.

61. The terms of this commission seemed to enable me to issue orders to the troops in Ceylon, but the effect of such orders appeared to me to be entirely frustrated by the independent powers of the civil government of the island, which must be deemed paramount to any powers derived from a mere military commission, unless that commission in express terms had superseded the authority of the civil government.

62. It would be extremely advantageous to furnish me with a distinct rule for my guidance with regard to the operation of my commission of Captain-general of the land forces over the island of Ceylon.

63. The preceding statements will apprize your Lordship, that if Ceylon be entirely exempted from the control of the general civil and military government of India, and from the command of the commander-in-chief, and of the Captain-general, in India the military establishments of that island cannot be deemed to constitute an efficient part of our general resources and power in India, excepting only to the extent to which these establishments may be sufficient to prevent the reduction of the island of Ceylon by the forces of any enemy, directed exclusively against that possession.

64. Your Lordship's judgment and experience in the affairs of this quarter of the globe will enable you to decide with facility whether such a separation and subdivision of powers be preferable to an union of all the British resources and strength in the hands of one supreme authority in India possessing power to apply every branch of the General Government to the defence of each part, or of the whole; and embracing in one comprehensive view the general welfare

and security of the empire, together with the particular and local interests of every province and possession.

65. The despatch addressed to the President of the Board of Commissioners for the affairs of India, under date 10th May, 1801, to which I had the honour to refer in the 37th paragraph of this letter, will convey to your Lordship my sentiments on this important question. These sentiments have been confirmed by the most mature and deliberate reflection, and by every event relating to the affairs of Ceylon which has reached my knowledge since the independence of that government has been established.

66. In one respect only has my opinion undergone any degree of variation. I am now convinced that the most effectual mode of rendering Ceylon a valuable addition to the British possessions in India, and an efficient augmentation of our military and political power would be to annex it, as a province directly to the Supreme Government of Bengal, with orders to the Governor-General in Council to adopt such measures as might appear requisite for regulating the civil and military government and establishments of the island. Such an arrangement would unite considerable advantages in point of economy, with a great improvement of the internal tranquillity, happiness, and prosperity of the island, and with a correspondent increase of its military strength.

67. The government of Ceylon might either be formed upon the model of that of any of the provinces subject to the immediate government of Bengal, and made the station of a Court of Circuit and Appeal, with establishments for the revenue and commerce of the island, and with one of his Majesty's general officers upon the staff commanding the troops; or the Government of Ceylon might be similar to that of Prince of Wales island, with a Lieutenant-Governor appointed from the civil service of Bengal. In this case also Ceylon should be the station of a general officer on the staff.

68. I am satisfied that, under either of these arrangements, the island of Ceylon would become a more valuable and a more secure possession than it can prove under the present constitution of its civil and military government. Your Lordship will receive these observations as a testimony of my

anxiety for the safety and prosperity of this great empire. My opinions are founded upon mature deliberation and practical experience; and it appears to me to be my positive duty to submit them to your Lordship in the most direct and unequivocal language. I request your Lordship, however, to be assured that I offer my sentiments on the subject of this despatch to your judgment, with the highest sense of respect, and with a just impression of my obligations of obedience and subordination to your Lordship's authority. Whatever may be his Majesty's determination with regard to the government of Ceylon, my submission will be implicit and cheerful; and your Lordship may rely on my most earnest endeavours during the present crisis, and at every future exigency, to mitigate the evils which I have respectfully represented, by the most cordial exertion of a sincere public zeal, and by an unfeigned spirit of effectual co-operation in the common cause.

69. I cannot however conclude this despatch without expressing a most anxious hope, that if it should not be deemed expedient to change the entire constitution of the government of Ceylon, his Majesty may at least be advised immediately to issue the necessary orders for subjecting, during the existing war with France and Holland, the civil and military government of Ceylon (including the exercise of all political power, and the command of the army,) to the control of the Governor-General in Council, of his Majesty's Commander-in-Chief, and of his Majesty's Captain-General of the land forces in the East Indies.

70. Without such a control, I shall entertain serious apprehensions, in the event of protracted war with France. Your Lordship however may be satisfied, that while I shall continue to hold my present charge, no possible combination of difficulties or dangers can abate my zeal for the defence, security, and welfare of every part of the British possessions in India, for the defeat of every project of the enemy, and for the effectual prosecution of every service connected with the execution of his Majesty's commands, with the success of his Majesty's arms, and with the honour and interests of our country in the present arduous contest.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

## No. CXLVI.

*Lieut.-General Lake to the Marquess Wellesley.*

(Private.)

My dear Lord, Camp, Helenah, Dec. 3, 1803.

Your letter of the 18th, so full of friendship and affection, added to all the kindness I have already received from you, renders me a complete bankrupt in words to express the sensations which warm my heart with every tie of attachment and gratitude to you, my dear Lord, for the various marks of esteem and confidence so repeatedly manifested towards me, and which nothing but death can ever eradicate from my mind. Your noble and feeling expressions respecting my son, while they afford me the most lively sensations of veneration and regard, call to my recollection what indeed can never be forgot; the pang I felt at the moment I saw him wounded, and believe me, I feel most truly thankful to the Almighty for sparing his life, and if possible, still more particularly so for having granted me fortitude sufficient to fulfil at that moment the duties of my station, a moment most critical, so much so, that in the event of any failure, the mischief that might have ensued is far beyond all calculation. The 1st of November, 1803, will ever remain fresh in my mind, for various reasons which cannot now be enumerated; the loss of so many brave men and worthy officers, I must ever most sincerely regret, and have only to look up to that Providence with adoration and thanksgiving, who, in the midst of our most perilous situation, saved so many of us to relate the tale, and offer up our prayers for his mercies vouchsafed unto us.

I have received your letter by General Fraser, who I was extremely happy to see; the duplicate arrived before him, which I will answer in a day or two; in the meantime, believe me, my dear Lord, and allow me to assure you that I am, with the truest affection and regard,

your devoted servant,

G. Lake.

## No. CXLVII.

*Lieut.-General Lake to the Marquess Wellesley.*

(Private.)

MY LORD, Camp at Coprka, Dec. 8, 1803.

Finding the Jeypore ambassadors very trifling and dilatory, and thinking Ambajee's man not so alive as he ought to be, I determined to move on the road to Dholpour, at the same time looking towards Jeypore, on a supposition that by this movement I should alarm all these negotiators, and expedite matters very considerably. The event has justified me in my idea, as they have separately come to request I would halt to-morrow, and that they would seriously enter upon the business of their separate masters, and hope soon to adjust every thing to the mutual satisfaction of all parties.

I now do really believe (although I am not of a very sanguine disposition) that all the negotiations in this quarter will terminate entirely as you could wish. The state of Holkar's army is such, that I trust little now is to be apprehended from him. I beg, my dear Lord, you will not imagine for one moment that I shall relax in my attention to his views and motions; on the contrary, I shall do all in my power to prevent him from penetrating into any part of the country we possess, and I think, from the precautions I have taken, upon which I shall write more fully to-morrow, that he cannot do us any injury. I cannot see how he can proceed without money, and as his army seems averse to moving, he cannot any longer plunder the country, which must prevent him from being a very formidable enemy; of all these, however, we shall be able to form a better judgment in a few days, and I cannot help flattering myself all will go right, and that peace and tranquillity will be restored to India. No one can wish for this blessing more sincerely than I do, and not the less so from knowing how anxious you are to attain this glorious and happy end of this successful campaign, and of your most excellent and wise plans adopted for the preservation of our territories in India, which but from your wise and judicious councils must shortly have been in the utmost danger.

Colonel Vandeleur, whom I highly esteemed, fell almost at the first shot. The only omission I have been guilty of in

my despatch was the not mentioning Lieut.-Colonel White and the five companies of the 16th Native Infantry, who deserved great praise. I have endeavoured to repair the neglect by writing a letter to him, regretting my not having inserted his name and the conduct of his corps in my official despatch.

I felt so much depressed for some days after that action, that it is possible I might not have expressed myself so strongly as I might otherwise have done, which will, I trust, make allowances for any deficiency on my part.

I request you will believe me,
My dear Lord,
with truth and affection,
your devoted servant,

G. Lake.

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## No. CXLVIII.

*The Marquess Wellesley to the Right Hon. Lord William Bentinck.*

(Secret.)

My Lord, Fort William, Dec. 9, 1803.

1. I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's letter, under date of the 25th of November, received this day, enclosing the copy of a despatch from Colonel Campbell, the commanding officer at Vellore, which contains a narrative of the supposed murder of a female slave by the orders of the Prince Abdul Khalik.

2. The peculiar situation of the sons of the late Tippoo Sultan must be considered to exempt them from the jurisdiction of any of our courts of justice. That exemption, however, cannot extend to the servants and dependants of those princes. The agent of Abdul Khalik in the commission of the supposed murder, should be tried, with a view to bring that agent to justice, and to establish the facts relating to the innocence or guilt of Abdul Khalik by a legal process.

3. In examining the declarations taken at Vellore on this occasion, I observe that the person stated to have conveyed poison to the deceased female slave, was informed "that his life could be saved only by declaring the truth."

4. This intimation cannot justly preclude the trial and eventual condemnation of that person, but in the event of his conviction, any promise of the nature stated would of course induce your Lordship to spare his life.

5. If the charge against Abdul Khalik should appear to be proved by the result of the trial of the agent, the only punishment which can properly be inflicted on the prince, will be, a reduction of his allowances, and an additional restraint upon his person.

6. If it should appear clearly from the evidence that Abdul Khalik has instigated this atrocious crime, your Lordship will be pleased to direct the commandant of Vellore to afford that prince an opportunity of stating his defence to your Lordship in council; and if your Lordship should be convinced, after having examined that defence, of the guilt of Abdul Khalik, I request that your Lordship will be pleased to reduce Abdul Khalik's allowances at least in the proportion of one half, and that you will confine him a close prisoner to the Fort of Vellore for at least six months.

7. It is impracticable to bring Abdul Khalik to a regular trial, but public example, and the necessity of preventing such atrocious excesses, will require that he should be punished at least to the extent specified in this despatch.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

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## No. CXLIX.

*The Marquess Wellesley to the Hon. Major-General Wellesley.*

(Secret and Official.)

SIR, Fort William, Dec. 11, 1803.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letters noted in the margin.*

2. I entirely approve your conduct in having admitted, without hesitation, a vakeel from Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and in the reception which you gave to that vakeel. The conference with the vakeel, of the 10th of November, was conducted

* Dated Camp at Jaum, Nov. 11, 1803; Dated Camp, Nov. 13, 1803. These letters are to be found in Colonel Gurwood's "Despatches of the Duke of Wellington," vol. I. p. 495—504.—[*Ed.*]

on your part with considerable judgment. Your demand of the full powers of the vakeel was perfectly just and proper, and it was absolutely necessary to insist upon the production of those powers from Scindiah, previously to the conclusion of any arrangements tending to peace. At the same time it was proper to permit the vakeel to remain in your camp until he could be enabled to obtain regular powers from Scindiah, and it was expedient during his continuance in your camp to permit him to offer to you whatever propositions he might choose to submit to your consideration.

3. I also approve your resolution to request the vakeel to withdraw from your camp, if he should not be enabled to produce the requisite powers within the time which you have specified for that purpose, and I conclude that if he should not have produced full powers from Scindiah, you will have compelled the vakeel to depart from your camp.

4. The same principles will necessarily induce you to refuse admission into your camp to any vakeel who may hereafter arrive from Dowlut Rao Scindiah, or from the Rajah of Berar, without producing full powers from those chieftains respectively. The omission of Dowlut Rao Scindiah to furnish Jeswunt Rao Goorparah with full powers may have been accidental. It may also be attributed to the barbarous pride of Scindiah, whose insolence and arrogance, wounded by disappointment, may have sought relief in the hope of acquiring a temporary triumph in his own durbar, by the acquiescence of the British Government in his disrespectful attempt to open negotiations for peace through an agent possessing no direct or regular authority from any of the belligerent powers. The object of Scindiah may also have been to gain time in the desperate condition of his affairs.

5. Your prudence and public spirit frustrated whatever hope might have been founded on such insidious and weak projects. After a formal notification to Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar of your determination not to admit hereafter any ambassador who shall not be furnished with full powers from his alleged principal, any attempt to intrude emissaries from the enemy into your camp under the pretence of opening negotiations for peace, will be received by you as an insult to the British Government; and you will signify to the confederates your determination to treat all such emissaries

as spies, and to punish them according to the established law of nations. You will observe that, under the treaties of Bassein and Hyderabad, neither the Peishwa nor the Nizam can enter into any negotiations separate from the British Government, and you will accordingly forbid any intercourse between the enemy and those princes respectively.

6. The conduct of Appah Dessaye manifests an entire devotion to the interests of Scindiah. Your replies to the treacherous communications of that artful Mahratta were extremely judicious.

7. You were empowered by my instructions of the 26th and 27th of June to conclude peace with Scindiah, the Rajah of Berar, and Holkar, jointly or separately. The progress of the war, however, has afforded sufficient proof of the advantage to be derived from separating the interests of those chiefs, and our situation now enables us to insist on such a separation; my notes of the 16th of October accordingly indicated my wish to conclude peace separately with Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar. The admission, however, of those chieftains to a joint treaty of peace, would not necessarily involve the admission of either of them to negotiate exclusively for the other. The treaty may be a joint instrument, although each party may have negotiated separately for its own interests. To admit any of the belligerent powers to negotiate for any other, would establish a permanent influence in the scale of that power beyond the limits of its due weight. I therefore approve your sentiments with respect to the separation of the interests of Scindiah, the Rajah of Berar, and Holkar.

8. Scindiah cannot be permitted to treat either for the Rajah of Berar, or for Holkar, excepting in the last extremity of our affairs. Unless, therefore, circumstances should absolutely compel you to permit a negotiation of this nature, you will positively reject it. The fundamental principles of my recent negotiations and treaties with the Peishwah would be entirely subverted by establishing such an union of power as would be fixed in the hands of Scindiah if he were permitted to negotiate for the Rajah of Berar, and for Holkar, or for either of those chiefs.

9. In the present desperate state of Scindiah's affairs, he must speedily be convinced that the only policy by which he

can recover any considerable degree of resource or territory, is to separate his interests from those of the Rajah of Berar.

10. Holkar has not yet entered directly into the war, and it is certainly expedient to consider him as a friend in every negotiation with the confederates. The conduct of Holkar, however, is extremely suspicious; and this circumstance furnishes an additional reason for compelling Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar to treat separately for peace.

11. If the war with Scindiah should continue, you will either remove Appah Dessaye from his present command, or you will provide effectual security against the consequences of Appah Dessaye's proved attachment to the cause of Scindiah. In the event of a protracted war with Scindiah, it would be highly desirable to remove Appah Dessaye from all intercourse with your army.

12. Your letter of the 6th of October, transmitting the letters which you had received from Balajee Koonjur, reached me on the 1st of November, and your conduct on that occasion received my entire approbation, which was signified to you by my private secretary.

13. On the 26th of October a paper of notes was forwarded to you (under date of the 16th of October) relative to various questions affecting the terms of peace with the confederate chieftains. The delay in the despatch of those notes from Fort William was occasioned by an interruption in the passage of the dawk through the province of Cuttack. The general tenor of those notes will have furnished you with a view of my opinions at that period of time with regard to the conditions of peace. But it has not been possible, until the present moment, to obtain such information with regard to the state of the war in all parts of India, to the condition of the negotiation with various powers, or to the situation and views of the confederate chieftains as might enable me to issue final instructions respecting the terms of peace.

14. The just, necessary, and attainable conditions of peace will be clearly ascertained by examining the causes, objects, and result of the war, together with the situation of the enemy at the present time.

15. The immediate cause of the war was the refusal of the confederates to separate and withdraw to their usual stations

within their respective territories the armies which they had assembled and united on the frontier of our ally the Soubadar of the Deccan, after having declared that the intention of that junction was to decide, whether there should be peace or war with the British Government and its allies.

16. Under these circumstances the continuance of the confederate army in the position which the chieftains appeared determined to maintain, was a manifest indication of a design to frustrate by hostilities, or by the terror of their arms, the operation of the alliance concluded between the British Government and the Peishwa, and to disturb the tranquillity of the dominions of the Nizam, and ultimately of the Company. The union of the confederate forces and their commanding and menacing position, afforded every advantage to the chieftains in prosecuting the hostile design which they had manifested, and enabled the confederated chieftains to hold the issue of peace and war in their hands, and to arbitrate the fate of the Deccan according to their interests or caprice.

17. At the same time the position and state of Scindiah's forces, under the command of his French officers in Hindostan, and the machinations of M. Perron with the adjoining states and with the subjects of the Company, and of the Vizier, manifested additional proofs of the hostile designs of the confederates, and furnished those chieftains with additional means of prosecuting such designs.

18. The primary object of the war originating in these causes, was to deprive the confederates of the means which they possessed of prosecuting their unwarrantable designs, and the general plan of military operations, connected with a corresponding system of political arrangement, was calculated to preclude the confederates from reviving the sources of that military and political power, which they had employed to disturb the security of our alliances, dependencies and dominions.

19. The power of Dowlut Rao Scindiah considered with relation to his means of affecting the security of the British empire in India, may be described to have consisted at the commencement of the war in the following branches of military and political resource:

First. The efficient state of Scindiah's military establishment, under the direction of European officers, and particularly the formidable condition of his regular infantry and artillery under the command of those officers.

Secondly. The possession of an extensive and rich territory and of various strong forts, magazines, founderies and arsenals, with considerable supplies of ammunition and military stores, deposited in convenient stations upon our frontier, contiguous to the most vulnerable part of the British dominions in Hindostan.

Thirdly. The establishment of a large and well disciplined body of troops, with a formidable train of artillery, under the command of French officers within that territory in Hindostan.

Fourthly. The actual assignment of that territory in Hindostan to the French officer holding the chief command of those troops.

Fifthly. The possession of the person of his Majesty Shah Aulum, under the immediate power of the forces commanded by French officers in the service of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and the exercise of the nominal authority of the Moghul through those French officers.

Sixthly. The ascendancy established by the agency of the French officer in command of Scindiah's troops in the north-west of Hindostan over the Rajpoot chieftains of Jynagur* and Jodepoor, and other states and chieftains in the northern and western provinces of Hindostan, and over many of the Seik chiefs and others, occupying the territory from the Jumna to the banks of the Indus, and the facility afforded by the advanced posts of M. Perron's army towards the Indus of aiding the invasion of the British dominions through that quarter.

Seventhly. The facility which the possession of the sea-port of Baroach afforded to Scindiah of improving his military establishment, by the accession of French or other European officers, of military supplies and stores, &c. and even of a body of French or other European troops.

Eighthly. The power of disturbing the tranquillity of the possessions of the Guickowar, and of the Company in the province of Guzerat, by means of Scindiah's intermixed territories and fortresses in that province, and by his claims and influence in that quarter.

Ninthly. The power of disturbing the tranquillity of the state of Poonah, and the stability of our alliance with the Peishwa by Scindiah's intermixed territories and fortresses

* Jynaghur is only another name for Jyepore.

in the vicinity of Poonah, and to the southward of the river Taptee, especially the fortress and territory of Ahmednuggur, and by Scindiah's various claims upon the state of Poonah, and by his influence at that court.

Tenthly. Scindiah's intermixed and bordering fortresses and possessions which enabled him to menace and disturb the dominions of the Soubadar of the Deccan, and to impair the efficiency of the British alliance with that prince, and Scindiah's various claims upon the Soubadar of the Deccan, and consequent influence at Hyderabad.

Eleventhly. The general magnitude, wealth and strength of Scindiah's dominions and army, and the reputation of his military power from which he derived a general influence and ascendancy at Poonah and over all the Mahratta states, and even at Hyderabad, which influence and ascendancy had been uniformly directed to injure the British power.

20. Under this view of the condition of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's power at the commencement of this war, it was dangerous to the British empire:

First. By the facilities which it afforded to the French of injuring the British interests in India, either in co-operation with Scindiah, or through the independent aid of his French and other European officers.

Secondly. By maintaining against the British Government a rival and hostile influence throughout every native state in India, and especially amongst our most important dependents and allies on the western side of India.

21. The danger arising from the condition of the Rajah of Berar's power with reference to the same considerations, appeared to be at the commencement of the war:

First. A military force greatly inferior to Scindiah's, in point of discipline, numbers, and artillery, but furnishing a considerable accession to the general strength of the confederacy against the British Government.

Secondly. The possession of an extensive territory and several strong forts, commanding the dominions of the Company and the Soubadar of the Deccan, in several vulnerable points.

Thirdly. The possession of the province of Cuttack by which the Rajah of Berar was enabled to interrupt the communication between our northern and southern possessions, to facilitate the invasion of Bengal and of the northern Circars,

and to obtain the aid of French, and other European officers, or troops, to be landed in the province of Cuttack.

Fourthly. The intermixture of the Rajah of Berar's possessions with those of the Soubadar of the Deccan, and his vexatious claims upon the Court of Hyderabad, and his consequent influence at that court.

Fifthly. The Rajah of Berar's pretensions to the Government of Poonah, and the ascendancy and influence which he derives from his descent, connected with the general magnitude of his dominions and resources, with his supposed wealth, and with the hostile spirit which has been manifested by the state of Berar for many years in counteracting the interests of the British empire in India.

22. It is not necessary to advert to the state of Holkar's power, as he has not hitherto been considered to be a party in the war.

23. It would also be superfluous to enumerate the special objects of the war, as they have been sufficiently described in the view which the preceding paragraphs contain of the condition of the enemy's power at the commenment of the war.

24. The progress of the war and the glorious success of our arms in Hindostan and the Deccan, in Guzerat, and Orissa, have actually accomplished every requisite object with respect to the reduction of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's military and political power, have materially affected the Rajah of Berar, and have placed in our hands the means of establishing the security of the British interests against Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and the Rajah of Berar, on foundations, which appear to promise considerable duration.

25. At the date of your last despatch, you could not have been apprized of the extent of Scindiah's loss, and of our success against his power in every quarter in which it has been attacked. These considerations however must form the basis of the conditions which we are empowered to require from Scindiah at the conclusion of peace.

26. The French force under the immediate command of M. Perron in Hindostan has been completely destroyed, nearly the whole force of Scindiah's regular battalions in Hindostan, and the Deccan, has been destroyed or dispersed

by the victories obtained under the personal command of his Excellency General Lake at Delhi on the 11th of September, and at Laswaree on the 1st of November, and under your personal command at Assye on the 23d of September, and nearly the whole of Scindiah's artillery has been taken or destroyed. The greater part of Scindiah's European officers is now placed under the protection of the British power. The territory formerly possessed by Dowlut Rao Scindiah, in the Doab of the Jumna and Ganges, and assigned to M. Perron for the payment of the French force in Scindiah's service has been subjected to our authority. Scindiah has lost the Forts of Delhi, Muttra and Agra, with the adjoining territory on the right bank of the Jumna, and a considerable sum of money (twenty-four lacs of rupees) taken in the Fort of Agra, and five lacs of rupees at Delhi, with further sums of money taken at Allyghur, and in other places, and immediately divided by the troops after the several actions. The person of his Majesty Shah Aulum and the royal family have been placed under the protection of the British power. Scindiah has been deprived of the means of availing himself of the connexion with the Seiks, with the Rajpoots and with all the chiefs and states in the north of Hindostan, and the alliance of several of those chieftains has been transferred to the British Government. Begum Sumroo has placed herself under the protection of the British Government, and has recalled her battalions in the Deccan from Scindiah's service. From the state of the negotiation with Rajah Ambajee, at the date of our latest advices from his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, it may be expected that Scindiah is now deprived of that portion of his territorial possessions in Hindostan, which was placed under the authority of Ambajee, and that Scindiah has altogether lost the support of Ambajee's power. The sea-port of Baroach and its dependent territory, the Forts of Champaneer and Powanghur, with the whole of Scindiah's territory in the Province of Guzerat, situated to the northward of Baroach have been subjected to our authority. The district of Godra has been occupied by our troops. The fort and territory of Ahmednuggur, with the city of Boorhanpore, and the Fort of Asseerghur, have also been subjected to the authority of the British Government, and the fort and district of Jalnapore, with other districts in the

Deccan, have been occupied by the combined armies of the British Government, and the Soubadar of the Deccan.

27. The loss sustained by the Rajah of Berar, must be considered separately in any negotiation with that chief. It is proper however to state that loss in this place, because it has diminished the power of Scindiah as a confederate against the British Government and our allies, in the further prosecution of the war.

28. From the Rajah of Berar all the intermixed Mahratta territories within the frontier of the Company on the side of Midnapore, have been taken and annexed to the British dominions, and the valuable province of Cuttack has also been subdued, and nearly settled. The loss of Juggernaut must deeply affect the consideration of the Rajah of Berar in the eyes of all the native powers. It is also reasonable to suppose that the military force of the Rajah of Berar must have suffered considerably at the battle of Assye, and during his subsequent unsuccessful operations, until the period of his disgraceful retreat to his own territories.

29. Under these circumstances the power and dominion of Dowlut Rao Scindiah must be considered to have suffered a degree of reduction nearly amounting to total ruin; and the Rajah of Berar with such reduction as he has suffered in his separate resources, appears to be at the mercy of the British Government for the remainder of his possessions, without any further hope (in the event of a continuance of the war) than that which he may found on the existing remnant of Scindiah's power.

30. You have not apprized me of your opinion with regard to the degree of connection remaining between Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar since the separation of their forces. The proposition of Appah Dessaye tending to represent Scindiah as a mediator for the Rajah of Berar, and for Holkar, furnishes no proof of the subsistence of the confederacy between Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar. This representation may have been fabricated by Appah Dessaye, or by Juswunt Rao Goorparah, or by Scindiah for the purposes of their own interests, or for the gratification of the characteristic vanity and pride of the Mahratta chieftains.

31. It is therefore possible that in the present state of the relation between the two chiefs, neither can expect cordial or

effectual support from the aid of the other; while it is evident that the cause of both must have suffered from their common loss and disgrace during the continuance of the confederacy.

32. Scindiah cannot entertain any just hope founded upon his own power and resources of recovering any part of his possessions, or of retrieving any branch of his affairs by the further progress of the war.

33. Scindiah can entertain no hope of effectual assistance from the Rajah of Berar, who must also expect to suffer additional loss, if not utter destruction, from a protracted war with the British power in its present condition.

34. It is not probable that either Scindiah or the Rajah of Berar formed any expectation of assistance from the co-operation of Holkar. If Holkar shall engage in the war, his operations will probably be directed to his own separate purposes; no apprehension exists of Holkar's success in any important enterprize, either for the attainment of his own objects, or of those of the confederacy. The means which may be employed to conciliate Holkar, may also be expected to prove successful.

35. From the French it is nearly impossible that either Scindiah or the Rajah of Berar could now derive any aid, even if those chieftains, after the defection of M. Perron, should be disposed to accept such assistance; nor is it probable in the present state of the French power in India, and in Europe, that France could make such an attempt upon any part of our dominions in India, as might operate to divert our forces from the effectual prosecution of another campaign against Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and the Rajah of Berar, and even against Holkar, if he should mix in the war.

36. On the other hand, the resources of the British Government in India are fully equal to the continuance of the war for another campaign, if such a delay should appear to be necessary for the purpose of placing our security on solid foundations.

37. An early conclusion of the war is however highly desirable, if it can be obtained by such means as shall effectually secure the just objects of the war, and the stability of peace.

38. The situation of the enemy therefore (combined with

that of the British Government) has reduced every important question respecting the conditions of peace to considerations of policy and justice. No necessity exists to require a speedy conclusion of peace on terms in any degree inadequate to our just rights and permanent security.

39. Any appearance on our part of a solicitude for the early termination of the war, would probably frustrate that desirable object, and a premature or defective treaty of peace would open fresh and abundant sources of war, from which innumerable calamities would flow hereafter, when we might not retain the advantages which we now possess for the vigorous prosecution of hostilities.

40. The restoration to Dowlut Rao Scindiah of any part of the territories conquered from that chieftain is therefore to be viewed as an act of mere concession, and liberal clemency on the part of the British Government, proceeding from those principles of moderation and prudence, which constitute the foundations of our policy in India.

41. It would neither be just, humane, nor honourable to insist upon the reduction of Scindiah's power to any extent unnecessary to secure the just objects of the war, together with the safety of the British power and its allies. The British Government will never deem any course of policy to be consistent with its wisdom and true interests, which is repugnant to the genuine dictates of justice, humanity and honour.

42. My duty requires me to employ every effort to reduce the power of the enemy within the bounds prescribed by the security of the interests committed to my charge, but it would be equally injurious to the glory and power of this government to prosecute war for the purposes of vengeance, and to urge the fall of a conquered enemy beyond the limits of our own safety and self-defence.

43. The state of the war and the conduct of Scindiah might have been such as to require the entire destruction of Scindiah's power, for purposes absolutely necessary to our security. In the present circumstances, it appears to me to be unnecessary to proceed to that extremity, and under this impression I now proceed to signify to you the conditions upon which I am prepared to conclude peace with Scindiah.

44. The most advantageous basis of a peace with Scindiah

would certainly be formed by his accession to the general defensive alliance, and by his acceptance of a subsidiary force from the British Government on the terms of the treaties of Hyderabad and Bassein, according to the propositions tendered to Scindiah by Colonel Collins at various periods of time. Copies of those propositions are forwarded to you for your information and guidance.

45. In order to explain to you in the most distinct manner the nature of my views with regard to the conclusion of peace with Scindiah, it will be necessary to consider the effect which Scindiah's acceptance of a subsidiary alliance ought to be permitted to produce upon the terms of peace.

46. For this purpose, as well as with a view to apprize you of my ultimate determination with regard to a cessation of hostilities with Scindiah; I deem it to be advisable to state distinct plans of peace with Scindiah, modified according to the circumstances of each respective case.

First. The terms of peace with Scindiah, which would be most desirable if he should not accept a subsidiary alliance.

Secondly. The terms of peace which must ultimately be required from Scindiah, even at the hazard of continuing the war, if Scindiah should decline a subsidiary alliance.

Thirdly. The terms of peace to be concluded with Scindiah upon the basis of a subsidiary alliance.

FIRST PLAN (A).

Article 1st (*a a*). There shall be peace and friendship between the British Government and all its allies and dependants, and Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

Article 1st. All territories, rights, and pretensions of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, situated to the northward of the territories of Oudepore, Joudpore and Jyenagur, to be ceded to the Company.

Article 2d. The Rajahs of Oudepore, Joudpore and Jyenagur, to be independent of Scindiah, and included in the treaty of peace, as allies of the British Government.

Article 3d. Scindiah's claims on the Rana of Gohud to be renounced. The Rana of Gohud to be independent of Scindiah, and included in the treaty of peace as an ally to the British Government.

Article 4th. All territories now held by Ambajee to be ceded to the British Government. Ambajee to be independent of Scindiah, and to be included in the treaty of peace as an ally of the British Government.

Article 5th. Scindiah to renounce all interference or connection with the chiefs and territories of Matcherry and Bhurrutpore, of Calpee and Jansee, with the chiefs or territories situated between the right bank of

the Jumna and the river Sutledge, with the chiefs and territories of Bundelcund and Boghelcund, and with any chief or territory situated to the northward of the province of Malwa; and all claims whatever on all those chiefs and territories.

Article 6th. Scindiah to renounce all claims upon the Seik chiefs or territories.

Article 7th. All chiefs and states who may have assisted the British Government during the war, to be protected from injury, although their territory may be ceded to Scindiah by the treaty of peace.

Article 8th. All treaties concluded by General Lake or Major-General Wellesley, or by the British Government with any chiefs or states during the war, to be acknowledged and confirmed by the treaty of peace, and all alliances formed by the British Government during the war, to be acknowledged and confirmed by the treaty of peace.

Article 9th. His Majesty Shah Aulum and the royal family to be under the protection of the British Government, and Scindiah to renounce all concern in his Majesty's affairs.

Article 10th. The fortress and city of Baroach, with the whole territory dependent thereon, to be retained by the Company.

Article 11th. The fortress of Powanghur, and the fort and district of Champaneer, to be retained by the Company.

Article 12th. All other districts in Guzerat belonging to Scindiah, within distance of the sea, to be ceded to the Company.

Article 13th. The fortress of Ahmednuggur, with the territory dependent thereon, to be ceded to the Peishwa.

Article 14th. All territories belonging to Scindiah, situated to the southward and eastward of the Adjuntee hills, including the fort and district of Jalnapore, and all districts in which Scindiah may have exercised a joint right with the Soubadar of the Deccan, to collect the revenues to be ceded to the Soubadar of the Deccan.

Article 15th. Scindiah to renounce all claim of Choute, of whatever denomination, on the Soubadar of the Deccan, and all allies of the British Government.

Article 16th. Scindiah to renounce all claims, of whatever denomination, upon the Nizam, the Peishwa, the Guickowar, and all allies of the Company.

Article 17th. Scindiah to dismiss from his service all Europeans now entertained therein, and never to entertain any European in his service without the express consent of the British Government.

Article 18th. Scindiah never to entertain in his service any native subject of the British Government without the express permission of the British Government.

Article 19th. The British Government and Scindiah constantly to maintain Resident Envoys at their respective Durbars, for the preservation of mutual good understanding.

Article 20th. The fort of Asseerghur, and the city of Boorhaunpore, with all the territories dependent thereon in Candeish, to be restored to Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

Article 21st. The district of Godra to be restored to Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

Article 22d. All territories and possessions conquered from Dowlut Rao Scindiah in Malwa and Candeish, to the northward of the Taptee, to be restored to Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

Article 23d. All territories and possessions belonging to the Peishwa in Malwa or Candeish, to the northward of the Taptee, to be ceded to Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

47. This plan provides effectually for every object of security against the power of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and it is my earnest desire that an effort should be made to obtain all these conditions, unless Scindiah can be induced to accede to a subsidiary alliance with the Company. If Scindiah should object to such an alliance, it will then be necessary to consider the ultimate terms which must be required from Scindiah, at the hazard of continuing the war.

48. In stating these terms, the most clear method will be to refer to plan (A), marking such articles as must be maintained without alteration by letter (B), and stating such modifications as are admissible in any article respectively.

SECOND PLAN (B).

Article 1st (*a a*), and 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th.

Article 11th. The fortress of Powanghur, and the fort and district of Champaneer, to be restored to Scindiah.

Article 12th (B).

Article 13th. The fort of Ahmednuggur, and a territory depending thereon, amounting to , to be retained by the Peishwa. The remaining territory of Ahmednuggur to be restored to Scindiah, under an engagement that Scindiah shall never maintain in that district a military force beyond the amount of , or beyond the amount necessary for the collection of the revenue and the maintenance of the police of the country.

Article 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th, 21st, and 22d.

Article 23d. This article may probably be omitted if the restitutions stated in the preceding articles be made to Scindiah. This article, however, might perhaps be received by Scindiah as a compensation for the retention of the territory in the vicinity of Baroach and on the sea-coast, as specified in articles 10th and 12th of this plan.

49. This plan (B), differs from your propositions in article 4th, which stipulates for the cession of the territories held by Ambajee, and for the independence of Ambajee, in the articles 10th and 12th, respecting the retention of the territory of Baroach, and of Scindiah's maritime possessions in Guzerat, and in article 13th, which imposes restrictions upon the

amount of the force to be maintained by Scindiah in the district of Ahmednuggur. Articles 17th, 18th, and 19th, are also additions to your propositions. The independence of Ambajee, and the arrangements of the territory held by him, have probably been guaranteed already by the Commander-in-chief. This article, therefore, will not admit of alteration.

50. The admission of Scindiah into any part of the district of Guzerat is extremely objectionable. If it be practicable, it would tend much to the stability of the peace to exclude Scindiah altogether from all intermixture with the territories of our allies. The same reasoning applies with additional force against the restitution of any part of the territory of Ahmednuggur. The restoration of any portion of Scindiah's authority in a possession so contiguous to Poonah and to the frontier of the Nizam ought to be avoided.

51. The restitution of Powanghur, Champaneer and Godra, appears to be less dangerous than any other restitution proposed in Guzerat. The absolute exclusion of Scindiah from any maritime possession appears to me to be indispensable.

52. Your reasoning respecting the fort of Asseerghur and the city of Boorhaunpore is perfectly satisfactory.

53. The articles 17th and 18th, respecting the exclusion from Scindiah's service of all European officers and British subjects, European or native, are indispensable.

54. The 19th article respecting the residence of envoys is also absolutely necessary.

55. The alterations which I have made upon your propositions appear to me to be extremely desirable, if not absolutely necessary for our security against Scindiah.

56. You will, however, be more competent to form a correct view of many details of this subject, than it is possible for me to take at this distance. You can also ascertain correctly the precise degree in which Scindiah's means of continuing the war have been reduced by our success; and therefore, although my judgment would incline me to apprehend danger from any concession beyond the limits of this plan (B), I authorize you to exercise your discretion in changing or modifying any of the articles (excepting articles 4th, 17th, 18th, and 19th), bearing in mind, however, the general tenor and spirit of my instructions.

57. In my opinion, the terms of peace granted to Scin-

diah by this plan (B), are not only just and equitable, but liberal, considered with reference to the relative situation of the belligerent powers.

58. The principal objects to be observed in the conditions of peace with Scindiah, should be to limit his military power and resources, and to preclude his intercourse with France, his interference with our allies and dependants, and his resumption of the means of menacing our frontier, and of disturbing the internal tranquillity of our dominions.

59. If Scindiah should conclude a treaty of peace with the British Government upon the basis of a subsidiary alliance, and should enter with sincerity into that alliance, I should feel no difficulty in conceding every point stated in your propositions, as far as they respect restitution of territory.

60. The articles (4th, 17th, 18th, and 19th) of the two preceding plans admit of no change or modification.

61. In order to render this division of the subject entirely distinct, I have thought it proper to enumerate the several articles of a treaty under this plan.

62. All articles of plan (B) to be retained in this treaty without alteration, will be marked (C), and any admissible alterations or modifications will be stated under such articles as are to be allowed or modified.

THIRD PLAN (C).

Articles 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, and 9th.

Article 10th to be modified according to your proposition, retaining only the fortress and city of Baroach, with an adequate territory.

Article 11th as in plans (B) and (C).

Article 12th in plans (A) and (B) to be omitted.

Article 13th. The fortress only of Ahmednuggur, with a sufficient territory, to be retained.

Articles 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th, 21st, and 22d.

Article 23d. It would be desirable to effect an exchange of the Peishwa's territories in Malwa and Candeish, northward of the Taptee, for the districts of Ahmednuggur; and if those territories in Malwa and Candeish should not prove an adequate compensation to Scindiah, an endeavour must be made to compensate to him by a further arrangement. Perhaps, however, the determination which I now proceed to state, may appear to furnish adequate compensation for any difference between the value of the districts of Ahmednuggur and those which the Peishwa may cede to Scindiah in Malwa and Candeish.

If Scindiah should agree to accept a subsidiary force

of the amount of that stationed at Hyderabad, I would require no other assignment of territory, or of other funds for the payment of the subsidy, than that comprehended in the articles of the treaty proposed in this plan (C).

63. In this event you will annex the subsidiary engagements on the part of the British Government to the articles already stated, omitting any assignment of territory or of other funds for the payment of the subsidy on the part of Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

64. As it is possible, however, that it may be satisfactory to Dowlut Rao Scindiah to assign by the terms of the treaty, in the form of security for the payment of the subsidy, the whole or part of the territories required to be ceded to the British Government by the preceding articles, I authorize you to accede to any such proposition on the part of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, provided the cession of all such territory shall contain a complete renunciation of all right or claim of sovereignty or authority on the part of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and an acknowledgement of the perpetual rights of sovereignty of the British Government over such territory to the extent in which Scindiah may possess the right or power of ceding or acknowledging such perpetual sovereignty.

65. In the present condition of Scindiah's affairs, it is not improbable that he may be inclined to seek the protection of a subsidiary force of British troops, from which alone he can now expect to derive effectual support against Holkar, or even the means of maintaining himself against the tributaries and dependants which will remain nominally annexed to his dominions at the close of the war.

66. As the preceding observations contain every instruction necessary to enable you to negociate and conclude peace with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and as you have already received the notification of the concessions to be required from the Rajah of Berar, I shall despatch this letter, reserving for future consideration such instructions as may appear to me to be necessary to regulate the partition of our conquests with the allies, and to complete the system of a general pacification of the native powers of Hindostan and the Deccan.

67. In reviewing this despatch, I perceive that I have not noticed an omission in the plan of peace with Scindiah contained in your despatch of the 11th of November. That

omission is supplied in article 8th of each of the three plans (A), (B), (C); and as the substance of that article was brought under your particular consideration by the notes despatched to you on the 26th of October, I am satisfied that this subject will engage your attention in the negociation of peace with any of the belligerent powers.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

*Note to explain the intention of Articles 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th, respecting the exclusion of Scindiah's influence over the petty states in Hindostan.*

Ambajee's territories extend to Seronge, and include Gohud and the district of Kutchwara; yielding, it is stated, thirteen lacs of rupees annually.

Within these territories are the independent chieftains of Kota; Boondee, Raggoghur, (situated between Kota and Seronge); Chandoree, Durteah, Jansi, Calpy, and Narwa.

The other chieftains to be rendered independent of Scindiah, and to be included in the terms of peace, appear to be—

I. The Seiks. II. 1. Jypore. 2. Joudpoor. 3. Oudipoor. 4. Petty chiefship of Kerowlee. *Rajpoots*, 5. Petty chiefship of Kishenghur near Ajmere. 6. The chief of Macherry, called the Rao Rajah, whose capital is Alwar, and with whom a treaty has been concluded by General Lake. 7. The district of Beykaneer; and 8. Generally all territories lying to the northward of Oudipoor, Kutchwara (Ambajee's district which is to be included,) and Behut, so as to include the passes in that quarter leading into Hindostan.

III. The Jauts, the principal of whom are the Rana of Gohud, and the Bhurtpoor Rajah, with the latter of whom a treaty has already been concluded by General Lake.

IV. The districts of Bundelcund, Bogglecund, Bopaul, Gurrah, Chundail, Sohagpoor, Chohan, Billounja, Singrowla.

Some petty chieftains may have been omitted in this list, but General Wellesley is recommended to call upon Lieut.-Colonel Reynold, who possesses the most accurate information with regard to the province of Malwa and the countries in its vicinity.

*Note to be added to the 8th Article.*

This line will be understood by a reference to Rennel's Map of Hindostan. The states to be included in the terms of peace are all situated to the northward of a line drawn from Joodpoor to Beehut, a town on the western extremity of Bundelcund. Provision should also be made for excluding Scindiah altogether from any connection with the chiefs occupying the provinces of Bundelcund and Bogglecund, and the districts of Gurrah, Sohagpoor, Chundail, Chohan, Billounja, and Singrowla.

## No. CL.

*Lord William Bentinck to the Marquess Wellesley.*

(Private.)

My Lord, Fort St. George, Dec. 14, 1803.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's very flattering letter of the 19th November. The sentiments of approbation which your Lordship has had the kindness to express upon my opinions respecting the various points of Lieut.-Colonel Hoghton's communication, have been highly gratifying to me. I trust that my future conduct will correspond with the principles which I have professed. I mistake my own feelings if I am not as anxious as I ought to be to conduct the affairs of this government upon the honourable system adopted by my predecessor, and to maintain untarnished, as far as depends upon my humble endeavours, the national character so extraordinarily exalted under your Lordship's auspices.

In the French intercepted correspondence which I had the honour of forwarding some days ago, a Monsieur Collin states himself to be a secret agent of the French at Pondicherry. He is represented to be a man of ability, with a great disposition to intrigue. I directed the commanding officer at Pondicherry to arrest him, to point out to him that he could be considered in no other situation than that of a spy, and that he became liable to capital punishment as established by the general usage of all nations in such cases; that his only hope of pardon must arise from an unreserved disclosure of the views and projects of the French. He was very intimate with General Binot, and some despatches which were received from the Isle of France a day or two before the departure of the *cartel* from Pondicherry were, I understand, opened in his presence. He has pretended entire ignorance upon all the subjects upon which he has been interrogated. I have ordered him to be sent to the Presidency, and when he perceives a determination to proceed to extremities, I have no doubt of his giving some interesting information. Both Monsieur Collin and Ragapa positively deny the fact (asserted in the letter of the latter to General Binot)

of communication having been made from the native powers to the French.

I have the satisfaction of informing your Lordship, that from a private letter received from the Collector in Malabar, there is every reason to hope that the insurrection in that province will soon be entirely quelled. The princes of the Pyche family, who lately made their escape from Cannanore, have made offers to surrender themselves. It is understood that their uncle, the Pyche Rajah, is also desirous of giving himself up. Tranquillity never can be established as long as that rebel remains at large. The people are every day bringing in their arms.

I have the honour to be,
with the greatest respect, my Lord,
your Lordship's most obedient servant,
W. BENTINCK.

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## No. CLI.

*The Hon. Major-General Wellesley to the Marquess Wellesley.*

Camp at Deogaum, Dec. 15, 1803.
[Received Jan. 24, 1804.]

MY LORD,

After the battle of Argaum, I determined to lose no time in commencing the siege of Gawilghur, and accordingly marched on, and arrived at Elichpoor on the 5th instant with both divisions, and halted on the 6th, in order to establish an hospital for the wounded in the battle at Argaum.

The fort of Gawilghur is situated in a range of mountains between the sources of the rivers Poonah and Taptee. It stands on a lofty mountain in this range, and consists of one complete inner fort, which fronts to the south, where the rock is most steep, and an outer fort, which covers the inner to the north-west and north. This outer fort has a third wall, which covers the approach to it from the north by the village of Labada. All these walls are strongly built, and fortified by ramparts and towers.

The communications with the fort are through three gates: one to the south with the inner fort; one to the north-west with the outer fort; and one to the north with the third wall. The ascent to the first is very long and steep, and is prac-

ticable only for men; that to the second is by a road, used for the common communications of the garrison with the countries to the southward; but the road passes round the west side of the fort, and is exposed for a great distance to its fire: it is so narrow as to make it impracticable to approach regularly by it, and the rock is scarped on each side. This road also leads no further than the gate.

The communication with the northern gate is direct from the village of Labada, and here the ground is level with that of the fort; but the road to Labada leads through the mountains for about thirty miles from Elichpoor, and it was obvious, that the difficulty and labour of moving ordnance and stores to Labada would be very great.

However, after making enquiry at Elichpoor, it appeared both to Colonel Stevenson and me, that this point of attack was, upon the whole, the most advantageous, and we accordingly adopted it.

Colonel Stevenson had equipped his corps at Asseerghur for the siege of Gawilghur, for which service it had long been destined; and I therefore determined that he should make the principal attack by Labada; while I should cover his operations, with my own division and all the cavalry, and, if possible, assist them by other attacks to the southward and westward.

On the 6th instant, the 1st battalion 2d regiment under Lieut.-Colonel Chalmers, and two companies of the 94th, and the 1st of the 6th under Captain Maitland, were detached; the former, to drive in the enemy from the ground which they occupied to the southward of the fort, and the latter, to seize the fortified village of Damergaum, which covers the entrance of the mountains, by the road by which Colonel Stevenson was to pass towards Labada, and to protect the parties sent forward to reconnoitre and repair the roads in the mountains. Both these detachments succeeded.

On the 7th, both divisions marched from Elichpoor; Colonel Stevenson, into the mountains by Damergaum, and my division, towards the southern face of the fort of Gawilghur. From that day till the 12th, on which Colonel Stevenson broke ground near Labada, the troops in his division went through a series of laborious services, such as I never before witnessed, with the utmost cheerfulness and perseverance.

The heavy ordnance and stores were dragged by hand over mountains, and through ravines for nearly the whole distance, by roads which it had been previously necessary for the troops to make for themselves.

On the 12th at night, Colonel Stevenson erected two batteries in front of the north face of the fort; one, consisting of two iron 18 pounders, and three iron 12 pounders, to breach the outer fort and third wall; and one, consisting of two brass 12 pounders and two 5½ inch howitzers, to clear and destroy the defences on the point of attack.

On the same night the troops of my division constructed a battery for two iron and two brass 12 pounders on the mountain under the southern gate; with a view, if possible, to breach the wall near that gate, or, at all events, to draw the enemy's attention to that quarter. Unfortunately, the iron guns could not be moved into the battery, notwithstanding the utmost exertions of the troops; and the fire of the brass guns produced but little effect.

The fire of all these batteries opened on the 13th, in the morning; and on the 14th, at night, the breaches in the walls of the outer fort were practicable. All the arrangements were made for storming on this day. Lieut.-Colonel Kenny, of the 11th regiment, commanded the party for the storm, consisting of the flank companies of the 94th regiment, and of the native corps in Colonel Stevenson's division, supported by the 94th regiment, and Lieut.-Colonel Halyburton's brigade, with Lieut.-Colonel Macleane's brigade in a reserve. At the same hour, I made two attacks from the southward, to draw the enemy's attention to this quarter. One, under Lieut.-Colonel Wallace, consisting of the 74th regiment, five companies of the 78th, and the 1st battalion 8th regiment, on the southern gate; and one, under Lieut.-Colonel Chalmers, consisting of five companies of the 78th, and the 1st battalion 10th regiment, on the north-west gate. These last attacks could be of no service, excepting to draw the enemy's attention from that from the north; unless they should succeed in blowing open the gates; till they should communicate with detachments from Colonel Stephenson's corps, as they had no other means of entering the fort. All the troops advanced at about ten in the morning. The detachment under Lieut.-Colonel Chalmers arrived at the north-west gate, at the moment when

the enemy were endeavouring to escape through it, from the detachment of Colonel Stevenson's corps, which had been sent to communicate with Colonel Chalmers, and he entered without difficulty.

The wall of the inner fort, in which no breach had been made, was then to be carried. After some attempts upon the gate of communication between the inner and outer fort, a place was found, at which it was possible to escalade the wall. Captain Campbell, with the light infantry of the 94th regiment, fixed the ladders against this place, escaladed the wall, opened the gate for the storming party, and the fort was shortly in our possession.

The enemy's garrison was numerous. It consisted of Rajepoots, and of a great part of Beny Sing's regular infantry, which had escaped from the battle of Argaum, commanded by Beny Sing himself. They were all well armed with Company's new muskets and bayonets. Vast numbers of them were killed, particularly at the different gates.

This service has been performed, I hope, with small loss on our side. No officer has been killed, and none wounded that I have heard of, excepting Lieut.-Colonel Kenny of the 11th regiment, and Lieutenant Young of the 2d, 7th.

In the performance of this service all the good qualities of British troops have been conspicuous, to a degree which I have seldom witnessed. In bringing on their ordnance and stores to the point of attack, the troops of Colonel Stevenson's division performed the most laborious work, with a zeal for the service, and patience and perseverance never surpassed; and when opposed to the enemy, their conduct shewed the same gallant spirit that has carried the British troops through so many difficulties in the course of this war.

I am particularly indebted to Colonel Stevenson, for the manner in which he conducted the service entrusted to him, from the moment of his march from Elichpoor to that of the capture of Gawilghur; to Lieut.-Colonel Kenny, for the manner in which he led on the storming party; to Captain Campbell and the light infantry of the 94th regiment, for the escalade of the inner fort; to Major Campbell and the 94th regiment, and to Lieut.-Colonel Halyburton and his brigade, which troops supported the attack.

Captain Burke, who commanded the artillery with the sub-

sidiary force, and Captain Heitland of the pioneers, and Captain Johnson of the Bombay engineers, are also entitled to my acknowledgements. The two latter were sent from my division to assist Colonel Stevenson. Upon the occasion of mentioning the name of Captain Johnson, I cannot omit to inform your Excellency, that throughout this campaign that officer has performed the most important service in the department of the guides entrusted to his charge; and I have no doubt but that his surveys will be a valuable public acquisition.

Although the most laborious, and the most brilliant part of this service did not fall to the lot of the troops of my division, I have to apprize your Excellency that they performed that part allotted to them in a manner perfectly satisfactory to me; and Lieut.-Colonel Wallace and Lieut.-Colonel Chalmers, and Captain Beauman, commanding the artillery, have received my thanks, for the manner in which the two former led their divisions to the attack, and the latter exerted himself, to forward the service of his department.

I shall hereafter have the honour of transmitting to your Excellency, lists of the killed and wounded, and returns of the ordnance and property captured in the fort.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,
with the greatest respect,
your Excellency's most obedient and
faithful humble servant,
ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

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## No. CLII.

*Lord Castlereagh to the Marquess Wellesley.*

(Most Secret.)

London, 23d June, 1803.

MY DEAR LORD, [Received 15th December, 1803.]

You will receive by the present conveyance the declaration of hostilities against the Batavian Republic, an event necessarily foreseen. The offer of neutrality has cost us nothing, and has had its effect I understand in Holland. However small the probability is of a speedy termination of the war, I am persuaded your Lordship will feel the importance of losing

no time in getting possession of Cochin, with a view of securing the demolition of its works against every contingency.

Hitherto the war has been productive of no event, except the occupation of Hanover. The captures have been unusually numerous by our cruizers, considering the extent of the enemy's commerce. The moment was seasonably chosen for bringing the question to an issue, much of their trade being at sea.

Nothing can exceed the spirit of the nation, as well as of the parliament, on the subject of the war. The degree of concurrence is far beyond what could have been hoped for, and the only difficulty government has to contend against in either house is, the charge of not calling even more largely on the resources of the country.

You will perceive that the financial arrangements go beyond what I ventured to hint in a former letter. The budget of thirteen millions is in progress, with every prospect of being carried through with a very slight resistance. If we can accomplish that great desideratum of providing even in war against the accumulation of debt, it will place us indeed on high ground. I trust your Lordship will carry the principle a step further in India, by paying off debt during the contest.

The plan of raising 50,000 men to be officered by officers of the line is in progress. When this army is raised, we shall then have at home 50,000 regulars, 90,000 militia, and 50,000 of this description of force, which will be applicable to the defence of either island, in all 190,000 men, exclusive of yeomanry, and local levies of a more irregular class which will be carried to a considerable extent. It is also hoped that a draft for the line from the other descriptions of force may be obtained, so as to complete the regular army. This will encrease our line at home to 70,000, which will give us a disposable force of at least 40,000, without weakening internal defence improvidently.

I have sent to the Court a despatch on the subject of the College, with respect to which I understand a representation is to be made to the Board. I propose delaying the departure of the overland express for some days, with a view of transmitting our proceedings, together with my own sentiments to your Lordship on this subject.

Lord St. Vincent is preparing three sail of the line to re-

inforce your Indian squadron, and hopes to despatch them soon. I have requested a number of frigates, as it is of the utmost importance that you should be secured by numerous cruizers against the depredations which the enemy will attempt against the commerce.

It affords me the highest satisfaction to observe that your Lordship's decision was taken to remain in India, during the present critical circumstances of affairs. I trust your devotion to the public service will be rewarded by bringing the Mahratta differences to a termination the most satisfactory to our interests, after which I am sanguine enough to hope, that the present war may pass over without a shot being fired in India.

Believe me, my dear Lord,
Ever most sincerely yours,
CASTLEREAGH.

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## No. CLIII.

*The Marquess Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh.*

MY DEAR LORD, Fort William, Dec. 15th, 1803.

Your Lordship has been already apprized of the motives which had induced me to continue in this government beyond the period of the month of January 1803, with a view to the important crisis of affairs which had occurred in the Mahratta empire. Subsequent events have proved that I was not mistaken with regard to the importance of that crisis, and to the nature of my public duties as connected with it.

I received with great satisfaction the determination of his Majesty's ministers, and the Court of Directors upon the late settlement of the Carnatic.

Your Lordship and the public being in full possession of the information upon which my decision respecting the affairs of the Carnatic was formed, I entertain no doubt that a correct judgment will be delivered upon the issue of any public discussion relative to that settlement. Having exercised my judgment upon the question to the best of my ability, my duty appears to me to be completely discharged, and I retain no further solicitude upon the subject than that

such an arrangement of the affairs of the Carnatic as may appear to Parliament to be just, wise, and honourable, may be secured upon permanent foundations.

Your Lordship's superior understanding, and your high sense of the public interests and honour, have already led you to draw a just conclusion from the transactions in the Carnatic; and I am satisfied that your sentiments on that subject will be confirmed by further deliberation, and will be maintained with the ability and energy, which have always distinguished your public opinions.

The act of 1793 declares, that the "pursuit of schemes of conquest and extension of dominion in India, is repugnant to the wish, the honour, and policy of the nation." This declatory preamble introduces the regulation of preventing the commencement of hostilities in India, in the conclusion of treaties of guarantee involving the contingency of war, without the express command and authority of the Court of Directors, or of the Secret Committee.

No inference can be drawn from the letter or spirit of the act of 1793, to preclude the extension of the British territories in India, by just and legitimate means, unconnected with schemes of conquest and irregular ambition.

The extension of territory which followed the conquest of Mysore in 1799, might otherwise have been condemned on similar grounds. That conquest as the result of a just and necessary war, and the transfer of the enemy's dominions to our authority, although involving considerable extension of territory, was never deemed for that reason to be inconsistent with the policy of the act of 1793, but was declared to be justified by the same principles which had justified the commencement of the war.

With the Nabob of the Carnatic, and with the Rājah of Tanjore subsidiary engagements were concluded by Lord Cornwallis in 1792, which eventually stipulated for a considerable extension of the territory of the Company, in the contingency of ultimate failure on the part of those princes in the regular payment of the subsidy; but it never yet has been contended that in the event of such failure, it would have been inconsistent with the policy of the act of 1793, to have insisted upon the right of the Company to demand the execution of those articles of the respective subsidiary trea-

ties, which either in direct terms or by manifest implication entitled the Company to an extension of territory in commutation of the subsidiary payments.

The Company on various occasions, with the authority of his Majesty, has expressed great anxiety to commute the subsidies of the Carnatic, and Tanjore, for adequate territorial security. It never has occurred until the present moment, to represent such a commutation as in any degree repugnant to the wish, the honour, or policy of the nation, or to the letter or spirit of the acts of regulation.

On my arrival in India in April 1798, I endeavoured in conformity to my original instructions from the Court of Directors, to obtain a commutation of this nature in the Carnatic. Your Lordship is apprized of my repeated and anxious efforts to effect this object, and you are also informed that in pursuing it I followed the steps of Lord Hobart's government, which had proceeded also under the commands of the Court of Directors.

Lord Hobart and I were equally unsuccessful, but our efforts have received the most unequivocal and frequent testimonies of public and official approbation, nor was an attempt ever hazarded to represent our endeavours for the improvement of the subsisting subsidiary engagements of the Company in the Carnatic, as a systematic violation of the act of 1793; although the success of those endeavours must have been accompanied by an extension of the territory of the Company in India.

In the settlement of Mysore upon concluding subsidiary engagements with the Rajah of Mysore, I have already declared in my letter of the 3d of August 1799, to the Court of Directors, that my express purpose was to facilitate the direct control of the Company over the whole territory of Mysore, with a view to the more effectual security of the subsidy. In fact, the territory governed in the name of the Rajah was actually annexed to the Company's dominion, by that article of the subsidiary treaty of Seringapatam, which empowers the Company at any time to assume the direct management of the whole country.* But this treaty has not yet been quoted to prove the existence of a systematic plan

* This has recently been done under the sanction of the home authorities.—[*Ed.*]

of territorial acquisition inconsistent with the policy of the act of 1793.

In Tanjore, I effected in the year 1800, a commutation of subsidy founded on the spirit of my original instructions respecting the Carnatic, and accordingly the territory of Tanjore was annexed to the Company's possessions.

In the year 1800, a new treaty of subsidy was formed with the Nizam; adverting to the uniform policy pursued by the Company since the act of 1793, to the tenor of my instructions respecting the Carnatic, and to my experience of the evils resulting frem the existing systems of subsidy in Oude and the Carnatic, I formed the subsidiary treaty with the Nizam upon the principle of obtaining territorial security for the payment of the subsidy, instead of depending for the safety of those funds on the precarious power, and imperfect administration of an Indian government.

The new treaties with the Rajah of Tanjore, and with the Nizam, have not hitherto been arraigned on the grounds recently stated.

The treaties of Surat, and the treaties with the Guikowar, were founded on similar principles with those of Tanjore and Hyderabad, substituting territorial security for an engagement to pay the amount of the subsidy from the treasury of the state. The right to conclude a subsidiary engagement with the Guikowar was derived from that stipulation of the treaty of Salbye, which constitutes the Company to be the guarantee of the succession and government of the Guikowar state.

The new subsidiary treaty concluded with the Nabob of Oude in November 1801, rested on the same foundations, and effected a commutation of all the Nabob Vizier's engagements with respect to subsidy and aid in war, for a cession of territory.

The treaty of Bassein recently concluded with the Peishwa proceeds on the same grounds. In renewing the ancient alliance between the Peishwa and the Company, it has constituted that alliance by a subsidiary engagement, and by a territorial cession formed upon the improved plan of policy repeatedly sanctioned by the authority of his Majesty, and of the East India Company, and already effected with other dependent states, in preference to that defective scheme of

subsidiary alliance which had produced innumerable evils in various parts of our dependencies in India, which for many years had constituted an annual theme of lamentation for all the governments in India, and for the honourable Court of Directors, and the policy of which appeared to have been exploded by the deliberate wisdom and long experience of that sage body.

The transfer of the civil and military government of the Carnatic to the Company, was warranted by the justice and necessity of that proceeding, founded upon the forfeiture incurred by Mahomed Ali, and Omdut ul Omra, and upon the dangers which menaced the security of the Company's rights on the coast of Coromandel, in consequence of the treachery of those faithless and abandoned characters. The justification of this proceeding rests upon principles similar to those by which war is justifiable against any public enemy, and the extension of territory which accompanied the prosecution of a just and legitimate public right, cannot be condemned upon any principles correctly derived from the act of 1793.

In prosecuting the just rights of the Company against the Nabob of the Carnatic, I resorted to my original instructions respecting the Carnatic; and I framed the new settlement with reference to the acknowledged expediency of effecting commutation of the subsidy for territorial security, and of rescuing the Carnatic from the evils of divided government and conflicting power, by establishing over that province one distinct authority in the hands of the Company, with a liberal provision for the Nabob and his family. I am at a loss to comprehend the application of the act of 1793, to any part of this transaction.

The acquisitions of territory which have been accomplished in India during my administration, have proceeded either from the successful prosecution of war, or from forfeiture in consequence of the violation of dependent alliances, or lastly from the improvement of existing, or the formation of new treaties of subsidy and guarantee. The first description includes those provinces and possessions of Tippoo Sultaun, retained by the Company under the partition treaty of Mysore. The second description consists of the possessions of Omdut ul Omra in the Carnatic; and the last com-

prehends the territories commuted for subsidy by the Rajah of Tanjore, by the Nizam, and by the Nabob of Oude, and the territories ceded in payment of subsidy by the Nabob of Surat, by the Guikowar, and ultimately by the Peishwa.

The records of the Company will furnish your Lordship with sufficient evidence that every extension of territory acquired under each of these classes, has originated in principles not only strictly conformable to the act of 1793, but to the general maxims of justice and policy, applicable to our Indian empire.

No extension of territory has been acquired otherwise than by the prosecution of just and necessary war, or of just and legitimate public right; the result of these acquisitions has not involved the necessity of defending any territory, which had not previously furnished increased means of offensive war to our enemies, or which we were not previously bound to defend either by the obligation of positive treaty, or of our own manifest interest. Our means of defence in every case are now greatly augmented, by the annexation of the civil and military government of the territories, from which we derive the military resource applicable to defray the charge of their respective protection and security.

With regard to the question of the floating debts of the Nabob of the Carnatic, I have already intimated my opinion to Mr. Addington, as far as it appeared to me proper to offer any opinion, while the settlement of the Carnatic remains in suspense in Parliament, after a public notification of an intention to subject that settlement to the result of a parliamentary enquiry.

I trust that your Lordship will not recognize any part of the Nabob's unconsolidated debt, without previous investigation under the authority of the legislature. When that authority shall have been furnished, I shall be fully prepared to offer my sentiments on every branch of the subject.

In the meanwhile I have the honour to enclose for your Lordship's notice, extracts of the opinions which I have already communicated to Mr. Addington in a private letter.*

I cannot suppose that the condition of the Company with

* Private and confidential letter to Mr. Addington, dated February 12th, 1803 (see Introduction.)

relation to any part of its territorial possessions in India, can be considered to be similar to that of a private individual proprietor of a landed estate. The Company with relation to its territory in India, must be viewed in the capacity of a sovereign power. If any other principle be recognized, and the Company be permitted to hold the nominal sovereignty of India, endless confusion must ensue; in such an extremity no possible remedy could save this country from anarchy and ruin, but the instantaneous assumption of the direct executive power of the British possessions in India, by the Crown of the United Kingdom.

If any accommodation with the Nabob's creditors should be attempted, it appears to me that the proposition which I offered to the Nabob Omdut ul Omra, in my letter of the 24th of April 1799, would form an eligible basis of such an arrangement. But in the present circumstances, it would not be advisable to recognize any part of the debt, without previous enquiry under authority from Parliament to the Court of Directors, and from the Court of Directors to the Government General.

Your Lordship's observations respecting the settlement of Oude, and the conduct of Mr. Henry Wellesley in the negotiation of the treaty with the Vizier, and in the superintendance of the provincial government of that country, have afforded me the highest satisfaction. On this subject your Lordship has received such ample details by the *Swallow* packet, as preclude the necessity of any further remark from me.

It has been a matter of great surprize as well as of considerable satisfaction to me to have found myself enabled within so short a space of time to establish the regular civil authority of the Company, in a country of which the disorderly and lawless state under the government of our ally the Vizier had long afforded occupation to the main body of the army of Bengal; I should have deemed it a reasonable compromise for the Court of Directors, to have secured the settlement of the country, and the regular introduction of their civil servants at the expiration of a military commission of the duration of five or seven years.

I feel however considerable pleasure in assuring your Lordship, that although the tranquillity of that province is

not yet completely secured, and although the final settlement of the Doab may hereafter require the employment of authority, great advantages have been derived in the prosecution of the present war, from the improvements already accomplished in the state of Oude, under the operation of the commission over which Mr. Henry Wellesley presided.

With regard to the policy and justice of the treaty of Lucknow, and to the recent settlement of Oude, your Lordship's letter (to which I have now the honour to reply) expresses a sanguine hope that I shall receive the approbation of the honourable Court. On this question, as on the subject of the Carnatic, my duty has been completely discharged, by applying the most assiduous exertion of my judgment to the formation of a settlement on principles which appear to me to be just, expedient, and desirable, and by submitting to the Court of Directors the grounds of my decision. I entertain no further anxiety on any part of this question, than that the public interests in Oude should be saved for my country; and if the honourable Court should be pleased to condemn the arrangements by which I have saved those interests from ruin, I trust that the wisdom and justice of that body will amend my errors, and reform the present government of the ceded provinces.

My correspondence with the Secret Committee upon the subject of Finance, embraces every point stated by your Lordship upon that important question. No doubt can exist that if the prime cost of investment in India be regularly supplied with bullion from Europe for a few years, every object in your Lordship's contemplation will be fully secured.

War with France, unless extended to India by active operations of the French will not materially retard the progress of your Lordship's plan for the reduction of the debt.

War in India must be expected to produce a temporary delay. The war in which we are now engaged has however been attended with so large and immediate an increase of revenue, that I trust our accounts at the close of the year will appear highly favourable; and as an early peace may be expected on terms of considerable advantage, and of permanent duration, the ultimate result of your Lordship's plan for the reduction of the debt will I trust, be rather accelerated than retarded by the events of the present war.

I cannot close this letter without repeating to your Lordship the sincere expressions of my high respect, and entire confidence. It is due to that confidence to apprize your Lordship, that you will find the primary object of all my views to be, the success of your Lordship's just, and wise plans for the prosperity and honour of this empire.

I have the honour to be,
with great respect and regard,
my dear Lord,
always yours most faithfully,
WELLESLEY.

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## No. CLIV.

*Major-General Wellesley to the Marquess Wellesley.*

MY LORD, Camp at Elichpoor, Dec. 17th, 1803.

I have the honour to enclose the English, Mahratta, and Persian copies of a treaty of peace, which I have this day concluded with Jeswunt Rao Ramchunder the vakeel of the Rajah of Berar.*

I have made the treaty in the name of the British Government, and its allies generally, and have engaged that it shall be ratified by your Excellency only. The reasons for omitting to name the allies in the treaty, and to engage that they shall ratify it will become sufficiently obvious, when the character and conduct of the government of these allies will be recollected.

It will remain with your Excellency to give such orders as you may think proper to the Residents at the different Durbars to obtain the assent of the allies to the treaty; but I should imagine that the Rajah of Berar will be satisfied with your Excellency's ratification.

The cesssions under the treaty are made to the British Government and its allies, and I have drawn it in this manner in order that your Excellency may have an opportunity of disposing of them hereafter in such manner as you may think proper. As soon as the Rajah will ratify the treaty, I propose to desire the officers of the Soubadar of the Deccan to take charge of the countries ceded in this quarter, but I shall

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* See Appendix.

request the Resident at Hyderabad to apprize his Highness's minister that, that must be considered only a temporary arrangement, and that all acquisitions must be liable to be disposed of hereafter, when peace will be made with all the powers engaged in the war.

I waited to be able to define more accurately the bounds of the cession of the province of Cuttack, but I had no information upon the subject; Lieutenant-Colonel Harcourt stated his opinion, that it would be convenient if the districts of Sohnpoor and Boad were ceded, besides Cuttack, and Mr. Melville says, that it would be convenient to add to the province of Cuttack countries which would have joined the northern Circars with the province of Bundlecund. But upon a reference to the map which is all the information that I could procure, I found, that even the first would have increased the extent of the demand on that side to such a degree, as to make it necessary to give up a part of what I demanded on this side, or to risk the conclusion of the treaty altogether.

I learn also by a late letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Harcourt, that he has commenced negotiations with the Rajahs of Sohnpoor and Boad, and if he should conclude them by treaties, those districts will be added to the Company's territories under the 10th article of the treaty of peace; if he should not, it is certain that the Company will not have for Cuttack, the boundary for which Lieutenant-Colonel Harcourt wished, but I do not doubt but that that province will have a very good boundary.

By the 3d article the Company and their allies gain on this side, the province of Berar, and the frontier of the Soubadar of the Deccan will be carried to the Wurdah river. The countries thus ceded are an old possession of the Soubadars of the Deccan, the revenues of which have been collected by them and the Rajahs of Berar in different proportions, at different times: when the latter were admitted to a participation of them, they received one-fifth, afterwards a fourth, the half by treaty, and latterly four-fifths by exaction and violence. It appeared to me to be an object of greater importance to get rid of the Rajah of Berar entirely from this fine country, than to secure an additional barrier for Cuttack.

The revenues of Berar on the side of the Wurdah, are

computed to amount to about one crore of rupees. The Rajah had appropriated entirely to himself countries the revenues of which are computed to have been ten lacs of rupees, and the remainder under different treaties was to be divided equally between him and the Soubadar of the Deccan. However, I have reason to believe from the conferences during the negotiations, that the Rajah of Berar never received more than thirty lacs, as his share of the countries on this side of the Wurdah.

Territory of this value was a great object to gain in this quarter, considering the probable circumstances of the peace with Scindiah, but whatever may be the real value of the acquisitions, a great object is gained by defining the frontier of the Rajah towards the Soubadar of the Deccan, and by his renunciation of all claims of every description, not only on the countries ceded, but on the other territories of the Soubadar.

In the course of the conferences in the negotiation, the minutes of which I will have the honour of transmitting as soon as they can be copied, the Rajah's minister declared repeatedly, and I have reason to believe with some truth, that the demands made were of the finest and most valuable parts of his territories.

By the 4th article I have agreed that the Rajah shall have possession of the Forts of Nernullah and Gaweilghur. In fact these forts are of a greater importance to the power which remains in possession of the mountains, than to that which possesses the plains; without these, the Rajah could not have exercised the powers of his government over the Gondwana Rajahs in those mountains, (a race of people who above all others require restraint) and to have given them to the Soubadar of the Deccan would have added nothing to his Highness's power.

I consented to the 5th article, because the districts in the plains immediately under the hills will always be liable to the depredations of the inhabitants of the hills; the loss to the Soubadar's government will be but trifling, in comparison with that which it would incur if the Rajah were not interested as he will now be, to restrain the incursions of the hill people into the plains.

The 7th article provides that the honourable Company are

to arbitrate between the Rajah and the Soubadar of the Deccan, and the Peishwa. The Rajah's minister was desirous that I should consent to confirm all grants and treaties made heretofore by those powers, bnt I refused this on the ground that I would not consent to any thing of which I had no knowledge. I then proposed the mediation and arbitration of the British Government, and its justice as the best security the Rajah could have for his claims upon the Soubadar of the Deccan and the Peishwa, which proposal was accepted.

The territory which the Rajah wished to secure by this demand was the province of Gurry Mundelah, of which he ought to collect the revenues in participation with the Peishwa, but I imagine that he has lately seized the whole for his own use.

At all events it appears to me, to be an important point gained and highly honourable to the character of the British Government, that even its enemies are willing to appeal to its justice, against the demands of its allies.

There was no objection on the part of the Rajah's minister to the 8th or 9th articles of the treaty. The last clause was added to the 8th by his desire, after the treaty had been drawn up.

The 10th article is one of considerable importance; the minister appeared to feel the full extent of the engagements to which it bound the Rajah, and expressed the greatest uneasiness upon the subject. He said, that after ceding Berar and Cuttack, the Rajah had no territories, excepting what he conquered from the Zemindars, Rajahs, &c. and that by this article he might be bound to give up the whole of his territories. I told him that whatever might be the consequence the article was indispensable, and must be agreed to, that peace would not have been agreed to, if the British Government had wished for the destruction of the Rajah's state; and that it certainly was not intended that the article should apply to more cases than were absolutely necessary to preserve the good faith of the British Government, and I promised him that the British government would apply it to as few cases as was possible consistently with an adherence to good faith.

The Vakeel was satisfied with this assurance, which I re-

quested him to convey to the Rajah, as I think it probable that this article will be that to which his Durbar will have the strongest objections.

I had demanded an hostage for the performance of the 10th article of the treaty; but upon considering all the circumstances of the case, it appeared to me that the best security the British government could have would be its strength and continued success, and I therefore determined not to persist in that demand. In giving his answer upon it, the Vakeel said, that the Rajah would send to me whoever I pleased, excepting his brother, his son, or his nephew, who are the only persons whose detention in my camp might possibly be a security against his hostility.

It appeared to me that he would not consent to send any of those persons, and the presence of any other would certainly have been useless. Upon the whole, therefore, I thought it best not to persist in a demand with which he would not comply, and which might have risked the whole treaty.

I hope that your Excellency will approve of, and ratify this treaty. It appears to me to provide for all essential points, at the same time that it leaves the Rajah's government in existence and strength. I should have demanded a sum of money, but I think there is reason to believe that the Rajah of Berar is as poor as the other Mahratta chieftains.

I have written to Mr. Webbe to inform him that I have agreed to this treaty, and to request him to prepare to set out for Nagpore as soon as possible. In the mean time, I propose to send the Hon. Mr. Elphinstone to the Rajah, to act as Resident till the arrival of Mr. Webbe.

In case your Excellency should ratify the treaty, I request that the ratification may be sent to the Resident at Hyderabad, to be forwarded either to Mr. Elphinstone or to Nagpoor, according to circumstances, as I might be at a great distance, and the ratification might not reach the Rajah in the time specified.

Upon the occasion of mentioning Mr. Elphinstone,* it is but

* Mr. Elphinstone was highly distinguished in the College of Fort William, was afterwards an assistant in the Governor-General's office, and has since been Governor of Bombay.—[Ed.]

justice to that gentleman to inform your Excellency, that I have received the greatest assistance from him since he has been with me. He is well versed in the language, has experience and a knowledge of the interests of the Mahratta powers, and their relations with each other, and with the British government and its allies. He has been present in all the actions which have been fought in this quarter during the war, and at the sieges, and is acquainted with every transaction that has taken place, and with my sentiments upon all subjects.

I therefore take the liberty of recommending him to your Excellency.

I have the honour to be, &c.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

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## No. CLV.

*The Marquess Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh.*

MY DEAR LORD, Fort William, December 20th, 1803.

Your Lordship will have perceived by my letter of July, 1803, that, at that period of time, apprehensions were entertained in India, that the force of the French and Dutch in these seas might have proved superior to his Majesty's squadron, in the event of a junction between the French and Batavian forces. At present, however, according to the best information, the strength of the French at Mauritius is confined to the ships stated in the margin.* No positive information has been received of the amount of the Dutch force at Batavia and in the Eastern Seas; but I have reason to believe that it does not exceed the force noted in the margin.†

I have also noted in the margin,‡ for your Lordship's in-

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* *Marengo*, 74 guns; *La Semillante*, 44; *La Belle Poule*, 40; *Le Coté D'Or*, an armed transport; a small corvette, name unknown; *L'Atalante*, 44 guns, lately at Muscat, and at present supposed to be on the Malabar coast.

† At Batavia, 4 ships of 64 guns each, names unknown; these ships are very badly manned, and the crews sickly. At Amboyna, Banda, and Ternate, 2 heavy frigates and 2 corvettes.

‡ Strength and disposition of the naval force under the command of

formation, the strength of his Majesty's squadron, and of the ships armed at Calcutta for the protection of this port.

The proportion of silver hitherto received in India, during the present season, is stated for your Lordship's notice in the margin.*

Your Lordship will remark, in the enclosed account, the great excess of the estimated prime cost of investment in India during the present season, beyond the bullion and other supplies received from England, and also the excess of supplies to China and Ceylon.

Although I am apprehensive that these circumstances, together with the existing war with the Mahratta chiefs, may delay for the present season the progress of your Lordship's plan for the reduction of debt in India, I repeat my entire confidence in the ultimate success of that plan; and I entirely concur with your Lordship in opinion, that, with due exertion at home in the transmission of silver, a reduction of debt may be effected in India, in time of peace with France and with the native powers, to the extent of two millions annually; and in time of war with France, unconnected with hostilities against any native power, to the extent of one million. The latter branch of this calculation indeed appears to me to be extremely moderate; and I am inclined to hope that even in the present year, if we should be enabled, ac-

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Vice-Admiral Rainier. At Bombay and on the Malabar coast:—*Arrogant*, 74 guns, guardship, laid up; *Tremendous*, 74; *Trident*, 64; *Lancaster*, 64; *Centurion*, 50; *St. Fiorenzo*, 40; *Dedaigneuse*, 36; *Fox*, 32; *Albatross*, 18. At Calcutta:—*Buffaloe*, 12 guns, store ship; to return to Norfolk Island. In the Bay of Bengal and in the Straits of Malacca:—*Sheerness*, 44; *Wilhelmina*, 36, armée en flute; *Caroline*, 36; *Concorde*, 36; *Terpsichore*, 32; *Victor*, 18; *Dasher*, 18; *Rattlesnake*, 18, at Prince of Wales Island. Ships armed at Calcutta for the protection of the port:—*Lord Castlereagh*, 48, fitting out; *Lady Castlereagh*, 42; *Teignmouth*, 20; *Waller*, 16; two gun boats to be launched at the end of this month, each to carry four 18-pounder long guns, and eight 18-pounder carronades. The *Bombay* frigate is also employed for the protection of this port.

* Total amount received in India, including charges as late as the 17th of Dec. £492,280; add consignment by the *Princess Mary* not yet received, £100,820; total to be received, £593,100. Total supply from Bengal, 2,45,93,558 S. R.; to be supplied from England, 1,25,99,076 S. R.; excess 1,19,94,482 S. R. to be supplied from Bengal. See detailed memorandum annexed to this despatch.

cording to my expectations, to conclude a peace with the Mahratta chieftains, the final result of our accounts will be satisfactory to your Lordship.

I return your Lordship many thanks for the able and satisfactory statement which you have had the goodness to transmit to me with regard to the causes of the renewal of war with France, and of the state of our preparations, and of the temper of the nation.

Every British spirit must be animated with zeal and determination in the cause in which his Majesty's ministers are now engaged; and your Lordship may rest assured of my entire devotion to that cause, and of my resolution, in whatever situation I may be placed, to contribute every effort within my power to the success of his Majesty's counsels and arms in this great contest.

Your Lordship's expressions with respect to the state of India, have afforded me the most cordial satisfaction; and I assure your Lordship that no human consideration shall ever induce me to abate the ardent zeal of my service in the station which I occupy; nor is there any sacrifice, excepting that of my honour, which I am not prepared to make for the purpose of preserving the interests committed to my charge.

I derived great pleasure from receiving your Lordship's approbation of the subsidiary treaty of Bassein connected with the treaty with the Guikowar; and I am persuaded that you will equally approve the measures which became absolutely necessary for the maintenance of our alliance with the Peishwa against the aggression, violence, and encroaching spirit of two of the Mahratta chieftains.

Although those measures have occasioned the most extensive military operations, and the most severe contest which has ever taken place with any native power in India, I trust that the great work of pacifying India, and of establishing the British dominion on solid foundations is now accomplished. Much expence has been incurred, and many valuable lives have been lost; but the most important additions have been made to the resources, power and glory of this empire.

A temporary interruption has necessarily occurred in the progress of the plan for the reduction of Indian debt; but great advantages have been acquired with a view to the ulti-

mate security of that object; and the ultimate extinction of French influence in India will be viewed by your Lordship with satisfaction.

I am not aware of any stipulation in the treaty of Salbye which could cast a just doubt upon the right of the Guikowar to conclude a treaty of subsidy with the Company without the consent of the Peishwa. The Peishwa's rights in the Guikowar state were expressly reserved.

I have derived great pleasure from the circumstances which have enabled me to subvert the power of the Mahratta chiefs and their French auxiliaries, without any interruption of the Company's commercial investment. Whatever may have been the views of France towards India, I should imagine that the events of the war with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and the Rajah of Berar, must close every rational prospect of disturbing the British empire in the East, provided an adequate military establishment be maintained in a state of efficiency and vigour within these possessions.

In referring to the next paragraph of your Lordship's letter on the subject of the discharge of debt in India during a season of war with France, I can only request your Lordship's notice to the accounts and estimates of the present year, and to the various observations in my several despatches connected with the state of the finances in India.

I entirely concur in the wisdom and justice of the plan proposed by your Lordship for an arrangement with the creditors of the Nabob of the Carnatic. Your Lordship, however, I am persuaded, will establish a due distinction between the assignment of a fund for the payment of the Nabob's debts, and the admission of the several claims.

It will be essential to the due administration of the government in India, that no claims should be admitted without a regular investigation under a competent authority constituted upon principles which shall afford sufficient security against abuse.

Your Lordship's arrangement appears to me to be entirely unexceptionable, if the principle which I have taken the liberty of submitting to your Lordship be duly observed.

The most eligible mode of carrying the plan into execution would be, after the assignment of the fund, to empower the Governor-General in council to nominate a commission for

the purpose of investigating the several claims, and of reporting upon them to the Governor-General in council whose award upon the subject ought to be rendered final.

No other alternative exists, without danger of considerable abuse, unless the whole question could be referred to a committee of the House of Commons. I apprehend that such a committee would prove incompetent to a just decision of the various local questions which would arise under the proposed investigation.

In acknowledging this despatch, I have the honour to refer your Lordship to my despatches to Lord Hobart, by which you will perceive that I have found it necessary to place a garrison in Goa, under the permission of the Viceroy, as the only practicable mode of securing that place from surprize. I trust that this act will not afford a pretext to France for commencing war with Portugal; but I am inclined to expect that the French will not have waited for any such pretext; and your Lordship will remark, that no other measure could have afforded any prospect of saving Goa from France.

I have not yet received the declaration of hostilities against the Batavian Republic; the event, however, was not unexpected.

Your Lordship will observe by my despatch of the 28th October, 1803, to Lord Hobart, that the fortifications of Cochin have been demolished, and that we have retained possession of all the French and Dutch settlements on the continent of India.

I am extremely happy to find that my continuance in India is approved by your Lordship; and I trust that the glorious result of the war with the Mahratta chieftains will preclude the possibility of any contest with France upon the continent of India.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

## No. CLVI.

*The Marquess Wellesley to the King's Most Excellent Majesty.*

Fort William, December 22nd, 1803.*

Lord Wellesley has the honour to submit to your Majesty's gracious consideration a narrative of the recent transactions in India, which have occasioned a war with the confederate Mahratta chiefs, aided by a party of French officers.

The narrative also contains a statement of the military operations conducted under the orders of the Governor-General in council by your Majesty's officers.

In the operations of the war, your Majesty's arms have triumphed in every quarter of India, and the result of a glorious and uninterrupted course of victories has extinguished the last remnant of French influence in India, and has confirmed the stability of the British empire in the East.

In the station which Lord Wellesley holds by your Majesty's royal indulgence and favour, it is his duty to solicit your Majesty's gracious notice to the distinguished merits of such of your Majesty's officers as have principally contributed to accomplish the splendid events of the late campaign in India.

With the most cordial satisfaction and sincere zeal, Lord Wellesley humbly offers to your Majesty an earnest recommendation of the eminent services of General Lake, the Commander-in-Chief of your Majesty's forces. Every loyal subject of the United Kingdom, every heart susceptible of attachment to your Majesty's royal person, family, and government, or to the welfare and glory of your Majesty's empire, must be inspired with the warmest sentiments of admiration and gratitude in contemplating the judgment, skill, and valour displayed by General Lake in conducting the operations of the army in Hindostan.

A particular statement of the services of General Lake is

* The original of this letter was forwarded in the *Belle* packet, in charge of Colonel Nicolson, Aid-de-Camp to Lieut.-Gen. Lake, with directions to deliver it to Mr. Addington. The narrative enclosed was the printed paper, entitled notes on the Mahratta war.—[Ed.]

contained in the printed narrative which Lord Wellesley now submits to your Majesty as an official document, conveying the recorded opinions of the Governor-General in council upon the merits of General Lake.

The near relation which Lord Wellesley bears to Major-General Wellesley cannot exempt the Governor-General of these possessions from the public duty of affording a just testimony of applause to the distinguished services of that able and gallant officer. Lord Wellesley is, therefore, confident that your Majesty will be pleased favorably to accept his humble request that your Majesty will direct your notice to the conduct of Major-General Wellesley, as recorded in the printed narrative of the campaign in the Deccan; in which quarter of India Major-General Wellesley has held the chief command of the troops, with the utmost degree of reputation and honour, during the whole course of the late transactions in the Mahratta empire.

Lord Wellesley, with the most unfeigned sentiments of loyalty, duty, and attachment, requests your Majesty's permission to offer to your Majesty the most zealous congratulations on the brilliant success of your Majesty's arms in this quarter of the globe; and he assures your Majesty that he will employ the most assiduous endeavours to derive from the prosperous issue of the war the most speedy and effectual means of establishing a general and durable pacification, and of augmenting the prosperity, strength, and honour of the British empire in Asia.

WELLESLEY.

## No. CLVII.

*The Marquess Wellesley to the Right Hon. Henry Addington.**

SIR, Fort William, Dec. 23, 1803.

I have the honour to transmit a copy of a printed statement recorded by my authority at Fort William, containing a narrative of the origin, conduct, and actual state of the war, in which I have been compelled to engage with the confederate Mahratta chiefs and their French officers.

* A similar letter was addressed to Lord Hobart.—[ED.]

That statement, together with my despatches to the Court of Directors, and to their Secret Committee, will, I trust, enable you and his Majesty's ministers to pass an early judgment upon my conduct on this important occasion; and it is my anxious wish, unless the public service should appear to you to oppose obstacles to such a discussion, that the justice, necessity, plan, and conduct of the war, together with the comprehensive system of policy which it embraces, should receive the solemn judgment of his Majesty and of Parliament, as soon as the documents now transmitted can be submitted to both houses.

I entertain a confident expectation that the deliberate result of my conscientious opinion on the several important questions which have demanded my decision, and the measures which I have adopted in consequence of that decision, will be sanctioned by the approbation of my sovereign and of my country.

My orders have been executed by the commanders, officers and troops employed in the present glorious campaign in Hindostan and the Deccan with a degree of alacrity, skill, and courage which demands the most unqualified admiration and gratitude. It is my particular duty to recommend to your most distinguished consideration the splendid and valuable services of General Lake, the commander-in-chief in India, whose activity, judgment, professional ability, promptitude, perseverance, and ardent valour, have been the main sources of our unparalleled success in Hindostan; while his integrity, humanity, and generous spirit have engaged the respect and attachment of the conquered provinces, and have augmented the reputation and honour of the British name in India.

To this just testimony of the services of the commander-in-chief in Hindostan, it is my public duty to add the expression of my deliberate judgment upon the conduct of Major-General Wellesley, who commands the British army in the Deccan, opposed to the combined armies of Scindiah, and the Rajah of Berar, under the personal command of those chieftains. From the time of Major-General Wellesley's march from the frontier of Mysore on the 9th of March to the date of his last signal victory on the 29th of November, his success has been uninterrupted and brilliant, and he has secured the most solid advantages to the cause of the allies:

through the entire course of his eminent services in the Deccan, he has displayed all the qualities of a most able, skilful, and gallant officer, together with those principles of justice, honour, and moderation, which are calculated to reflect additional lustre upon the triumphs of our arms, obtained under his personal command.

The detailed statements will inform his Majesty's ministers of the particular services of General Lake at Coel, Alighur, Delhi, Agrah, and Laswaree; and of Major-General Wellesley at Poonah, Ahmednuggur, Assaye, and on the plains of Argaum.

In addition to these military operations, General Lake has rendered the most useful assistance in the deliverance and establishment of the unfortunate emperor Shah Aulum at Delhi, in the settlement of the conquered provinces, and in various negotiations with the chiefs and states on the borders of our north-western frontier, and on the banks of the river Jumna.

Major-General Wellesley has also afforded most essential aid in conducting with the utmost judgment and discretion the restoration of the Peishwa to the supreme authority of the Mahratta empire, in conciliating the southern Mahratta powers, and in maintaining the efficiency of our alliance with the Nizam, as well as in conducting the preliminary negotiations of peace with Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

I have the honour to refer you to the documents transmitted by this conveyance for the recital of the various merits of the officers employed in other branches of the service under the respective commands of General Lake and of Major-General Wellesley.

Lieut.-General Stuart commanding in chief at Fort St. George, has afforded me the most zealous, able, and important co-operation in all the arrangements necessary to the completion of my plans for the campaign in the Deccan. I acknowledge with gratitude the assistance which I have derived from the experience, wisdom, zeal, and public spirit, of that highly distinguished and respectable officer, whose claims upon the approbation of his country, established by a long career of active service, have been augmented by his judicious execution of my orders on this occasion. From the Government of Fort St. George, in the hands of Lord Clive, I re-

ceived the same cordial and honourable support, which distinguished the conduct of that upright, prudent, and zealous public servant in the memorable conquest of Mysore, and in every period of his faithful, exemplary, and brilliant administration of the affairs of Fort St. George. To Lord Clive I am indebted for the seasonable equipment, and for the complete preparation of the excellent army, which, under Major-General Wellesley's command, has accomplished our recent success in the Deccan. His Lordship is also entitled to considerable praise for many of the early arrangements, connected with the position, movement, and supply of that branch of our force. Lord Clive is not responsible in any degree for the origin of the war; but I should be unjust to genuine merit, and to the noble public spirit and indefatigable exertions of the principal civil officer subject to my authority, if I denied to Lord Clive a considerable share in the success of the war; or if I omitted my anxious request, that while the causes of hostilities shall be examined with reference to the conduct of the confederates, and to the authority of the Governor-General in Council exclusively, the government of Fort St. George, and the name of Lord Clive, may be associated with the memory of our triumphs in India.

From Lord William Bentinck, since his Lordship's arrival in India, I have experienced the most cordial and invariable support and co-operation. His Lordship has already manifested considerable judgment and discretion, with great attention and zeal, and a spirit of prompt and cheerful obedience to the authority of this government. In any crisis of difficulty or danger, I rely with confidence on the useful assistance of Lord William Bentinck. I have the honour to request that this communication, together with the documents to which it refers, may be submitted to his Majesty's gracious notice, and I shall anxiously expect to receive the notification of his royal pleasure respecting my conduct, and to be favoured with the early judgment of Parliament.

I have the honour to be,
with the highest respect and esteem, Sir,
your most faithful and obedient servant,
WELLESLEY.

## No. CLVIII.

*The Governor-General in Council to the Honourable the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors.*

HONOURABLE SIRS, Fort William, December 28, 1803.

On the 31st of October, the Governor-General in council had the honour to communicate to your honourable Committee the progress of transactions connected with the operations of the war in which the British Government is engaged with the Rajah of Berar and Dowlut Rao Scindiah, to the latest date of our advices.*

The Governor-General in council has now the honour to continue the narrative of the transactions and operations of the war.

After the glorious victory obtained at Assye on the 23d of September, under the command of the honourable Major-General Wellesley over the forces of the Rajah of Berar and Dowlut Rao Scindiah, the confederates having collected the remains of their broken armies, moved to the westward along the bank of the Taptee, with a view to proceed to the southward by the Caserbary Ghaut, and to prevent General Wellesley proceeding northward against Scindiah's city of Boorhanpoor, and the strong and important fortress of Asseerghur.

This movement induced General Wellesley to remain to the southward with the division of the British army under his immediate command, in order to check the operations of the confederates in that direction, General Wellesley however determined to prosecute his original plan of operations against the fortress of Asseerghur, and accordingly directed Colonel Stevenson, who on the 25th of September had descended the Adjuntee Ghaut in pursuit of the enemy, to continue his march to the northward, and to attack Boorhanpoor and Asseerghur.

As soon as the confederates found that although General Wellesley remained with the division of the army under his immediate command to the southward of the Adjuntee Pass, he had detached a sufficient force for the reduction of Scindiah's important possessions to the northward of that pass, they altered their plan of operations. They separated their

* See p. 424.

armies, the Rajah of Berar proceeded towards Chandore and Scindiah made a movement to the northward, for the purpose of interrupting Colonel Stevenson's operations against Asseerghur. General Wellesley therefore on the 16th of October marched again to the northward, and on the 19th descended the Adjuntee Ghaut. Scindiah halted as soon as he heard of General Wellesley's movement to the northward, and afterwards moved in an easterly direction towards Berar by Mulkapoor, and though the valley formed by the Taptee and Poorna rivers.

In the meanwhile General Wellesley received authentic accounts that the Rajah of Berar had passed through the hills which form the boundaries of Candeish, and had moved towards the river Godavery. General Wellesley therefore ascended the Adjuntee Ghaut on the 25th of October, and continued his march to the southward on the 26th, and passed Aurungabad on the 29th of that month.

Colonel Stevenson with the subsidiary force, serving with the Soubadar of the Deccan marched to Boorhanpore, a city belonging to Scindiah, and the capital of the district of Candeish. That city was evacuated on Colonel Stevenson's approach, and was occupied by the British troops on the 15th of October. On the 17th Colonel Stevenson advanced to Asseerghur, and on the 18th attacked and gained possession of the Pettah. On the 19th preparations were made for the siege of the fortress of Asseerghur belonging to Scindiah, the key of the Deccan. A flag of truce with a summons to surrender the fort had been previously sent to the officer in command, who returned an equivocal reply. The operations against the fort were therefore continued, and on the 20th the batteries were opened; in the course of an hour a signal was made from the fort indicating the Commandant's acceptance of the terms which Colonel Stevenson had offered to to the garrison. Those terms were that the garrison should be permitted to march out with their private property, and that their arrears should be discharged to the amount of 20,000 rupees. On these terms the Fort of Asseerghur was surrendered to the British arms on the 21st of October. The number of killed and wounded of the troops under the command of Colonel Stevenson during the operations against Asseerghur was inconsiderable.

Previously to the occupation of Boorhanpore nine officers and four serjeants, subjects of France and other European states surrendered themselves to Colonel Stevenson, under the proclamation of the Governor-General in council of the 29th of August.*

Subsequently to the capture of Asseerghur Colonel Stevenson proceeded with the subsidiary force, and the contingent of his Highness the Soubadar of the Deccan to the eastward in pursuit of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and Colonel Stevenson was directed by the Honourable Major-General Wellesley to prosecute his march as far as the fortress of Gavilghur the principal fortress in the possession of the Rajah of Berar, and to lay siege to that place.

In the despatch of the 31st of October, the Governor-General in council informed your honourable Committee that on the 6th of October, the honourable Major-General Wellesley received a letter from the enemy's camp, requesting that Major-General Wellesley would despatch a British officer, together with an officer of the Soubadar of the Deccan to the enemy's camp, for the purpose of negotiating the terms of peace between the allies and the confederated Mahratta chieftains; the motives which had induced Major-General Wellesley to refuse compliance with that request, were also stated to your honourable Committee on the 31st of October. The Governor-General in council at the same time expressed his expectation of the early receipt of intelligence of the disposition of the confederate chieftains to despatch to the British camp an embassy duly authorized to negotiate the terms of peace.

Subsequently to the despatch of Major-General Wellesley's reply to the letter from the camp of the enemy, Major-General Wellesley received various letters and messages on the subject of a pacification through different channels. All these communications however proceeded from persons unauthorized by official situation under the government of Dowlut Rao Scindiah to open negotiations on the part of that chieftain. In the first week of the month of November, a person of considerable rank named Jeswunt Rao Goorparah and another person of inferior rank named Naroo Punt Nana

* See Appendix.

arrived from Dowlut Rao Scindiah's camp, in the camp of Major-General Wellesley, declaring themselves to be authorized by Scindiah to negotiate the terms of peace.

At the first conference which Major-General Wellesley held with Jeswunt Rao Goorparah and Naroo Punt Nana on the 10th of November, those persons could not produce powers from Scindiah to prosecute the negotiation. Major-General Wellesley therefore referred Jeswunt Rao Goorparah and Naroo Punt Nana to Scindiah for full powers, in the meanwhile permitting those persons to remain in the British camp.

Subsequently to the date of Major-General Wellesley's conference with those persons, Major-General Wellesley received a letter from Dowlut Rao Scindiah by which it appeared that Scindiah intended to appoint a person named Mahomed Meer Khaun to negotiate the peace, and that Scindiah disavowed Jeswunt Rao Goorparah and Naroo Punt Nana. On the receipt of that letter Major-General Wellesley sent for Jeswunt Rao Goorparah and his colleague, and held a conference with them on the 20th of November. The result of this conference confirmed Major-General Wellesley in the opinion which he had previously entertained, that notwithstanding the letter of Scindiah disavowing Jeswunt Rao Goorpara and Naroo Punt Nana, those persons had actually been sent to the British camp, by the authority of Scindiah, Major-General Wellesley deemed it to be probable that full powers would be transmitted to Jeswunt Rao Goorparah as soon as Scindiah should have been apprized of the amicable reception of that agent in Major-General Wellesley's camp.

Major-General Wellesley therefore considered it to be advisable to state to that agent, and to his colleague, the dangers to which they were exposed by the defect of the necessary credentials, and the moderation and favour which had been manifested towards them by permitting them to remain with impunity in the British camp, than to dismiss them with disgrace.

They accordingly retired from the conference of the 20th of November highly satisfied with the treatment which they had received from Major-General Wellesley, and greatly disgusted with the evasive and equivocal conduct of their employer. On the same day, in the course of two hours,

Naroo Punt Nana returned to Major-General Wellesley with a letter from Dowlut Rao Scindiah, which was written by that chieftain in consequence of the reference made to him after the conference of the 10th of November, conveying powers to Jeswunt Rao Goorparah and Naroo Punt Nana, to negotiate with Major-General Wellesley.

The Governor-General in council will hereafter communicate to your honourable Committee the detail of the intrigues which appear to have prevailed in the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, with a view to direct the negociations for peace through various channels. These intrigues suggested doubts of the authenticity of the mission of Jeswunt Rao Goorparah and Naroo Punt Nana.

It is manifest that various persons at the Durbar of Dowlut Rao Scindiah have respectively endeavoured to become the channel of negociation; and Major-General Wellesley is of opinion that Jeswunt Rao Goorparah has succeeded by exaggerated reports of the solicitude of Major-General Wellesley for the conclusion of peace, and by encouraging an expectation that Major-General Wellesley would be induced to despatch a British officer for that purpose to the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

The course of the negociations for peace, and the general plan of pacification in Hindostan and the Deccan, will form the subject of a separate despatch to your honourable Committee by an early opportunity, when the further progress of the conferences and negociations now pending shall have enabled the Governor-General in council to submit to your consideration a full view of his proceedings in the conduct of those important affairs. At present, it appears to be sufficient to inform your honourable Committee that, at the conference held with Jeswunt Rao Goorparah and Naroo Punt Nana, on the 20th November, after the verification of their general powers from Scindiah, it appeared that those powers were still defective in the essential point of enabling the ambassadors to conclude any of the several territorial compensations to the Company and the allies, which must form the basis of the peace with Scindiah. Major-General Wellesley, therefore, with great judgment, referred the ambassadors again to their chief for distinct powers to negociate those compensations. At this conference, Scindiah's ambassadors earnestly solicited Major-General Wellesley's consent to a

suspension of hostilities with Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, which that officer granted to Scindiah exclusively.

Your honourable Committee will observe, that by the terms of the armistice, the Rajah of Berar was expressly excluded from the benefit of it; it being obviously prudent not to allow either of the confederates to treat for the other, and the Rajah of Berar not having yet despatched any ambassador to the British camp, or manifested any inclination to conclude peace.

The Governor-General in council entirely approved the conduct of Major-General Wellesley in refusing the proposed armistice to the Rajah of Berar, and in granting it to Scindiah.

These transactions justified an expectation of the dissolution of the confederacy between Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, and of the conclusion of a separate peace with the former of those chieftains. A despatch, however, was received on the 23rd December, from the Hon. Major-General Wellesley, under date the 30th Nov., communicating the intelligence that, on the 29th of November, an action had taken place between the combined armies of the confederated chieftains and those of Major-General Wellesley and Colonel Stevenson, which had terminated in the total defeat of the enemy, with the loss of all their artillery, amounting to thirty-eight pieces of ordnance, with ammunition, baggage, &c. with the slaughter of great numbers of their troops.

The annexed copy of Major-General Wellesley's despatch of the 30th November,* contains the detail of this signal victory, and of the insidious artifices by which Dowlut Rao Scindiah had evaded the first conditions of the armistice, and had united the remnant of his forces with those of the Rajah of Berar in a position close to Major-General Wellesley's army; in consequence of which act of treachery, General Wellesley had given notice to Scindiah's ambassadors, previously to the day of the action, that the armistice was inadmissible, and that the British army would act against both of the confederates without delay.

The Governor-General in council is happy to find that this decisive success has been obtained with inconsiderable loss on our side.

The Governor-General in council confidently trusts that

* See p. 472.

the ultimate objects of the war will be more speedily and completely obtained, in consequence of this signal defeat of the combined armies of the confederates, than could have been expected even by the conclusion of a separate treaty of peace with Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

In the despatch of the 31st October, the Governor-General in council communicated to your honourable Committee the intelligence of the occupation of the sea port of Baroach, and of its dependent territory, by the British troops under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Woodington, on the 29th of August. After the capture of that place, Lieutenant-Colonel Woodington proceeded to reduce the district of Champaneer, which was the only territory remaining to Scindiah in Guzzerat; and subsequently attacked the fort of Powanghur, a strongly-fortified hill, with the town of Champaneer attached, situated about twenty-five miles east of Brodera, on the western confines of the province of Malwa. The town of Champaneer was attacked and carried by assault, with little loss on the part of the British troops; and the fort was summoned to surrender. The Killedar having refused to comply with the summons, preparations were immediately made for the attack of the fort, which was to have been stormed on the 17th of September, when the fort capitulated, and was immediately occupied by the British troops. This success was followed by the reduction of the district of Godra, a territory belonging to Scindiah, in the province of Malwa, and contiguous to the district of Champaneer. Colonel Murray, who commands the British forces stationed in Guzzerat, has since been employed in settling the revenues of the district of Godra.

The capture of Boorhanpoor and Asseer-ghur* was followed by the subjection of Scindiah's territory in Candeish, of which Boorhanpore is the capital; and that territory has for the present been delivered into the hands of the officers of his Highness the Soubahdar of the Deccan.

These successes have completed the conquest of the whole of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's territorial possessions situated in Guzzerat and south of the Nerbudda.

The Governor-General in council has now the honour to communicate to your honourable Committee the progress of

* The capital of Guzzerat, and the residence of the Guikowar.

the military operations and political arrangements in Hindostan, under the direction of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, subsequently to the reduction of Agra on the 17th of October, of which event information was transmitted to your honourable Committee in the despatch of the Governor-General in council of the 31st of October.

The British army marched from Agra on the 27th of October in pursuit of a force of the enemy, composed of fifteen of Monsieur Perron's regular battalions (which had been detached by Scindiah from the Deccan, in the early part of the campaign, under the command of Monsieur Duderneg), and of two battalions which had effected their escape from Delhi after the battle of the 11th of September. During the siege of Agra, this force occupied a position about thirty miles in the rear of the British army, but made no attempt to interrupt the siege of that important fortress. It appears that these battalions of the enemy were destined to proceed towards Delhi for the purpose of attempting the recovery of that important post; and the existence of so considerable a force of the enemy in Hindostan alarmed those native chieftains who were disposed to unite with the British government, and encouraged all those who might be adverse to our interests. The destruction of this force, therefore, became an object of the utmost importance.

On the 31st of October, the British army made a march of twenty miles, and arrived and encamped at a short distance from the ground which the enemy had quitted the same morning. Possessed of this intelligence, the Commander-in-Chief determined to make an effort to overtake the enemy with all the cavalry of the army, intending to delay the enemy by a light engagement until the British infantry should be able to effect a junction with the cavalry in advance, and if any confusion should be occasioned by this attack, to seize the enemy's guns and baggage. With this view, the Commander-in-Chief, with the whole of the cavalry, marched at twelve o'clock, on the night of the 31st of October, and after a march of twenty-five miles, came up with the enemy at daybreak, on the morning of the 1st of November, notwithstanding the difficulties which are opposed by the climate of India to the rapid movements of European troops. The distance marched by the army under General Lake, in the mornings of the 30th and 31st of October, exceeded forty

miles, making the total distance marched by the army in forty-eight hours upwards of sixty-five miles. Previously to the march of the British cavalry, orders were given for the infantry to march at three o'clock in the morning.

On the 1st of November, in the morning, when General Lake with the British cavalry overtook the enemy, the enemy appearing to be on his retreat, and in great confusion, the Commander-in-Chief was induced to try the effect of an attack with the cavalry alone, without awaiting the arrival of the infantry. The cavalry succeeded in breaking the enemy's line, and in taking possession of some of the enemy's guns; but the fire of the enemy's numerous and well-served artillery rendered it necessary to withdraw the cavalry out of the reach of the guns until the British infantry could approach. The British cavalry accordingly retired in perfect order, retaining possession of part of the enemy's artillery.

On the arrival of the infantry, a general attack was made on the enemy, who, after a long and vigorous resistance, were completely defeated, with the loss of all their bazars, camp equipage and baggage, a considerable number of elephants, camels and bullocks, seventy-two pieces of cannon, five thousand stand of arms thrown down on the field of battle, forty-four stands of colours, sixty-four tumbrils, completely laden with ammunition, together with three tumbrils of money, fifty-seven carts laden with matchlocks, muskets, and stores. Two thousand prisoners were taken and numbers slain.

The resistance opposed by the enemy on this memorable occasion was more determined than any which the army under General Lake had experienced since the commencement of the campaign.

The victory must principally be attributed to the admirable skill, judgment, heroic courage, and matchless activity of the Commander-in-Chief, whose magnanimous example, together with the recollection of his achievements at Coel, Alligurh, Delhi, and Agra, inspired general confidence and emulation.

In the morning, General Lake led the charge of the cavalry, and in the afternoon conducted in person, at the head of his Majesty's 76th regiment, all the different attacks of the enemy's line.

The Commander-in-Chief displayed not only the most resolute fortitude and ardent valour, but the utmost degree of professional ability and knowledge, availing himself with admirable

promptitude of every advantage presented by the enemy, and frustrating every effort of the enemy's obstinacy and boldness.

The Governor-General in council desires to offer to your honourable Committee his congratulations on this most splendid and important victory, which has completed the subversion of Scindiah's hostile power and formidable resources in Hindostan.

Your honourable Committee will contemplate, with sentiments of the highest admiration, the unexampled rapidity and success of the British arms in every part of India since the commencement of hostilities.

From the 8th of August, the day on which hostilities commenced, to the 29th of November, the date of the battle of Argaum in the Deccan, the British army has conquered all the possessions of Scindiah in Guzerat, the city of Boorhaunpoor in Candeish, together with all the territorial possessions of that chieftain situated to the southward of the Nerbuddah, the province of Cuttack in Orissa, the Mahratta dominions between the Jumna and the Ganges, the city of Delhi and the right bank of the Jumna, the city of Agra and the adjoining territory; has reduced by storm the fortified town of Ahmednuggur, the forts of Allyghur, Baroach, and Cuttack, and by capitulation, after having opened the batteries, the forts of Ahmednuggur, of Powanghur and Champaneer, the forts of Asseergurh and Agra, and has defeated the enemy in four general engagements—at Delhi, on the 11th of September; at Assye, on the 23rd of September; at Laswaree, on the 1st of November; and on the plains of Argaum, on the 29th of November.

The defeat of the formidable force of the enemy assembled at Laswaree, has tended in a considerable degree to promote the success of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief's negociations with the chiefs and states of Hindostan.

The Commander-in-Chief has accordingly made considerable progress in the various political arrangements connected with the exclusion of the Mahratta power from the Company's frontier in Hindostan.

The Commissioners appointed for the affairs of Cuttack have proceeded successfully in the settlement of that province, and have already realized a proportion of its revenues.

The progress of our military operations and political arrangements, down to the date of this despatch, connected

with the war in which the British government is engaged, has been uniformly prosperous and successful in every quarter of India, and the speedy termination of hostilities may be expected to place the interests and security of the British empire in India on a basis of improved strength and power.

We have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.
G. H. BARLOW.
G. UDNY.

## No. CLIX.

*Lieut.-General Lake to the Marquess Wellesley.*

(Private.)

MY LORD, Camp, Beana, Dec. 28th, 1803.

You will receive this by express, conveying a letter from Holkar; and I feel happy to think that he means to be upon friendly terms. You may be assured that nothing shall happen on my part to cause him to alter these sentiments; but I own his actions do not appear to accord with his words. I can venture to assure your Lordship that he can do us no harm, as my frontier is too strongly guarded for any set of men to get past it. Lieut.-Col. White and Mr. Mercer were, on the 26th inst., within five coss of Gwalior, and had no doubt of being admitted quietly into the fort in a day or two.

All matters in Bundlecund seem to be going on perfectly well, and there will be a sufficient force to enable us to detach from that part of the country, if necessary, towards the territory of the Berar Rajah; but I flatter myself that a peace will soon take place, and prevent the necessity of such a movement. We have a report here, and which seems to deserve credit from the quarter whence it comes, that General Wellesley has given that chief a complete beating. God send it may be true.

I write in haste, that no time should be lost in sending Holkar's letter, who is so little to be depended upon, that I wish to know your Lordship's opinions and directions respecting him.

I shall remain here a few days, as it is a central position and good ground.

Believe me, my dear Lord,
with attachment and affection, your devoted,

G. LAKE.

P.S.—You may depend on my watching Holkar at every turn.

## No. CLX.

*The Marquess Wellesley to the Court of Directors.*

HONOURABLE SIRS, Fort William, Dec. 30th, 1803.

1. The important crisis of affairs which has unexpectedly occurred in India having compelled me to engage in an extensive and complicated system of military operations, connected with political negotiations and arrangements, which must deeply affect the interests and honour of the Company and the nation, I have deemed it to be my public duty to relinquish my intention for embarking for Europe in the month of January, 1804. The same considerations have determined me to await in India the issue of those transactions which have originated during my administration in the course of the last year.

2. I trust that this determination will be approved by your honourable Court; and I entertain a confident expectation of being enabled to derive considerable advantage to your interests by conducting the depending negotiations for peace to a favourable issue.

I have the honour to be,
Honourable Sirs,
your most obedient, obliged, and faithful servant,
WELLESLEY.

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## No. CLXI.

*Major-General Wellesley to the Marquess Wellesley.*

MY LORD, Camp, Dec. 30th, 1803.

I have the honour to inform your Excellency that I have this day concluded with the vakeels of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and signed a treaty of peace, copies of which in the English, Persian, and Mahratta languages, I have the honour to enclose.

This treaty like that with the Rajah of Berar, is concluded in the name of the British Government and its allies generally, and the cessions are made to all the allied powers. It will remain with your Excellency to give orders to the Residents

at the different Durbars to procure the consent of the allied governments to the treaty, and to divide the conquests in such manner as you may think proper.

By this treaty which I hope your Excellency will ratify, all the important objects detailed in your Excellency's instructions of the 27th of June are secured; and the ground is laid for a more complete alliance with Scindiah's Government; or supposing that he should omit to take advantage of the terms offered to him, to ally himself more closely with the Company's Government, such an influence will be established in his, as will render it very improbable, that its means will ever be again directed against that of the Company.

By the 2nd article of the treaty, Scindiah consents to cede to the honourable Company all his territories north of the countries of the Rajahs of Jeypore, Jodepore, and the Rana of Gohud. A schedule is annexed to the treaty which contains the best account that can be procured of the revenue of those territories.

Besides the territories included in the schedule, there are three Pergunnahs also north of the countries of Jeypore, Jodepore, and Gohud, viz. Dholepore, Raree and Rajahkerrah, which were formerly granted to the family of Scindiah in Enaum,* which have never been carried into the Dufters† under the head of lands in Hindostan, and have been considered as the private property of Scindiah's house. These Pergunnahs are to remain in his possession under certain stipulations which exclude his troops from the line fixed upon by your Excellency.

Besides three Pergunnahs there are others, the Jagheer lands of the ladies of the family of the late Madhajee Scindiah, and those of some of the principal Sirdars and ministers of Dowlut Rao, also not included in the schedule, which according to the 7th article are to remain in the hands of their present possessors under the protection of the British Government; and the British Government is to give pensions or jagheers according to its option, to Sirdars to be named by Scindiah, to the amount of seventeen lacs of rupees, including the value of those jagheers to remain in the hands of their present possessors under the 7th article.

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* Gift. † Offices of record.

It would have been impossible to arrange this great cession in the disturbed state of Scindiah's Government under all the circumstances of his misfortunes in the war, and of the great diminution of his military power and reputation, in comparison with that of his rival Holkar, without determining to provide in some degree for those who reaped benefits from the revenues of the ceded territories, or making up my mind to throw into Holkar's hands, and to add to his armies, all the Sirdars and troops who had been subsisted by the resources of those countries, and who must have been forthwith discharged from Scindiah's service, and would have looked to Holkar for protection and future employment. I chose the former which I think is most consistent with your Excellency's policy, and it appears that besides avoiding the evil of increasing the numbers of the followers of the only freebooter that remains in India, it tends to establish an influence in Scindiah's Durbar, which must guide its measures in a great degree even if Scindiah should omit to unite himself more closely with the Company; and must tend greatly to facilitate all the objects of the British Government in his Durbar if he should agree to the terms of the general defensive alliance.

Upon the whole therefore I hope that your Excellency will approve of this arrangement, the expence of which will amount to about fourteen lacs of rupees annually, to be deducted from the revenues stated in the schedule.

The next point to which I wish to draw your Excellency's attention in order to bring under your view at once every thing relating to the cession in Hindostan, is the 15th article of the treaty, by which it is agreed that Scindiah shall have a subsidiary force, the expence of which shall be paid out of the cessions made by the 2d, 3d, and 4th articles of the treaty.

In the course of this war Scindiah's power, reputation, and military resources, have been greatly diminished, while his rival Holkar after having recovered the possessions of his family by his treaty of peace with Scindiah remains with undiminished power, and increased reputation. Comparatively with those of Scindiah, his power, and his military resources are much greater than they were previous to the war, and I have but little doubt but that the contest between those chiefs will be renewed.

This would be a matter of but little consequence to the British Government if the parties were so equal in point of strength, resources and abilities, as to render the event of the contest doubtful. But Holkar is certainly at this moment superior to Scindiah in every point of view; and the consequence of leaving the latter to his own means must be, that he will fall an easy prey to Holkar, or if he should endeavour to avoid the contest which I do not think probable, his government will by degrees become dependent upon that of his rival.

Under these circumstances, and particularly as I was aware of your Excellency's determination to support the peace, and the relative situation in which it should leave the different powers in the manner in which that had been established by the exercise of the force of the British Government, I thought it expedient to hold forth to Scindiah an option of becoming a party to the general defensive alliance; and as a further inducement to him to agree to that treaty, to engage that the assistance which should be given to him, should occasion no further diminution of his revenues.

I was induced to make this last engagement by the conviction that Scindiah would not agree to the treaty of general defensive alliance, although his ministers proposed that he should unite himself more closely with the Company, if he was to be obliged to pay for the assistance which he should receive, and that if he does agree to that treaty, the peace of India is secured as far as it can be by human means.

I have every reason to believe also that when Scindiah will wind up his affairs at the end of this war, he will not have a disposable clear revenue such as the British Government would require to pay the expences of the force which might be given to him.

Upon this point I have likewise to observe, that supposing Scindiah should agree to the treaty of defensive alliance, the diminution of receipt to the Company will be eight lacs of rupees annually, if his Highness the Peishwa be admitted to participate equally with the Company and the Nizam in the benefits of the war, and twelve-and-a-half lacs of rupees if his Highness the Nizam only should be admitted to that participation.

I have sanguine hopes therefore that your Excellency will approve of this article of the peace.

By the cession of Baroach the Company will gain a clear revenue of ten lacs of rupees annually, and a valuable territory in a commercial point of view.

I ordered that the hill fort of Pawanghur might be destroyed when I determined to return that conquest to Scindiah. My motives for returning the conquests in that part of India and Asseerghur and Boorhanpore in the Deccan, are explained to your Excellency in my despatch of the of November, and although I intend to endeavour to retain possession of Pawanghur and Dohud in the negotiation of the treaty of general defensive alliance in exchange for land elsewhere, I am still of opinion that without making some sacrifices, I could not have peace; and these places appeared to me to be of less consequence than any of the other conquests which the British troops had made.

The territories restored in the neighbourhood of Ahmednuggur are the ancient family lands of Scindiah, and your Excellency will perceive in the Minutes of the Conferences (which will be sent as soon as they can be copied) the great anxiety to retain these lands. They have been returned therefore under a particular stipulation that no armed men are ever to be kept in them.

I did every thing in my power to retain the lands of which I took possession upon the capture of Ahmednuggur, as I wished to exclude Scindiah entirely from the Deccan; but as the lands are really his family property, to have kept them would have occasioned a personal inconvenience which your Excellency would have been desirous to remove; and the restoration of them is accompanied by a stipulation which I hope will prevent the bad consequences attending his having any lands in those countries.

There was considerable difficulty also in settling the 9th article respecting the treaties made with the Rajahs. The ministers appeared to be aware of the loss which Scindiah's government might incur under this article, and they contended strongly against it until at last I was obliged to tell them that unless they agreed to it I could not make peace. The advantage which it appeared to me that your Excellency expected to derive from the independence of the Rajahs of Jeypore and Jodepore, and the Rana of Gohud was, that these chiefs should connect themselves by treaty with the

British Government. From the different accounts however which I have received, I observe that treaties have not been concluded with any of these chiefs, notwithstanding the rapid and astonishing success of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief. The consequence of their independence, unless they should have connected themselves with the British Government would be, that the annual contest which they have had with the Mahrattas for the Peishcush would cease, and the British Government would derive no additional security.

I therefore deemed it best to stipulate generally for the independence of every Rajah with whom a treaty should have been concluded; by which your Excellency's object is insured in respect to all of this description; and in regard to the others they are left to their fate.

There was not much difficulty in arranging the other articles of the peace. There were some objections to the 12th article founded upon the necessity of Scindiah's performing the duties of his office of Vakeel-ool-Mootluck,* which however were easily overcome.

In negociating this treaty I have received the greatest assistance from Mr. Elphinstone, and since he arrived in camp, from Major Malcolm; indeed the acquaintance of the latter with your Excellency's sentiments upon all political questions, and his own political knowledge and abilities, have enabled me to conclude this difficult treaty in a manner which I hope will be satisfactory to your Excellency.

I have requested Major Malcolm to prepare to go to Scindiah's camp as soon as I have received the ratification of the treaty. By a residence there for some time he will be enabled to settle with that chief the treaty of general defensive alliance if it should be possible to arrange it, or at all events to acquire a knowledge of the characters at his Durbar, and of the state of his remaining military resources.

In case your Excellency should think it proper to ratify this treaty, it will be best to send one copy of the ratification to Major Kirkpatrick, to be forwarded to Major Malcolm, and one to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to be

* A titular office derived from the Emperor of Delhi. It may be translated *Agent, Plenipotentiary,* or *Lieutenant of the Empire.* This title was borne on Scindiah's great seal.

forwarded through Hindostan, as one of the first objects of Major Malcolm's attention will be to communicate with his Excellency by a Dawk.

I propose to desire the servants of the Soubadar of the Deccan to take possession of Scindiah's territories, ceded by the 4th article of the treaty of peace. In respect to the other territories they will remain to be disposed of according to the orders which I may receive from your Excellency.

I have the honour to be, &c.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

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## No. CLXII.

*The Marquess Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh.*

(Private and Confidential.)

MY DEAR LORD, Barrackpore, Dec. 31, 1803.

The state of the war with the Mahratta chiefs, and of the various depending negotiations, has determined me to remain in India, until I can bring our affairs to a favourable issue. My departure would occasion the utmost embarrassment to General Lake, to General Wellesley, and to every person concerned in the conduct of the war, or in the negotiation of peace. My own wishes would lead me to return to Europe, if I could relinquish this charge with honour to myself, and with justice to the interests of my country: but I should sacrifice my own character as well as the public service, if I abdicated the duty of completing my own plans, and entrusted to other hands the final security of a work commenced by myself, and which cannot be finished with equal celerity or advantage by any other person, however superior to me in the necessary qualifications for this arduous government.

I have therefore resolved to meet every difficulty and vexation, and to act that part which my conscience and judgment recommend, as the only clear, distinct, and faithful observance of my public duty. In addition to other difficulties, the state of parties in England, announced by the arrival of the ship *Tigris*, will subject me to a most painful and distracting alternative. On this subject I have not hitherto

explained my sentiments to your Lordship. In my present station, my first obligation is to acquit myself of the indispensable duties of the great charge which I undertook in the year 1797, with a full sense of its importance, and of all the dangers to which it exposed my personal honour and future happiness. Mr. Pitt and Mr. Addington are distinctly apprized of my estimation of the nature of this trust, and of the obligations which it imposes. They both must feel that I am bound by the most sacred ties to sacrifice every consideration to the preservation of this empire, of which I have undertaken the care. When that primary and high duty shall have been faithfully discharged to the satisfaction of my King and my country, I shall be at liberty to exercise my judgment upon the disastrous circumstances, which have separated friends and connections, whose union appeared to me to be as indissoluble as my regard and attachment are sincere and cordial.

While I shall retain this station, your Lordship may be assured, that I shall deem it to be an indispensable part of my duty and a main obligation of my trust to act with the most unqualified zeal in the cause of the existing administration at home, and to co-operate without reserve in the course of every measure connected with my charge. Nor shall I confine the operation of this principle to my personal conduct in India. While I shall deem it to be my duty to exercise this trust, and while it shall be continued in my hands, all my friends in England shall know that it is my determination to contribute every possible aid to the administration under which I have thought that my honour and the public interests require me to serve. My future conduct on my arrival in England must be regulated by a more intimate knowledge of recent transactions than I can acquire at this distance; but it will be difficult to engage me with warmth or alacrity against *any* of my friends; for *all* of whom I retain my affection, esteem, and respect; nor will I now enter more deeply into the discussion than to declare, that the late peace with France appeared to me to be indispensable, although neither desirable nor secure; and that the present war appears to me to be just and necessary, and to require the ardent support of every British heart. These opinions furnish a sufficient rule for my present guidance, connected with the principles prescribed by my particular

station; I most earnestly hope that the same rule may guide me through the contest between my friends without any injury to mutual confidence and regard.

Believe me, my dear Lord,
with great esteem,
yours ever most faithfully,
WELLESLEY.

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## No. CLXIII.

*The Marquess Wellesley to the Honourable the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors.*

HONOURABLE SIRS, Fort William, February 21st, 1804.

1. The Governor-General in council has the honour to communicate to your honourable Committee the satisfactory intelligence of the termination of hostilities between the British Government and Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, by the conclusion of separate treaties of peace with each of those chieftains.

2. After the battle of Argaum, the particulars of which were communicated to your honourable Committee in our despatch of the 28th of December, 1803, the Hon. Major-General Wellesley made the necessary arrangements for the siege of the strong fortress of Gawilgurh, the principal fortress in the dominions of the Rajah of Berar. The difficulties attending this operation were of an extraordinary nature, and were surmounted by the British troops employed on that occasion with a degree of perseverance, courage, and activity which has never been surpassed.

3. The fortress of Gawilgurh was carried by assault on the 15th of December. The details of this important and arduous achievement are contained in the annexed copy of a despatch from the Hon. Major-General Wellesley of the same date.

4. Previously to the capture of that fortress, the Rajah of Berar had despatched Vakeels to the camp of Major-General Wellesley, ostensibly for the purpose of negociating the terms of a separate peace with the British Government.

5. On the 17th of December, 1803, the treaty of peace was concluded with the Vakeels of the Rajah of Berar, and

was returned to the Hon. Major-General Wellesley with the ratification of the Rajah of Berar on the 23rd of that month.

6. The terms of the peace with the Rajah of Berar appearing to the Governor-General in council to be highly advantageous and honourable to the British Government and its allies, the treaty was ratified by the Governor-General in council on the 9th of January, the day on which a copy of it was first received at Fort William.

7. A copy of that treaty, together with a copy of a letter from the Hon. Major-General Wellesley, containing explanatory observations on the several articles of it, are enclosed for your honourable Committee's information.*

8. On the 24th of December, the Hon. Mr. Elphinstone was despatched by the Hon. Major-General Wellesley to reside at the Court of the Rajah of Berar, where Mr. Elphinstone was received with due respect and honour. The despatches received from Mr. Elphinstone induce the Governor-General in council to believe that the peace concluded with the Rajah of Berar will prove permanent.

9. The negociations of Major-General Wellesley with the Ministers and Vakeels of Dowlut Rao Scindiah were terminated by the conclusion of a treaty of peace on the 30th of December, 1803, and that treaty was returned to Major-General Wellesley, with the ratification of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, on the 5th of January, 1804.

10. In consequence of some unaccountable irregularity in the conveyance of letters between the camp of Major-General Wellesley and Hydrabad, the Governor-General in council did not receive a copy of the treaty of peace with Scindiah until the 13th inst.

11. The terms of the peace concluded with Dowlut Rao Scindiah appearing to the Governor-General in council to be entirely conformable to the general tenor of the instructions with which Major-General Wellesley had been furnished on that subject, highly honourable and advantageous to the British Government and its allies, and calculated to secure permanent tranquillity to the honourable Company's dominions, and to all the native powers of India, the treaty was ratified by the Governor-General in council on the 13th of February, the day on which a copy of it was received at Fort William.

* See Appendix.

12. The Governor-General in council has now the honour to transmit, for the information of your honourable Committee, a copy of the treaty of peace concluded with Scindiah, together with a copy of the letter from the Hon. Major-General Wellesley, which was annexed to the treaty.*

13. Major John Malcolm, Resident of Mysore, was despatched by Major-General Wellesley on a mission to the Court of Dowlut Rao Scindiah after the conclusion of peace.

14. Major Malcolm arrived in Scindiah's camp on the 11th of January, and was received with due honour and respect.

15. The peace now happily concluded with the confederated Mahratta chieftains, involving considerations and details of an extensive and complicated nature, the preparation of which will necessarily occupy a considerable portion of time, the Governor-General in council has deemed it expedient to postpone the communication of his detailed sentiments on that important subject until a future opportunity, and to limit his communication to your honourable Committee on the subject of the late pacification by the ships now under despatch to the general statement contained in this address.

16. It is the intention of the Governor-General in council to despatch the honourable Company's extra ship *Tigris*, for the express purpose of conveying to your honourable Committee and to the honourable Court of Directors all the details and documents connected with this important subject.

17. The Governor-General in council desires to offer to your honourable Committee his congratulations on the happy conclusion of peace with the Mahratta powers, within the space of five months from the commencement of the war, upon terms highly honourable and advantageous to the honourable Company and to the nation; and the Governor-General in council trusts that the condition of the peace will be found to correspond with the extraordinary glory acquired by the British arms in the late splendid and memorable campaign.

We have the honour to be, honourable Sirs,
your most obedient and faithful servants,

WELLESLEY.
G. H. BARLOW.
G. UDNY.

* See Appendix.

## No. CLXIV.

*The Marquess Cornwallis to the Marquess Wellesley*

(Private.)

Burlington Street, April 30th, 1804.
[Received Sept. 27th, 1804.]

MY DEAR LORD,

I have received your Lordship's letter dated the 6th of November, by the hands of Captain Salmond, to whom I shall be desirous to shew every possible attention; my retired situation, however, leaves little in my power beyond personal civility.

I can with truth assure you that I have felt much anxiety during the course of your Mahratta warfare, being well aware of the difficulties against which you had to contend, and I now sincerely congratulate you on your brilliant successes.

The important and glorious achievements of my friends, Generals Lake and Wellesley, have afforded me the most sincere satisfaction.

As I am now growing old, and perhaps out of fashion, it is not likely that I should be again selected for any active situation. My wishes, however, continue to be as warm as they ever were for the honour and welfare of my country; and I earnestly hope that, in every part of the globe, its interests will be promoted by as able statesmen, and its armies conducted by as meritorious generals, as those who have of late been entrusted with the preservation of our Asiatic empire.

I have the honour to be,
with great esteem and regard,
my dear Lord,
your most obedient and faithful servant,
CORNWALLIS.

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* As this and the following letters relate solely to the war described in the present volume, they are given here out of their chronological order.—[ED.]

## No. CLXV.

*Lord Hobart to the Marquess Wellesley.*

Downing Street, May 4th, 1804.
[Received Dec. 5th, 1804.]

My Lord,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatches noted in the margin,* containing, with other important papers, the documents relative to the several brilliant and decisive operations against the Mahrattas; and although circumstances have hitherto prevented my receiving his Majesty's commands upon the subject, I have no doubt that it will be brought before him in a manner the most calculated to produce a just consideration of the extraordinary merits and services of your Lordship, as well as of the other persons who have so much distinguished themselves in the recent campaign in India.

I feel a peculiar pleasure in offering to your Lordship my most sincere congratulations upon the complete success that has attended your Lordship's measures; a success which, while it has so eminently extended the fame of the British arms, has contributed in so great a degree to your Lordship's personal reputation, by renewing the display of that ability, energy, and zeal, which had been before so conspicuous in the war with Tippoo Sultaun, and in the co-operation of the Indian army in Egypt.

In acknowledging your Lordship's separate letter marked (Official, A), I cannot too strongly testify my hearty concurrence in the sentiments expressed by your Lordship respecting the highly honourable and glorious conduct of the troops under the respective personal commands of General Lake and the Hon. Major-General Wellesley; and your Lordship will believe that it was with the fullest sense of gratification I discharged my duty in moving the resolution of thanks which the House of Lords has ordered to be transmitted to your Lordship, and to the commanders, officers, and men of those armies, whose achievements have so greatly exalted the honour of their country in the East Indies, and

* Nos. 12 to 27.

whose services will stand recorded amongst the most illustrious of those which adorn the annals of the British empire.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,

your Lordship's most obedient and
humble servant,
HOBART.

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## No. CLXVI.

*Lord Castlereagh to the Marquess Wellesley.*

(Most Secret.)

London, May 18, 1804.
[Received overland, Oct. 14, 1804.]

MY DEAR LORD,

Your despatches by the *Belle* reached England on the 25th, and those by the *Waller* on the 28th of April last.

It would have been my wish to have addressed your Lordship, without delay, in reply to the variety of important and interesting matter to which these despatches relate, but the state of affairs at home will explain to your Lordship the grounds on which I must still defer to a future conveyance a decision on those points, which require reference to my colleagues in the government.

In my correspondence with your Lordship I have hitherto avoided any remarks on the painful and melancholy progress of disunion amongst those who were formerly most closely connected and warmly attached, and for whom, in common with your Lordship, I have felt from the first moment of my public life, every sentiment of respect, attachment, and confidence.

The change which has recently taken place in his Majesty's councils, and the cordial and flattering declaration of your own public and private feelings with which your Lordship has honoured me in your letter marked "private and confidential," imposes upon me the obligation of explaining shortly to your Lordship, as far as my means of information have extended, the circumstances which immediately led to the event in question.

I shall not attempt to trace the various causes which at first by slow degrees, and latterly by rapid strides, produced

so afflicting a change in the reciprocal feelings of former friends; your Lordship's sentiments of attachment to them all, will best enable you to appreciate what those suffered who had a public duty to perform in this trying struggle. It is enough to remark, that on the meeting of parliament after the recess, the measures of government were attacked on two or three questions, on which the united force of Mr. Pitt's, Mr. Fox's, and Lord Grenville's friends, was concentered. In the Commons the majority of government was materially reduced, whilst the minority exceeded 200. In the Lords the strength of those who would have divided against government, on Lord Stafford's motion, was even more seriously formidable, considering the usual temper of this assembly.

Under these circumstances his Majesty's ministers, dubious how long they might be enabled to retain a majority in parliament, and under a strong conviction that against such a combination of numbers, talent and connection, it was no longer to be expected that they could continue to administer the government with that energy and effect which the public interests at such a moment required, were of opinion they should best discharge their duty by availing themselves of the first occasion which the King's recovery afforded them, of advising his Majesty to form an administration, which might be likely to unite in parliament greater strength in support of his government. The cabinet assured the King that to the formation of such an administration, they were desirous of giving every facility; whilst they were ready, if his Majesty met with insuperable difficulties in the formation of such an arrangement as he could reconcile to his own mind, to continue their best exertions in discharge of their public duty.

This advice was certainly offered in the confident hope that the King would turn his attention to Mr. Pitt; this expectation was not disappointed, and the Lord Chancellor was desired by the King to learn Mr. Pitt's sentiments upon the formation of a new government. Mr. Pitt, under the present circumstances of the empire, considered it as his duty to bring under the King's consideration the expediency of forming an arrangement, which should embrace the leading men of all parties as best calculated to keep down factious

dissensions during the war, and to afford the King the repose and tranquillity so essential to his health. It is unnecessary for me to offer any remarks upon the merits or defects of such a plan, whatever might have been the consequences, had it been carried into effect, it is enough to know, that Mr. Pitt proposed it, to be assured, that in his conscientious judgment, it appeared to him the best adapted under all the circumstances to promote the public service. In a personal interview with the King of three hours, he pressed the proposition upon his Majesty's most serious attention; the result was, an acquiescence on the part of the King in the leading men of all parties (Mr. Fox excepted) being included.

Upon this being made known, Mr. Fox urged his friends to lend themselves to the arrangement, this they declined, unless he was also to hold office, and upon Lord Grenville, Lord Spencer, and Mr. Windham being applied to by Mr. Pitt, they also refused to accept of office, if Mr. Fox was to be proscribed. Mr. Pitt having made every effort in the hope of disarming hostility to the King's government, certainly having gone much greater lengths than was congenial to the feelings and sentiments of a large portion of the public and of many of his best friends; when he was thus disappointed of the aid of those whose services he was anxious to procure for the public, in consequence of a decision on the part of the King which it was strictly competent and constitutional for him to form, did not a moment hesitate in proceeding to submit to his Majesty the best arrangement for the administration of his affairs, which his means of selection thus narrowed would afford. I transmit to your Lordship the appointments as far as they have hitherto gone, and if some most distinguished names of Mr. Pitt's former connections, not by his, but by their own act, are absent from the list, your Lordship will discover no presumable seeds of internal discord in the cabinet which can thwart or impede the full exercise of Mr. Pitt's powers. The government will probably have to contend with a very serious opposition, countenanced by high authority, and comprehending great ability and considerable strength. If Mr. Pitt's health does not fail him, it will, I am confident, only rouse him to greater and more successful exertions. It is to be seriously lamented

that wounded feelings and other causes have deprived the King at this critical moment of the united services of all those who in the last twelve years preserved the country, exposed as it has been to unexampled dangers, and it is painful to observe, Mr. Addington and several valuable men withdrawn from the King's service, we must, however, trust to time for bringing back feelings and sentiments between Mr. Pitt and Mr. Addington to their former state of relation, and I believe at this moment it is the only thing really wanting to the King's complete personal satisfaction.

I am, my dear Lord,
with great regard,
yours most faithfully,
CASTLEREAGH.

*List of the Cabinet.*

| | |
|---|---|
| *Lord Chancellor | Lord Eldon. |
| Chancellor of the Exchequer | Mr. Pitt. |
| *President of the Council | Duke of Portland. |
| *Privy Seal | Lord Westmoreland. |
| Secretary of State, Foreign | Lord Harrowby. |
| * Do. Home | Lord Hawkesbury. |
| Do. Colonies and War | Lord Camden. |
| Admiralty | Lord Melville. |
| *Ordnance | Lord Chatham. |
| Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster | Lord Mulgrave. |
| President of the Board of Trade | Duke of Montrose. |
| *President of the Board of Control | Lord Castlereagh. |

Those marked (*) were of the former Cabinet.

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## No. CLXVII.

*Lord Castlereagh to the Marquess Wellesley.*

(Most Secret.)

London, May 19, 1804.
[Received overland, Oct. 14, 1804.]

MY DEAR LORD,

The Convoy, which sailed about ten days since, will have carried to your Lordship, and to the gallant army employed by you in the field, the thanks and acknowledgements of Parliament, for the splendid and important services which have been rendered to the country in the late glorious cam-

paign. In the hope of being able to acquaint your Lordship with the King's sentiments and determination with regard to the individuals most conspicuously engaged in this brilliant career of victory, I delayed writing from day to day, till the ships had actually sailed, the packet now under despatch will probably outstrip the Convoy, and thus enable me to be amongst the first to offer to your Lordship my cordial congratulations on the series of events, than which none have ever occurred in the military history of our country, more proudly calculated to confirm, and even exalt the reputation and glory of the British arms. The whole of this campaign in the conception of the plan, in the preparation of the army for the field, in the application of it to the vulnerable and important points of the enemy's territory, and above all in the conduct of the army in the day of battle, must ever be deemed a chef d'œuvre of military energy, foresight, and science, and cannot fail in this age of arms, to augment, by the confidence which it is calculated to inspire, our security, not only in the East, but in every quarter of the empire at home and abroad.

I lament that the King's health has not yet admitted of his perusing the interesting details of those services which have been performed by his Indian army; no representation can do the same justice to their merits, and it is to his Majesty's personal conviction of the claim they have on the gratitude of their country, and the favour of their sovereign, that the individuals would, I am persuaded, alone wish to owe the reward which they have so well and so nobly earned. What mark of favour the King may ultimately destine for your Lordship, it is not for me to anticipate, none can exceed the fair and just reward of your distinguished and honourable claims; but I do presume, in confidence, to hope that the two illustrious officers, whose achievements have never been surpassed, will on this occasion be upheld by the most marked and conclusive proofs of the estimation in which their services are held. As this point yet remains unsettled, in expressing my own wishes and expectations, your Lordship will, I am persuaded, be sensible of the propriety of their being for the present confined to your own breast, but I fairly own I should feel that nothing short of the honors which were conferred on General Hutchinson, after the campaign in Egypt, can in any

degree discharge the debt of gratitude which we owe to General Lake; and that your brother's services, equal in every respect to those of the Commander-in-chief, demand, in addition to every future mark of favour and confidence in his profession, the immediate tribute of an extra red ribbon.

Upon the arrival of the series of despatches by the *Belle* and *Waller*, the long interruption of which had certainly been productive of considerable anxiety and embarrassment to the government at home, it was a subject of some difficulty to determine at what period of time the notice of parliament could with most propriety be called to this subject. To postpone the tribute of applause which was due to the army, till the political part of the transaction could be canvassed, was in appearance too cold a return for such unexampled services. To mix the civil with the military merits of the question was impossible, after the claim for information as to the origin of the war had been so formally made, and yet to pass your Lordship's services by, confining the vote singly to the army, was what I could by no means reconcile to my own sense of duty. I trust the line pursued was under all the circumstances the most correct, and I am the more persuaded of this from perceiving, (owing to the voluminous body of information which is preparing for Parliament, and the time which must elapse before this can be printed), that there remains very little chance of any proceeding being had upon it in the course of the present session, which it is hoped may be closed before the end of June.

With the exception of Mr. Francis, as yet, there appears no eagerness in parliament to take up the subject hostilely; in calling for the information, Mr. Francis desired to be understood as not pledged to bring forward any motion, his ulterior determination necessarily depending upon a consideration of the documents to be laid before the house. The disposition which might naturally exist in the members of the old opposition may possibly be considerably corrected by those with whom at present they seem in the habit of acting, and although the course of measures connected with the war will possibly undergo, as I know it is your Lordship's earnest wish they should, a full investigation in parliament, I do not apprehend that the discussion will be conducted with either

acrimony or illiberality. I shall reserve, for a separate letter, whatever observations I shall think it necessary at present to trouble your Lordship with on Mahratta affairs.

I have the honour to be,
my dear Lord,
with great regard, yours most faithfully,
CASTLEREAGH.

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## No. CLXVIII.

*Lord Castlereagh to the Marquess Wellesley.*

(Most Secret.)

London, May 21, 1804.

MY DEAR LORD, [Received overland, Oct. 14, 1804.]

Since I closed my despatch to your Lordship marked "Most Secret, No. 21." I have had an opportunity of conversing generally with Mr. Pitt on the late transactions in India, and particularly on the brilliant services of the army, which I felt to be the most pressing for an early consideration, as I should have been unwilling to send off my letters without having it in my power to convey to you his sentiments upon this part of the subject, and to apprize you of the distinctions which he is disposed to advise his Majesty to confer on the officers who have had the prominent share of glory in conducting the two principal armies to victory.

The personal interest with which Mr. Pitt is disposed to view every transaction in which your Lordship's honour is so largely mixed, in addition to the ardour he always feels to encourage and reward distinguished and meritorious public services, induced him at once to adopt with cordiality the propositions suggested in my former letter, and I am authorized *in confidence*, to assure your Lordship, that Mr. Pitt will take an early opportunity of recommending to the King to confer on General Lake the same mark of his royal favour, which was given to General Hutchinson at the close of the Egyptian campaign, namely: the raising him to the peerage, accompanied by an annuity of similar amount attached to the title, and that he will at the same time request his Majesty to bestow upon Major-General Wellesley the Order of the Bath.

Although I am permitted to convey this assurance in the fullest manner to your Lordship, yet I am persuaded you will feel, that until I am enabled to acquaint you, that the King's pleasure has been actually taken upon this subject, Mr. Pitt's intention should not transpire.

In considering what was due to others your Lordship's strong claims upon the King's favour did not escape Mr. Pitt's notice; he conceived however, whatever distinction the King might be graciously disposed ultimately to confer upon your Lordship, that such mark of his Majesty's approbation would be bestowed in a manner more honourable to your character, and at a moment more consonant to your Lordship's feelings, at the winding up of the important transaction in which you are now engaged, than while it is yet depending.

Believe me, my dear Lord,
With great truth and regard,
Yours most faithfully,
CASTLEREAGH.

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## No. CLXIX.

*Lord Castlereagh to the Marquess Wellesley.*

(Private.)

London, May 24, 1804.

MY DEAR LORD, [Received Oct. 14, 1804.]

The interest you take in everything that concerns the feelings and character of those who have honourably and cordially assisted you in the discharge of your public duties, will make it grateful to your mind to be informed, that my Lord Clive immediately on his return to Europe, has received a marked proof of the King's favour and approbation of his public services, by his Lordship being raised to the dignity of an earldom.

Having always entertained great respect for Lord Clive's zeal, honour, and upright intentions, it was extremely painful to me to find myself under the necessity of concurring in an official disapprobation of sentiments expressed by his Lordship in one of his late minutes, which appeared to me irreconcileable with his then relation to the Government at home.

I have not been the less anxious on that account, by every representation in my power, and the strongest testimonies to the eminently successful tenor of Lord Clive's administration, to contribute to his Lordship's receiving such a mark of the King's favour as I deemed to be justly due to his Lordship's faithful, and honourable exertions in the service of his country.

I have the honour to be,
With great regard, my dear Lord,
Yours most faithfully,
CASTLEREAGH.

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## No. CLXX.

*Lord Camden to the Marquess Wellesley.*

MY LORD, Colonial Office, Downing Street, Aug. 30, 1804.

Your Lordship's letter of the 25th of December 1803, has been laid before the King.

The brilliant and decisive success that has attended the progress of the armies, which have been employed in the East Indies under the command of General Lake and Major-General Wellesley, is justly appreciated by his Majesty, and I have in consequence received his Majesty's commands to inform your Lordship, that in consideration of the meritorious services, and gallant conduct of General Lake, his Majesty has been graciously pleased to create him a Peer of the United Kingdom of England and Ireland; and that in consideration also of the eminent and brilliant services of Major-General Wellelesy, his Majesty has been graciously pleased to direct that the insignia of the most honourable Order of the Bath should be transmitted to that officer; and, that he may immediately evince his sense of Major-General Wellesley's merits and services, his Majesty has further directed that he shall be created an extra Knight Companion of that order, and that his creation and investiture shall not wait for a succession to a regular vacancy therein.

In transmitting to your Lordship his Majesty's gracious approbation of the services of General Lake and Major-General Wellesley, and in acquainting you that his Majesty has been pleased to bestow those marks of his royal favour

upon the respective Commanders of those armies which have so much distinguished themselves, it is my duty to state to your Lordship, at the same time, the very high sense which his Majesty entertains of the able and useful co-operation afforded by Lieutenant-General Stuart in the arrangements necessary for carrying into execution the plans so judiciously formed by your Lordship for the operations of the last campaign; and I am commanded to inform your Lordship of his Majesty's entire approbation of that officer's conduct, and that is the intention of his Majesty's ministers to recommend to his Majesty to bestow some mark of his royal favour on that meritorious officer when he returns to Europe.

Your Lordship has received by a former conveyance, the information of the distinguished manner in which his Majesty considers the enterprize, zeal, spirit, and good conduct of the officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates, employed under the respective orders of General Lake and Major-General Wellesley; I cannot however, close this despatch without repeating his Majesty's gracious approbation and admiration of that conduct, which has contributed so essentially to the happy and glorious termination of the late war in India.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,
Your Lordship's
Most obedient and humble servant,
CAMDEN.

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## No. CLXXI.

*Address of the Inhabitants of Calcutta to his Excellency the most noble Richard Marquess Wellesley, K. P. and Governor General and Captain General, &c. &c.*

MAY IT PLEASE YOUR EXCELLENCY,

We, the British inhabitants of Calcutta, beg leave to offer to your Excellency our sincere and heartfelt congratulations on the happy restoration of peace to the continent of India; and on the important national advantages acquired, under your Excellency's guidance, by the brilliant success of our arms.

At a moment, when the renewal of war in Europe was justly apprehended, the menacing attitude of the armies assembled by the Mahratta chieftains of Malwa and Berar, and the uncontroled authority exercised by French adventurers over the disciplined troops of Scindiah, could not have been viewed without anxiety. But we were scarcely sensible of insecurity to the public peace when the vigour of your Excellency's measures dispelled every alarm, and all apprehension was lost in sentiments of admiration at the provident wisdom with which the danger had been foreseen, and the promptitude with which it was encountered.

The previous distinguished events of your Excellency's administration had prepared the way for the signal successes, which we have recently witnessed. The conquest of Seringapatam, the restoration of the rightful sovereign of Mysore, the dissolution of the French party at the Court of the Nizam, and the peaceful succession of his son to the government of his father's dominions, insured the cordial co-operation of two powers attached to the British Government by the firmest ties of interest and gratitude; while the re-establishment of the Peishwa's legitimate authority at Poonah, has contributed in its turn, to the support of the alliance by which it was effected.

The result has been answerable to the energy with which your Excellency has employed the power and resources of the British Government and of its allies. Within the short space of five months, and chiefly in a season hitherto reputed incompatible with military operations, we have seen two of the most formidable among the Mahratta states reduced, by an unexampled succession of the most splendid victories, to an unconditional dependance on British generosity: their numerous troops dispersed; their most important fortresses captured; and their most valuable dominions subdued.

Our own provinces, and the possessions of our allies, have at the same time displayed the most striking contrast of tranquillity. Their inhabitants, almost unconscious of external war, have enjoyed in security the reward of prosperous industry; and the confidence, reposed by all ranks in the faith and stability of the British Government, has been unequivocally demonstrated by the unprecedented state of public credit, higher at the moment of renewed war with France,

and during the arduous contest now happily terminated in India, than in the most flourishing period of profound peace.

We cannot deny ourselves the pleasure of acknowledging with grateful pride, the conspicuous manner in which the national character for clemency and humanity has been upheld by the strict regularity of our troops, who, in their march through hostile territories, have been welcomed and assisted as benefactors and deliverers. Nor can we suppress the emotions of exultation, with which we have seen the venerable representative of the house of Timur, rescued from the oppression of a French faction, and received under the protection of the British Government.

The tribute of our applause is due to the gallant conduct of the armies whose achievements have advanced the honour of the British name in India. Watching their progress with unceasing interest, we have admired in our heroic Commander-in-Chief General Lake, the rarest union of zeal and intrepidity, with profound skill and considerate humanity. In another quarter, the honourable Major-General Wellesley has nobly emulated that illustrious example; and the memorable days of Assye and Argaum will be placed, with the signal victories of Delhi and Laswaree, among the fairest monuments of national glory. Our brave armies will ever esteem it their highest praise, that by their valour, discipline, exemplary order, contempt of danger, and endurance of hardships, they have shewn themselves actuated by the spirit of their Generals, and equal to the arduous and honourable efforts to which they were called by the vigour of your Excellency's councils.

The exertions of your Excellency in the conduct of the war have been crowned by its propitious termination; and the British power in India has been raised to the proudest pre-eminence. By this auspicious conclusion of a rapid and glorious war, we see the enemies of the British empire humbled; the French influence annihilated; our allies encouraged; our resources enlarged and solidly established; and the British dominions in India rendered at once more secure of enjoying the advantages of peace and more capable of repelling the dangers of war. Contemplating these splendid and substantial benefits, we should do violence to our feelings, did we not tender this testimony of our respect and gratitude

for the eminent virtues and exalted talents exerted by your Excellency, for the safety and prosperity of this valuable portion of the British empire.

Signed by all the British Inhabitants.

*Calcutta, 21st February,* 1804.

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*The following Resolutions were unanimously adopted at the Meeting at which the foregoing Address was agreed to.*

Resolved, That a marble statue of his Excellency Marquess Wellesley be erected at Calcutta, as a lasting memorial of the sense which the inhabitants of this settlement entertain of his public services.

Resolved, That a sword of the value of £1,500 be presented to his Excellency General Lake, in the name of the British inhabitants of this settlement, as a testimony of the sense which they entertain of the services rendered by his Excellency to the East India Company and his country.

Resolved, That his Excellency the most noble the Governor-General be respectfully solicited to communicate to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief the desire of the British inhabitants of this settlement, expressed in the preceding resolution.

Resolved, That a sword of the value of £1,000 be presented to the honourable Major-General Wellesley in the name of the British inhabitants of this settlement, as a testimony of the sense which they entertain of the services rendered by him to the East India Company and his country.

Resolved, That his Excellency the most noble the Governor-General be respectfully solicited to communicate to the honourable Major-General Wellesley the desire of the British inhabitants of this settlement, expressed in the preceding resolution.

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*Governor-General's Reply.*

His Excellency the Governor-General was pleased to return the following answer to the address:

GENTLEMEN,

The regularity, order, and deliberation with which the proceedings of your public meeting have been conducted, are

conformable to the respectable character of this great settlement, and to the magnitude and importance of this happy occasion. The sentiments expressed in your address, are derived from an attentive observation of the events which preceded the commencing of hostilities on the continent of India, and from a correct knowledge of the principles which constitute the basis of the general pacification. You have considered the glory of our victories, and the genuine lustre of our ultimate triumph to be inseparably blended with the original justice of our cause, and with the moderation and clemency exercised in the hour of conquest. Satisfied that the public safety, and the national honour required an appeal to the sword, you have manifested a due sense of the national advantages obtained by the brilliant success of the war, and confirmed by the equitable conditions of the peace.

In this course of proceeding, I recognize with satisfaction and pride, the public spirit of British subjects. To commence or to continue war for purposes of aggrandizement, for the extension of dominion or power, for the gratification of pride, vanity, hatred, or irregular passion, is a species of policy, which no success can sanction, and which every British subject must abhor. Your birth, your education, your attachment to the laws and constitution of our country preclude your admiration of any system of public measures, however adorned by success, which is not founded in the sacred maxims of justice, humanity and honour. I therefore deem it to be a circumstance highly creditable to the character of this settlement, and of my administration, that I should have received from you this unsolicited, deliberate, and public testimony of your sincere and zealous concurrence in the principles of British policy, which have regulated my conduct from the origin to the close of the late memorable war. In the moment of alarm and danger, my duty required me to repel the menaces, insults, and power of the enemy by the most active use of our military force. In the full career of victory, and with the most splendid prospects of unlimited success, the same duty forbad me to prosecute hostilities to the extremity of vengeance, or to urge the fall of a vanquished enemy beyond the just limits of national security, and public faith. With these sentiments I accept this address, not only as a valuable mark of your personal regard, and an unequi-

vocal proof of your honourable attachment to the interests of the public service, but as a solemn pledge of your unanimous determination to maintain in this distinguished settlement, that ardent and active zeal for the glory of our country in which consists the vital principle of the British empire, the source and support of our national fame and power, the origin of our triumphs abroad, the strength of our security at home, and the main bulwark of our defence in every quarter of the globe.

During the crisis which preceded the war I should have viewed the situation of these possessions with anxiety, if I had not been supported by a firm confidence, that the spirit which you have displayed on this occasion, animated the counsels of this government and those of the governments of Fort St. George and Bombay; and that an equal zeal prevailed amongst the generals, officers and troops charged with the execution of my orders.

With united counsels, with an unrivalled army, with flourishing resources, with powerful alliances, and with a just cause, I was enabled to encounter and to surmount the difficulties which surrounded me, and to witness the rapid and complete effect of our military operations on every point of the enemy's strength. The vast extent, complicated system, and matchless success of the campaigns in Hindostan and the Deccan, cannot be contemplated without emotions of gratitude and admiration. The execution of the plans, which it was my duty to form, corresponded with the renown of an army, accustomed to victory, inured to fatigue and danger, attached to the just principles of discipline and order, animated by the memory of former triumphs, and commanded by generals who possess every qualification requisite to inspire confidence, to excite enterprize, and to ensure success.

Peace is the fairest fruit of victory, the brightest ornament of military triumph, and the highest reward of successful valour. The peace, which has been concluded, comprehends every object of the war, with every practicable security for the continuance of tranquillity. The object of the war was not to accomplish inordinate projects of extravagant conquest; not to subvert ancient and revered authorities; not to desolate flourishing provinces; not to plunder private property; nor to disturb the civil and religious institutions of contigu-

ous states; nor to raise commotion in the bosom of established governments; nor to excite discord among powers connected by the relations of amity and peace. The object of the war was, to vindicate and to secure the just and legitimate rights, interests, and honour of the British government and of its allies against usurpation, violence, and rapine. The restoration of the legitimate authority of our ally the Peishwa at Poonah, the establishment of our ally the Soubahdar of the Deccan in his hereditary rights and dominions at Hyderabad, and the deliverance of the unfortunate and venerable emperor Shah Aulum from the hands of the Mahrattas and French at Delhi, were the earliest effects of the success of our military operations. During the progress of our arms, every endeavour was employed to mitigate the horrors of war, even in the midst of hostilities, and to extend security and protection to the utmost limits compatible with the safety of our armies in the field.

In the termination of hostilities, my solicitude has been directed to the important purpose of effecting a general pacification of India on principles of reciprocal justice and moderation. The power, reputation and dignity of the British empire in India, will derive additional security and lustre from the establishment of peace and good order among the native states. In the decline of intrinsic strength, inferior states may perhaps have gained a temporary safety by fomenting the discord of contiguous powers. In any extremity such a policy is unwarrantable and disgraceful; nor can permanent repose be secured upon such precarious foundations. In the actual condition of this empire, I am happy to declare, that the concord of the established native states, the independence of their separate authorities, the internal peace of their respective dominions, and the tranquillity and happiness of their respective subjects will tend to confirm and to fortify the power and resources of the British government, and must constitute the most desirable objects of British policy in India.

In pursuance of these principles, the treaties of peace provide the means, not only of enlarging and consolidating the resources and power of our allies, but of guarding the less powerful neutral states from oppression; of placing the illustrious house of Timur in a condition of competent affluence,

dignity, and honourable repose, and even of admitting our vanquished enemies to the benefits of a general defensive alliance, calculated to secure them in the independent exercise of their actual rights, and in the uncontrolled government of their present dominions; to exclude usurpation, and to limit the several powers of Hindostan and the Deccan to the undisturbed cultivation of their separate resources, within the boundaries of their respective possessions. I trust that the result of this system will prove equally advantageous to our interests and to our honour.

The foundations of our empire in Asia are now laid in the tranquillity of surrounding nations, and in the happiness and welfare of the people of India. In addition to the augmentation of our territories and resources, the peace has manifested exemplary faith and equity towards our allies, moderation and lenity towards our enemies, and a sincere desire to promote the general prosperity of this quarter of the globe. The position in which we are now placed is suited to the character of the British nation, to the principles of our laws, to the spirit of our constitution, and to the liberal and comprehensive policy, which becomes the dignity of a great and powerful empire.

My public duty is discharged to the satisfaction of my conscience by the prosperous establishment of a system of policy, which promises to improve the general condition of the people of India, and to unite the principal native states in the bond of peace, under the protection of the British power.

WELLESLEY.

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## No. CLXXII.

*The Right Hon. Lord Wm. Bentinck, Governor of Madras, to the Most Noble the Marquess Wellesley, K. P., &c. &c. &c.*

MY LORD, Fort St. George, May 2nd, 1804.

I have the honour of transmitting to your Excellency, by Major-General Dowdeswell, the address of the inhabitants of this settlement upon the splendid termination of the Mahratta war.

I feel it to be almost superfluous to express my entire concurrence in the sentiments of that meeting. As an Eng-

lishman, I must admire and be grateful to the man who has raised my country to so high a pitch of prosperity and glory.

Extending, however, the view beyond the immediate prospect of our own national advantages, it is most pleasing to reflect that the result of this war affords a hope of equal benefit to the great mass of the people whose rulers have been conquered.

If the annals of Indian history are retraced, and more particularly the events of later years, it will be found that this vast peninsula has presented one constant scene of anarchy and misery. Constant revolutions, without even a professed legitimate object, have succeeded each other. Wars of great and petty chieftains, unwarranted in their origin and unprincipled in their conduct, for the sole object of robbery and plunder, have depopulated and laid waste the general face of this unhappy country. Justice, order, consideration of public and private rights, nowhere appear in relief of this melancholy picture.

Happily a period has arrived to these barbarous excesses. For the first time, the blessings of universal tranquillity may be expected. That system of policy which could embrace the whole of India, which could comprehend in one bond of mutual defence and reciprocal forbearance the predatory chiefs of this great empire, deserves the admiration of all the civilized world. That system, one of the noblest efforts of the wisdom and patriotism of a subject, which has founded British greatness upon Indian happiness, demands, in a particular manner, the thanks and applause of his country.

I have the honour to be, with the greatest respect,
my Lord,
your Lordship's most obedient and faithful servant,
W. BENTINCK.

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*Address of the Inhabitants of Madras to the Most Noble Richard Marquess Wellesley, K.P., Governor-General and Captain-General, &c. &c.*

MAY IT PLEASE YOUR EXCELLENCY,

We the undersigned British inhabitants of the settlement of Madras, impressed with a just sense of the signal benefits which have resulted from the brilliant success of the late war against the confederated powers of the Mahratta empire,

Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, and from the glorious termination of that contest, have the honour to approach your Excellency with our unfeigned congratulations on events which have raised the splendour and renown of the British arms and achievements to a pitch of unrivalled pre-eminence and grandeur.

At an early period of your Excellency's administration over the affairs of India, the inhabitants of this settlement were called upon by the sense which was impressed upon the minds of all, by the wisdom, energy, and success manifested in the measures which led to the subjugation of the French faction in the Deccan, and to the memorable conquest of Mysore, to convey the tribute of their congratulations on the distinguished events which marked the commencement of your Excellency's government.

When your Excellency assumed the supreme authority of India, we saw the territories of the British nation surrounded and menaced by formidable enemies, and her interests supported by precarious and doubtful alliances; but in the contrast of the present posture of affairs with the past, the contemplation of the change must fill every British heart with sentiments of elevation and thankfulness. In the course of six eventful years, we have seen the conquest of Mysore achieved; our powerful and inveterate enemy, the Sultan of Mysore, who staked the fate of his empire in seeking the destruction of the British power, vanquished, and the legitimate prince, now our nearest ally, raised to the throne of the usurper: we have seen the power of the ancient house of Nizam Ally, which tottered to its fall, restored in security, under the influence of your Excellency's measures, and the son succeed in peace to his father's possessions: we have seen the lawful representative of the Mahratta states compelled by the feudatories of the empire to fly for safety under the protection of the British government, obtain the protection which he sought, and restored to the Musnud of his ancestors; and we have beheld the powerful forces with which your Excellency was called upon to contend in support of the measure, humbled and subdued, after a series of triumphs unexampled in the annals of history.

The confidence which we had been accustomed to repose in the conduct of your Excellency's measures, had averted

much of the anxiety which might have been entertained at the prospect of engaging in hostilities with the combined armies of the Mahratta empire; but unlimited as was our confidence in the wisdom, foresight, and energy of your Excellency's councils, the auspicious conclusion of that war has surpassed the hope that could have been indulged in the most sanguine mind; and when it can scarcely have been known in Europe that the British armies had been compelled to engage in hostile operations, victory and peace have followed a series of events of which the brilliancies can alone be equalled by the rapidity of their succession.

While we admire the wisdom and vigour of your Excellency's counsels in foreseeing the threatening danger, and in seizing the critical moment of action; while we admire, with sentiments which must endear their names to every Briton, those distinguished generals who led forth our armies to victory in Hindostan and the Deccan, and the discipline, perseverance, and valour of the officers and troops, who have, under your Excellency's auspices, performed deeds which in heroism and glory cannot be surpassed, we beg to assure your Excellency that we are not less impressed with sentiments of admiration at the signal example of forbearance and moderation which your Excellency has manifested to the world in stopping the career of victory, at the moment when the power of our adversaries was threatened with annihilation, and in restoring peace to the empire of India, on foundations which promise, under the favour of Divine Providence, the long and undisturbed enjoyment of that invaluable blessing.

In this last great measure of your Excellency's Government, we recognise, with sentiments of national pride and satisfaction, a bright example of the operation of the principles of virtue and justice which have so eminently characterized your Excellency's administration. Splendid as the success of the British arms has been, your Excellency's fame will gather increased lustre from the inviolable attachment to public faith, and the disposition to cultivate and extend the arts of peace, which have formed so proud and elevated a feature in your Excellency's character; and while the conquests which have been achieved under your Excellency's guidance have been great and important beyond former

example, the glory of those deeds will shine more conspicuously pre-eminent, from your Excellency's humanity and munificence in softening the fallen fortunes of the vanquished enemies of our nation.

In conveying to your Excellency our acknowledgements of the unexampled talents, energy, and success with which the foreign relations of the British power in India have, under your Excellency's administration, been upheld, invigorated, and enlarged; for the greatness to which the fame of our power has been raised abroad; for the uprightness and wisdom with which public credit has been maintained, our institutions improved, and justice administered at home; we join our voice in unison with every British subject who has witnessed and participated the inestimable benefits of your Excellency's Government.

(Signed by all the Inhabitants.)

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*Reply of the Governor-General.*

GENTLEMEN,

The British inhabitants of the settlement of Madras are entitled to the most public demonstration of my sincere gratitude and respect.

The zealous, able, and honourable support which I received from Fort St. George, at the commencement of my administration, constituted an efficient cause of the success of our counsels and arms in augmenting the glory and power of our country, by the seasonable restoration of our alliances in the Deccan, by the splendid and auspicious conquest of Mysore, and by the happy settlement of that valuable kingdom.

The recollection of those memorable transactions is indelibly fixed in my mind. At this distance of time, I reflect with increasing pleasure upon the splendid series of events which terminated in the prosperous settlement of Mysore, and established the main foundations of our glorious success in the late contest with the Mahratta power. Our recent triumphs, therefore, have revived and confirmed my grateful remembrance of the useful assistance which I received during the critical period of my residence upon the coast of Coromandel from the loyalty, public spirit, active zeal, and emi-

nent ability which characterize the civil and military service, and the British inhabitants of Madras.

The success of our military operations in the Deccan, during the war with the Mahratta confederates, was essentially promoted by the continuance of the same happy spirit of concord and union which animated the conduct of the Government, and of the settlement of Madras during the contest with the hostile power of Mysore.

Under these circumstances, it is highly satisfactory to me to receive this distinguished mark of the continued confidence and esteem of a settlement which has abundantly supplied the means and instruments of the success of my administration in every exigency of difficulty or danger: and I accept, with particular pleasure, the cordial assurance of your participation in the exalted sentiments of national glory, inspired by the illustrious achievements of our generals, officers, and troops, during the war, and by the principles of British justice, humanity, and honour, which have regulated the conditions of the peace.

The welfare of each of the Presidencies is equally the anxious object of my solicitude and duty. Under the advantages of restored peace, I shall continue to apply my diligent attention to the important purpose of extending throughout this empire, every practical improvement in the internal administration of public affairs. In the progress of this salutary work, I contemplate the rising prosperity of the great settlement of Madras with peculiar interest and satisfaction. During the course of my administration, extensive, valuable, and populous provinces have been added to the government of Fort St. George; its importance in the general scale of the empire, has been considerably increased; its military, financial, and commercial resources, augmented and improved; and its external security firmly established under a system of foreign relations calculated to protect peaceful industry, to cherish the growth of private property, and of internal wealth, and to strengthen and consolidate the powers of the government by the general happiness and welfare of the people.

The laudable sentiments which you have expressed in this address, combined with my confidence in the respectable and honourable hands which administer the internal affairs of Fort St. George, afford a firm expectation that, while justice, public

faith, superior strength, and unrivalled military fame, shall secure the British empire in India against the assaults of our enemies, the provinces subject to the Presidency of Fort St. George will partake of the general prosperity, in a proportion adequate to their extent and importance, to their numerous population, to their valuable intrinsic resources, and to their advantageous local position.

WELLESLEY.

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## No. CLXXIII.

*From the Honourable Jonathan Duncan, Governor of Bombay, to His Excellency the most noble Richard Marquess Wellesley, K. P. Governor General, &c. &c. &c.*

MY LORD, Bombay Castle, 14th April, 1804.

I have the honour to advise your Excellency that several of the principal British inhabitants of this settlement having, on the 13th of last month, applied to the Sheriff to convene a general meeting to consider of an address to your Excellency, on the subject of the late happy termination of hostilities in India, Mr. Nash, the Sheriff, appointed this meeting to take place on Thursday the 22d of March, at the hall of the office of police; where, having opened the business of the day, and Mr. Henshaw having been requested to take the chair a Committee was, after a very eloquent and impressive speech from Mr. Thriepland, appointed to prepare an address, consisting of the following gentlemen:—Robert Henshaw, Esq.; Robert Anderson, Esq.; Major-Gen. John Bellassis; Major-Gen. Richard Jones; Helenus Scott, Esq.; Lieutenant-Colonel Watson, 75th regiment; James Augustus Grant, Esq.; Simon Halliday, Esq.; S. M. Thriepland, Esq.; William Dowdeswell, Esq.; William Kennedy, Esq.; Charles Forbes, Esq.;* and Patrick Hadow, Esq.

These gentlemen having drawn up the form of an address, it was, in due course, approved of and signed by the civil servants, the military and marine officers, the clergy, the gentlemen of the professions of law and physic, the merchants,

* The present distinguished friend of India, and deservedly esteemed Baronet, Sir Charles Forbes, for whose uniform kindness and much valued friendship, the Editor is happy to testify his grateful remembrance.—[ED.]

and other classes of our inhabitants; in which state the same committee waited upon me with it on the 6th instant, requesting that I would forward it to your Excellency in such manner as I should think proper; and Col. Woodington having offered his services, and desired to be honored with the charge of this cordial and sincere expression of the sentiments of the settlement on an occasion no less important to the interests of the United Kingdom, than honourable and glorious to your Excellency's administration, I have with pleasure availed myself of this channel of forwarding the present communication, with the address, that it may be offered to your Excellency by an officer, who, having had opportunities to distinguish himself in the course of the general service to which it refers, has thence already attracted the high and gratifying honour of your Excellency's approbation.

A separate address has, on the present truly interesting occasion, been made to the honourable Major-General Wellesley by the same inhabitants, of which, and of the honourable General's answer, copies are herewith submitted for your Excellency's notice.*

I have the honour to be,
with the utmost respect, my Lord,
your Excellency's most obedient humble servant,
JONATHAN DUNCAN.

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*Bombay Address to his Excellency the most noble Richard, Marquess Wellesley, K. P. Governor-General and Captain-General, &c. &c. &c.*

Bombay, 22d. March, 1804.

MAY IT PLEASE YOUR EXCELLENCY,

We, the undersigned British subjects, now residing in Bombay, beg leave to offer to your Excellency our sincere congratulations on the happy termination of a war, distinguished by a succession of the most brilliant, rapid, and important victories over confederated chieftains, long versed in the practice of arms, possessed of every advantage which a vast superiority of numbers could afford, in a country protected by fortresses of great natural strength, and with such a formid-

* See the Duke of Wellington's Despatches.

able force of artillery on their works, and in the field, as Eastern ambition has seldom accumulated to disturb the tranquillity of surrounding States; and which, at once, evinced the danger of farther delay, and augmented the difficulties of immediate success.

In estimating the causes of this decisive and unparalleled career, we are deeply sensible how much is due to the gallant armies and their illustrious leaders, whose persevering ardour (viewing nothing done while anything great or glorious remained to be accomplished), has left their country no wish connected with the war ungratified, nor any of its objects unfulfilled. But we cannot forget that there is yet a superior claim to our gratitude on this occasion; and, when we address your Excellency as the source whence the high and indelible obligation proceeds, we are convinced we use the language of all who are animated with zeal for the prosperity of the British isles, and are duly aware that the proud and commanding rank which the British Empire occupies among the nations of Europe is indissolubly linked with the permanence of its power, consequence, and authority among the States of Asia.

That such signal success should have crowned the arms of our country at a moment of so much interest to us all, from the arduous and important contest which an inveterate enemy has renewed at home, is an additional reason for exultation on this occasion; and when we reflect that a blow has been struck in one campaign which destroys the laboured fabric of that enemy's insidious policy in the Peninsula, and every other part of India, we look in vain for any former example of a war where an object of such lasting benefit was the result of so short a struggle bestowed on its attainment.

The magnitude of this, and of the various other advantages of the war, would have more than recompensed the greatest sacrifices; but, instead of those, we have had the satisfaction of remarking that there never was a period in the history of India when public credit (the sure criterion of public confidence and opinion), was at a higher pitch than when the armies of the several Pesidencies were engaged in active operations, and the fate of the contest was, as yet, the subject of hope alone; but hope, confirmed by the inspiring recollection of the past, and a knowledge that the same

vigorous and enlightened councils which presided over the campaign of Mysore still reigned in the cabinet, while hearts, which the same undaunted valour animated, beat high for equal glory in the field.

Had we no other means of estimating the extent and value of the obligation which your Excellency's memorable administration of their affairs has conferred on the honourable Company, this striking contrast to the experience of former times (when the hour of victory was sometimes marked with the same financial embarrassment and depression which aggravated the moment of defeat), would itself be sufficient for that purpose; and, when the close of that splendid administration arrives, the loss to British India will only be alleviated by reflecting, that whatever is essential to the permanence of its prosperity, the stability of its power, and the fame of its arms, has already been accomplished; and, that sufficient praise will belong to those who succeed to the management of affairs if they maintain the system which they find established, preserve the elevation which the national character has every where acquired, and prevent the revival of dangers which your Excellency has laboured with such signal and complete success to avert and to subdue.

We have the honour to be, with the greatest respect,
may it please your Excellency,
your Excellency's most obedient
and humble Servants.

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*Reply of the Governor-General.*

GENTLEMEN,

The congratulations which you are pleased to offer to me on the happy termination of the late war, manifest the most honourable, zealous, and just spirit of attachment to the public welfare, and to the national fame and glory.

I accept the animated expressions of your confidence and favourable opinion with a due estimation of the liberal sentiments which dictated your address, and with a high sense of the honour conveyed to me by this public testimony of your approbation.

Your vicinity to the theatre of the war in the Deccan has enabled you to appreciate with accuracy and justice, the

magnitude of the dangers which have been surmounted, and the extent of the substantial advantages which have been obtained by this signal triumph of the British arms. In the commencement and progress of the war in the western quarter of India, the efficiency of various important branches of our military operations was secured by the active aid of the government, of the civil and military service, and of the British inhabitants of Bombay, and the useful and cordial assistance which you contributed in your several capacities to promote the common cause in the hour of peril, entitles you to participate in the honour which has attended our glorious success.

The exertions of Bombay during the late contest have recalled to my recollection the distinguished services of that settlement in a crisis of equal importance; and I have viewed with confidence and satisfaction the revival of the same energy and zeal which facilitated the success of our arms in Mysore.

It is grateful to my mind, that the conclusion of peace should have established national advantages, from which, peculiar benefit will be derived to the settlement of Bombay, by the security and extension of its commerce, military resources, territorial revenues, and political influence and power. The magnitude and importance of these advantages afford a due reward to the loyalty, public zeal and courage uniformly displayed by the settlement of Bombay during my administration. Having borne a considerable share in the burthen and hazard of war, you have received a just proportion of the benefits of peace.

You may rely on the continuance of my earnest endeavours to promote the improvement of those benefits, in your opulent and public spirited settlement; and to maintain the interests, honour, and welfare of Bombay, by a just application of the same principles of public policy which have contributed to secure the general prosperity of the British empire in Asia.

WELLESLEY.

## No. CLXXIV.

*The Governor-General to the Hon. Jōnathan Duncan.*

SIR, July 6, 1804.

I have the honour to acknowledge your kind and satisfactory letter, received by Colonel Woodington, together with the address of the British inhabitants of Bombay.

I have publicly delivered to Colonel Woodington my answer to that spirited and eloquent address, Colonel Woodington will transmit my answer to you, with my request, that you will be pleased to communicate it to the chairman of the meeting, which has declared so honourable a sense of the success of my endeavours to serve my country in the arduous station in which I am placed.

I request you to receive my warmest thanks for the obliging expressions with which you have been pleased to accompany this grateful and respectable communication.

It was peculiarly satisfactory to me to receive the address from the hands of Colonel Woodington, for whose services I entertain a sincere and cordial respect.

The copy of the address presented by the British inhabitants of Bombay to Major-General Wellesley, and the copy of that officer's answer, transmitted with your letter, excited the most lively interest in my mind. The address presented to Major-General Wellesley furnishes an additional instance of the sincere and zealous attachment of the settlement of Bombay to the interests and honour of our country. The public spirit of that proceeding demands the expression of my public approbation.

I am also highly sensible of the personal esteem and regard which the same proceeding manifests towards me; and I request you to assure the British inhabitants of Bombay that I shall ever retain a sense of their personal favours, proportioned to my solicitude for the fame and honour of Major-General Wellesley; whose character and conduct have combined in my mind every sentiment of private affection and attachment, with the most urgent duty of public respect, admiration, and gratitude.

Major-General Wellesley's answer to the address, which he had the honour of receiving, is worthy of the character of

that distinguished officer, and entirely conformable to my sentiments.*

I have the honour to be,
with great respect, Sir,
your faithful servant,
WELLESLEY.

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## No. CLXXV.

*Address from the British Inhabitants of Bhaugulpore.*

Zillah Bhaugulpore, March 15, 1804.

MAY IT PLEASE YOUR EXCELLENCY,

Precluded by our local situation from uniting in the late address to your Excellency of the inhabitants of Calcutta, but concurring in, and impressed with the same sentiments; We, the British inhabitants, residing in the district of Bhaugulpore in the province of Behar, beg leave to approach your Excellency with our ardent and respectful congratulations, on the happy termination of hostilities, and the restoration of peace to Hindostan.

In contemplating the rise, progress and termination of the late glorious war, we view with admiration the comprehensive sagacity which at once embraced the extensive and alarming consequences of the Mahratta confederacy, and with the utmost promptitude and vigour, provided the means of completely defeating them.

The rapid succession of splendid military achievements in the prosecution of your Excellency's plans during the last few months, and the successful conclusion of the war, have established on the most solid and permanent foundation the British empire in India, and inseparably connected your Excellency's fame with the national prosperity and renown.

We further remark, with extreme satisfaction, the display of the British character in the clemency and moderation of the terms of peace, granted to the enemy in the career of victory; and we should suppress our feelings, if we omitted

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* There were addresses to the Governor-General from every British station in India; but those here given are sufficient to shew the feelings pervading the minds of the inhabitants of our eastern settlements as to the policy of the Mahratta war.—[ED.]

to express our pleasure and exultation, in viewing the triumph of humanity, generosity and justice, displayed by the emancipation of the unfortunate, but illustrious, house of Timoor; and its restoration to dignity and independence, under the protection of the mild and equitable British government in India.

An act so noble and disinterested, cannot fail to impress with indelible characters of admiration and gratitude, the minds of the natives of Hindostan, and to engage their attachment to the British nation and its interests; nor to inspire every generous Briton with the most exalted notions of your Excellency's humanity and liberality.

We trust it will not be considered foreign to this address to observe, that we contemplate with the utmost veneration, the consummate skill and heroism which his Excellency General Lake, our illustrious Commander-in-chief, evinced in a rapid series of brilliant and successful exploits, triumphing over every obstacle which could be opposed to his progress, by an enemy vastly superior in numbers, and in discipline and equipment exceeding any native armies hitherto opposed to the British forces.

We also beg leave to notice in similar respectful terms, our admiration of the honorable Major-General Wellesley's rapid successes, whose splendid victories were not less arduous, nor of less importance to the general cause. In expressing these sentiments, our gratitude to our brave officers and soldiers is also excited, for their patient, zealous, and laborious exertions in the field.

May your Excellency's measures invariably be attended with the same brilliant success; and may your happiness in private life be proportionable to your public conduct and invaluable services to the state; and may your Excellency experience the most honourable effects of the lasting gratitude of your King and country.

We have the honour to be,
with the most profound respect,
your Excellency's most obedient,
and most humble servants.

## No. CLXXVI.

*Moorshedabad Address to his Excellency the most noble Richard Marquess Wellesley, &c. &c., Knight of the most illustrious Order of St. Patrick, Governor-General and Captain-General of the Forces of his Majesty and the Honorable Company in India, &c. &c.*

Moorshedabad, February 22, 1804.

MAY IT PLEASE YOUR EXCELLENCY,

We, the European inhabitants of Moorshedabad and its vicinity, impelled by sentiments of the highest respect for your Excellency's character, and equal admiration of the brilliant effects of your Lordship's wise and successful administration, request to be permitted to approach you with heartfelt and sincere congratulations on the happy termination of the late war and the conclusion of a treaty replete with eminent and important advantages of instant possession and of beneficial consequences to an almost incalculable extent. When considered, as giving solid and permanent security to the possessions of the British empire in every part of India, not only those who have the happiness to be placed under your Excellency's immediate government, but the British nation at large, and Britons in all parts of the globe, will pay the tribute of grateful admiration to those transcendent talents and splendid abilities which wisely planned the measures for carrying on this just and necessary conflict; and to that energy of character which concentered and applied the resources of government, and thereby ensured success rapid, brilliant, and unparalleled.

The gallant exertions of the armies, animated by the valour and example of their leaders, have fully seconded your Lordship's intentions, and have given complete effect to your well digested plans; thereby consolidating, extending, and giving full and secure stability to our possessions in India, annihilating completely the heretofore formidable and apparently established interests of our natural enemies the French, evincing, that under such auspices, the united and combined force of native powers is wholly unequal to a contest with British valour; and whilst lustre has been added to our national glory the purposes of humanity have been essentially promoted by the happy and complete emancipation of an

august sovereign and his numerous family, who have long suffered under the pressure of severe calamity.

On these glorious and happy events, fraught with present advantage and future benefit, effected at a most important crisis, when the mother country engaged in an arduous struggle for her liberties and dearest interests, feels most forcibly every acquisition of strength and resource tending to weaken her enemies and cripple their exertions, we, as eye witnesses, reflect with astonishment, gratitude and admiration. These events will hereafter animate the page of history, and lighten the toil of the historian, who will dwell with rapture on a detail of facts and circumstances, adding to the splendour of the national character and almost challenging belief from their number, importance, and consequences.

May your Excellency long continue to guide the helm of the British empire in Asia, and to add, by a succession of exertions emanating from consummate wisdom, and fraught with sound justice and perfect integrity, to the security of the national interests, the advancement of its glory, and to the happiness and comforts of those who reside under your well directed authority and fostering protection.

With those sentiments of grateful and profound respect and decided attachment to your person and character, which animate us in common with all Britons in India, we beg leave to subscribe ourselves,

My Lord,
your Excellency's most faithful and obedient
humble servants.

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## No. CLXXVII.

### BENARES.

March 24th, 1804.

At a Meeting of the British inhabitants of the Province of Benares, holden at Secrole, on the 24th of March 1804, Mr. Thomas Brooke being unanimously called to the chair, the business of the day was opened by the Chairman, in the following appropriate speech:

"The purpose for which this assembly has been convened, is to consider of a suitable and respectful address from the

British inhabitants of this Province, to that high and exalted character by whose wisdom, foresight, and energy, the long planned machinations of our enemies have been defeated, the British empire in India twice preserved, and by the late honourable peace concluded with the Rajah of Berar and Dowlut Rao Scindiah at length secured on a firm and solid basis.

"Knowing as I do, the sentiments of all the gentlemen present, and of those residing in this Province, it is unnecessary for me to point out that the late war was solely undertaken on principles purely defensive, that it was not until every means by negotiation with the powers that had assembled their forces in a menacing position against us had failed, that his Excellency the most noble the Governor-General had recourse to arms.

"The decisive energy which was then displayed in the cabinet and in the field, is the object of our present pride, and will be the admiration of future generations. To him, from whom these noble feelings of exultation arise, is due the most public testimony of our gratitude.

"On such an occasion, words can but feebly express the sentiments that must alike glow in every bosom, and animate every heart. I shall therefore confine myself to proposing, that, an address expressive of our gratitude, our attachment, and our admiration be prepared and presented to his Excellency the most noble the Governor-General Marquess Wellesley."

The proposal was seconded by Mr. Hawkins in the following speech:

"I heartily second the motion. Whilst surrounding societies are offering to our most noble the Governor-General, the just tribute of their unbounded admiration of the wisdom, energy, and unparalleled success of his Excellency's most brilliant administration, and of public gratitude for the signal services rendered by that exalted personage to the British empire at large, and to the Asiatic branch of it in particular, let not silence on our part leave room for a supposition, that, these sentiments glow with less warmth in our bosoms than in the rest of our countrymen in India."

The motion was unanimously agreed to, and the following address presented to his Excellency.

*Benares Address.*

MAY IT PLEASE YOUR EXCELLENCY,

We the British inhabitants of the Province of Benares, beg your Excellency to accept our heartfelt congratulations on the splendid advantages derived to the British empire from the late memorable peace concluded in Hindostan.

Reviewing the transactions which preceded this distinguished event, the vigorous decision with which the alarming designs of the Mahratta potentates of Malwa and Berar were repelled has appeared to us suitable to the whole tenour of your Excellency's administration; and your Excellency's subsequent measures have amply justified the confidence which this energetic commencement of the war inspired.

Under the favour of Providence, the guidance of your Excellency's presiding genius, and the matchless conduct of the Generals, the brilliant career of our arms has surpassed all former example; and with exultation we have beheld our gallant forces surmounting by an invincible spirit all the obstacles opposed to them by severity of climate, by difficult and remote countries, by fortresses deemed impregnable, by the desperate resistance of numerous and disciplined armies, and advancing with unrivalled rapidity from success to success, from victory to victory, until our humbled enemies found their sole refuge in your Excellency's magnanimity.

Fortunate it has been in this arduous crisis that your Excellency could avail yourself of powerful means, the fruit of your Excellency's previous exertions.

The period is yet recent when an army under the control of French officers menaced the authority of our ally the Nizam, and the resources of Mysore were united in the hands of a dangerous, aspiring and implacable foe, but during the late contest we have seen those states affording cordial and efficacious aid to the British cause.

Led by this striking contrast to extend our view to the whole series of your Excellency's measures, we have recognized the genuine character of a policy which commands fortune, and which, in securing present advantages and repelling present dangers, prepares the foundations of strength, and the sources of future glory.

At length a propitious and honourable peace has rewarded your Excellency's cares. The seeds of incalculable evils have perished in the annihilation of French influence, the general pacification of Hindostan has been effected on wise and equitable principles, and the prosperity of the British empire in India, reposes on the stable basis of improved territorial strength, of new and beneficial alliances, of encreased glory, of confirmed reputation for humanity, moderation, and good faith; nor can we esteem it the least important triumph of your Excellency's liberal and enlightened policy, that the unfortunate and oppressed Monarch, the object of affectionate veneration to the Musselman inhabitants of Hindostan, now ranks in the number of princes, who acknowlege the most signal obligations to British valour, and British generosity.

Reflecting on these great achievements, we feel impelled by every sentiment of personal attachment and of public duty to express to your Excellency, our lively sense of the transcendent talents and illustrious virtues, by which your Excellency has supported in these distant provinces the fortunes of our country, and by which your Excellency has entitled yourself to a most conspicuous place among the statesmen and heroes who have raised the fame and power of Great Britain, and nobly united her cause with the dearest interests of humanity and justice.

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*Address of the Military Officers to Major-General George Deare, commanding the station of Benares, &c.*

SIR,

We, the British commissioned and staff officers of the first battalion of the 1st native regiment at Helliah, having had the honour to be informed by your Brigade Major, that an Address is prepared, and about to be despatched by the British inhabitants of Benares, congratulating his Excellency the most noble the Governor-General in Council, upon the late glorious success of the British arms in India, under the happy auspices of the directing wisdom of his Lordship's counsels; and that if we authorize some person there to add our names to the said address, it is probable that a letter

from hence would reach Benares, before the despatch of the same from thence;

We, the above-mentioned therefore, being entirely actuated by the same loyal desire to approach his Lordship, with our humble and heartfelt congratulations, which pervades the rest of the community; and being at the same time anxious, that the accomplishment of this faithful and loyal wish may not depend upon the uncertain probability of a letter from hence arriving in due time at Benares,

We do therefore, with the greatest respect entreat, that you Sir, as our immediate commanding officer, will have the goodness to forward to his Lordship's Military Secretary, if you deem him to be the proper medium, the following expressions (however inadequate) of our most sincere joy, our lively gratitude, profound respect, and high admiration, upon the subject of the late glorious and unparalleled successes.

For us to attempt to descant at large upon so high a theme, would, (we conceive) not only be superfluous, but beyond the limits of our abilities and condition. We must therefore confine ourselves to the more suitable, but not less grateful duty, of laying at his Excellency's feet, our humble, faithful, and loyal congratulations, upon the distinguished marks of honour and favour, which Divine Providence, the fountain of wisdom and valour, hath bestowed upon his Excellency, in selecting him, specially, for the high and arduous task of governing this great empire, and in making his Excellency the organ, and the centre, of that spirit of wisdom and fortitude, valour, justice, and moderation, which has not only saved British and Christian India, at this awful crisis, from a formidable confederacy, but has also in all human certainty, established the glory and prosperity of the same, upon a broader and deeper foundation.

Next to those sentiments of religious gratitude and praise, which are due in the first place to the great Ruler of princes, and Disposer of all events, our tribute of grateful and humble admiration, is due to his Excellency, whose wisdom we trace in its signal effects.

That the same Divine Providence, who has so highly exalted and honoured his Excellency, may be pleased long to continue to inspire his Excellency with every grace and virtue, which may render him the guardian and true glory of a loyal,

grateful and a Christian community, is the humble and cordial prayer of

Sir,

Your most obedient and humble servants,
GEORGE PROLE, Lieut.-Colonel,
and all the other Officers.

*Helliah, March 27th* 1804.

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## No. CLXXVIII.

*Address of the Inhabitants of Patna to Peter Speke, Esq. President of the Committee of the British Inhabitants for presenting an Address to his Excellency the Most Noble the Marquess Wellesley.*

SIR,

We the British inhabitants of the province of Behar, impressed with the most lively sensations of admiration, attachment, and respect for the person and government of his Excellency the most noble Marquess Wellesley, beg leave, Sir, to express to you our regret that, on account of our great distance from the Presidency, we have been excluded from the benefit of subscribing the address presented by your Committee to our illustrious Governor-General on the late happy termination of hostilities in India; the sentiments of that Address corresponding in the fullest manner with our own feelings on this momentous occasion.

Thus unfortunately precluded from the advantage of adding our signatures to your address, we entreat, Sir, that you will do us the favour to assure his Excellency of the high sense of veneration which we entertain of the splendour and value of his distinguished talents and transcendent virtues, and of our hearty concurrence in your congratulations on the glorious issue of a war of such magnitude and importance—a war which, being commenced through necessity, was conducted with that degree of wisdom, promptitude, and valour, which has never been surpassed, and from whence his Excellency and our gallant armies have acquired immortal honour for themselves; at the same time that the most solid advantages have accrued to the British nation and its allies, by the annihilation of French influence throughout India, and from an equitable distribution of power, which has secured, on a

firm basis, the invaluable blessings of peace to the whole peninsula.

We further beg leave to request that you will have the goodness to express to his Excellency our most cordial concurrence in the resolutions of the British inhabitants of Calcutta which are connected with the subject of the address.

We have the honour to be,
with the greatest respect, Sir,
your most obedient and humble servants.
(Signed by all the Inhabitants.)

*Patna, March 12th,* 1804.

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## No. CLXXIX.

*Address from the British Inhabitants of Cuttack to his Excellency the most noble the Marquess Wellesley, K.P. Governor-General and Captain-General of all the Land Forces serving in India, &c.*

MAY IT PLEASE YOUR EXCELLENCY,

While the public admiration and gratitude has been attracted, and glowingly expressed in such respectable quarters of this empire, on the great and substantial advantages arising from your Excellency's measures, we should deem ourselves deficient in the sentiments of public spirit, which become every British subject, if we were to neglect the opportunity which the example of other stations affords us, of soliciting your Excellency's favourable acceptance of our zealous congratulations on the glorious events, and auspicious result of the late war with the confederate Mahratta chieftains.

The laudable principle of just solicitude for the maintenance of the public honour, and the prosperity of the national interests, combined with sentiments of the highest personal veneration and respect for your Excellency, induce us to hope, that your Excellency will receive with approbation, the respectful tribute of our sincere participation in those feelings of admiration and applause, which have been universally excited by the wisdom of your Excellency's councils, by the unparalleled energy of your Excellency's measures, by the splendour of the military achievements under your Excellency's auspices, and by the incalculable benefits which the British empire has acquired, under the general pacification of India.

The importance of your Excellency's services is proportionate to the inestimable blessings secured to this country, by the exertion of those talents and virtues, which have distinguished every measure of your Excellency's administration, from the glorious conquest of Seringapatam in 1799, until the memorable peace concluded in 1803. In the course of that period, the most arduous measures have been carried into execution with unequalled splendour and success, and the interests of the British empire in India have been gradually strengthened, until they have attained, by the result of the late war, the highest degree of prosperity and stability.

Your Excellency is therefore entitled, not only to the admiration and applause of every Briton, but to the gratitude of every person, who can estimate the extent and importance of your transcendent public services.

The tribute of our applause is also justly due to those illustrious characters, his Excellency General Lake, and the honourable Major-General Wellesley, the memory of whose heroic achievments, will be cherished in the grateful recollection of every Briton, who is animated by the love of his country.

Having been distinguished by your Excellency's approbation of our conduct, in the execution of your plans, in the conquest of this Province; we flatter ourselves that the unanimous testimony of our sentiments on the present occasion, will not be considered as a departure from that respect and subordination which are due to your Excellency, no less in your private character, than as the chief executive authority in this great empire.

We beg to assure your Excellency, that no period of time can efface from our memories the recollection of services, which have so justly exalted your name and character; and that we shall feel to the latest moment of existence, the deepest interest in any event, which may be connected with your Excellency's fame and happiness.

(Signed) JOHN MELVILL, &c. &c.

March 30th, 1804.

## No. CLXXX.

*Translation of an Address from the Native Inhabitants of Calcutta to his Excellency the most noble the Marquess Wellesley.*

MAY IT PLEASE YOUR EXCELLENCY,

When by a long series of unfortunate and unavoidable circumstances the affairs of the universe are involved in anarchy and confusion, and whole nations groan under the dreadful effects of tyranny and oppression, the Almighty and all-merciful Deity, in his infinite benevolence selects a personage of consummate excellence for the purpose of restraining the cruel career of powerful tyrants, and of restoring to the world the blessings of universal peace, order and tranquillity.

With joy and gratitude we acknowledge the seasonable interposition of divine Providence, in the selection of your Excellency by whose wise and energetic councils the rapacious designs of lawless ambition have been successfully frustrated, and the rights aad happiness of millions have been firmly secured and established.

From the period of time when the authority of the British nation was first acknowledged in various parts of the fertile and extensive provinces of Hindostan, to whatsover quarter the skill and bravery of its generals directed the march of its armies, victory and success like willing servants have ever accompanied their movements and waited upon their progress.

The several exalted personages who have superintended the government of these heaven bestowed dominions, as well as the subordinate officers who have conducted the detail of the civil administration by the strictest principles of justice, honour and integrity, have consulted the happiness and prosperity of every class of the honourable Company's subjects, and by the establishment of regulations calculated to ensure the preservation of the rights and interests of the inhabitants of the conquered countries, have secured the approbation of their Creator.

The advantages resulting from this distribution of justice have been demonstrated by the loyalty and ready obedience of the inhabitants, and by their consequent state of improved prosperity and augmented happiness.

Praised be the Almighty for all his favours, but more espe-

cially that at a time when the neighbouring chieftains jealous of the power of the British Government were anxious to effect the ruin and desolation of these fertile provinces, He, in his gracious Providence thought fit to select your Excellency to frustrate the ambitious designs of the wicked, and to secure the happiness and prosperity of these dominions.

Since the period of your Excellency's auspicious arrival in this country, we have beheld with gratitude and admiration a succession of splendid victories unexampled in the annals of former ages.

Under the providence of the Almighty, we attribute to your Excellency's unrivalled wisdom, prudence and energy, these brilliant successes, by the result of which, numerous and extensive provinces have been rescued from the tyrannical sway of the Mahratta chieftains, and the seat of Majesty has been recovered from the rapacious hands of a powerful and ambitious enemy.

Our admiration at these successes is augmented by the reflection that former Emperors of Hindostan in the plenitude of their power, possessed of numerous armies, of ample resources, in vain attempted during a period of many years to overpower those states, and to reduce those fortresses, which under the direction of your Excellency, and by the skill and bravery of the British Generals, and the British armies, have been subdued in the course of a few months.

The fame of these triumphs, and the renown of these conquests have reached the most remote quarters of the world, and with your Excellency's name will be transmitted with honour to the latest posterity.

Under these circumstances, we beg leave with every sentiment of humility, respect and gratitude, to offer to your Excellency our heartfelt congratulations on the attainment of these signal successes, and to express our earnest hopes that Almighty Providence may long preserve your Excellency in the protection of these dominions, and in the enjoyment of increasing power, happiness and dignity.*

*Calcutta, July 9th* 1804.

* The signatures to this Address comprise all the Natives of wealth and rank in the lower Provinces.—[*Ed.*]

## No. CLXXXI.

*Archibald Seton, Esq.,* to the Marquess Wellesley.*

My Lord, Barelli, July 16, 1804.

At a time when the heart of every Briton, who really felt for the prosperity of his native land, exulted in the brilliant success of the measures adopted by your Excellency, and when almost every class of British subjects who were at all distinguished by local or official circumstances, from the general body of their countrymen, manifested its grateful and patriotic feelings in a congratulatory address, it might naturally be expected that the gentlemen stationed in the ceded provinces would be anxious to be permitted to approach your Excellency for the purpose of expressing *their* feelings also, upon an occasion still more interesting, if possible, to *them*, than to their fellow subjects in the lower provinces of Bengal, since the frontier situation of the districts where they were stationed during the war, and their vicinity to the seat thereof, rendered them, in a manner, eye witnesses of the important scene, and feelingly convinced them of the admirable policy, wisdom and foresight of the measures, which, by securing in perpetuity the tranquillity of British India, will for ever render the glorious and eventful administration of your Excellency an era most dear to the recollection of every Briton.

It was accordingly in agitation to adopt that mode of respectfully assuring your Excellency how ardently we participated in the feelings and wishes of our countrymen. But, on further consideration, it occurred to us that, however gratifying to *ourselves*, the measure would have been,—the smallness of our number was such as to have prevented it from being an offering worthy of being presented to your Excellency; and upon that principle, it was deemed advisable to give up the idea of requesting permission to approach your Excellency with a public address; a line of conduct, to which we were further induced to adhere, by the reflection that the British inhabitants of the metropolis of British India *virtually* included and spoke for their absent countrymen in

* Then holding the situation of Agent to the Governor-General in the ceded and conquered provinces.

this quarter; to whose "respect and gratitude for the eminent virtues and exalted talents so successfully exerted by your Excellency, for the safety and prosperity of this valuable portion of the British empire," no powers of language can do justice.

But, however insignificant our sentiments and wishes might have appeared, if conveyed in the form above alluded to, I am persuaded your Excellency will not be displeased at my taking the liberty to assure you, in the present more humble manner, that our sensations on this most interesting occasion, so justly dear to the feelings of every real well wisher to his conntry, are ardent, zealous, and sincere; that in our *hearts* we congratulate your Excellency on the complete and brilliant success which has attended your measures; and that our patriotic exultations are blended with a sensation of the most animated personal gratitude towards your Excellency, as the saviour of British India, at a moment the most critical and arduous that had yet occurred.

It is not, however, to British breasts alone that gratitude and admiration are confined. The nature of my official situation gives me frequent opportunities of learning the sentiments of the natives; and I can with truth assert, that all ranks are strongly impressed with a sense of the general benefit which will result to India from the present decided preponderance of British influence, by completely checking that spirit of predatory warfare, which has long desolated its fairest provinces; and by introducing tranquillity, regulation and order into countries which, almost from time immemorial have been the seat of war, anarchy, and rapine.

But, what the more enlightened natives are particularly fond of dwelling upon, is the humanity with which the war has been conducted, and the salutary relief and protection which it has been the immediate means of affording to many illustrious families that had long been the victims of Mahratta oppression, combined with French rapacity. In discussing the subject, they appear to have a rational and well founded satisfaction in contrasting the conduct of the present possessors of Delhi with that of its former conquerors. The miseries which the inhabitants of that unfortunate city suffered when captured by Tamerlane, Nadir Shah, and Ahmed Shah Abdallee, are well known to all ranks of natives. "It was

reserved," they remark, "for a British conqueror to exhibit the rare instance of conquering, not to destroy, but to preserve." The entry of his Excellency the Commander-in-chief into Delhi was an event no less glorious to himself and to his victorious army than desirable to the inhabitants of that capital; who felt, that to be placed under British protection, was to them the first of blessings.

Such is the language held by the native inhabitants of a country which, by the enlightened policy and energetic measures of your Excellency, has been delivered from the calamities of anarchy, injustice, and oppression.

With a fervent and heartfelt wish, that, in addition to a nation's gratitude, your Excellency may long enjoy every happiness and prosperity which this world can afford, I have the honour to be, My Lord,

your Excellency's most obliged and most obedient, humble servant,

ARCHIBALD SETON.

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## No. CLXXXII.

*The Marquess Wellesley to Lieut.-General Lake.*

SIR, Fort William, March 9, 1804.

With the most sincere satisfaction, I have the honour to comply with the request of this great and respectable settlement, in transmitting to your Excellency the testimony of gratitude and admiration contained in the unanimous resolution of a general meeting of the British inhabitants of Calcutta.

The most sacred principles of public duty, united with unalterable sentiments of friendship and affectionate attachment, excite in my mind an anxious solicitude for your Excellency's welfare, happiness, and fame. Your Excellency's splendid and valuable achievements demand every public honour from the justice and gratitude of your country. No duty can be so acceptable to me as that of conveying to you the deserved reward of your arduous services. I therefore trust, that your Excellency will accept, with satisfaction, the unanimous testimony of public respect, offered to you in the enclosed resolution; and that you will receive with pleasure my cordial and zealous approbation of the just and laudable

sentiments expressed on this occasion by the British inhabitants of the capital of the British possessions in India.

I have the honour to be, Sir,
your Excellency's most faithful servant,
WELLESLEY.

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*Lieut.-General Lake's Reply to the Marquess Wellesley.*

Head Quarters, Camp at Rhamgur,
March 20, 1804.

MY LORD,

I have received, with sentiments of the most sincere pleasure, your Lordship's letter, conveying to me the resolution of a general meeting of the British inhabitants of Calcutta, to honour me with a valuable testimony of their respect and approbation.

Whilst I participate in that just triumph, which has its origin in the general prosperity, and in the increase of the power and glory of our country, I feel the satisfaction which had arisen from the success of my exertions in conducting the late campaign in Hindostan, greatly enhanced by so honourable a testimony of esteem, from a large and respectable settlement.

The public applause, admiration and gratitude, have been justly excited by the foresight, wisdom and energy of your Lordship's councils; and I experience a pride and pleasure which can only terminate with my existence, in having contributed to conduct your Lordship's measures to a termination fraught with benefits at once the most splendid, the most stable, and the most important.

The esteem and applause of our country form the best motives to animate our exertions, and are the great and wished-for reward of every public service. To be honoured, therefore, with an expression of these sentiments, in a public and unanimous resolution of so respectable a body of my countrymen, is peculiarly gratifying to every principle of public duty.

The manner in which this resolution has been transmitted to me, the expressions of your Lordship's friendship which have accompanied it, and the high approbation with which my exertions have been honoured, are circumstances gratifying beyond expression to the warmest feelings of my heart.

I beg leave to offer to your Lordship assurances of my

affectionate attachment, and of my sincere sense of repeated obligations; whilst I request the favour of your Lordship to convey to the British inhabitants of Calcutta my most grateful acknowledgements for the flattering opinion they entertain of my services, and for the distinguished mark of partiality and regard with which they have honoured me. I most ardently hope that they will continue in the same career of prosperity and success in which they have advanced to their present exalted situation of importance, opulence, and grandeur. I have the honour to be, my Lord,

your Lordship's most faithful humble servant,

G. LAKE.

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## No. CLXXXIII.

*The Right Hon. Lord Eldon to the Marquess Wellesley.*

MY LORD, House of Lords, 3d May, 1804.

In obedience to the commands of the House of Lords, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship the several inclosed resolutions of that House, expressive of its high sense of the great and important services rendered to the empire, by the late illustrious operations in India.

I beg your Lordship to be assured that whilst I feel pride and satisfaction in being the instrument of conveying the gratitude of the House towards all those to whom the House has been pleased to express that gratitude, I cannot but more especially rejoice that I am called upon to communicate to your Lordship those testimonies of your country's applause which your Lordship's great services have earned from its justice. I have the honour to be, with sincere attachment,

Your Lordship's

most faithful friend and obedient humble servant,

ELDON.

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Die Jovis, 3° Maij, 1804.

Resolved, Nemine Dissentiente, by the Lords Spiritual and Temporal in Parliament assembled, That the thanks of this House be given to the most honourable Richard Marquess Wellesley, Governor-General of the British possessions in the East Indies, for the zeal, energy and ability, with which the

military resources of the British empire in India have been recently applied, under his direction, in the prosecution of the war against the confederate forces of Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar; and, that this House doth eminently attribute the brilliant and glorious successes, which have crowned our arms in that quarter of the globe, to the vigorous and comprehensive system of measures pursued by the Marquess Wellesley for bringing the various armies with promptitude and effect into the field.

Resolved, Nemine Dissentiente, That the thanks of this House be given to the Right Honourable Lord Clive, late Governor of the settlement of Fort St. George, for his zealous, cordial, and honourable concurrence in promoting the military operations which, since the commencement of the war, have been attended in every part of India with an uninterrupted series of the most signal and splendid victories; and that the Lord Chancellor do give his Lordship the same, when his Lordship is in his place in this House.

Resolved, Nemine Dissentiente, by the Lords Spiritual and Temporal in Parliament assembled, That the thanks of this House be given to Jonathan Duncan, Esquire, Governor of Bombay, who, by his promptitude and activity in employing the resources and power of that Presidency, has materially contributed to the glorious success of the British arms in India.

Resolved, Nemine Dissentiente, by the Lords Spiritual and Temporal in Parliament assembled, That the thanks of this House be given to General Gerard Lake, Commander-in-Chief of his Majesty's and of the Company's forces in India, for the eminent judgment, active spirit, and invincible intrepidity manifested by him in the command of the army serving in Hindostan, by which he has maintained the honour of the British nation, and reflected such additional lustre on the reputation of the British arms.

Resolved, Nemine Dissentiente, by the Lords Spiritual and Temporal in Parliament assembled, That the thanks of this House be given to Major-General the honourable Frederick St.John, for his courage and steadiness in seconding the efforts of the Commander-in-Chief in Hindostan; and also, to Major General the honourable Arthur Wellesley, for the many important, brilliant and memorable services atchieved by him in the command of the separate army within the Deccan; and also, to

the several officers of the army, both European and native, for their gallant conduct and meritorious exertions, during the arduous, honourable, and successful campaign in the East Indies.

Resolved, Nemine Dissentiente, by the Lords Spiritual and Temporal in Parliament assembled, That this House doth highly approve and acknowledge the zeal, discipline, and bravery uniformly displayed by the non-commissioned Officers and private soldiers, both European and native, employed against the enemy in the East Indies; and that the same be signified to them by the Commanders of the several corps, who are desired to thank them for their exemplary and gallant behaviour.

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*The Marquess Wellesley to the Right Honourable Lord Eldon, Lord High Chancellor, &c, &c.*

My Lord, Fort William, May 30th, 1805.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's letter, transmitting to me the resolutions of the House of Lords of the 3d of May 1804, respecting the operations of his Majesty's and the honourable Company's forces in India against the Mahratta confederates.

Those Resolutions together with your Lordship's letter, were immediately published to the army, and I have since forwarded the separate resolutions to the public officers, whom their Lordship's have been pleased to distinguish by the honour of their particular approbation, copies of my letters on this occasion and of such answers as I have received, are enclosed in this despatch for the information of the House of Lords.

The unanimous approbation which the House of Lords have been pleased to express of the late military operations in India, cannot fail to perpetuate the spirit of public zeal which animated the exertions of the general officers and soldiers, employed in the war.

I request your Lordship to submit to the House of Lords with every expression of respect my grateful acknowledgments of the favour manifested towards me by their Lordships, in distinguishing my humble services by the high testimony of their approbation. At the same time, I trust that your Lordship will accept my sincere thanks for the great additional distinction conferred upon me by the honourable terms,

which your Lordship has been pleased to employ, in communicating to me the resolutions of the House of Lords.

I have the honour to be,
With great respect, &c.
WELLESLEY.

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## No. CLXXXIV.

*The Right Hon. Charles Abbott, Speaker of the House of Commons, to the Marquess Wellesley.*

House of Commons, London,
May 4th, 1804.

MY LORD,

In obedience to the commands of the House of Commons of the united Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, I have the honour of transmitting their resolution of thanks to your Lordship for the zeal, energy and ability with which the military resources of the British empire in India have been recently applied under your Lordship's direction, in the prosecution of the war against the confederate forces of Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar; this house eminently attributing the brilliant and glorious successes which have crowned our arms in that quarter of the globe, to the vigorous and comprehensive system of measures pursued by your Lordship for bringing the various armies with promptitude and effect into the field.

This House has also given its thanks to Lord Clive, the late governor of the settlement of Fort St. George, and to Jonathan Duncan, Esq., Governor of Bombay respectively, for their zealous concurrence and activity in promoting the military operations which, under your Lordship's auspices, have been attended with an uninterrupted series of signal and splendid victories.

I am also commanded to transmit to your Lordship the unanimous thanks of this House to General Lake, Commander-in-chief of his Majesty's and the Company's forces in India, to Major-General St. John, to Major-General Wellesley, and to the several officers of the army, both European and native, employed under them, expressed in terms which characterize the just sense which this House entertains of their highly distinguished and ever memorable services.

To these votes is further added an unanimous resolution

of the house, declaring its high approbation and acknowledgment of the zeal, discipline, and bravery displayed by the non-commissioned officers and private soldiers, both European and native, employed against the enemy; and desiring the commanders of the several corps to thank them for their exemplary and gallant behaviour.

In transmitting these resolutions to your Lordship, I cannot refrain from bearing testimony to the sentiments of universal admiration with which this nation has heard of the heroic achievements of their brave countrymen in the East, and the rapid succession of their triumphs throughout the wide extent of one short campaign, planned, executed, and consummated in a manner which, at the same time that it raises a splendid and lasting monument of our military glory, must teach surrounding nations to stand in dread of our arms, and materially contribute at this eventful period to the strength and security of every part of our empire.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,
your Lordship's most faithful and
obedient servant,
CHARLES ABBOTT.

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*Thanks of the House of Commons*

Jovis, 3 die Maij, 1804.

Resolved, That the thanks of this House be given to the most noble Richard Marquess Wellesley, Governor-General of the British possessions in the East Indies, for the zeal, energy and ability with which the military resources of the British empire in India have been recently applied, under his direction, in the prosecution of the war against the confederate forces of Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar; and that this house doth eminently attribute the brilliant and glorious successes which have crowned our arms in that quarter of the globe, to the vigorous and comprehensive system of measures pursued by Marquess Wellesley, for bringing the various armies with promptitude and effect into the field.

Resolved, That the thanks of this House be given to the Right Hon. Lord Clive, late Governor of the settlement of Fort St. George, for his zealous, cordial, and honourable concurrence in promoting the military operations which, since the commencement of the war, have been attended in every

part of India with an uninterrupted series of the most signal and splendid victories.

Resolved, That the thanks of this House be given to Jonathan Duncan, Esq., Governor of Bombay, who, by his promptitude and activity in employing the resources and power of that Presidency, has materially contributed to the glorious success of the British arms in India.

Resolved, Nemine Contradicente,—That the thanks of this House be given to General Gerard Lake, Commander-in-chief of his Majesty's and of the Company's forces in India, for the eminent judgment, active spirit, and invincible intrepidity, manifested by him in the command of the army serving in Hindostan, by which he has maintained the honour of the British nation, and reflected such additional lustre on the reputation of the British arms.

Resolved, Nemine Contradicente,—That the thanks of this House be given to Major-General the honorable Frederick St. John, for his courage and steadiness in seconding the efforts of the Commander-in-chief in Hindostan; and also to Major-General the honorable Arthur Wellesley, for the many important, brilliant, and memorable services achieved by him in the command of the separate army within the Deccan; and also to the several officers of the army, both European and native, for their gallant conduct and meritorious exertions during the arduous, honourable, and successful campaign in the East Indies.

Resolved, Nemine Contradicente,—That this House doth highly approve and acknowledge the zeal, discipline and bravery, uniformly displayed by the non-commissioned officers and private soldiers, both European and native, employed against the enemy in the East Indies; and that the same be signified to them by the commanders of the several corps, who are desired to thank them for their exemplary and gallant behaviour.

Ordered, that the said resolutions be transmitted by Mr. Speaker to the Marquess Wellesley, Governor-General of the British possessions in the East Indies, and that his Lordship be desired to communicate the said resolutions to the Governor-General and other officers referred to therein.

J. Ley,
Ch. D. Dom. Com.

*The Marquess Wellesley to the Right Hon. Charles Abbott, Speaker of the House of Commons.*

SIR, Fort William, May 30, 1805.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, under date the 4th of May 1804, transmitting the resolutions of the House of Commons of the 3d May 1804, respecting the late military operations in India against the confederate Mahratta powers.

Your letter, together with the resolutions of the House of Commons, has been published in general orders, and the separate resolutions of the house have been transmitted to the several public officers distinguished by that high honour. Copies of my letters transmitting those resolutions, and of such answers as I have received, accompany this letter.

I request that you will be pleased to submit to the House of Commons the dutiful sense of gratitude and respect with which I receive this honourable testimony of the approbation of the House.

The proceedings of the House of Commons on this occasion are calculated to confirm, in every branch of the civil and military service in India, those sentiments of zealous attachment to the public interests and honour which have distinguished the conduct of his Majesty's and the honourable Company's servants during the late war.

The expressions which you have been pleased to employ in transmitting to me the resolutions of the House of Commons demand my most grateful acknowledgments, and constitute a considerable addition to the honour conferred by the commands of the House.

I have the honour to be,
with great respect, &c.
WELLESLEY.

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## No. CLXXXV.

*Vote of Thanks from the Court of Directors of the Company to the Marquess Wellesley.*

At a Court of Directors held on Friday the 18th May, 1804:

Resolved, That the Court taking into consideration the

despatches relative to the late brilliant successes in the East Indies, in the war with the Mahratta chieftains Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and the Rajah of Berar, without entering at present into the origin or policy of that war,

The thanks of this Court be given to the most noble the Marquess Wellesley, Governor-General for the zeal, vigour, activity and ability, which he displayed in preparing the armies at the several Presidencies to take the field, and to which may be attributed in a great measure, the rapid and brilliant successes of the military operations which have crowned the British arms in the East Indies.

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## No. CLXXXVI.

*Vote of Thanks of the Court of Proprietors of the East India Company.*

At a General Court of Proprietors held on Tuesday the 22d of May, 1804:

Resolved unanimously, That this Court taking into consideration the despatches relative to the late brilliant successes in the East Indies, in the war with the Mahratta chieftains Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and the Rajah of Berar, without entering at present into the origin and policy of that war, the documents respecting which are not yet before the Court, the thanks of this Court be given to the most noble the Marquess Wellesley, Governor-General, for the zeal, vigour, activity and ability, which he displayed in preparing the armies at the several Presidencies to take the field, and to which may be attributed in a great measure, the rapid and brilliant successes of the military operations which have crowned the British arms in the East Indies.

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*Calcutta Gazette Extraordinary.*

26 October, 1804.

The Governor-General in Council, Captain-General, and Commander-in-Chief, &c. has the satisfaction to publish to the army, by order of the honourable Court of Directors, the following Resolutions of the honourable Court of Directors, and of the General Court of Proprietors, communicated in the commands of the honourable Court of Di-

rectors, signified to the Governor-General in Council, under date 1st of June 1804.

At a Court of Directors, the 18th May, 1804.

Resolved, that the thanks of this Court be given to General Gerard Lake, Commander-in-Chief of his Majesty's and of the Company's forces in India, for the great and eminent services, and the invincible intrepidity and spirit manifested by him in the command of the army serving in Hindostan, by which he has maintained the honour of the British nation, and reflected such additional lustre on the reputation of the British arms.

Resolved, that the thanks of this Court be given to Major-General the honourable Frederick St. John, for his courage and steadiness in seconding the efforts of the Commander-in-Chief in Hindostan; and also to Major-General the honourable Arthur Wellesley, for the important and brilliant services performed by him in the command of the separate army within the Deccan; and also to the several officers of the army, both European and Native, for their gallant conduct and meritorious exertions during the arduous, honourable, and successful campaign in the East Indies.

Resolved, that this Court doth highly approve and acknowledge the zeal, discipline, and bravery uniformly displayed by the non-commissioned officers and private soldiers, both European and Native, employed against the enemy in the East Indies; and that the same be signified to them by the commanders of the several corps, who are desired to thank them for their exemplary and gallant behaviour.*

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*The Marquess Wellesley to the Honourable the Court of Directors.*

HONOURABLE SIRS, Fort William, March 23d, 1805.

The resolutions of your honourable Court passed on the 18th of May 1804, and of the general Court of Proprietors passed on the 22d of the same month, on the subject of the military operations in India, during the late war with Dowlut

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* A similar vote of thanks to General Lake and the army was passed by the Court of Proprietors, the only difference being the word "*unanimously*" in the latter, which was not inserted in the former.—[*Ed.*]

Rao Scindiah, and the Rajah of Berar, were received at Fort William in the month of October 1804.

2. I request your honourable Court to accept my humble thanks for the honour which you have been pleased to confer upon me by your resolution, and to submit to the honourable the Court of Proprietors, my dutiful sense of the favour by which they have distinguished my conduct in the discharge of my public duty during the important crisis of the late war.

3. In pursuance of the commands of your honourable Court, the resolutions of thanks to his Excellency the right honourable Lord Lake, Commander-in-Chief; to Major-General the honourable Frederick St. John; to Major-General the honourable Sir Arthur Wellesley, K.B., and to the officers and men employed in Hindostan, and in the Deccan, were published in general orders to the army, and in an extraordinary gazette of the 26th of October, 1804, of which a copy is annexed to this letter.

4. Your honourable Court will observe that the resolutions by which your honourable Court, and the Court of Proprietors, have been pleased to signify your approbation of my conduct, are not published in those orders.

5. I have never been required to offer a greater or more painful sacrifice to public duty than that by which I renounced the satisfaction of publishing in India, the marks of approbation and honour conferred upon me by your honourable Court, and by the Court of Proprietors; but it appeared to me to be necessary to submit the high personal distinction which I should have derived from such a publication, to more important considerations of the public safety, and of the interests of the Company, and of the nation in India.

6. The determination expressed in those resolutions to withhold all judgment upon the original justice, necessity and policy of the war, could not have been published in India by a formal act of this government, without conveying an universal impression of doubt and ambiguity respecting the stability of every arrangement connected with the progress and success of our arms. The permanency of all the treaties of peace, partition, subsidy, and alliance must have been exposed to hazard by such a public declaration, proceeding from the high authority of your honourable Court, and of the Court of

Proprietors, and announced by your government in India to all your subjects, dependents and allies.

7. The public and formal reservation of your judgment upon the justice of the war necessarily would have involved the possibility of your future condemnation of the cause in which the British arms had been employed. It could not be supposed that either your honourable Court, or the Court of Proprietors would try the justice of our cause by the success of our arms: the prosperous result of the war therefore could not have removed the doubts of its justice arising from the reservations expressed in your resolutions; and the irresistible inference in the minds of all the native states would have been, that your honourable Court and the Court of Proprietors might ultimately censure the whole transaction; while the general fame of your equity and magnanimity would have precluded any supposition that in condemning the justice of our cause, you would retain the fruits of our success, or enjoy the benefits of the peace, while you repudiated the necessity and policy of the war.

8. The wisdom and prudence of your honourable Court will anticipate the confusion and disorder which must have arisen among the native powers if any doubt had been cast (without your express commands) by the public authority of this government upon the stability of a settlement of peace, concluded with the utmost degree of solemnity at the close of a most awful contest in arms, embracing the interests of every principal state in India, and establishing a comprehensive system of alliance and political relation over every region and province of Hindostan and the Deccan.

9. If the origin and policy of the war shall ultimately be condemned, and the treaties of peace, partition, subsidy and alliance shall finally be abrogated by the commands of your honourable Court, those commands will be issued in such terms and accompanied by such arrangements as shall render the execution of your orders an additional bulwark to the public safety, and a fresh security to the public faith. During whatever interval of time your honourable Court may be pleased to suspend your determination, it would neither be consistent with the welfare of the honourable Company in India, nor with the respect due to your high authority, that one of your servants, for the gratification of personal ambi-

tion by the ostentatious display of the honours which you had been pleased to confer upon him, should pursue a course which might embarrass the free and deliberate exercise of your wisdom and justice in a matter of the utmost importance to the national interests and honour; or that, by a premature and unseasonable publication of your favourable acceptance of his services, the same servant should risk the main object of those services, and endanger the immediate security of a great political system of arrangement which it may possibly be your future pleasure to confirm.

10. With these sentiments I have reluctantly determined to deny myself the honour of publishing the resolutions of your honourable Court and of the Court of Proprietors, conferring personal distinctions upon my conduct, until I shall be satisfied that these marks of your favour towards me can be announced in India without injury to your interests or embarrassment to your ultimate decision.

11. The votes of both houses of parliament being entirely silent respecting the origin, policy, justice, and necessity of the war, and expressing no reservation on any of those important topics, I have published all the resolutions of the Lords and Commons in general orders, without any apprehension of the dangers described in the preceding paragraphs of this letter.

12. I trust that your honourable Court and the Court of Proprietors will receive with favour the repeated expression of my sincere gratitude for the honour which you have been pleased to bestow upon me, and of my deep concern that the object of your liberal, generous, and public spirited views, in conferring those high distinctions upon your principal servant in India, has been suspended by his conscientious sense of his duty to you, to the Company, and to the nation.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

# APPENDIX.

## A.

*Treaty of perpetual and general defensive alliance, between the Honourable English East India Company and his Highness the Peishwa Badjee Rao Ragonaut Rao Pundit Purdhaun Bahauder, his children, heirs and successors, settled by Lieutenant Colonel Barry Close, Resident at the Court of his Highness, by virtue of the powers delegated to him by his Excellency the Most Noble Richard Marquis Wellesley Knight of the most illustrious order of Saint Patrick, one of his Britannic Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council, Governor General in Council, appointed by the Honourable Court of Directors of the said company to direct and controul all their affairs in the East Indies.—*

Whereas, by the blessing of God, the relations of peace, and friendship, have uninterruptedly subsisted for a length of time between the Honourable English East India Company and his Highness Rao Pundit Purdhaun Bahauder, and have been confirmed at different periods, by treaties of amity and union; the powers aforesaid adverting to the complexion of the times have determined, with a view to the preservation of peace and tranquillity to enter into a general defensive alliance, for the complete and reciprocal protection of their respective territories, together with those of their several allies and dependants, against the unprovoked aggressions or unjust encroachments of all or any enemies whatever.

ARTICLE 1st. The peace, union and friendship, so long subsisting between the two states, shall be promoted and increased by this treaty, and shall be perpetual. The friends and enemies of either, shall be the friends and enemies of both, and the contracting parties agree, that all the former treaties and agreements between the two states, now in force, and not contrary to the tenour of this engagement, shall be confirmed by it.

ARTICLE 2nd. If any power or state whatever, shall commit any act of unprovoked hostility or aggression against either of the contracting parties, or against their respective dependants or allies, and after due representation, shall refuse to enter into amicable explanation, or shall deny the just satisfaction or indemnity which the contracting parties shall have required, then the contracting Parties will proceed to concert, and prosecute such further measures, as the case shall appear to demand.

For the more distinct explanation and effect of this agreement the Governor General in Council on behalf of the Honourable Company, hereby declares, that the British Government will never permit any power or state whatever to commit with impunity, any act of unprovoked hostility or aggression against the rights and territories of his Highness Rao Pundit Purdhaun Bahauder, but will at all times maintain and defend the same, in the same manner as the rights and territories of the Honourable Company, are now maintained and defended.

ARTICLE 3rd. With a view to fulfil this treaty of general defence and protection, his Highness Rao Pundit Purdhaun Bahaudur agrees to receive, and the Honourable East India Company to furnish, a permanent subsidiary force of not

less than six thousand regular native infantry, with the usual proportion of field pieces, and European artillery-men attached, and with the proper equipment of warlike stores and ammunition, which force is to be accordingly stationed, in perpetuity in his said Highnesses territories.

ARTICLE 4th. For the regular payment of the whole expence of the said subsidiary force, his Highness Rao Pundit Purdhaun Bahauder hereby assigns and cedes in perpetuity to the Honourable East India Company, all the territories detailed in the schedule annexed to this treaty.

ARTICLE 5th. As it may be found that certain of the territories ceded by the foregoing article to the Honourable Company, may be inconvenient from their situation, his Highness Rao Pundit Purdhaun Bahauder, for the purpose of rendering the boundary line of the Honourable Company's possessions, a good and well defined one, agrees, that such exchanges of talooks or lands shall be made hereafter, on terms of a fair valuation of their respective revenues, as the completion of the said purpose may require, and it is agreed and covenanted, that the territories to be assigned and ceded to the Honourable Company by the 4th article, or in consequence of the exchange stipulated eventually in this article, shall be subject to the exclusive management and authority of the said company and of their officers.

ARTICLE 6th. Notwithstanding the total annual expence of the subsidiary force is estimated at 25 lacs of rupees his said Highness hath agreed to cede by article 4th. lands estimated to yield annually the sum of 26 lacs of rupees, the additional lac being intended to meet possible deficiencies in the revenues of the said lands, and save the Honourable Company from loss.

ARTICLE 7th. After the conclusion of this treaty, and as soon as the British Resident shall signify to his Highness Rao Pundit Purdhaun Bahauder, that the honourable Company's officers are prepared to take charge of the districts ceded by article 4th. his Highness will immediately issue the necessary Purwannahs or orders to his officers to deliver over charge of the same to the officers of the honourable Company, and it is hereby agreed, and stipulated that all collections made by his Highness's officers, subsequently to the date of this treaty, and before the officers of the honourable Company shall have taken charge of the said districts, shall be carried to the credit of the honourable Company and all claims to balance from the said districts, referring to the periods antecedent to the conclusion of this treaty, shall be considered null and void.

ARTICLE 8th. All forts situated within the districts to be ceded as aforesaid shall be delivered to the officers of the honourable Company with the said districts: and his Highness Rao Pundit Purdhaun Bahauder engages, that the said forts shall be delivered to the honourable Company without being injured or damaged, and with their equipment of ordnance stores and provisions.

ARTICLE 9th. Grain and all other articles of consumption, and provisions and all sorts of materials for wearing apparel together with the necessary numbers of cattle, horses and camels, required for the use of the subsidiary force shall be entirely exempted from duties, and the commanding officer, and officers of the said subsidiary force shall be treated in all respects in a manner suited to the dignity and greatness of both states. The subsidiary force will at all times be ready to execute services of importance—such as the protection of the person of his Highness, his heirs and successors, the overawing and chastisement of rebels, or exciters of disturbance in his Highness's dominions, and due correction of his subjects or dependants, who may withhold payment of the sircar's just claims; but it is not to be employed on trifling occasions, nor like sibundy to be stationed in the country to collect the revenues, nor against any of the principal branches of the Mahratta Empire, nor in levying contributions from Mahratta dependants in the manner of Moolkgeery.

ARTICLE 10th. Whereas much inconvenience has arisen from certain claims and demands of the Mahratta state, affecting the city of Surat, it is agreed, that a just calculation shall be made of the value of the said claims by his Highness Rao Pundit Purdhaun Bahadur and the government of Bombay; and in consequence of the intimate friendship now established between the contracting parties, His Highness Rao Pundit Purdhaun Bahauder agrees for himself, his heirs and successors, to relinquish for ever, all the rights, claims, and privileges of the Mahratta state affecting the said city of Surat, and all collections on that account shall cease and determine from the day on which this treaty shall be concluded; in considera-

tion of which act of friendship, the Honourable East India Company agrees, that a piece of land yielding a sum equal to the estimated value of the said claims of the Mahratta state, shall be deducted from the districts ceded by article 4th. and on the same principle, and from similar considerations, his Highness further agrees, that the amount of the collections made for the Poonah state, under the title of Nagabundy, in the Purgunnahs of Chourassy and Chickly shall be ascertained, by an average taken from the receipts of a certain number of years, or by such other mode of calculation as may be determined on; and his said Highness doth further agree, for himself, his heirs, and successors, to relinquish for ever the Nagabundy collections aforesaid, and they shall accordingly cease from the conclusion of this treaty, and it is agreed and stipulated that a piece of land yielding a sum equal to the amount of the said Nagabundy collections, shall be deducted from the districts ceded by article 4th. in the same manner as stipulated in regard to the Choute of Surat.

ARTICLE 11th. Whereas it has been usual for his Highness Rao Pundit Purdhaun Bahauder to enlist and retain in his service Europeans of different countries, his said Highness hereby agrees and stipulates, that in the event of War breaking out between the English and any European nation, and of discovery being made that any European or Europeans in his service belonging to such nation at war with the English, shall have meditated injury towards the English, or have entered into intrigues hostile to their interest, such European or Europeans, so offending, shall be discharged by his said Highness, and not suffered to reside in his dominions.

ARTICLE 12th. Inasmuch as, by the present treaty, the contracting parties are bound in a general defensive alliance, for mutual defence and protection against all enemies, his Highness Rao Pundit Purdhaun Bahauder consequently engages, never to commit any act of personal hostility and aggression against his Highness the Nabob Asoph Jah Bahauder, or any of the Honourable Company's allies or dependants, or against any of the principal branches of the Mahratta Empire, or against any power whatever, and in the event of differences arising whatever adjustment the Company's Government, weighing matters in the scale of truth and justice, may determine, shall meet with full approbation and acquiescence.

ARTICLE 13th. And whereas certain differences, referring to past transactions, are known to subsist between the Sirkar of his Highness Rao Pundit Purdhaun Bahauder and the Sirkar of his Highness the Nabob Asoph Jah Bahauder, and whereas an amicable adjustment of those differences must be highly desirable for the welfare and benefit of both the said Sirkars, his Highness Rao Pundit Purdhaun Bahauder with a view to the above end, agrees, and accordingly binds himself, his heirs, and successors, to fulfil and conform to the stipulations of the treaty of Mahr; and his Highness Rao Pundit Purdhaun Bahauder further agrees, that on the basis of the fulfilment of the said treaty of Mahr, and of the claims of his Highness the Nabob Asoph Jah Bahauder, to be totally exempted from the pay of Choute, the Honourable Company's Government shall be entitled to arbitrate and determine all such points, as may be in doubt or difference between the Sirkars of their Highnesses above mentioned; and his Highness Rao Pundit Purdhaun Bahauder further agrees, that in the event of any differences arising between his government and that of his Highness the Nabob Asoph Jah Bahauder, at any future period, the particulars of such differences shall be communicated to the Honourable East India Company, before any act of hostility shall be committed on either side, and the said Honourable Company interposing their mediation, in a way suitable to rectitude, friendship, and union, and mindful of justice and established usage, shall apply themselves to the adjustment of all such differences, conformable to propriety and truth, and shall bring the parties to a right understanding. And it is further agreed, that whatever adjustment of any such differences the Company's Government, weighing things in the scale of truth and justice, shall determine, that determination shall, without hesitation or objection, meet with the full approbation and acquiescence of both parties. It is however agreed, that this stipulation shall not prevent any amicable negotiations which the Honourable Company and the Courts of Poonah and Hyderabad, respectively, may be desirous of opening, provided no such negotiation shall be carried on between any of the three parties, without full communication thereof to each other.

ARTICLE 14th. Whereas a treaty of friendship and alliance has been concluded between the Honourable Company and Rajah Anund Row Guickwar Bahauder,

and whereas the said treaty was mediated and executed, without any intention that it should infringe any of the just rights or claims of his Highness Rao Pundit Purdhaun Bahauder affecting the Sirkars of the said Rajah, his said Highness adverting thereto, and also to the intimate alliance now established between the contracting parties, doth hereby formally acknowledge the existence of the said treaty between the Honourable Company and Rajah Anund Row Guickwar Bahauder; and inasmuch as, by reason of certain unfinished transactions, the conclusion of which has been suspended from time to time, various demands and papers of accounts are found to subsist between the government of his Highness Row Pundit Purdhaun Bahauder and the Sirkar of the Rajah aforementioned, his said Highness, placing full reliance on the impartiality, truth, and justice of the British Government, doth hereby agree, that the said government shall examine into, and finally adjust, the said demands and papers of accounts; and his said Highness further stipulates and binds himself, his heirs, and successors, to abide by such adjustment as the British Government shall accordingly determine.

ARTICLE 15th. The contracting parties will employ all practicable means of conciliation to prevent the calamity of war, and for that purpose will, at all times, be ready to enter into amicable explanations with other states, and to cultivate and improve the general relations of peace and amity with all the powers of India, according to the true spirit and tenor of this defensive treaty. But if a war should unfortunately break out between the contracting parties and any other power whatever, then his Highness Row Pundit Purdhaun Bahauder engages, that with the reserve of two battalions of Sepoys, which are to remain near his Highness's person, the residue of the British subsidiary force, consisting of four battalions of Sepoys with their artillery, joined by six thousand infantry and ten thousand horse of his Highness's own troops, and making together an army of ten thousand infantry and ten thousand cavalry, with the requisite train of artillery and warlike stores of every kind, shall be immediately put in motion; for the purpose of opposing the enemy: and his Highness likewise engages to employ every further effort in his power, for the purpose of bringing into the field, as speedily as possible, the whole force which he may be able to supply from his dominions, with a view to the effectual prosecution and speedy termination of the said war. The Honourable Company, in the same manner, engage on their parts, in this case, to employ in active operations against the enemy, the largest force they may be able to furnish, over and above the said subsidiary force.

ARTICLE 16th. Whenever war shall appear probable, his Highness Rao Pundit Purdhaun Bahauder engages to collect as many Brinjaries as possible and to stow as much grain as may be practicable in his frontier garrisons.

ARTICLE 17th. As, by the present treaty, the union and friendship of the two states is so firmly connected, that they may be considered as one and the same, his Highness Rao Pundit Purdhaun Bahauder engages neither to commence nor to pursue in future, any negotiations with any other power whatever, without giving previous notice, and entering into mutual consultation, with the Honourable East India Company's Government: and the Honourable Company's Government, on their parts, hereby declare, that they have no manner of concern with any of his Highness's children, relations, subjects, or servants, with respect to whom his Highness is absolute.

ARTICLE 18th. Inasmuch as, by the present treaty of general defensive alliance, the ties of union are, with the blessing of God, so closely drawn, that the interests of the two states are become identified, it is further mutually agreed, that if disturbances shall at any time break out in the districts ceded to the Honourable Company by this agreement, his Highness Rao Pundit Purdhaun Bahauder shall permit such a proportion of the subsidiary troops, as may be requisite, to be employed in quelling the same within the said districts. If disturbances shall, at any time, break out in any part of his Highness's dominions contiguous to the Company's frontier, to which it might be inconvenient to detach any proportion of the subsidiary force, the British Government, in like manner, if required by his Highness Rao Pundit Purdhaun Bahauder, shall direct such proportion of the troops of the Company, as may be most conveniently stationed for the purpose, to assist in quelling the said disturbances within his Highness's dominions.

ARTICLE 19th. It is finally declared, that this treaty, which, according to the foregoing articles, is meant for the support and credit of his said Highness's

Government, and to preserve it from loss and decline, shall last as long as the sun and moon shall endure.

Signed, sealed, and exchanged, at Bassein, the 31st of December, Anno Domini 1802, or the 5th of Ramzaun, Anno Higeræ 1217.

A true Copy,

B. Close,
Resident at Poona.

Ratified by the Governor General in Council
11 February 1803.

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*Schedule of the Territories ceded in perpetuity, by His Highness Bajee Rao Ragonaut Pundit Purdhaun Bahauder to the Honourable English East India Company, agreeably to the fourth Article of the annexed Treaty.*

| | |
|---|---|
| 1st, From the province of Guzerat and territories south thereof: Dundooka, together with Chooia, Komapoor, and Gogo, | 1,05,000 |
| Cambay, Choute, and Nassoor, | 60,000 |
| South of the Taptie. Purnair, 27,000; Bootseer, 6,200; Banwanny, 8,800; Balsur, 85,000; Parchole, 1,07,000; Soopa, 51,000; Sarbaun, 30,000; Wallow, 30,000; Bamdoo Kusbah, 7,900; Waunsda Choute, 7,000; Durumpoory do. 9,000; Surat do. 42,100; Customs, 83,000. | |
| Between the Taptie and Nerbuddah. Oolpah, 3,16,000; Hansood, 85,000; Octisier, 78,000; Nundary 65,000. Total South of the Taptie, and between Taptie and Nerbuddah, 10,38,000. Deduct twenty per cent, on account of decrease of revenue, 2,07,600. | 8,30,400 |
| Nahabundy of Chourassy and Chickley, 20,000; Phoolparra, Coomarria Cattergom, 5,000. | 25,000 |
| 2d. From the territories near the Toombuddrah: Savancore, 26 Talooks, 10,22,838; From Bankapoor, 5,56,762. | 15,79,600 |
| Grand Total | 26,00,000 |

Signed, sealed, and exchanged at Bassein, 31st December, Anno Domini 1802, or the 5th Ramzan, Anno Higeræ 1217.

A true Copy,

B. Close.

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*Supplemental to the Treaty of Bassein*, 1803.

A treaty, consisting of nineteen articles, was concluded at Bassein, between the Honourable English East-India Company Bahauder and his Highness the Paishwa Badjee Rao Ragonaut Pundit Purdhaun Bahauder. The following articles of engagement are now agreed on and settled, as supplemental to the said Treaty, by Lieutenant Colonel Barry Close, on the part of the said Honourable Company, and Anund Rao Vakeel, on the part of the said Rao Pundit Purdhaun Bahauder, under full power and authority granted to them respectively for the purpose.

Article 1st. That of the territory ceded in perpetuity to the Honourable East India Company by the said treaty of Bassein, the country of Savenore, and Taalooks of Buncapoor, in the Carnatic, yielding an annual revenue of sixteen lacks of Rupees, shall be restored, in perpetuity, to the Sircar of the said Rao Pundit Purdhaun Bahauder.

Article 2nd. That of the territory ceded in perpetuity to the English East India Company by the treaty of Bassein, the Purgunnah of Oolpah, in Guzerat, yielding a revenue annually of three lacks and sixteen thousand Rupees, shall likewise be restored, in perpetuity, to the Sircar of the said Rao Pundit Purdhaun Bahauder, in order that it may be restored to Nursing Khundy Rao, who has served the Sircar with fidelity and attachment.

Article 3rd. That a regiment of native cavalry, of the same strengh and complement as the cavalry regiments belonging to the Hyderabad subsidiary force, shall be added to the British Poona subsidiary force.

Article 4th. In the fifteenth article of the treaty of Bassein it is stipulated, that ten thousand cavalry and six thousand infantry, with a due proportion of

ordnance and military stores, shall be furnished by the said Rao Pundit Purdhaun Bahauder, and in addition thereto, such further force as the Sircar of the said Rao Pundit Purdhaun Bahauder should be able to bring into the field. This stipulation is now annulled, and, in lieu thereof, it is agreed and covenanted, that in time of war the said Rao Pundit Purdhaun Bahauder shall appoint and furnish five thousand cavalry and three thousand infantry, with a due proportion of ordnance and military stores, and, in addition thereto, such further force as the said Rao Pundit Purdhaun Bahauder shall be able to bring into the field.

ARTICLE 5th. That a corps of Mahratta cavalry, amounting to five thousand, shall be maintained by the British Government during the present war, for the service of the Poona State, under the orders of the British Government, of which five thousand horse, two thousand shall serve with his Highness the Paishwa, and the remaining three thousand with the British army in the field; and in the said five thousand Mahratta cavalry are not to be included the Mahratta troops serving with the British army under the chieftains Bapoojee, Gunneis Punt Gokiah, and Sudojee Rao Nimalcar, which troops shall continue to be subsisted at the charge of Rao Pundit Purdhaun Bahauder.

ARTICLE 6th. By the first and second articles of this agreement, territory, yielding an annual revenue of 19,16,000 rupees, is restored to the Sircar of Rao Pundit Purdhaun Bahauder; in lieu thereof, and for the purposes hereafter mentioned, the said Rao Pundit Purdhaun Bahauder agrees and stipulates to cede, in perpetuity, to the honourable English East India Company, from the province of Bundelcund, conquered for the Poona State by Ali Bahauder, territory yielding an estimated annual revenue of 36,16,000 rupees, agreeably to the following detail:

1. In lieu of the country of Savenore, and Taalooks of Buncapoor, in the Carnatic, and the Purgunnah of Oolpar, in Guzerat, a tract of territory, yielding an annual revenue of 19,16,000 rupees.

2. On account of the stated high value of Oolpah, a tract of territory, yielding an annual revenue of 50,000 rupees, in excess for that Purgunnah.

3. To bear the entire expence of the regiment of cavalry mentioned in article III., a tract of territory, yielding an annual revenue of 7,50,000 rupees.

4. To serve as an equivalent for the expence to be incurred by the British Government, in paying and maintaining, during the present war, the five thousand cavalry mentioned in article V., a tract of territory, yielding an annual revenue of 5,00,000 rupees, and lastly, a tract of territory, yielding an annual revenue of 4,00,000 rupees, to meet the extraordinary expence which the British Government must be subject to, in establishing its authority in Bundelcund, which is disturbed and ravaged by rebels, who must be subdued and punished.

Total ceded from Bundelcund 36,16,000 rupees.

ARTICLE 7th. The whole of the foregoing territory, ceded, as above, from Bundelcund to the honourable English East-India Company, shall be taken from those quarters of the province most contiguous to the British possessions, and in every respect most convenient for the British Government.

ARTICLE 8th. Inasmuch as the Purgunnah of Oolpah was particularly valuable to the honourable Company's Government, by reason of its proximity to the city of Surat, in the prosperity of which the British Government bears an anxious concern, it is accordingly agreed and stipulated, that the said Purgunnah of Oolpah shall be so managed and governed, at all times, by the Mahratta authority, as to conduce to the convenience of the said city, by attention to the rules of good neighbourhood, and the promotion of an amicable and commercial intercourse between the inhabitants of both sides. And inasmuch as the sovereignty of the river Taptee doth belong to the British Government, it is accordingly agreed and covenanted, that the Mahratta authority in Oolpah shall have no right or concern whatever in the wreck of any vessel that may be cast upon any part of the Oolpah territory, connecting with the said river Taptee, but be bound, in the event of any such wreck, to render the vessel all practicable aid, for which the parties assisting shall be entitled to receive from the owners of the wreck a just and reasonable compensation.

Signed, sealed, and exchanged, at Poona, the
16th December, Anno Domini 1803, or the
1st Ramzaun, Anno Higeræ 1218.

Ratified by the Governor General in Council, the 7th January, 1804.

# APPENDIX B.

*Treaty of Peace between the Honourable English East India Company and their Allies, on the one part, and Senah Saheb Soubah Ragojee Bhooslah, on the other, settled by Major-General Wellesley, on the part of the Honourable Company and their allies, and by Jeswunt Rao Ramchunder, on the part of Senah Saheb Soubah Ragojee Bhooslah; who have each communicated to the other their full powers.*

ART. 1. There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the honourable Company and their allies on the one part, and Senah Saheb Soubah Ragojee Bhooslah, on the other.

ART. 2. Senah Saheb Soubah Ragojee Bhooslah cedes to the honourable Company and their allies, in perpetual sovereignty, the province of Cuttack, including the port and district of Balasore.

ART. 3. He likewise cedes to the honourable Company and their allies, in perpetual sovereignty, all the territories, of which he has collected the revenues, in participation with the Soubahdar of the Deccan, and those of which he may have possession, which are to the westward of the river Wurdah.

ART. 4. It is agreed, that the frontier of Senah Saheb Soubah, towards the territories of his Highness the Soubahdar of the Deccan, shall be formed, to the west, by the river Wurdah, from its issue from the Injardy hills, to its junction with the Godavery. The hills on which are the forts of Nernallah and Gawulghur, are to be in the possession of Senah Saheb Soubah, and every thing south of those hills, and to the west of the river Wurdah is to belong to the British Government and their allies.

ART. 5. Districts amounting to four lacs of rupees per annum, contiguous to, and to the south of the forts of Nernallah and Gawulghur, are to be given over to Senah Saheb Soubah. Those districts are to be fixed upon by Major-General Wellesley, and delivered over to Senah Saheb Soubah at the same time with the forts.

ART. 6. Senah Saheb Soubah, for himself, his heirs and successors, entirely renounces all claims of every description on the teritories of the British Government and their allies, ceded by the 2d, 3d, and 4th Articles, and on all the territories of his Highness the Soubahdar of the Deccan.

ART. 7. The honourable Company engage, that they will mediate and arbitrate according to the principles of justice, any disputes or differences that may now exist, or may hereafter arise, between the honourable Company's allies, Secunder Jah Bahaudur, his heirs and successors, and Rao Pundit Purdhaun, his heirs and successors respectively, and Senah Saheb Soubah.

ART. 8. Senah Saheb Soubah engages never to take or retain in his service, any Frenchman, or the subject of any other European or American power, the government of which may be at war with the British Government; or any British subject, whether European or Indian, without the consent of the British Government. The honourable Company engage on their part, that they will not give aid or countenance to any discontented relations, Rajahs, Zemindars, or other subjects of Senah Saheb Soubah, who may fly from, or rebel against, his authority.

ART. 9. In order to secure and improve the relations of amity and peace hereby established, between the governments, it is agreed, that, accredited ministers from each shall reside at the court of the other.

ART. 10. Certain treaties have been made by the British Government with feudatories of Senah Saheb Soubah. These treaties are to be confirmed. Lists of the persons with whom such treaties have been made, will be given to Senah Saheb Soubah, when this treaty will be ratified by his Excellency, the Governor-General in council.

ART. 11. Senah Saheb Soubah hereby renounces, for himself, his heirs and successors, all adherence to the confederacy formed by him and Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and other Mahratta chiefs, to attack the honourable Company and their allies. He engages not to assist those chiefs if the war with them should still continue.

ART. 12. This treaty of peace is to be ratified by Senah Saheb Soubah within eight days from this time, and the ratification is to be delivered to Major-General Wellesley; at which time the orders for the cession of the ceded territories are to be delivered and the troops are to withdraw. Major-General Wellesley engages that the treaty shall be ratified by his Excellency the most noble the Governor-General in Council, and that the ratification shall be delivered in two months from this date.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY, Major-General.
JESWUNT RAO RAMCHUNDER, on the part of
SENAH SAHEB SOUBAH.

Done in Camp at Deogaum, this 17th December 1803, answering to the 2d Ramzaun 1213 Fusslee.

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# APPENDIX C.

*Treaty of Peace between the Honourable English East India Company and their Allies on the one part, and the Maharajah Ali Jah Dowlut Rao Scindiah on the other; settled by Major-General Wellesley on the part of the Honourable Company and their Allies, and by Eetul Mahadeo, Moonshee Kavel Nyn, Jeswunt Rao Goorparah Ameer-ool-Omrah, and Naroo Hurry, on the part of the Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah, who have each communicated to the other their full powers.*

ART. 1. There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the honourable Company and their allies, on the one part and the Maharajah Ali Jah Dowlut Rao Scindiah on the other.

ART. 2. The Maharajah cedes to the honourable Company and their allies in perpetual sovereignty, all his forts, territories, and rights in the Doab or country situated between the Jumna and Ganges; and all his forts, territories, rights and interests in the countries which are to the northward of those of the Rajahs of Jeypoor and Joudpoor and of the Ranah of Gohud; of which territories, &c. a detailed list is given in the accompanying schedule. Such countries formerly in the possession of the Maharajah situated between Jeypoor and Joudpoor, and to the southward of the former, are to belong to the Maharajah.

ART. 3. The Maharajah likewise cedes to the honourable Company and their allies in perpetual sovereignty, the fort of Baroach and territory depending thereon, and the fort of Ahmednuggur and territory depending thereon; excepting those lands which it is agreed by Article 8th of this treaty, that the Maharajah is to retain.

ART. 4. The Maharajah likewise cedes to the honourable Company and their allies, all the territories which belonged to him previous to the breaking out of the war, which are situated to the southward of the hills, called the Adjuntee hills, including the fort and district of Jalnapore, the town and district of Gandapore, and all other districts between that range of hills and the river Godavery.

ART. 5. The Maharajah Ali Jah Dowlut Rao Scindiah, for himself, his heirs and successors, hereby renounces all the claim to the forts, territories, rights and interests, ceded by the 2d, 3d, and 4th Articles; and all claims of every description upon the British Government, and their allies the Soubahdar of the Deccan the Peishwa, and Anund Rao Guikwar.

ART. 6. The fort of Asseerghur, the city of Boorhanpore, the forts of Powanghur and Dohud, and the territories in Candeish, and Guzerat, depending on these forts, shall be restored to the Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

ART. 7. Whereas the Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah has represented that his family have long held in Enaum as a gift from the kings of Hindostan, the districts of Dhoolpoor-Baree, and Rajah-Kerrah, which are situated to the northward of the countries of the Rajahs of Jeypoor and Joudpoor, and of the Ranah of Gohud, and that lands in Hindostan, ceded by the 2d Article of this treaty to the honourable Company and their allies, are held in Jaghire by persons of the family of the late Madhajee Scindiah, and others by principal Sirdars in his service, all of whom would suffer distress, if deprived of the advantages they enjoy in those

countries: it is agreed, that the Maharajah shall continue to hold and enjoy in Enaum the lands of Dhoolpoor-Baree, and Rajah-Kerrah; and that Bala Baye Sahib, and Munsoor Sahib, Moonshee Kavel Nyn, Boogajee Jamdah, Amrajee Jadhoo, and Wirdah Charie, shall continue to hold their lands in Jaghire, under the protection of the honourable Company: and further, in order that no individual may incur loss or suffer distress in consequence of this arrangement, it is agreed, that the honourable Company shall either pay pensions, or grant lands in Jaghire, according to the option of the British Government, to certain other Sirdars and others to be named by the Maharajah, provided that the total amount of the sums paid, or Jaghires granted or held, does not exceed seventeen lacs of rupees per annum, including the annual value of the lands, which it is agreed by this Article that Bala Baye Sahib, Munsoor Sahib, Moonshee Kavel Nyn, Boogajee Jamdah, Amrajee Jadhoo, and Wirdah Charie, are to continue to hold; and provided that no troops in the service of the Maharajah are to be introduced into Dhoolpoor-Baree and Rajah-Kerrah, or the other lands held in Jaghire, under the pretence of collecting the revenue, or any other pretence whatever.

ART. 8. Whereas the Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah has represented that his family have long held in Enaum certain lands, villages, &c. in the territories of Rao Pundit Purdhaun, viz. Chomargoondee Pergunna, Jamgaum, Ranjingaum, half of Seo Gaum Pergunna, six villages in Umber Pergunna, five villages in Pytun Pergunna, five villages in Niwaz Pergunna, five villages in Kurla Pergunna, six villages in Poonah Pergunna, two villages in Wahy Pergunna, six villages in Patutood Pergunna, five villages in Pandipeergaum Pergunna, five villages in Pagood Pergunna, two villages in Parnyra Pergunna, which have lately been taken possession of by the British Government and their allies; it is agreed, that those lands and villages shall be restored to him, provided that no troops shall ever be introduced into those lands and villages, under pretence of collecting the revenues, or any other pretence whatever.

ART. 9. Certain treaties have been made by the British Government with Rajahs and others heretofore feudatories of the Maharajah Ali Jah Dowlut Rao Scindiah. These treaties are to be confirmed, and the Maharajah hereby renounces all claims upon the persons with whom such treaties have been made, and declares them to be independent of his government and authority, provided that none of the territories belonging to the Maharajah, situated to the southward of those of the Rajahs of Jeypoor and Joudpoor, and the Ranah of Gohud, of which the revenues have been collected by him or his Aumildars, or have been applicable as Surinjamee to the payment of his troops, are granted away by such treaties. Lists of the persons with whom such treaties have been made will be given to the Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah, when this treaty will be ratified by his Excellency the Governor-General.

ART. 10. No person whatever is hereafter to be molested on account of the part which he may have taken in the present war.

ART. 11. It is agreed that the rights of his Highness the Peishwa to certain lands in Malwa, and elsewhere, shall be established as heretofore, and in case any difference should arise respecting those rights, it is agreed that the honourable Company shall mediate, arbitrate, and decide according to the principles of justice between his Highness and the Maharajah, and whatever shall be thus decided, will be agreed to by both parties, and will be carried into execution.

ART. 12. The Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah hereby renounces all claims upon his Majesty Shah Alum, and engages on his part to interfere no further in the affairs of his Majesty.

ART. 13. The Maharajah Ali Jah Dowlut Rao Scindiah engages never to take or retain in his service any Frenchman, or the subject of any other European or American power, the Government of which may be at war with the British Government; or any British subject, whether European or native of India, without the consent of the British Government.

ART. 14. In order to secure and improve the relations of amity and peace hereby established between the Governments, it is agreed, that accredited ministers from each shall reside at the court of the other.

ART. 15. The honourable Company being bound by treaties of general defensive alliance with his Highness the Soubahdar of the Deccan, and his Highness Rao Pundit Purdhaun, to which the Maharajah Ali Jah Dowlut Rao Scindiah is desirous of acceding, he is to be admitted to the benefits thereof; and the honourable Com-

pany, with a view to the future security of the Maharajah's territories, engage in the event of his agreeing to the treaty above-mentioned, in two months to furnish him with a force consisting of six battalions of infantry, with their complement of ordnance and artillery, and usual equipments of Military stores, &c. and the expense of this force is to be defrayed out of the revenues of the lands ceded by the 2d, 3d, and 4th Articles. But it is agreed, that in case it should suit the interests of the Maharajah's Government to decline to enter into the treaty above-mentioned, such refusal shall not affect any of the stipulations of this treaty of peace, which are in every respect to be binding on the contracting parties, their heirs and successors.

ART. 16. This treaty is to be ratified by the Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah in eight days from this time, and the ratification is to be delivered to Major-General Wellesley.

Major-General Wellesley engages that it shall be ratified by his Excellency the most noble the Governor-General in Council, and the ratifications shall be delivered to the Maharajah in three months, or sooner, if possible.

The orders for the cession of the territories shall be delivered to Major-General Wellesley at the same time with the ratification of the treaty of peace; but the forts of Asseerghur, Powanghur, and Dohud, are not to be delivered up, till accounts will have been received that the territories ceded, have been evacuated by the Maharajah's officers and troops.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY,
EETUL MAHADEO,
KAVEL NYN,
JESWUNT RAO GOORPARAH,
NAROO HURRY.

Done in Camp at Surje Anjengaum, this 30th of December 1803, answering to the 15th Ramzaun 1213 Fusslee.

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## APPENDIX D.

*Additional Article of Treaty between the Honourable East India Company, on the one part, and his Highness Navaub Nizum ool Moolk Asoph Jah Meer Ukbur Ali Khaun Bahauder, Soobah of the Deccan, his Children, Heirs and Successors, on the other; to be considered as appertaining to the Treaty of perpetual and general defensive alliance concluded at Hyderabad, on the 12th of October, 1800, A. D., or 22nd of Jemmaudee ool awul 1215, A. H.*

ARTICLE. In the event (which God, however, avert) of joint war breaking out hereafter with any other power, it is hereby agreed that, during the continuance thereof, all officers and all troops, whether individually or collectively belonging to either of the contracting parties, shall have free ingress and egress to and from all the territories, and to and from all the forts belonging to each other respectively. And it is hereby further agreed, that all officers, whether civil or military, belonging to either Government shall, when requisite, employ all their power and all the resources at their command in facilitating the operations of the troops employed, to whichever of the two contracting powers they may happen to belong.

Signed, sealed, and exchanged, at Hyderabad, this 9th day of January, A. D. 1804, agreeing with the 25th of Ramzaun, A. H. 1218.

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## APPENDIX E.

*Treaty with the Rajah of Bhurrutpore, September 29th, 1803.*

ARTICLE 1. Perpetual friendship shall be maintained between Maha Rajah Bishunder Sewaee Runjeet Sing Bahauder, Bahauder Jung, and the Hon. Company.

ARTICLE 2. The friends and enemies of either state shall be the friends and enemies of both.

ARTICLE 3. The British Government shall never interfere in the concerns of the Maha Rajah's country, nor exact any tribute from him.

ARTICLE 4. If an enemy should invade the territories of the honourable Company, the Maha Rajah hereby engages to furnish to the English the aid of his troops in the expulsion of such enemy. And, in like manner, the honourable Company engages to assist the Maha Rajah with its forces, in defending his dominions against external attacks.

The sincerity of this engagement is attested on the Holy Bible.

Dated on the 29th day of September, in the year of our Lord 1803, corresponding with the 11th day of the month of Jemmaudee-ul-Saunee, in the year 1218 Higera.

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# APPENDIX F.

*Treaty with the Rajah of Macherry, November 14th, 1803.*

ARTICLE 1. A permanent friendship is established between the honourable East India Company and Maha Rao Rajah Seway Buctawar Sing Bahauder, and between their heirs and successors.

ARTICLE 2. The friends and enemies of the honourable Company shall be considered the friends and enemies of Maha Rao Rajah, and the friends and enemies of Maha Rao Rajah shall be the friends and enemies of the honourable Company.

ARTICLE 3. The honourable Company shall not interfere with the country of Maha Rao Rajah, nor shall demand any tribute from him.

ARTICLE 4. In the event of an enemy evincing a disposition to attack the countries now in the possession of the honourable Company, or of their allies in Hindostan, Maha Rao Rajah agrees to send the whole of his force to their assistance, and to exert himself to the utmost of his power to repel the enemy, and to omit no opportunity of proving his friendship and attachment.

ARTICLE 5. As, from the friendship established by the second article of the present treaty, the honourable Company become guarantee to Maha Rajah for the security of his country against external enemies, Maha Rao Rajah hereby agrees, that if any misunderstanding should arise between him and the Sircar of any other chieftain, Maha Rao Rajah will, in the first instance, submit the cause of dispute to the Company's Government, that the Government may endeavour to settle it amicably. If, from the obstinacy of the opposite party, no amicable terms can be settled, then Maha Rao Rajah may demand aid from the Company's Government. In the event above stated in this article, it will be granted; and Maha Rao Rajah agrees to take upon himself the charge of the expence of such aid, at the same rate as has been settled with the other chieftains of Hindostan.

Dated on the 14th day of November, 1803 of the Christian æra, agreeing with the 26th of Rujeb, 1218 Higera, and the 15th of Aghun, 1860 Sumbut.

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# APPENDIX G.

*Treaty with the Rajah of Jyepoor (or Jyenagur), December 12th, 1803.*

ARTICLE 1. A firm and permanent friendship and alliance is established between the honourable the English Company and Maha Rajah Dheeraj Juggut Sing Bahauder, and between their heirs and successors.

ARTICLE 2. Whereas friendship has been established between the two states, the friends and enemies of one of the parties shall be considered the friends and enemies of both, and an adherence to this condition shall be constantly observed by both states.

ARTICLE 3. The honourable Company shall not interfere in the government of the country now possessed by Maha Rajah Dheeraj, and shall not demand tribute from him.

ARTICLE 4. In the event of an enemy of the honourable Company evincing a disposition to invade the country lately taken possession of by the honourable

Company in Hindostan, Maha Rajah Dheeraj shall send the whole of his forces to the assistance of the Company's army, and shall exert himself to the utmost of his power in repelling the enemy, and shall neglect no opportunity of proving his friendship and attachment.

ARTICLE 5. Whereas, in consequence of the friendship established by the second article of the present treaty, the honourable Company become guarantees to the Maha Rajah Dheeraj for the security of his country against external enemies, Maha Rajah Dheeraj hereby agrees, that if any misunderstanding should arise between him and any other state, Maha Rajah Dheeraj will, in the first instance, submit the cause of dispute to the Company's Government, that the Government may endeavour to settle it amicably. If, from the obstinacy of the opposite party, no amicable terms can be settled, then Maha Rajah Dheeraj may demand aid from the Company's Government. In the event above stated, it will be granted; and Maha Rajah Dheeraj agrees to take upon himself the charge of the expence of such aid, at the same rate as has been settled with the other chieftains of Hindostan.

ARTICLE 6. Maha Rajah Dheeraj hereby agrees, although he is in reality the master of his own army, to act during the time of war, or prospect of action, agreeably to the advice and opinion of the Commander of the English army which may be employed with his troops.

ARTICLE 7. The Maha Rajah shall not entertain in his service, or in any manner give admission to, any English or French subjects, or any other person from among the inhabitants of Europe, without the consent of the Company's Government.

The above treaty, comprised in seven articles, has been duly concluded and confirmed, by the seal and signature of his Excellency General Gerard Lake, at Surhindee, in the Soobah of Akburrabad, on the 12th day of December, 1803 of the Christian æra, corresponding with the 26th of Shabaan, 1218 Higera, and with the 14th of Poos, 1860 Sumbut; and under the seal and signature of Maha Rajah Dheeraj Raj Rajinder Séway Juggut Sing Bahauder, at ——— on the — day of —— 180– of the Christian æra, corresponding with the — of ——— 1218 Higera, and with the — of —— 1860 Sumbut. When a treaty, containing the above seven articles, shall be delivered to Maha Rajah Dheeraj, under the seal and signature of his Excellency the Most Noble the Governor-General in Council, the present Treaty, under the seal and signature of his Excellency General Lake, shall be returned.

## APPENDIX H.

*List of the Sirdars, Zemindars, &c. under the authority of Maha Rajah Raggoojee Bhooslah, with whom engagements were entered into on the part of the honourable East India Company by the Commissioners for the affairs of Cuttack and by Major Broughton.*

SUMBLEPORE, comprising—*Pergunnahs:* Sumblepore Khas, Rae Ghur, Sonepore, Sarengur, Burgur, Suctee, Seracole, Bombra, Bonie, Gangpore. *Zemindars:* Rajah Jeyt Sing, Rajah Joujar Sing, Rajah Pertee Sing, Rajah Bisserrau Sahy, Tacoor Adjeet Sing, Dewan Sew Sing, Beerbudh Tennah, Rajah Irjun Deo, Rajah Inder Deo, Rajah Inder Siccer Deo.

PATNA, comprising—*Pergunnahs:* Patna Khas, Nowagur, Kheriar, Toolger, Boora Samber. *Zemindars:* Rajah Ramchunder Deo, Rajah Acber Sahy, Maha Patee Purtab Looter, Rajah Adjeet Sahy, Buggut Burreyee.

CUTTACK, comprising—*Pergunnahs:* Boad, Ramghur. *Zemindar:* Rajah Bissumber Deo.

## APPENDIX I.

*Lieut.-Gen. Lake, Commander-in-Chief, to his Royal Highness the Duke of York, Commander-in-Chief, &c. &c. &c.*

SIR, Head Quarters of the British Army, Camp, Agra, Oct. 20th, 1803.

In my despatch under date the 16th of August, I acquainted Colonel Clinton, for the information of your Royal Highness, that I marched from Cawnpore on

the 7th of that month, towards the north west frontier of the honourable Company's dominions.

I have now the honour to inform your Royal Highness, that soon after that period, a rupture actually took place between the British Government and its allies, on the one side, and Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, on the other.

From the date of my last despatch, I moved on without meeting with any interruption till the morning of the 29th of August, when, after entering the Mahratta territories, I encountered a large force of cavalry commanded by Mon. Perron, a French officer.

This man had been entrusted with the government of a large extent of country in the immediate vicinity of the British territory; and, with many of his countrymen, who have at different times entered the service of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, had for many years past been employed in organizing a strong army of both infantry and cavalry.

They had succeeded to a very alarming degree in the accomplishment of this object, and had now at their disposal a force which was at once large, well armed, and effective, and for the support of which ample means was afforded by the revenues arising from the country under their controul.

It became, therefore, to the Government of this country an object of the utmost importance to destroy a power whose views were avowedly hostile to British interests, whose situation was contiguous and menacing, and whose strength and solidity, already formidable, were every day increasing.

I found Mons. Perron with his army posted in a very strong position in the neighbourhood of Coel, a town of considerable consequence within the Mahratta frontier; and from this I completely drove him, after some resistance, and dispersed the strong force he had collected.

I beg leave for particulars on this subject to refer your Royal Highness to my despatch to his Excellency the most noble the Governor-General, a copy of which (No. 1) I have the honour to enclose.

After this affair, I encamped with my army before the fort of Ally Ghur, which, from the breadth and depth of the water in its ditch, is a place of great strength, and to be assailed with the utmost difficulty.

After mature deliberation on the different ways in which it might be attacked, and the certainty that whatever mode was adopted, our loss must necessarily be considerable, I determined to gain possession of it, if possible, by *coup de main*, on the morning of the 4th of September.

The party destined for this service consisted of a part of his Majesty's 76th regiment, and about fifteen companies of sepoys, the whole commanded by the hon. Lieut.-Colonel Monson.

This party met with a most vigorous resistance; but, owing to the unexampled bravery of both officers and men, they succeeded in forcing the gates, and gained complete possession of every part of the fort. Colonel Monson, whose services were most meritorious, was very severely wounded, and many valuable officers and men were killed and wounded.

I beg leave to recommend Colonel Monson particularly to his Majesty's favour, and to assure your Royal Highness that I cannot find words to express the high sense I entertain of the conduct of that officer.

Captain Macleod, Brevet-Major, who succeeded to the command of the corps after Colonel Monson was wounded, is equally entitled to my warmest praise; and I should be wanting in justice, did I not inform your Royal Highness that every officer and man employed behaved in a style of the most heroic gallantry and determined perseverance.

It is necessary to add, for the information of your Royal Highness, and to enable you to judge of the difficulties that were to be surmounted, that from the great breadth of the ditch and its depth of water, the attack was only practicable on the gates, three of which it was necessary to burst open before the fort could be entered. These gates were uncommonly strong, and the road to them was completely covered by batteries, and other strong works within the fort, from which the enemy did much execution.

I have the honour to enclose a copy of my despatch on this occasion to his Excellency the Governor-General, together with a return of our loss (No. 2).

After halting two days in my original position at the town of Coel, I moved with my army towards Delhi, with the exception of a garrison left in the fort of Ally Ghur, and a brigade of cavalry, which I found it necessary to send towards our own territories, to repel an irruption which had been made by a part of the enemy's cavalry.

This brigade consisted of his Majesty's 29th regiment of light dragoons, and two regiments of native cavalry.

My advance from Coel was not interrupted until the 11th of that month, when I encountered a very large force, both of cavalry and infantry, with a numerous artillery, under the command of M. Bourquain, one of the French officers already alluded to.

My army had made a very long march in the morning, and were hardly arrived on their ground, when I learnt that the enemy were preparing to attack us.

I immediately moved out the whole line of cavalry and infantry, and advanced on the enemy's line, who opposed to us a very severe fire from their numerous artillery, which did much execution.

I am happy to say, that we succeeded in completely defeating the enemy, killing great numbers of them, and gaining possession of the whole of their artillery.

I have the honour to enclose copies of my letters to the Governor-General on this occasion (Nos. 3, 4, and 5), and I cannot omit expressing to your Royal Highness how infinitely I feel indebted to the officers and men employed on this glorious day.

His Majesty's 76th regiment, which has on all occasions been conspicuous for its good conduct, afforded, in the present instance, an example of distinguished gallantry to the rest of the army, which led to complete success.

The honourable Major-General St. John, who commanded my left wing, displayed eminent courage and ability, and by his steady and collected conduct defeated the designs, and threw into confusion the right wing of the enemy to which he was opposed. I humbly hope your Royal Highness will be graciously pleased to make known to his Majesty his meritorious conduct on this occasion.

I am no less indebted to the skill, ability, and courage of Colonel St. Leger, who commanded the cavalry, to whose prompt and vigorous charge of the enemy the final dispersion of their force is to be ascribed.

After this affair, I encamped my army on the banks of the river Jumna, opposite to the city of Delhi; and early next morning a message arrived from his Majesty Shah Allum, with information that the town and two forts which defend it, had been evacuated by the party of the enemy left for their defence, on hearing that their army on the other side of the river had been totally defeated.

Shah Allum, the unfortunate representative of the House of Timur, whose whole life has been a miserable series of calamity and misfortune, has for a number of years past been totally under the power and controul of the French faction which has governed this country.

The oppressive and degrading manner in which they had exerted their authority —their insulting conduct to the royal family—the state of rigorous confinement in which it had been detained—and the extreme indigence to which it was reduced by French rapacity—were all circumstances which rendered this monarch eager to receive the British protection, and made him view its approach with joy and exultation.

Every effort which the liberty he had obtained by the defeat of his oppressors gave him the power of exerting, was employed in affording my army the means of crossing the river, and in testifying the extreme satisfaction felt by himself and every one of his dependants at the distinguished success of the British arms.

In testimony of the sentiments he entertained on this occasion, he conferred on me a title, the second in the empire in rank and importance, and would have conferred the first, had it not been previously bestowed on Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

On my part, I paid every deference, respect, and honour, consistent with my situation, to the royal dignity, and encouraged every hope of future comfort and independence from the generous conduct and acknowledged liberality of the British Government.

Soon after the fall of the fort of Ally Ghur, Mons. Perron, who opposed me on the 29th of August, and who was at the head of the French faction, and commanded the whole military force of Dowlut Rao Scindiah in Hindostan, threw

himself on my protection, and entreated permission to resign the service of his prince, and to pass through the Company's territories on his way to Europe.

For reasons specified in my letter to the Governor-General, a copy of which (No. 6) I have the honour to transmit for the information of your Royal Highness, I complied with Mons. Perron's wishes; and he is now at Lucknow, on his way to Calcutta.

Soon after my arrival at Delhi, Mons. Louis Bourquain, who commanded the army opposed to me on the 11th of September, and a number of French officers of inferior rank, also threw themselves on my protection. This measure they were compelled to adopt for their personal safety; the whole country, irritated by their extortions and oppressions, being desirous, now that they found them divested of power, to avenge, by their destruction, the sufferings they had occasioned.

These I have sent under guards within the British provinces; and I have now reason to think that, as the French influence and authority in India are thus completely dissolved, the ambition and hostile designs of France will find no room hereafter to endanger the British possessions.

Having completed every arrangement respecting the royal person that I judged necessary in the present situation of affairs, and left such a force as I deemed sufficient for the defence and protection of Delhi and its neighourhood, I marched towards Agra on the 24th of September.

The weather, which at this season of the year, has been, beyond example, favourable to military operations, permitted us to march with little interruption, and I arrived at Muttra, a town of considerable importance on the Jumna, on the 2d of October.

At this place Colonel Vandeleur, with his Majesty's 8th regiment of light dragoons, and the brigade which I had sent from Ally Ghur to repel an incursion which the enemy had made into the British provinces in my rear, joined me.

Colonel Vandeleur, who was proceeding up the country to join my army, effected a junction with this brigade, and by his judicious movements compelled the enemy to make a precipitate retreat from the British territories.

From Muttra I proceeded towards Agra, where I arrived on the 4th instant.

The Town of Agra, situated on the banks of the Jumna, is large and populous, and defended by a strong wall. On its south-west side it has a fort, regularly constructed, with a deep ditch and high walls, deemed amongst the natives of this country of extraordinary strength.

Immediately after my arrival, I took up such a position as circumstances seemed to require.

On the 10th of the month, I drove the enemy with great loss, both of their men and artillery from the town, and from some deep ravines on the south-west side of the fort where they were strongly posted, and which it was necessary for me to occupy, in order to carry on my approaches.

The particulars of this affair are detailed in my letter to the Governor-General, of which I have the honour to forward a copy, (No. 7) for your Royal Highness' information.

From this period, my engineer and artillery officers were employed in the construction of batteries for the purpose of effecting a breach in the wall.

I had the satisfaction to see these completed, at the distance of three hundred and fifty yards, on the morning of the 17th, and in the course of that day they did so much execution, that the garrison were compelled to send to me proposals of capitulation.

The nature of these was such as to meet my entire concurrence, and the whole garrison, amounting to upwards of 5000 men, were on the 18th allowed to march out. I immediately occupied the fort with my troops, and I had great reason to rejoice that possession of it had been obtained on such terms, as I afterwards perceived, that the obstacles to have been surmounted, must have occasioned us very heavy loss, if the enemy had persisted in opposition.

A copy of my despatch to his Excellency the Governor-General, (No. 8) will inform your Royal Highness of all particulars.

This finishes a plan of operations which I had laid down for the purpose of effecting different objects contained in instructions, which I received from his Excellency the Governor-General in Council.

These instructions pointed out the expediency of destroying the French power and authority in Hindostan; of seizing their arsenals, military stores, and strong places; of taking possession, on account of the British Government, of that extent of country which is situated between the Ganges and Jumna, called the Doab; of securing a line of posts on the north-western banks of the Jumna, to protect the navigation of that river; of taking under the protection of the British Government, his Majesty Shah Allum; and of forming such connections with the independent Rajahs and petty princes to the north-westward of Hindostan, as would secure their friendship, and form a barrier against the power of the Mahratta states.

The fall of the fort of Ally Ghur was attended with the acquisition of most of the military stores belonging to the French party. This was the place of residence of their principal officer, M. Perron, and it was the grand depôt of their military stores.

This event also, with the decisive consequences of the action of the 11th of September, at the same time that they destroyed the French influence and authority, put into our possession the whole of the tract of country above alluded to.

The French officers stript of their authority, and finding themselves the objects of just indignation to the country they had governed, were compelled to solicit my protection. I disposed of them in the manner I have already pointed out, and I have now reason to believe, that there does not remain in the service of Dowlut Rao Scindia, or of any other native prince, an individual, that has either power or inclination to espouse the interests of France.

The conquered country seems to rejoice in its change of masters, and will I can have no doubt, submit with the utmost tranquillity and satisfaction, to the introduction of those forms and regulations by which the British possessions in India are governed.

This must be attributed in a great measure to the mild treatment and security which they could not help being informed, the British Government affords to all its subjects; but I cannot in justice to the army I have the honour to command, conceal from your Royal Highness, that the good opinion and favourable disposition of the natives has been in a great measure obtained by the humane treatment and orderly behaviour of my troops.

It has hitherto been unknown in Hindostan, that a victorious army has moved without everywhere committing plunder and devastation. During our progress, on the contrary, the utmost attention has been paid to the protection of the persons and property of the inhabitants, and this has led them to regard us more in the light of friends and deliverers than enemies and oppressors.

The possession of Delhi, Muttra, Agra, and other places, secures the navigation of the river Jumna, and gives us possession of a considerable tract of country on its north-western banks. I therefore also look upon this object of Government as obtained.

The unfortunate Shah Allum has been rescued from the power of his oppressors, by which means the purposes of humanity are accomplished, and so far as this object is to be regarded in a political point of view, his being under the protection of the British Government, will effectually prevent any other power from availing itself of the weight and influence which his name must ever possess amongst the Mussulman inhabitants of Hindostan.

The native chieftains and independent Rajahs, who possess territory to the north-westward of Hindostan, are for the most part eager to embrace our friendship, and with several of the most powerful I have already entered into treaties, conformable to my instructions, by which their alliance is secured.

Every object therefore contained in the instructions with which I was furnished by his Excellency the Governor-General in Council, appears to be fully accomplished.

The prosecution of the war against Doulut Rao Scindia and the Rajah of Berar, will require that I should still farther extend my operations; and I shall have the honour, in my next despatch, to inform your Royal Highness what measures I may find necessary to adopt for that purpose.

The success of my army hitherto, has in point of extent, surpassed even my most sanguine hopes, and no example is to be found in this country which equals it in point of rapidity.

This I most willingly ascribe in a great degree to the high discipline, persevering courage, and emminent gallantry of the officers and men who compose my army, many instances of which have already been pointed out to the notice of your Royal Highness.

I find also a most important cause of my success in the unrestrained powers with which I have been invested by his Excellency the Governor-General, and in the very ample means with which I have been supplied for the prosecution of the various objects of this campaign.

The effect of these has been so great, that whilst I feel towards the Marquess Wellesley the highest sense of private obligation, I conceive it a public duty to express to your Royal Highness, the beneficial consequence my public measures have derived from his zealous assistance, his unlimited support, and his complete confidence in my various exertions.

Permit me to add, that I derive the most sincere satisfaction from the success which has attended my endeavours to carry into effect the comprehensive plans of his Excellency, and that I feel in the highest degree gratified by the praise and approbation with which he has been pleased to honour my conduct, and signalise the services of the army.

A well grounded confidence may now be entertained that his Lordship's views will soon be successfully accomplished, and that whilst his political wisdom, energy, and decision are fully evinced, an increase of power, resources and stability will be obtained to our Indian possessions, and ultimate advantages secured to Great Britain, the extent and importance of which cannot easily be calculated.

I cannot close this despatch without recommending to the notice of your Royal Highness my two Aides-de-camp, Majors Nicolson and Lake, to whose zeal, and activity upon all occasions since they have been attached to me, I feel most particularly obliged.

The former, with whose merits your Royal Highness is well acquainted, I have made the bearer of this despatch, that he may have the honour of communicating any particulars respecting the campaign, with which your Royal Highness may be desirous of being made acquainted.

I feel it incumbent upon me from my situation (although a parent) to assure your Royal Highness that Major Lake has in every action displayed so much energy, zeal and ability, as to convince me that he is one of the first officers of his standing I ever saw and will, I am quite certain, become a very distinguished character in his profession.

I have long forborne mentioning this young man on account of his near connection with me, but I feel it a duty I owe to him, both as a father and an officer, to inform your Royal Highness of his merits, in the hope that he may reap the benefit of your Royal Highness's patronage and protection, and that you will be graciously pleased to recommend him to the notice of his Majesty.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your Royal Highness's most faithful and humble servant,

G. LAKE.

# APPENDIX K.

## *The Marquess Wellesley to Lord Hobart.*

(Official and Secret.)

MY LORD, Fort William, June 20, 1803.

In my despatch under date the 8th of October, 1802,* I had the honour to convey to your Lordship an intimation of my intention to submit to you the various considerations to which it appears to me to be necessary to advert, in obeying his Majesty's commands signified to me in your Lordship's secret and confidential letter of the 5th of May, 1802, relative to the restitution of the possessions of the French and Batavian Republics conquered by his Majesty's arms during the war.

Various circumstances have occurred to delay this communication, while the state of affairs between his Majesty and France, has rendered the delay less important to the public interests, and has offered ample time for a mature examination of the subject.

By his Majesty's warrant of the 3d of May, 1802, I am commanded to deliver to such commissary, or such commissaries, as shall be named and authorized on the part of the French Republic, and of the Batavian Republic, respectively to receive the same, all and every of the countries, territories, and factories, in the

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* The following is the despatch referred to; it is inserted here in order to explain this letter more fully.—[ED.]

*The Marquess Wellesley to Lord Hobart.*

MY LORD, Fort William, October 8, 1802.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatch, of the 5th of May, enclosing a copy of the definitive treaty of peace concluded at Amiens on the 27th of March, 1802, and his Majesty's warrant for the restoration of the French and Dutch possessions in India, (with the exception of the Dutch possessions in the island of Ceylon,) which have been occupied by British troops during the late war, conformably to the stipulations of the definitive treaty of peace concluded at Amiens on the 27th of March, 1802.

Your Lordship's letter of the 5th of May reached Fort William on the 14th instant (yesterday), having been brought to Madras by his Majesty's frigate *La Dédaigneuse*, which ship arrived at the Cape of Good Hope on the 13th of August, sailed from that settlement on the 19th of August, and arrived at Madras on the 21st of September.

Immediately on the receipt of your Lordship's letter I issued the necessary orders for carrying his Majesty's commands into effect.

Your Lordship may rely on my strict attention (until I shall be honoured with his Majesty's further orders) to that part of your letter which directs me to observe the provision of the convention of 1787, between his Majesty and France, as the rule by which my conduct is to be governed in all questions which may arise with regard to the situation of the French in India. It is, however, necessary to apprize your Lordship that in my judgment the various important occurrences which have happened in India since the commencement of the late war with France, and the alterations which have taken place in many of the British interests in Asia, will materially affect the application of the provisions of the Convention of 1787, to the present situation of affairs in this quarter of the globe.

Being unwilling to delay the present despatch, and being anxious to give the fullest consideration to this important question, before I submit my sentiments to your Lordship's authority, it is my intention, as soon as may be practicable, to address a separate letter to your Lordship on this particular subject, which I shall despatch without delay by an express conveyance by sea and land.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

East Indies, which may have been conquered from the said powers, respectively during the war, (with the exception of the Dutch possessions on the Island of Ceylon) with the fortifications thereof, in the state in which they may have been at the time of the signature of the preliminary treaty, leaving untouched the works which may have been constructed since the occupation.

By your Lordship's letter of the 5th of May, 1802, I am directed to take the necessary measures for placing the subjects of the French and Batavian Republics in India, upon the same footing on which they stood at the commencement of the war, and in the event of any questions arising with respect to the situation of the French in India, I am further commanded to consider the provisions of the convention of 1787, as constituting the rule by which my conduct is to be governed upon such questions, it being his Majesty's pleasure under the present circumstances, to allow to France all the advantages of " that convention."

I am not at present apprized that any important question can be expected to arise, with regard to the limits or local position of any possession to be restored to the French or Batavian Republics, excepting the settlement of Mahé; in the vicinity of that settlement, the French have formerly advanced pretensions to an extension of territory more important from its relation to our possessions in that quarter, than from its magnitude or intrinsic value.

Your Lordship may be assured, that I shall endeavour to avoid the agitation of any vexatious question, with relation to the limits or position of the territories to be restored under his Majesty's commands. But if any territorial claim, doubtful or dangerous in my judgment, should be preferred by the commissaries of either Republic, not deeming myself to be authorized to admit such pretensions without the express commands of his Majesty, I shall refer every claim which appears to me to be of that description to your Lordship's decision.

It is necessary however, in this place to solicit your Lordship's attention to a possible contingency, which may require my immediate determination, and may preclude the opportunity of resorting to his Majesty's previous commands.

Reports have reached me through various channels, intimating an apprehension that the French Republic has secretly concluded engagements with the Batavian Republic, by which the Batavian Republic has ceded to France considerable portions of the territorial possessions conquered from the Dutch in India, during the war. The Dutch possessions at Cochin are stated to be included in the supposed plan of secret cession from Holland to France.

The terms of his Majesty's warrant convey no authority to the local Government of India to deliver to the commissaries of the French Republic any possessions which had been conquered from the Dutch during the war. No further authority can be derived from that warrant, or from your Lordship's instructions, than the limited power of delivering to the commissaries of the French Republic the possessions conquered from France, and to the commissaries of the Batavian Republic the possessions conquered from the Dutch during the war. Any interchange, or cession of territory, which may have been concluded between those Republics respectively, would require the previous sanction of his Majesty, and the notification of his royal pleasure to the local Government of India, in order to authorize any departure from the tenor of his Majesty's warrant, dated 3d of May, 1802, and of the articles of defensive treaty of peace to which that warrant expressly refers.

If therefore, the French or Batavian commissaries, should require the local Government of India to deliver to either Republic respectively, any possession which by his Majesty's warrant I have been commanded to deliver to the other, I shall not deem myself to be authorized to assent to such a demand without his Majesty's special command, and I shall refer any such demand to your Lordship for his Majesty's final pleasure.

The same principle will be equally applicable to any artifice by which either the agents of the French, or Batavian Republic immediately after having received possession of their respective territories, or the agents of any European power possessing territory in India, may attempt to transfer any portion of their respective territorial possessions to the French or to the Batavian Republic. Any such transfer of territory however modified, which could be attempted in the period of time within which your Lordship's further instructions in answer to this despatch might reach Bengal, must bear direct reference to the conditions of the peace of

Amiens, and must therefore be considered to be subject to the general operation of the spirit of his Majesty's warrant of the 3rd of May, 1802. It is therefore my intention to resist, as far as may be practicable, without resorting to hostilities, any transfer of territory of the nature described, which may be attempted previously to the receipt of such further commands, as his Majesty may be pleased to signify to me on this important question.

To your Lordship's judgment and experience, it is unnecessary to suggest the serious importance of admitting interchanges or cessions of territory, which might involve the dangerous result of confirming to the French a considerable extension of territorial possession in India, under circumstances favourable to the establishment of an exclusive sovereignty in any position which might facilitate an intercourse with any of the natives states, or might furnish the means of disturbing the internal tranquillity of the British dominions. That cessions and interchanges of territory, which would involve consequences of this nature, might be effected between France and other European powers established in India, must be obvious to your Lordship's knowledge of the local position of the Dutch and Portuguese possessions in India, without entering into any consideration of the territorial possessions of other European powers in this quarter of the globe.

With regard to the fortifications of the several places to be restored to either Republic on the continent of India, I apprehend that long before the time of the signature of the preliminary treaty (with the exception of the works at Cochin) they had been destroyed, and that no works have been constructed during the occupation. A serious question however will arise with respect to the right of either Republic, to restore such fortifications as may have been destroyed, or to construct new works in new positions. To this subject I propose to solicit your Lordship's attention in a subsequent part of this despatch. I am not apprized that any additions of importance have been made to the fortifications at Malacca, or at any place in the Eastern Seas since those Dutch settlements have been occupied by the British Government.

In considering the instructions contained in your Lordship's letter of the 5th of May, 1802, it appeared to me to be necessary to advert to the relative situation and natural pretensions of the French and Batavian Republics in the capacity of states possessed of territory in India, as well as to the condition and claims of the individual subjects of those powers respectively.

The convention of 1787 contains no special definition of the relative national rights of Great Britain and France in India, in the capacity of states respectively possessed of territory, but the general spirit of that engagement, his Majesty's instructions to Mr. Eden of September, 1787, and the letter of the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors to the Governor-General in council, of the 3rd of November, 1787, afford sufficient proof that an admission of our exclusive sovereignty within the territories actually possessed by the Company in India, and of our exclusive authority over our native tributaries and dependent princes, constituted a fundamental principle of the convention of 1787; that France under the stipulations of that treaty, was recognized merely as a commercial power within the limits of our sovereignty, authority, or influence; and that the convention of 1787, was not intended by Great Britain to secure to France within those limits any other advantages than a liberal protection in the free exercise of a safe and independent trade, together with an impartial administration of justice under the established sovereign power of the Company, or under our established authority or influence in the dominions of our tributaries and dependents.

The events which have occurred in India since the date of the convention of 1787, have considerably extended the limits within which (under the principle assumed at that time) France as a state holding territory in India, would be considered in the most favourable view to possess no right beyond the condition of a protected commercial establishment, under the authority of an acknowledged sovereign power.

From the year 1787, to the present period of time, the British Sovereignty in India has been directly extended over the province of Benares, over the greater part of the territories of Tippoo Sultaun, over Tanjore, a considerable part of the Deccan, the whole of the Carnatic, the greater part of Oude, the city of Surat, part of Guzerat, and the Island of Ceylon, and by the treaty of Bassein over part of the Mahratta territory.

The dependency of the Rajahs of Benares and of Tanjore, of the Nawaubs of Surat, of the Carnatic, and of Oude, has been clearly defined and confirmed. The Nizam has entered into engagements with the British Government, involving a condition of dependence at least equal to that in which the Nawaub of the Carnatic was placed in 1787; the subsisting treaties so closely connect the Rajah of Mysore with the Company, that his Government is absolutely identified with the British power, and cannot by any foreign state be considered otherwise than as a branch of the sovereignty of the Company, exercised through a native dependent prince. The Guickwar and the Peishwa have respectively formed connections with the British Government, which render each of those powers dependent on the Company for protection.

Applying the general tenor and spirit of the principles, on which was founded the convention of 1787, to the actual state of the British power in India, I therefore conclude, that, within all the British territories, possessions, and dependencies acquired since the year 1787, as well as within those possessed by Great Britain previously to that period of time, France, in the most favourable view, is not entitled to be admitted to any advantage beyond the immunities of a mere commercial establishment to be protected by the British sovereignty, authority, and influence in the secure exercise of trade under just and equitable regulations.

This construction of his Majesty's commands, and of your Lordship's instructions, would appear to me to be correct, even if I had understood from the tenor of those orders that the convention of 1787 had been formally and expressly renewed with the French Republic, and that France had become entitled to claim the advantages of that convention, as matter of national right.

But your Lordship's instructions of the 5th of May, 1802, having expressed it to be his Majesty's pleasure, under the present circumstances, to allow to France all the advantages of the convention of 1787, I have been led by those expressions to conceive that no formal stipulation to that effect has been concluded with the French Republic, and that the observance of the provisions of the convention of 1787, as the rule of decision in all questions which may arise with respect to the French in India, will rest absolutely upon his Majesty's future pleasure.

With this view of the subject, I presume to submit to your Lordship's consideration such reflections as have occurred to my mind with regard to the expediency of modifying the rules which would be derived from the provisions of the convention of 1787, in such a manner as may render the application of the general spirit and tenor of that engagement more suitable to the actual state of the British empire in India.

By the 1st article of the convention of 1787, his Majesty engages "to take such measures as shall be in his power for securing to the subjects of France a safe, free, and independent trade, such as was carried on by the French East India Company, and as it is explained in the following articles, whether they exercise it individually, or as a Company, as well in the Nabobship of Arcot, and the countries of Madura and Tanjore, as in the provinces of Bengal, Bahar and Orixa, in the northern Circars, and in general in all the British possessions on the coast of Orixa, Coromandel, and Malabar."

The 4th article declares, that "the six ancient factories, namely, Chandernagore, Cossimbuzar, Dacca, Jugdea, Balasore, and Patna, with the territories belonging to the said factories, shall be under the protection of the French flag, and subject to the French jurisdiction."

The 5th article declares, that "France shall always have possession of the ancient houses of Soopore, Keerpoy, Cannicole, Mohunpore, Serampore, and Chittagong, as well as the dependencies on Soopore, viz., Gautjeraut, Alsinde, Chintzabad, Patoreeha, Moneypore, and Dololbaudy; and shall further have the faculty of establishing new houses of commerce; but none of the said houses shall have any jurisdiction, or any exemption from the ordinary justice of the country, exercised over British subjects."

By the 6th article his Majesty engages "to take measures to secure to French subjects, without the limits of the ancient factories above mentioned, an exact and impartial administration of justice in all matters concerning their persons or properties, or the carrying on their trade in the same manner, and as effectually as to his own subjects."

Under the operation of these articles his Majesty engaged to secure to the subjects of France either individually or in the character of a company, within all the British possessions and dependencies, a free trade, by establishing the six ancient French factories in Bengal, Bahar, and Orixa, in the exercise of French jurisdiction within their respective limits; by confirming to the French the possession of their ancient houses of commerce without the limits of those factories, subject, however, to the ordinary justice of the country exercised over British subjects; by granting to France the faculty of establishing new houses of commerce under a similar restriction, and finally, by affording to all French subjects without the limits of the ancient factories, the benefit of the same administration of justice as is exercised over British subjects.

The articles which stipulate for the restitution of the ancient French factories, together with the exercise of French jurisdiction in each respectively, appear to be of a description which cannot now be modified without involving questions of difficulty and danger, but I trust that your Lordship will be enabled, without embarrassment, to advert to the situation of French subjects in India residing without the limits of the ancient factories, and of the towns of Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay, and to the faculty granted to France under the 5th article of the convention, of establishing new houses of commerce.

For the purpose of submitting to your Lordship the most full information on these inportant points, I have the honour to enclose an extract of a letter from the Governor-General in Council to the Secret Committee, under date the 6th of November, 1788, by which document, as well as by considering the charters of his Majesty's Courts at Fort William, Madras, and Bombay, and the regulations enacted by the Governor-General in Council, and by the subordinate governments of Fort St. George and Bombay, your Lordship will perceive, that, if the advantages of the 5th article of the convention of 1787 be extended to all French subjects residing without the limits of the ancient factories, the immediate consequence must be to exempt all French subjects residing without the limits of the ancient factories, and without the limits of the towns of Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay respectively, from the restraint of any existing civil or criminal jurisdiction in any part of the Company's dominions.

The charters of his Majesty's Courts grant no jurisdiction in civil or criminal cases over foreign Europeans beyond the limits of the towns of Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay respectively; the regulations of these governments establishing the Company's civil and criminal courts of judicature in the provinces have not rendered British subjects amenable to those Courts, nor could the jurisdiction of the Company's Courts be extended to British subjects without the previous authority of an Act of Parliament, framed expressly for that purpose. With the exception of British subjects, all Europeans residing without the limits of their respective factories, and of the towns of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay, previously to the convention of 1787, were equally amenable with natives to the authority of the Company's civil and criminal courts. But as the 5th article of the Convention placed the subjects of France in India, with regard to civil and criminal jurisdiction in the Company's provinces on the same level with British subjects, the subjects of France were necessarily exempted from the jurisdiction of the Company's Courts, and no Act of Parliament or charter from the Crown having extended the jurisdiction of his Majesty's Courts to French subjects resident in the provinces, the result was the entire exemption of all French subjects in that situation from every restraint of civil or criminal law.

This inconvenience was indicated to the Secret Committee of the honourable the Court of Directors by the despatch from the Governor-General in Council of the 6th of November, 1788, to an extract from which I had the honour of soliciting your Lordship's attention in a former Paragraph. The reply of the Secret Committee to that letter is dated the 15th of April, 1789. A copy of it is annexed to this despatch for your Lordship's information. Your Lordship will remark that the Secret Committee concurred in the opinion of the Governor-General in Council, that difficulties might arise in the execution of the 5th article of the convention of 1787, and intimated that an early and attentive consideration would be given to the subject. No measures, however, appear to have been adopted either in Great Britain or in India for the purpose of removing the stated incon-

venience, and from the 21st of May, 1788, until the commencement of war with France in 1793, the subjects of France residing without the limits of the ancient French factories, and of the towns of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay, continued in a state of entire exemption from the restraints of civil or criminal law under the operation of the 5th article of the convention of 1787. During that period of time the Company's magistrates in Bengal, Bahar and Orissa, exercised the power which they possessed of apprehending French subjects accused of crimes and of detaining them for future trial before his Majesty's Supreme Court of Judicature at Fort William; but as no regular and legal mode existed of bringing such criminals to trial consistently with the existing charters of his Majesty's Courts, or with the public faith pledged by the convention of 1787, considerable inconvenience was experienced in various instances; while the propriety of detaining criminals under such circumstances could be justified only by the absolute necessity of the case.

The rupture between Great Britain and France in the year 1793 removed these embarrassments by suspending the operation of the convention of 1787, and no difficulty was experienced during the continuance of the war with regard to the situation of subjects of France residing in any part of India. The revival of the principles of the convention of 1787 at this period of time must renew the difficulties represented in the letter from the Governor-General in Council of the 6th of November, 1788, unless early measures be adopted in Europe either by an Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom or by amicable explanation with France to preclude all inconvenience in the administration of justice to the foreign Europeans residing within the British territories in India.

The construction, however, which his Majesty's commands appear to admit relieves the local government of India from any immediate difficulty with regard to this important question, while it enables me to submit to your Lordship without reserve every suggestion which can tend to illustrate this part of the subject. The convention of 1787 not having been formally revived between his Majesty and the French republic, and not constituting any actual obligation of the public faith, it appears to me to be the duty of the local government of India to modify the execution of his Majesty's commands with regard to the administration of justice to French subjects residing in the provinces by such regulations as may best adapt the spirit of his Majesty's intentions to circumstances which could not have been under consideration at the time of issuing those commands.

Until his Majesty's further pleasure can be received I shall not hesitate, therefore, to consider all subjects of France residing without the limits of the ancient French factories, and without the limits of the towns of Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay respectively to be amenable to the Company's courts of civil and criminal judicature in common with all other foreign Europeans. This determination will place the subjects of France under such circumstances precisely in the situation in which they stood previously to the convention of 1787, and will render them amenable to the only jurisdiction in India which can legally take cognizance of their actions.

Your Lordship will observe that his Majesty's Courts in India under their present charter cannot take cognizance of the actions of French subjects residing beyond the limits of the towns of Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay respectively, no other alternative than that which I propose to adopt can remain to this Government consistently with the due administration of civil and criminal justice until the further notification of his Majesty's pleasure shall be received; and that no consideration inferior to a solemn stipulation of public faith or to his Majesty's final commands could justify this Government in withholding the exercise of so important a branch of its duty as the administration of civil and criminal justice to any description of persons resident within the limits of its authority. Your Lordship will also be sensible of the hazard to which the peace and good order of the country and the happiness and security of our native subjects must be exposed if the subjects of France were to be admitted within our dominions under an entire exemption from the restraints of civil or criminal law.

I now proceed to submit to your Lordship my sentiments with regard to the principles which appear to my judgment to be most expedient for the final regulation of this question.

All foreign Europeans residing without the limits of their respective factories,

and also without the limits of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay respectively, being now amenable to the Company's courts of civil and criminal judicature in the provinces, it is proper to examine the policy of continuing the same system of administration of justice or of modifying it, either with respect to the subjects of any particular European state or with respect to all foreign Europeans. The principle of inculcating a high respect for the European character constitutes a main foundation of our power in India, and it has therefore appeared to me to have been a mistaken and dangerous policy to subject Europeans of any description in criminal cases to the jurisdiction of the Company's Courts, where native officers must be concerned in the trial and sentence, and where the proceedings must be governed by the principles of the Hindoo or Mahomedan law, although modified in some cases by the regulations of the British Government. It is, therefore, my decided opinion that all foreign Europeans should be rendered exclusively amenable to his Majesty's Courts in India in criminal cases; the Company's magistrates, however, in their capacity of Justices of the Peace, under the Act* of the 33d year of the reign of his Majesty should as at present retain the power of apprehending and detaining for trial, before his Majesty's Courts, all Europeans, including British European subjects of every description accused of crimes. I take the liberty of recommending to your Lordship the immediate introduction of an Act of Parliament for extending the criminal jurisdiction of his Majesty's Courts to all foreign Europeans according to the preceding suggestions.

The principle of these suggestions necessarily includes Americans and the children of Europeans or Americans by Europeans and Americans.

Such an Act of Parliament would remove all difficulty in India with regard to the French in criminal cases, as it would place them, with regard to the administration of criminal justice precisely on the same level with his Majesty's European subjects residing in India.

With regard to civil actions, it appears to me to be a necessary restraint upon the conduct of all foreign Europeans resident within the Company's provinces, that the local jurisdiction of the Company's courts should take cognizance of their proceedings in all civil transactions.

The distance of many of our provinces from the respective seats of his Majesty's courts of judicature would render it difficult for our native subjects to resort to his Majesty's courts for redress in civil cases, and it is well known that our native subjects are averse to such appeals to a remote authority. To impart to his Majesty's judges the power of making circuits through the Company's provinces for the trial of civil actions originating in distant situations would tend to withdraw the respect of the natives from the established executive power, to divide local authority, and to impair the consideration of the Company's civil officers and magistrates in the opinion of our native subjects.

The jurisdiction of the Company's courts in the provinces now forms a salutary protection to our native subjects against the oppressions and frauds of foreign Europeans while it operates as an useful instrument to the Government in observing and controlling the conduct of all foreign Europeans. I therefore take the liberty of recommending that the civil jurisdiction of the Company's courts over all foreign Europeans be confirmed. Americans will necessarily be included in this suggestion.

No reason of policy appears to me to recommend the exemption of the subjects of France resident in India from any control deemed necessary to restrain the conduct of other foreign Europeans. On the other hand various considerations require that the conduct of French subjects resident within the Company's territories in India should be observed with every degree of vigilance, and controlled by every restraint compatible with the general principles of justice, with the law of nations, and with the special obligation of subsisting treaties. If therefore my opinion should not have been erroneous in concluding that these questions still remain open to his Majesty's determination, I trust that they may be determined in conformity to the principles stated in the preceding paragraphs, by which equal justice will be administered in India to all the subjects of European or American states in amity with his Majesty, and no restraint will be imposed which is not

* Cap. 52, sect. 151.

absolutely necessary for the protection of our native subjects, and for the preservation of our empire in the East.

For your Lordship's further information on this branch of the subject, I have the honour to annex to this despatch a note written at my desire by Mr. Barlow, observing to your Lordship that I entirely concur in the opinions stated by Mr. Barlow in that note.

The particular object of this letter has not led me to consider the case of British subjects not in the service of his Majesty or of the Company, as stated by Mr. Barlow, but I entirely concur in the expediency of subjecting persons of that description to the jurisdiction of the Company's courts in civil cases in the manner proposed by Mr. Barlow.

In considering the various modes by which civil and criminal justice might be administered to French subjects resident without the ancient factories, I have not adverted to the expedient suggested in the letter from the Governor-General in Council under date the 6th November 1788, of referring the actions of all French subjects to the jurisdiction of the principal French officer residing at the chief settlement or factory belonging to the French.

Your Lordship will remark that this expedient would afford no adequate security against the excesses of the subjects of France residing within our provinces, and would establish between the French officers and our native subjects an intercourse of a nature highly derogatory to the dignity and authority of the British Government, injurious to the internal peace and good order of our provinces, and dangerous to our political interests.

The draft of the proposed Act of Parliament to which reference is made in the letter of the Governor-General in Council of the 6th November 1788, does not appear to me to embrace the objects stated in the preceding paragraphs.

In framing an Act of Parliament for the purposes which I have had the honour to specify in this despatch, I take the liberty of suggesting to your Lordship the expediency of consulting the opinion of Mr. Burroughs, late Advocate-General in Bengal, who is perfectly qualified to afford every necessary assistance on every part of the question.

The faculty granted to France by the 5th Article of the Convention of 1787, of "*establishing new Houses of Commerce*," appears to require more accurate explanation and positive commands from his Majesty.

From the words of the 5th article it is not evident whether the right of establishing new houses of commerce in India is to be exercised by the French government and under its express license, or individually and without distinction by all French subjects who may arrive in India, The first article of the convention secures to the subjects of France the specified rights of trade whether exercised individually or by a Company.

If the French should open the trade to India it will be necessary to ascertain whether under the 5th article of the convention, the local governments of India are required to permit all French subjects without exception to establish themselves in all parts of the territories and dependencies of the Company, under no other restriction than that such French subjects shall be established in houses of commerce; it is also desirable to ascertain more precisely the nature of the establishment described in the convention by the term "House of Commerce."

Under the terms of the convention unexplained, I apprehend that the British possessions and dependencies in India might speedily become the resort of such a multitude of French adventurers, as might endanger the peace of the country, and might greatly disturb the minds of our native subjects and dependents. This evil would be aggravated if it were deemed necessary to give full operation to those stipulations of the convention to which I have already solicited your Lordship's attention, and under which I apprehend that all French subjects residing beyond the limits of the ancient factories and of the towns of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay, must be exempt from the efficient control of any regular civil or criminal jurisdiction.

The establishment of any considerable number of French subjects under any restriction in any of our provinces must be viewed with apprehension and concern; in Oude, in Mysore, in the ceded and conquered districts, in Malabar, Canara, and other maritime possessions and in such of our provinces as are not yet completely settled, the general establishment of French subjects would be highly excep-

tionable; and the danger would not be inferior in the territories of our tributaries and allies the Nabob Vizier, the Nizam, the Peishwa, the Guicowar, and the Rajah of Travancore; the establishment of any considerable number of French houses in Ceylon would also appear to be objectionable on similar grounds.

If the French trade to India should be exercised by a company or under any form of license from the French government to individuals, the number of French adventurers destined to India might possibly be more limited than in the event of an open trade. Even in this case the power of limiting that number would be lodged in the hands of the French Company or of the French government. It is supposed however that the French trade to India will be entirely open, and that no exclusive Company will be constituted, and no power of restraint or license reserved by the French Government.

In any case under the present terms of the 5th Article of the Convention, the subjects of France would enjoy greater advantages than British subjects within the British possessions and dependencies in India; any subject of France without previous licence or covenant from the Company's Government might claim a positive right to establish himself in any part of our dominions or of the territories of our tributaries or allies, provided only that he should establish himself in a house of commerce, nor would the Company's Government possess the power under the stipulations of the convention, of requiring any previous security for the conduct of such French subject, or of exercising any control over his conduct similar to that exercised over British subjects.

Neither British subjects unlicensed or licensed by the Company to reside in India nor even the public officers in the service of the Crown or of the Company are entitled to privileges so extensive. No British subject can establish himself in any part of our provinces or dependencies without the express permission of the local government and the continuance of all such establishments of British subjects whether commercial or of any other description, depends absolutely upon the discretion of the Governor or Governor-General in Council. The same powers are exercised by the Company's government in time of peace over all foreign Europeans of every description beyond the limits of the respective established factories. If therefore the privilege granted by the words of the 5th article to the French be not restrained by his Majesty's orders, I apprehend that it will place every French subject in India in a situation of superior advantage not only to that of every other foreign European, or British subject unlicensed or licensed by the Company, but even to that of the servants of the Crown or of the Company, inasmuch as it will exempt French subjects with regard to the right of commercial establishments from the authority of the local government.

The words of the 5th and 6th articles which render French subjects residing in the new houses of commerce or without the limits of the ancient factories amenable to the ordinary justice of the country, cannot be construed to enable the Company's government to deny to any French subject the right of establishing a house of commerce in any part of India, or to remove any such establishment after it has been formed. The words quoted in this paragraph from the 5th article, relate exclusively to the ordinary judicial process of the courts of civil and criminal justice; and the executive power of the Company's government appears to be restrained by the terms of the same article from exercising any discretion over the establishment of any French subject in a house of commerce.

The same principles which have induced me to determine until further orders to suspend the operation of the stipulations of the convention of 1787, as far as they relate to the administration of justice over French subjects in India, will justify me in considering the right of establishing new houses of commerce to be subject to the discretion of the Company's local government until his Majesty's ulterior commands shall be received.

The question involves the foundations of our empire in India; the security of our empire in India requires that the establishment even of British subjects within our Indian dominions and dependencies should be restrained by the most strict limitations and observed with the utmost degree of vigilance and care. The actual powers of the executive government in India have secured a control over the establishment and conduct of British subjects sufficient to preclude all apprehension of danger from an influx of British adventurers in our Oriental possessions. Without the active exercise of that control considerable danger

might arise from the establishment of any great number even of British adventurers in India: your Lordship will apply these principles to the case now submitted to your consideration, and I am persuaded that you will perceive the necessity of employing every effort to limit the number, and to control the subjects of France to be admitted within our possessions and dependencies under the treaty of Amiens.

It might be deemed a secure and equitable arrangement to confirm the French in the possession of their ancient factories and houses of commerce, and to subject all new establishments to the discretion and previous license of the Company or of the British government in India, under the same rules which now exist with regard to all similar establishments of British subjects.

France cannot object to this principle, unless she be determined to contest our rights of sovereignty and authority within our established possessions and dependencies in India.

Neither justice nor liberality require that the subjects of France should enjoy greater immunities than his Majesty's subjects within the limits of any part of the British empire. If any such claim be preferred by France with respect to the British possessions and dependencies in India, it must be founded upon a supposition that those possessions and dependencies are not included within the limits of the British empire.

In addition to these, supplemental arrangements for defining the condition of the subjects of France within our provinces and dependencies, it would be extremely desirable to ascertain by some fixed stipulation or declared rule, the precise nature of the rights of France as a state possessing territory in India.

In the capacity of a mere commercial establishment subsisting under the protection of the British power, the French Government in India would be entitled to maintain a larger military force than might be necessary for the preservation of internal tranquillity, and for the security of public and private property within its respective settlements.

It appears from his Majesty's instructions to Mr. Eden under date September 1787, to have been his Majesty's intention at that time to consider the condition of France in India under the convention of 1787 to be that of a merely commercial establishment according to the description stated in a former paragraph of this letter.* The convention of 1787 contains no direct expression of this principle, but the principle may justly be inferred from the general tenor and spirit of that engagement. Former treaties appear to preclude any military establishment of the French within the provinces immediately dependent on Bengal. But the settlements of Pondicherry and Mahé, and other places in the southern districts of India, are rather of the nature of military stations than of commercial establishments, and the military nature of those stations has not been affected by the positive letter of the convention of 1787, or by the practice of the British Government in India previously to the war.

It would be highly advantageous to the British interests to determine the extent of the military force which the French shall be permitted to maintain at those places, and generally in India, as well as to decide whether the French shall be allowed to restore the works of any of their former fortifications, or to construct new works at any of their settlements.

The convention of 1787 is entirely silent upon these points; but the general spirit of that engagement applicable to the present time would appear to preclude the French from any increase of their military strength, either by fortifications, or by the introduction or levying of troops, beyond the extent requisite for the security of the commercial rights of France in India.

In the discussions which occurred in Parliament on the treaty of Amiens, the opinion of his Majesty's ministers seemed to be decisive in favour of the exclusion of France in India, from the rights of a military power. His Majesty's commands signified in your Lordship's letter of the 5th of May, have not furnished me with any special instructions with regard to the extent and nature of the rights of the French to restore their ancient fortifications, or to construct new works of that description, or to introduce troops into their settlements, or to levy troops for the

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* See p. 646.

French service. It appears, however, from the general tenor of your Lordship's letter, and from other circumstances, that it had been found expedient to wave the discussion of those points, and perhaps in this view of the subject it might be his Majesty's intention to permit the French to restore their fortifications in India to the state in which they actually existed at the commencement of the war, and to maintain in India any military force which should not be of greater extent than the French army maintained in India at that period of time.

Entertaining, however, considerable doubts with regard to this construction of his Majesty's commands, I conceive it will be my duty (in the event of any attempt on the part of the French officers in India to restore the demolished fortifications, or to construct new works in any of their settlements,) to address a temperate representation to the local government of France in India, stating my reasons for proposing a reference to the respective governments at home previously to the completion or further progress of any such works, and I shall accordingly forward the earliest representations upon the subject to your Lordship; but I shall not attempt to interrupt by force the commencement or progress of any such works without special orders fram his Majesty.

I shall apply the same general principles in the event of any arrival or levy of troops for the French service in India, unless in the extreme case of such an augmentation of the French force as should evidently be directed to hostile purposes against the British interests. In that case, I am satisfied that his Majesty will expect me to adopt every necessary precaution for the security of these dominions.

I am aware of the difficulties which might attend any attempt to discuss and determine in Europe the rights of France with regard to the extent and nature of her fortifications, and of her army in India. Extreme embarrassment, however, might arise in India from the continuance of the present state of doubt with regard to those important questions.

Without some definite arrangement of these points, the French might gradually establish in India a degree of military power, which might become a serious object of solicitude to the British Government. The extent of the European force to be maintained by the British Government in India must always bear a certain proportion to the actual strength of the French army maintained in India, and to the facility of augmenting that force. The existence of any considerable French force in India must always tend to disturb the minds of the native states, and of our subjects, tributaries, dependents and allies. The dangerous impression of such a French establishment could be counteracted only by a decided and evident superiority of strength on the part of the British Government, and the local positions of the principal French stations would require that a considerable body of our troops should be exclusively employed in observing those stations, if garrisoned by a large force. Your Lordship, however, will not understand my opinion to be, that even the entire destruction of the French military power in India would justify any reduction of our present military establishments, especially of our European force; but I apprehend that any considerable augmentation of the French force in India would require a large augmentation of the number of his Majesty's regiments now employed in India.

I request your Lordship's attention to the situation of the political rights of France in India with relation to the native states and powers. It would be very desirable to ascertain to what extent any correspondence is to be permitted between the French and any of those states, independent of the British power, and unconnected with it by alliance or treaty.

With regard to the independent and unallied native states, it would be necessary to determine whether France is to be permitted to take such states under her protection or guarantee, or to furnish officers for the discipline of their armies, or military stores, ordnance, and other military resources, for the improvement of their respective military power; whether the French are to be allowed to contract subsidiary engagements with such states, and to receive grants of territory as security for the payment of such subsidies, or under any other circumstances, to receive grants of territory or any other establishment from any of the independent or unallied native states or powers.

By the progress of our alliances, and the success of our arms, the French are

absolutely excluded, (without committing acts of positive aggression,) from any connection of the nature described, with any considerable native states or powers of India, excepting Scindiah, the Rajah of Berar, and the family of Holkar. But many of the inferior class of *states* are still open to French intrigue.

With many of these powers the French might form political connections, and under those connections might obtain territorial and military establishments extremely dangerous to the British interests; and great evils are to be apprehended even from the systematic introduction of French adventurers, and French military science into the armies of the independent and unallied native powers. With regard to all our tributaries, dependents, or allies, I conclude that his Majesty will approve my determination to prohibit in the most strict manner any intercourse between them and the agents or emissaries of France.

The exercise of political powers of the nature described in these suggestions certainly cannot be deemed necessary to the security of a limited commercial establishment existing under the protection of the acknowledged sovereign authority of the British Government. But if France should entertain designs of reviving in India a rival power and dominion, with a view of checking the present ascendency of the British influence, it is to be apprehended that the political connections to which I have referred might become useful instruments of French ambition and intrigue.

France may contest our right to interfere with her system of negotiations or establishment at the courts, or in the dominions of powers unconnected with us either by dependence, alliance, or treaty. The security of the British empire in India, however, absolutely demands that France should not be permitted to extend her territorial possessions in India, or in any manner to strengthen the military power and resources of any native state in India.

In the present disturbed condition of the Mahratta empire, and of several of the inferior native states, favourable opportunities might be offered to the enterprizing and adventurous spirit of the French for the successful prosecution of such projects.

It would, therefore, be highly advantageous either to fix by positive treaty the nature and extent of the political power of France in India, or to furnish the local government of India with such instructions as might prescribe a systematic course of precautionary measures for the purpose of preventing the French from forming connections or establishments of the description apprehended.

With a view also to the stability of the British ascendency in India, it will be necessary to determine whether France shall at any time be permitted, without the special consent of the British power, to increase her territorial possessions in India by cessions or conquests from any European power now occupying territory in India.

I have already submitted my sentiments to your Lordship on this part of the subject with referrence to such a period of time as may be supposed to connect any such cession from an European power with the spirit of the treaty of Amiens; but it would be desirable to regulate a question of this importance by some permanent and established principle.

The condition of the subjects of the Batavian Republic resident within the Company's dominions and dependencies in India, is not affected by the convention of 1787. The Dutch subjects will therefore return to the situation in which they were placed previously to the war, and consequently I do not apprehend any embarrassments with regard to the administration of justice over Dutch subjects, or to any claims on their part to the right of forming new establishments within our possessions or dependencies.

The political and military rights of the Batavian Republic in India will, however, require your Lordship's attention, with reference to the principles which I have submitted to you respecting similar pretensions on the part of France.

This delicate and important question will become more urgent, in proportion as the interests and power of the Batavian Republic shall be more nearly connected with those of France. If an union of interests and power should be established between the two Republics, nearly equal danger may arise from the political and military power of either, and our security may require the application of similar restraints to both.

Any considerable increase of the Dutch military force at Cochin might prove the source of serious inconvenience, notwithstanding the destruction of the hostile

power of Mysore. Other settlements of the Batavian Republic might also furnish the means of disturbing the British establishments.

In adverting to the political and military power of the Batavian and French Republics to be established in India under the treaty of Amiens, your Lordship's attention will necessarily be directed to the amount of the naval force to be maintained in India by those Republics. This question is beyond the limits of my duty or authority; but in endeavouring to submit to your Lordship the various circumstances which may affect the important interests committed to my charge, it has appeared to me to be requisite to advert to the necessity of establishing a rule for the guidance of the local government in India, in the event of any actual or meditated increase of the French or Dutch naval forces in India, or of any attempt towards the improvement of their sea-ports (with a view to hostile operations by sea,) or towards any augmentation of their naval resources in India, or towards deriving advantage from the abundant means which India affords of building ships of war, and of founding a formidable naval power in these seas.

The consideration of this branch of the question will lead your Lordship to examine the right or inclination of the French or Batavian Republics to occupy either by force or by negotiation any part of the dominions of the King of Ava, and you will determine the propriety of instructing the local government of India on that delicate and important question.

This letter having necessarily involved a discussion of considerable detail, it may be convenient to your Lordship that I should conclude by recapitulating the principal questions on which I am axious to obtain your Lordship's instructions.

First. Whether the convention of 1787 has been formally revived between his Majesty and France, or whether the admission of the French to the benefits of that treaty rests absolutely upon his Majesty's indulgence, and cannot be claimed as an obligation of public faith.

Secondly. By what jurisdiction and in what manner civil and criminal justice is to be administered to the subjects of France within the territories and dependencies of the British Government in India.

Thirdly. By what regulations the establishments of the French within the British possessions and dependencies are to be limited or restrained.

Fourthly. Whether the French Government in India is to be considered as a mere commercial establishment, or as a political and military power.

Fifthly. If the French Government in India is to be considered as a political and military power, what are to be the relations of that power towards the British possessions, dependencies, and allies, and also towards the independent and unallied native powers: what is to be the extent of the military power to be maintained by France in India, and what is to be the extent of her right to repair or to construct fortifications, or to strengthen her military resources in India by alliances or by other means.

Sixthly. If the French Government in India is to be considered in the situation merely of a commercial establishment, with relation to all the powers of India, European and native, by what regulations, and by what system of policy, is the local British Government of India to be authorized to enforce the obligations of such a condition upon the French Government, and upon the other powers of India.

Seventhly. What is to be the condition of the Batavian Government in India, with reference to military and political power.

Eighthly. The nature and extent of the naval power of the French and Batavian Governments in India.

Ninthly. Whether the French and Batavian Republics respectively, are to be permitted to interchange their respective territories and possessions, or to make cessions of territories or possessions to each other respectively; or to receive interchanges or cessions of territory from any other European, or native power in India.

In examining the various topics which this despatch embraces, I have omitted to observe to your Lordship, that some of our dependents exercise a local and distinct sovereign authority within their immediate possessions; the Nawaub of Oude, the Rajah of Mysore, and the Nizam, with several other states are of this description. It may become a question whether French subjects or others, residing

within the possessions of such princes or states should be amenable exclusively to the civil and criminal jurisdiction on the spot, or to the Company's, or to any concurrent jurisdiction of these authorities. On this point your Lordship will receive the most correct opinion from the high legal authorities in England. It is desirable that the conduct of European foreigners resident within the immediate territories of our dependent princes should be controlled by some jurisdiction of more just and regular operation, and of more efficacious, certain and speedy effect than can be derived from the arbitrary, corrupt, and precarious administration of any native state in India.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

*Postcript, 23d July.*

1. For your Lordship's more easy reference with regard to the settlements to be restored to the Batavian and French Republics within the territories and dependencies of the Government of Fort St. George, I have the honor to annex a copy of the reply of that government to my orders of the 24th of November, 1802. The detailed statements to which the letter from the Government of Fort St. George, and its enclosures refer, will be found at the India House, if your Lordship should have occasion to examine this subject with particular attention.

2. Your Lordship will observe, that several settlements both of the French and Dutch to be restored under the treaty of Amiens are interspersed within the Company's dominions in a manner which is likely to produce great inconvenience, and to interfere essentially with the uniformity and vigor of the British system of government.

3. In addition to the instances of interspersed possession, stated in the letter from Fort St. George, great inconvenience of a similar nature will arise in Bengal, especially from the restitution of the small district of Barnagore situated within a few miles of Calcutta, on the same bank of the Hoogly river. The restitution of that district to the Dutch will seriously affect the police and local revenue of Calcutta, and will obstruct the success of every regulation established for collecting the town duties, and for maintaining the peace and good order of the great town of Calcutta, and of its populous vicinity. These objects are highly important, and the encreasing population of Calcutta renders the regulation of the local administration and of the revenues and police of the town, a matter of great consideration in the general government of this empire.

4. It would be highly advantageous if the British, French and Dutch Governments of India could be vested respectively with the power of concluding such interchanges of territory as might establish a more defined boundary, and might preclude the confusion, which must arise from the intermixture of the authorities of the British, French, and Batavian Governments.

5. It would be desirable that this power should be special with regard to the district of Barnagore and to the districts specified in the report from Fort St. George. In the meanwhile the restitution of Barnagore to the Dutch will be attended with such extreme inconvenience to the police of Calcutta, that it is my intention to pay the amount of the revenue of that district into the hands of the officers of the Dutch Government, and to withold the actual restitution of the district until I shall have the honour of receiving his Majesty's further commands.

6. No difficulty could occur in ceding to the Batavian Republic a tract of country immediately adjoining to Chinsurah in commutation for the district of Barnagore. This arrangement will be equally advantageous to both parties.

7. I have not annexed to this letter any report of the particular settlements and districts to be restored to the French and Batavian Republics under the immediate government of Bengal; the several settlements are so well known, and all the documents respecting them being within your Lordship's reach at the India House. The same observation applies to the factories to be restored by the Government of Bombay under the treaty of Amiens.

WELLESLEY.

# APPENDIX L.

## *The Marquess Wellesley to Lord Hobart.*

MY LORD, Fort William, 1st August, 1803.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordships dispatch of the 18th March 1803 received on the 6th of July, 1803 together with its enclosures.

The mode of carrying into effect the restitutions to be made under the treaty of Amiens on the continent of India to the French and Batavian Republics necessarily involved various Questions respecting territorial limits, and other national and local rights and claims, the decision of which appeared to be more properly the duty of the Governor General in Council, than of any of the subordinate governments.

Under this impression, on the 24th of November 1802, I issued an order in Council to Fort St. George and Bombay, directing certain documents and statements connected with the intended restitutions to be transmitted to Bengal for the information of the Governor General in Council, and I further directed that in the event of the arrival of French or Batavian Commissaries or other officers, who might demand possession of the territories to be restored under the treaty of Amiens, the demand should be referred to the Governor General in Council in the first instance; and that the actual restitution of any possession demanded should be postponed, until express authority should be received for the purpose from the Governor General in Council. In the interval of time, which must necessarily have elapsed during the proposed reference to Bengal, I directed that any French or Batavian officers who might have arrived in India, should be treated with every practicable degree of civility and attention.

My order in council of the 24th of Nov. 1802, appeared to be requisite for the general reasons stated in the 3rd Paragraph of this letter; nor could the government of France or that of Holland have justly complained that the supreme executive power of the British Government in India, had reserved for its own direct authority, an act of such importance as the final restoration to the French and Batavian Commissaries, of the conquests made from France and Holland during the war.

From the effect of these previous directions to Fort St. George and Bombay I should have derived considerable facility in the execution of your Lordship's orders of the 17th of October 1802, if any of the stipulated restitutions had been demanded previously to the receipt in India of your Lordship's Dispatch of the 16th Nov. 1802. The necessity of postponing the restitutions at Fort St. George and Bombay until direct powers could be obtained from the authority of the Governor General in Council, would have amply justified the delay enjoined by his Majesty's commands of the 17th of October 1802, without exciting jealousy, or creating any apprehension of hostile motives.

His Majesty's commands contained in your Lordship's Dispatch of the 16th Nov. 1802, did not appear to me to require any alteration of my instructions to the subordinate governments of the 24th Nov. 1802.

My instructions of the 24th Nov. 1802, accordingly remained in full force at Fort St. George and at Bombay after your Lordship's orders of the 16th Nov. 1802 had reached each of those Presidencies.

No commissary or officer regularly authorised by the Governments of France or of Holland, arrived in India until the 15th of June 1802, when the French frigate *La Belle Poule* arrived at Pondicherry having on board Citizen Leger "Prefet Colonial" and Monsieur Binot "Chef de L' Etat Major de L' Expedition des Isles Orientales." Monsieur Binot brought dispatches to the Governor of Fort St. George and to the Governor General from his Excellency General De Caen the Captain General of the French Establishments in India. Copies of those dispatches are enclosed for your Lordship's information. By those letters it appeared that Monsieur Binot together with Citizen Leger was authorised to receive charge of the settlement of Pondicherry and its dependancies on the part of the French republic, and to make the necessary arrangements for the reception of the French troops destined for India.—A detachment of French troops supposed to amount to 160 men of the 9th. Demi Brigade arrived at Pondicherry at the same time. The notification of

this event reached Bengal on the 4th of July 1803, in a letter from the Governor in Council at Fort St. George under date the 18th of June 1803, enclosing General De Caen's dispatch to the Governor General.

Previously to the 15th of June Lord Clive had received intelligence which appeared to indicate the certainty of an early renewal of hostilities between his Majesty and France, his Lordship therefore adverting to my instructions of the 24th of November 1802, and to the spirit of your Lordship's "Most Secret" dispatch of the 17th of October 1802, as applicable to the existing crisis in India, apprized Monsieur Binot of the intention of the Government of Fort St. George to postpone the restitution of the settlement of Pondicherry until the authority of the Governor General in Council for that purpose should be received at Madras. Lord Clive at the same time transmitted orders to the British officer commanding at Pondicherry directing that the French troops should be permitted to disembark and that the officers and troops composing the detachment should be treated with every practicable degree of civility and attention.

Previously to the 4th of July, I had received intelligence relative to the critical state of affairs between his Majesty and the French republic of a similar complexion to that which had reached Lord Clive; and on the 6th of July I had the honour to receive your Lordship's dispatch of the 18th of March 1803, by Lieut. Col. Monson.

Under these circumstances, I entirely approved the prudent and judicious conduct of Lord Clive in strictly observing my instructions of the 24th Nov. 1802, and consequently in refraining from the final restitution of the conquered settlements, until his Lordship could receive my direct authority for that purpose; and I conceived it to be my duty in reply to his Lordship's reference, to issue such orders as should apply the spirit of his Majesty's commands of the 17th of October 1802, to the existing crisis of affairs in India.

In a state of suspense even with regard to the actual renewal of the War in Europe, and under the expectation, that, if such an event had not already occurred it could not be long delayed, it appeared to me to be requisite in obedience to the general tenor of your Lordship's dispatch of the 17th of October 1802, to postpone the execution of the treaty of Amiens in India, until I could be furnished with his Majesty's further commands, or could receive decisive information with regard to the condition of the subsisting relations between his Majesty and France.

On the 7th of July therefore I communicated in a private letter by express to Lord Clive my determination "not to restore the French or Dutch settlements in India until I should receive further instructions from England," and I directed his Lordship "to regulate his conduct by this determination;" and on the 9th of the same month I transmitted to Lord Clive by express an official dispatch of which a copy is annexed for your Lordship's information.

Your Lordship will observe that my instructions contained in that dispatch positively prohibit the restoration to any persons authorized either on the part of the French or of the Batavian republic, of any possession within the limits of the government of Fort St. George conquered from the French or the Dutch during the war without further orders from the Governor General in Council.

It appeared to me that the most advisable mode of withholding the several restitutions would be to postpone any reply to the letter received from General De Caen until the actual arrival of that officer in India, or until I should receive further orders from your Lordship or more satisfactory advices respecting the aspect of affairs in Europe.

On the 23rd of July I received a letter from Lord Clive dated the 13th of July announcing the arrival at Pondicherry on the 11th of July, of the French Squadron which sailed from Brest in the month of March 1803, consisting of the *Marengo* of 74 guns and two frigates, and having on board his Excellency General De Caen with a military force supposed to amount to between 600 and 700 European troops.

The French frigate *La Belle Poule* which was despatched to Fort St. George from Pondicherry, for the purpose of announcing this intelligence, conveyed a letter from his Excellency General De Caen to Lord Clive of which a copy is annexed for your Lordship's information.

Lord Clive communicated to me at the same time a copy of the letter which his Lordship had addressed to General De Caen for the purpose of explaining the

considerations by which his Lordship was precluded from a compliance with General De Caen's application for the restitution of the Settlement of Pondicherry without previous instructions from the Governor General in Council.

On the same day (the 23rd of July) I received a dispatch from Lord Clive dated the 14th of July, communicating the precipitate departure of the French Squadron from the roads of Pondicherry on the night of the 12th of July together with the troops which had recently arrived with General De Caen, of which no part had been landed.

Lord Clive was not able to procure distinct information regarding the motives which may have determined General De Caen to depart from Pondicherry with such precipitation before any answer could have reached Pondicherry from Lord Clive to General De Caen's letter of the 11th of July or from the Governor General to General De Caen's letter received at Fort William, on the 4th July, General De Caen's sudden departure is supposed however to have been the result of intelligence stated to have been communicated to General De Caen by a Corvette which arrived about noon, on the 12th of July at Pondicherry, and which was said to have left Brest about the 15th of March 1803.

The Troops which had been landed at Pondicherry from the French Frigate *La Belle Poule,* remained at that place under the command of Monsieur Binot who upon General De Caen's departure addressed a letter to the British Commissioner at Pondicherry (of which a copy is annexed for your lordship's information.) In this letter M. Binot states that General De Caen had appointed him to the command of Pondicherry, for the purpose of receiving the restitution of that settlement in conformity to the treaty of Amiens. It does not appear that M. Binot produced any powers under the express authority of M. De Caen.

No letter has been received by the government of Fort St. George, or by the Governor General from General De Caen announcing or confirming by his authority the appointment of M. Binot for the purposes stated in the preceding Paragraph.

The secrecy which was observed in the departure of the French Squadron precluded the means of ascertaining the place of its destination. But in combining the circumstances connected with its departure, and the state of affairs in Europe, Lord Clive supposes that the probable intention of General De Caen is to proceed to the Isle of France.

It has not appeared to me to be either necessary or proper under these circumstances to recognise M. Binot's powers, or to address any reply to him, as the authorized agent of General De Caen.—General De Caen's present station and destination are utterly unknown to me; his designs certainly bear an appearance which justifies suspicion and demands vigilance. To deliver over the settlement of Pondicherry to M. Binot if strictly regular in point of form would be highly imprudent; the sudden departure and unascertained situation of General De Caen preclude the possibility of correspondence with him; and his conduct in the actual state of intelligence from Europe renders it necessary to withold the restitutions under the treaty of Amiens until his Majesty's commands or further advices shall relieve me from doubt on this important subject.

I have therefore resolved neither to correspond with M. Binot, nor to attempt the transmission of any letter to M. De Caen, nor to sanction any restitution under the treaty of Amiens until I shall have received additional information or orders from England for the regulation of my conduct.

I have the honor to be &c.

WELLESLEY.

# APPENDIX M.

*Rajah Ragojee Bhoouslah to the Marquess Wellesley.*

Received 15th May, 1803.

I have derived great satisfaction from the receipt of your Lordship's friendly letter on the subject of Sirgoojah,* and apprizing me of the proposed mission of a gentleman of rank to this place, agreeably to the relations of subsisting harmony and friendship, for the purpose of concluding a permanent settlement of the affairs of that district, and of communicating to me your Lordship's views and sentiments on all points.

The relations of sincere friendship, harmony and concord, have, during a long period of time, subsisted between the two states, so firmly as to have admitted of no difference of interests between them, nor will any separation of them occur. Adverting to this circumstance, I had, previously to my receipt of your Lordship's letter, repeatedly enjoined the Taalookdar of Chhutteessghur to apprehend and chastise the Zemindar of Sirgoojah. The measure which your Lordship's penetration and wisdom, however, has suggested to you of despatching a person of rank for the purpose of negotiating in concert with me, a settlement of the affairs of Sirgoojah, is highly expedient and proper, and a source of ease and confidence to the inhabitants of this quarter.

After I shall have had a personal interview with the gentleman selected for this mission, and understood all the circumstances connected with the existing differences, a secure and permanent arrangement shall be made.

I refer your Lordship to Ruggojee Pundit for a full communication of my friendly sentiments; and I trust that you will continue to gratify me by letters denoting your welfare.

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*Translation of a Letter from Rajah Ragojee Bhoouslah to Auzim ul Omrah† communicated to the Resident at Hyderabad, May 4th* 1803.

To the Nawaub Sahib, the kind, the ornament of bounty unto his humble friends safety!

Previously to this a friendly letter respecting the departure of my ministers Shreedhur Pundit and Kishen Rao Chitnaveese, from Poonah, and the dismission of the respectable Keysho Rao Ramchunder, and requesting the commands of the resplendent presence, and desiring to be informed of the secret views and wishes of that founder of the basis, regarding future councils and arrangements, was written by the pen of amity. It is probable that its contents have become the medium of intelligence and information, and that the dismission of the aforesaid respectable person will already have been granted.

At this time on the 18th of Zekaud (March 15th) the aforesaid ministers arrived in safety at Nagpore, and they were accompanied by Narrain Rao Beyd on the part of Rao Pundit Purdhaun Baijy Rao, and by Wunkut Rao the vakeel of Ashwunt Rao Holkar, who reached this place on the same day. On the 25th of the same month also (March 20th) Idoo Rao Bashker the plenipotentiary minister of Dowlut Rao Scindiah arrived and had an interview with me; and in our public and private meetings they have repeatedly observed, in enumerating the circumstances which were entrusted to their verbal communication, that the causes of their mutual enmity and difference are perfectly evident, and do not require a particular detail. That by the grace of God, their respective masters regard me to be as venerable and illustrious as their parents; and that they conceive me to be wise and thoroughly informed on all matters, and on all occasions; and as

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* Sirgoojah is a small district belonging to the Rajah of Berar, on the north-eastern frontier of his dominions, from whence predatory incursions were continually made into the contiguous British possessions; and the repeated remonstrances of the British Government having proved unavailing, a detachment of British troops was employed for the suppression of these outrages.

† Prime Minister of his Highness the Nizam.

united in the prosperity and adversity of the state of Rao Pundit Purdhaun. Adverting to which, they never would depart from that line of policy and counsel which I might devise for the removal and eradication of their mutual enmity and dissatisfaction, and for the establishment of a plan for the adjustment of the state and government of Rao Pundit Purdhaun.

In a similar manner also, my ministers Shreedhur Pundit and Kishen Rao Chitnaveese have represented to me the secrets of the mind of Ashwunt Rao Holkar, in consequence of which, after ascertaining their objects and intentions, and having adjusted a plan for the union of Scindiah and Holkar, I deputed Ashwunt Rao Ramchunder and Wunkut Rao the vakeel to Holkar; and in compliance with the earnest solicitation and desire of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and the urgent entreaties of Judhoo Rao Bashker, my entering my tents has been settled for the 23d of Zehedge (16th April.)

After a meeting shall have taken place, and an arrangement for the reconciliation and union between Scindiah and Holkar have been effected, a specific plan for the adjustment of the state and government of Rao Pundit Purdhaun, such as the honour and integrity of the Rauj indispensably calls for, and is calculated for the prosperity of the country and cities, and the happiness of mankind at large, shall, with a due attention to the complexion of the times be maturely devised and executed.

Of this, a communication shall assuredly be made by the pen of affection, and as the permanence and settlement of the Peishwaship is designed and intended by the fragrant mind of the resplendent presence and by that founder of the basis, in consideration of the ancient alliance and lasting ties; and as in fact the knowledge of this circumstance is regarded as the cause of stability to the several states and the source of boundless advantage, to communicate particularly advice and counsel on such a subject is a proof of our intimate union and harmony.

Other circumstances will become known to you by the verbal representations of the respectable Madhoo Rao and Keysho Rao Ramchunder; and you will augment the happiness of my heart, the seat of friendship, by the transmission of letters communicating your welfare and the state of your councils.

May the days of your happiness and felicity be eternal.

A true translation.

(Signed) HENRY RUSSELL,
Secretary to the Resident.

N. B. A letter precisely of the same tenor and date as the above from the Rajah of Berar's ministers Shreedhur Pundit and Kishen Rao Chitnaveese to Auzim ul Omrah.

(Signed) H. R. Secretary.

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# APPENDIX N.

*General Orders by the Commander-in-Chief.*

Head Quarters, Camp near Lasswaree,
November 4th, 1803.

The Commander-in-Chief congratulates the army, on the brilliant result of the action of the 1st instant, although his Excelleney must ever lament the loss of so many brave officers and men.

The superiority of numbers, aided by a strong position and most formidable artillery, which they had to encounter after a fatiguing march of twenty-five miles, were circumstances to have discouraged an army less brave, more particularly when the obstinate and determined resistance of the enemy is considered.

While his Excellency offers his best thanks and acknowledgments to the whole of the army engaged, he feels it a tribute of justice to express his warmest thanks and gratitude to Colonel Macan, Captain Wade, Captain Elliott, and the officers and men of his Majesty's 29th dragoons, and 4th regiment native cavalry; to Major Mc'Leod, Captain Robertson, and officers and men of his Majesty's 76th regiment, for the conspicuous gallantry which they displayed, and to Colonel White, and officers and men of the detachment of the 16th regiment, and to Major Gregory,

and officers and men of the second battalion of the 12th regiment, for the timely and gallant advance to the support of the 76th regiment.

On this, as on every former occasion, his Excellency beheld with admiration, the heroic behaviour of the 76th regiment, whose gallantry must ever leave a lasting impression of gratitude upon his mind.

His Excellency's best thanks and acknowledgments are due to the whole of the cavalry who were engaged in the morning of the 1st of November, for the intrepidity and courage which they displayed.

The cavalry gallopers were served in a manner to reflect great credit on the officers in charge of them, and on the men who managed them.

(Signed) J. GERARD,
Adjutant-General.

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*General Orders by the Governor and Captain-General.*

Fort William, November 13th, 1803.

A royal salute and three vollies of musquetry to be fired at all the stations of the army, in honour of the glorious and important victory obtained on the 1st of November 1803, near Laswaree in Hindostan, by the army under the personal command of his Excellency General Lake, over a large body of the enemy's regular infantry and cavalry, in which the enemy were entirely defeated, with the loss of all their guns, tumbrils, and baggage.

By command of his Excellency,
(Signed) J. ARMSTRONG,
Acting Military Secretary.

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*General Orders by the Governor and Captain-General.*

Fort William, December 23d, 1803.

A royal salute to be fired from the ramparts of Fort William immediately, and three vollies of musquetry by the troops in garrison, at sun-set this evening, in honour of the signal victory obtained on the 29th of November 1803, on the plains of Argaum, by the army, under the immediate command of the honourable Major General Wellesley, together with the subsidiary force serving with the Soubahdar of the Deccan, over the combined armies of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and the Rajah of Berar, in which the enemy was completely defeated, with the loss of their cannon, ammunition, &c.

Vast numbers of the enemy were killed. The loss sustained by the British army has not been great. No officers have been killed, and but few wounded.

Extra batta to be served to the European troops in garrison.

By his Excellency's command,
(Signed) J. ARMSTRONG,
Acting Military Secretary.

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## APPENDIX O.

*Enclosures in a Letter from the Acting Resident at Poona, dated 20th of February.*

Received 11th March, 1804.

Translation of the Declaration by his Excellency General Decain, Captain-General and Governor of the Isles of Mauritius and Bourbon, and of their dependencies, addressed to all the Chiefs of Hindostan.

From the time when the English obtained possession of more than half of Hindostan, they have continually laboured to defame the character of the French, and

have endeavoured to persuade you that we are a faithless and a perfidious people. Without noticing the gross falsity of this assertion, I will withdraw the veil with which they have hitherto concealed their cunning.

Be it known unto you, that, at a time when the French nation was convulsed by internal contests, the English endeavoured to extend the flames of civil discord, as they had before done in Hindostan; but they did not accomplish their infernal object. Aware of their treacherous designs, we composed our animosities, and cordially uniting with each other, we attacked them with so much vigour that they were compelled to consent to terms of peace. Of this circumstance you have doubtless been already informed.

You have observed the line of conduct which the English pursue in Hindostan; you have witnessed the treachery by which they obtained possession of Bengal and Behar; you have seen their tyranny and cruelty in expelling Rajah Cheyt Sing from Benares; their savage and unmanly treatment of the unhappy Begums at Fyzabad; their injustice and violence in wresting from their rightful owners the countries of Oude, Arcot, and Surat; their fraud and rapacity in seizing the territories of Tippoo Sultaun; and, lastly, the unjust and aggressive war in which they are now engaged with the Mahratta Chieftains.

Had you opposed their first attack with the same spirit as ourselves, they would not have now had it in their power to exercise their tyrannical and oppressive sway over the countries of Hindostan.

A remedy may be found. Your enemies are by no means numerous. In the whole of Hindostan there are only a few thousand; the remainder of their force consists of native soldiers, your own subjects.

Tell those deceived and unfortunate persons, that they will hereafter be accountable to God, the Prophets, and the (Tacoor) deities, for thus drawing their swords against their liege sovereigns.

Ye chiefs, descended from the stock of the ancient kings and rulers of Hindostan, know your own power—you have hearts, and soldiers, and treasures.

Attack them with your united force, and liberate Hindostan from their violence, oppressions, and tyranny.

Farewell! direct your observation to Ceylon; imitate the example which the inhabitants of that island have placed before you, and the plan which they have pursued.

N. B. The three other enclosures are precisely to the same effect.

# APPENDIX P.

## MILITARY RETURNS.

*Abstract Statement, shewing the strength in Non Commissioned Rank and File, and distribution of the Forces in the Field under* Lieutenant-General Stuart; *detached with the Honourable* Major-General Wellesley; *the Subsidiary Force under* Colonel Stevenson; *the detachment at Hyderabad, commanded by* Major Irton; *and of the Troops stationed under* Colonel Montresor, *in Malabar and Canara.*

*State of the Army in the Do-ab under Lieutenant-General Stuart.*

| Corps. | Non Commissioned Drums Rank and File. | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Europ. | Natives. | Total. |
| His Majesty's 25th dragns. 1st. and 2d regts. of Madras native cavalry . . . . . | 431 | 846 | 1277 |
| Detachments of 1st and 2d battals. of Madras artil. | 251 | | 251 |
| Five comps. of his Majesty's 33d regt. 73d and 7 comps. of 80th regts. The 4th regt. 1 batt. 10th 1 batt. 12th and 1 batt. 17th regt. Mad. N. Inf. | 1529 | 4769 | 6298 |
| Total (sick and well) | 2211 | 5615 | 7826 |

N.B. 535 Artillery Lascars and 620 pioneers are not included in the total. A detachment of 463 of the batt. 12th is stationed at Kempsâgur and employed in escorting treasure to Poona, but included above.

*State of the Forces detached under Major-General the Honourable A. Wellesley (with Colonel Murray's Force.)*

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| H. M. 19th dragns. the 4th, 5th, and 7th regts. of Madras native cavalry . . . . . | 384 | 1347 | 1731 |
| Detachts. of Madras and Bombay Art. (from Saonda). | 173 | | 173 |
| H. M. 74th regt. 3d regt. 1st batt. 2d. 1st batt. 8th. 2d batt. 12th and 2d batt. 18th regt. of Madras native infantry . . . . . | 668 | 5631 | 6299 |
| Total | 1225 | 6978 | 8203 |
| *Under Colonel Murray from Bombay.* | | | |
| A detachment of Bombay artillery . . . . | 93 | | 93 |
| H. M. 78th and 5 comps. 84th regt. 1st batt. 3d and a detacht. of 1st batt. 7th regt. Bombay native infantry . . . . . | 1170 | 1035 | 2205 |
| Grand Total (sick and well) | 2488 | 8013 | 10501 |

N.B. 357 Madras and 177 Bombay artillery Lascars, and 653 Madras pioneers are included in the total. The detachment of H. M. 84th, one batt. of Madras, and one batt. of Bombay sepoys are at Poonah.

*State of the Force subsidised by his Highness the Nizam, under Colonel Stevenson (in the Field.)*

| Corps. | Non Commissioned Drums Rank and File. | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Europ. | Natives. | Total. |
| The 3d and 6th regts. of Madras native cavalry . | 4 | 905 | 909 |
| Detachment of 1st and 2d Madras batt. artill. . | 120 | | 120 |
| H.M. Scots brig. 2d batt. 2d. 1st batt. 6th 2d. batt. 7th. 2d batt. 9th. and 11th regt. of Madras native infantry . . . . . | 778 | 6113 | 6891 |
| Total (sick and well) | 902 | 7018 | 7920 |

N.B. 276 Madras artillery Lascars, and 212 Madras pioneers are not included in the state.

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*State of Major Irton's Detachment, now stationed at Hyderabad.*

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| A detachment of Madras artillery . . . | 28 | | 28 |
| 2d batt. 5th. and 2d. batt. 10th regt. Madras native infantry . . . . . | 3 | 1966 | 1969 |
| Total (sick and well) | 31 | 1966 | 1997 |

N.B. 47 Lascars of artillery not included.

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*State of the Forces serving under Colonel Montresor in the Provinces of Malabar and Canara.*

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Detachment of Bombay artillery . . . | 156 | | 156 |
| H.M. 77th regt. 3 comps. 80th, and Bombay Europ. regt. 2d batt. 1st Madras, and 2d 4th. and 8th regts. 2d batt. 3d. and 2d batt. 5th Bombay N. I. | 1367 | 7926 | 9293 |
| Total (sick and well) | 1523 | 7926 | 9449 |

N.B. 410 Bombay pioneers, 573 men of an irregular police corps in Malabar, and 100 of a police corps in Wynaad, and 314 Bombay artillery Lascars not included in the total. Of the above force in Malabar and Canara, only 2025 effective men could be assembled by Colonel Montresor for field service during the existing rebellion: as the troops in those provinces are distributed in detail through 32 stations, garrisons, and posts, to check the progress of insurrection.

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*Return of the Killed and Wounded, at the Assault of Allyghur, on the morning of the 4th of September,* 1803.

Comprising the 27th Dragoons; Artillery; 76th Reg.; 1st Bat. 4th N. Reg.; 2d Bat. 4th N. Reg. 4 Comps. 17th Reg. Total killed and wounded—2 Lt.-Cols.; 1 Major; 4 Cap.; 8 Lts.; 2 Ensigns; 1 Soubahdar; 2 Jemadars; 15 Serjts. and Havildars; 2 Drummers; 223 rank & file; 1 tindal; 4 lascars; and 6 horses.

*Names of Officers killed and wounded.* Artil.—Capt. Shipton, wounded. 76th Reg. *Killed*—Capt. Cameron, Lts. Flemming, Brown, Campbell, Lt. and Adj. St. Aubin. *Wounded*—The Hon. Lt. Col. Monson, Maj. Me Leod, Lt. Sinclair, and

En. Fraser. 1st. Bat. 4th Reg. *Killed*—Lt. Turton. *Wounded*—Lt.-Col. Browne, Capt. Berrie, Lt. André, and En. Burgess. 4 Comps. 17th Reg. *Wounded*—Capt. Bagshaw, and Lt. Boscawen.

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*Return of the Ordnance, &c. captured in the Fort of Allyghur, on the 4th of September,* 1803.

*On the Rounee, or Faussebraye, and on the circular Work before the Gates.*—Brass guns from 11-pounder to a 9-pounder, 22; iron ditto from 10-pr. to a 2-pr., 11; brass 6-inch howitzers, 4. *On the Bastions.*—Brass guns from a 20-pr. to a 6-pr., 6; iron ditto from a 17-pr. to a 3-pr., 8. *On the Curtains.*—Iron guns, the calibre not taken, 21; brass mortars 9 3-inch, 1. *In the Arsenal yard, and not mounted.*—Brass guns from a 3-pr. to a 2-pr., 3; ditto small, 2; iron guns from a 13-pr. to a 2-pr., 16; ditto small, 4; brass mortars 11-inch, 1; iron wall pieces, 182.

N. B. There was not sufficient time to ascertain the exact condition of the above ordnance, so as to pronounce them serviceable, or unserviceable.

In the Arsenal yard is abundance of shot for the above guns, and some stone shells, but neither of them are yet counted.

In the Magazine is a large quantity of gunpowder, not yet weighed.

In the Arsenal is a great number of new arms and some accoutrements. Part of the arms are made after the European, and part after the country fashion; the exact number of each not yet known.

In the Store Rooms are military stores of various kinds, but not at present examined.

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*Return of the Killed, Wounded and Missing, in the Action before Delhi, of the 11th of September,* 1803.

*27th Dragoons. Killed.*—1 Cor.; 1 Qr.-Mast.; 1 Serj.; 9 Priv. *Wounded*—1 Capt.-Lt.; 1 Serj.; 17 Priv. *Missing*—1 Priv.—Total, 32.

*Artillery. Killed*—1 Serj.; 1 Corp.; 1 Matross; 1 Lascar. *Wounded*—1 Cap.; 1 Serj.; 1 Corp.; 2 Gunn.; 8 Matt.; 2 Serangs; 13 Las. *Missing*—1 Gunn.; 1 Las. Total, 34.

*2d Regiment N. Cavalry. Wounded*—2 Cor.; 1 Naik; 14 Priv. Total 17.

*3d Regiment N. Cavalry. Killed*—1 Major; 1 Havildar; 5 Troopers. *Wounded*—1 Cor.: 1 Jemadar; 1 Naik; 9 Troopers. Total 19.

*76th Foot. Killed*—2 Serj.; 3 Cor.; 29 Priv. *Wounded*—1 Lieut.; 1 Serj.; 3 Corp.; 93 Priv. *Missing*—1 Corp.; 5 Priv. Total, 138.

*2d Batt. 4th Regiment. Killed*—2 Havildars; 1 Naik; 9 Sepoys. *Wounded*—1 Lieut.; 2 Subrs.; 2 Havs.; 4 Naiks; 1 Drumm.; 69 Sepoys. *Total 91.*

*2d Batt. 12th Regiment. Killed*—1 Lieut.; 1 Soub.; 2 Havdrs.; 1 Naik; 3 Drumrs.; 11 Sepoys. *Wounded*—1 Soub.; 1 Havr.; 2 Naiks; 32 Sepoys; 1 Bhisty. Total 56.

*1st Batt. 15th Regiment. Killed*—1 Subr.; 3 Sepoys. *Wounded*—3 Havs.; 1 Naik; 8 Sepoys. Total, 16.

*2d Batt. 15th Regiment. Killed*—1 Lieut.; 1 Drum.; 5 Sepoys. *Wounded*—9 Sepoys. Total, 16.

*1st Batt. 2d Regiment. Killed*—1 Hav.; 1 Naik; 1 Sepoy. *Wounded*—1 Lieut.; 1 Hav.; 1 Naik; 12 Sepoys. Total, 18.

*2 Batt. 2d Regiment. Killed*—2 Hav.; 4 Sepoys. *Wounded*—2 Lieuts.; 1 Hav.; 1 Naik; 18 Sepoys. Total, 28.

*1st Batt. 14th Regiment. Wounded*—1 Hav.; 12 Sepoys.

*Europeans Killed, Wounded and Missing. Killed*—1 Maj.; 1 Capt.; 2 Lieuts.; 1 Cor.; 1 Qr.-Mast.; 4 Serjts.; 4 Corps.; 39 Privs. *Wounded*—1 Capt.; 1 Capt.-Lieut.; 4 Lieuts.; 3 Cor.; 3 Serjs.; 4 Corps.; 2 Gunrs.; 118 Privs. *Missing*—1 Corp.; 1 Gunn.; 6 Privs. Total, 197.

*Natives Killed, Wounded and Missing. Killed*—2 Sub.; 8 Havs.; 3 Naiks; 38 Privs.; 4 Drumms.; 1 Lascar. *Wounded*—3 Sub.; 1 Jemadar; 9 Havs.: 11 Naiks; 191 Privs.; 1 Drumm.; 2 Serangs; 13 Lascars; 1 Bhisty. Total, 288.

*Names of Officers Killed and Wounded. Killed*—Major Middleton, 3d reg. cav.; Capt. McGregor, Persian Interpreter in the field; Lieut. Hill, 2d batt. 12th reg.; Lieut. Preston, 2d batt. 15th reg.; Cornet Sanguine, 27th Dragoons; and Qr.-Mr. R. Richardson, 27th Dragoons. *Wounded*—Major-Gen. Ware; Capt. Matthews, artillery; Capt.-Lieut. Covell, 27th Dragoons; Lieut. MacDonald, 76th reg.; Lieut. Wrottesley, 2d batt. 4th reg.; Lieuts. Alden and Harriott, 2d batt. 2d reg.; Cornets Crowe and Mather, 2d reg. cav.; Cornet Swindell, 3d reg. cav.

J. GERARD, Adjutant-General.

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*Report of the Ordnance, &c. captured opposite Delhi on the 11th of September, 1803.*

Two brass 20-pounders; 5 ditto 18-pr. carronades; 3 ditto 16-pr. ditto; 3 iron 12-pr. (French); 14 brass 6-pr.; 1 iron 6-pr.; 23 brass 4-pr.; 5 ditto 3-pr.; 4 iron 3-pr.; 1 brass 8-inch mortar; 1 ditto 8-inch howitzer; 4 ditto 6-inch ditto; 2 ditto 5-8 ditto. Total 68 pieces of Cannon of different natures; the whole mounted on field carriages, with limbers and traces complete. 37 tumbrils complete, laden with ammunition; 24 tumbrils blown up on the field of battle.

N. B. Many tumbrils and ammunition carriages abandoned by the enemy in the Jumnah and Nullah, not included above.

*Remarks.*—The whole of the above-mentioned ordnance appears "serviceable," excepting one iron 12-pounder, and 1 ditto 3-pounder, which are burst in firing.

The iron guns are of Europe manufacture. The brass guns, mortars, and howitzers have been cast in India, one Portuguese 3-pounder excepted. Some bear an inscription of being made at Muttra; others at Ugein, but the whole are evidently from the design and execution of an European artist. The dimensions are, in general, those of the French; the workmanship is of as high a finish as any in the Company's Arsenal.

Thirteen of the four-pounders have iron cylinders, or bores, over which it would seem, the metal was run in casting the piece; for the adherence is so close, that no slit or chasm appears; and nothing but the different colours of the two metals discover the junction. The iron cylinder, or bore, is composed of four longitudinal pieces of hammered iron, remarkably close, and neatly fitted throughout the bore.

The whole of the pieces are furnished with well-made elevating screws; some are of the latest French improvement. And to the mortars and howitzers the same kind of elevating screws are, by a simple and ingenious adjustment, made to elevate the piece to any angle, and give either of them the double capacity of mortar and howitzer.

The carriages are strong and good; some are neatly made according to the French pattern.

The tumbrils are very stout; but of the clumsy size and shape made by the Company in their arsenal about twenty years ago; some, however, have the modern draft chain, whilst others have retained the trace made of green hide.

The ammunition, both round and grape, differs from that made in the Company's arsenal, insomuch as that the bags are of cotton instead of serge, and not fixed to bottoms with the shot; and also, that two sorts of grape are made use of after the French ordonnance, viz. large balls for great distances, and smaller balls for lesser distances.

Chain shot rolled up into the shape of a ball, of the size of the bore of the piece, either mortar or howitzer, made part also of the enemy's ammunition.

JOHN HORSFORD, Lieut.-Colonel,
Commanding the Artillery in the Field.

*A Return of the Killed, Wounded and Missing, of the Detachment under the Command of Major-General the Honourable Arthur Wellesley, at the Battle of Assye, against the Army of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, on Friday the 23d of September,* 1803.

Comprising *Cavalry,* H. M. 19th regt. lt. dragoons; H. C. 4th regt. N. Cav.; H. C. 5th regt. do.; H. C. 7th regt. do.—*Detachment of Artillery,* 1st batt. of the Madras Art.; 2d bat. do.; Bombay Art.; attached to the Cav. guns.—*Eur. Inf.* H. M. 74th regt.; H. M. 78th regt.—*Nat. Inf.* 1st bat. 2d regt. N. I.; 1st bat. 4th regt. do.; 1st bat. 8th regt. do.; 1st bat. 10th regt. do.; 2d bat. 12th regt. do.; pioneers, (1st. bat. of.)

*Killed.—Europeans, Commissioned,* 1 Lieut.-Col. 6 Captains, 2 Capt.-Lieut. 12 Lieut. 1 Volunteer.

Ditto.—*Staff,* 1 Lieut. and Adj. 1 Non-Commis.—12 Serj. 162 Rank and File.

Ditto.—*Natives,* Officers, 5 Subahdars, 3 Jemidars, 13 Havildars, 4 trumpeters, 195 Rank and File, 8 Gun Lascars, 2 Puccallies;—Total 428. Officer's horses 20, Regimental do. 305.

*Wounded.—Europeans, Commissioned,* 1 Lieut.-Col. 2 Maj. 4 Capt. 2 Capt.-Lieut. 17 Lieut. 3 Cornets.

Ditto.—*Staff,* 1 Lieut. and Quarter Master, 1 Non-Commis.——— 34 Serj. 6 Trumpeters, 371 Rank and File.

Ditto.—*Natives,* Officers, 12 Subahdars, 16 Jemidars, 39 Havildars, 6 Trumpeters, 586 Rank and File, 35 Gun Lascars, 2 Puccallies;—Total 1138. Regimental horses 111.

*Missing.*—16 Rank and File, 2 Gun Lascars;—Total 18. Regimental horses 2.

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*List of Officers Killed and Wounded at the Battle of Assye, 23d September,* 1803.

*H. M. 19th Lt. Regt.*—Lieut.-Col. Maxwell, killed, commanding the Cavalry, Capt. R. Boyle, killed; Capts. Cathcart, Sale, Lieuts. Wilson, Young, wounded.

*4th Nat. Cav.*—Capt. H. Mackay, killed, agent for public cattle; Cornet Meredith, wounded.

*5th Nat. Cav.*—Capt. J. Colebrooke, wounded; Lieut. Bonomi, killed, Adjutant; Lieut. Macleod, wounded, Quarter Master; Lieut. Darke.

*7th Nat. Cav.*—Capt. MacGregor, wounded.

*1st Batt. Artillery.*—Capt.-Lieuts. Steele, Fowler, Lieuts. Lindsay, Griffith, killed.

*H. M. 74th Regt.*—Capt. D. Aytone, A. Dyce, R. Macleod, Paymaster of the Regt. J. Maxwell; Lieuts. J. Campbell, J. M. Campbell, J. Grant, R. Neilson, L. Campbell, M. Morris; Volunteer G. Tew, not on the strength, but recommended for an Ensigncy, killed; Major S. Swinton, Capt.-Lieut. N. J. Moore, Lieuts. J. A. Mein, McMurdo, M. Shawe, Ensign B. Kernan, wounded.

*H. M. 78th Regt.*—Lieut. J. Douglas, killed; Capt.-Lieut. C. McKenzie, Lieut. J. Kinlock, J. Larkin, Ensign J. Bethune, Acting Adjutant, wounded.

*1st Batt. 2d N. I.*—Lieut. Brown, killed.

*1st Batt. 4th N. I.*—Lieut. Mavor, killed.

*1st Batt. 8th N. I.*—Lieuts. Davie, Fair, Hunter, Desgraves, wounded.

*1st Batt. 10th N. I.*—Lieuts. Perrie, killed; Taylor, wounded.

*2d Batt. 12th N. I.*—Lieut.-Col. Macleod, Major McCally, Lieuts. Bowdler, Harvey, Smith, De Crez, wounded.

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*A Return of Ordnance taken from the Enemy in the Battle of the 23d September,* 1803.

Howitzers Brass—Two 8-inch; two 6 do.; two 5½ do.; one 5 do. Total 7.

Guns Brass—Six 18 pounders; 7 sixteen do.; one 12 do.; one 10 do.; three 8 do.; twenty-two 6 do.; four 4 do.; twelve 3 do.; nine 2½ do.; four 1 do. Total 69.

Guns Iron—Two 24 pounders; two 18 do.; three 16 do.; two 12 do.; four 9 do.; five 6 do.; four 4 do. Total 22.—Total Ordnance of different descriptions 98.

The number of tumbrils and quantity of ammunitions and stores taken cannot be ascertained, as after the action and during the night, a great number of tumbrils were blown up.

M. BEAUMAN,
Captain Commanding Artillery.

Camp Assye, 29th September, 1803.

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## *Return of the Killed, Wounded, and Missing, in Lieutenant-General Lake's Action of the 10th October, 1803.*

Comprising *Artillery*—Killed 1 Gunner; Wounded, 1 Lieut.; 2 Tindals; 1 Havildar; 1 Gunner; 7 Privates; 7 Gun Lascars. *2d Batt. 9th Regt.*—K. 1 Lieut.; 6 Sepoys; W. 1 Lieut.; 3 Subahdars; 2 Havildars; 2 Naicks; 44 Sepoys. Missing, 1 Sepoy. *1st Batt. 12th Regt.*—W. 1 Lieut.; 2 Sepoys. *1st Batt. 4th Regt.*—K. 2 Havildars; 15 Sepoys. W. 1 Major; 1 Lieut.; 1 Ensign; 1 Subahdar; 2 Jemadars; 3 Havildars; 3 Naicks; 2 Drummers; 55 Sepoys. M. 11 Sepoys. *1st Batt. 15th Regt.*—K. 2 Sepoys. W. 1 Lieut.; 1 Havildar; 17 Sepoys.. M. 1 Havildar. *2d Batt. 15th Regt.*—K. 1 Havildar; 1 Naick; 5 Sepoys. W. 13 Sepoys. M. 1 Naick; 1 Sepoy. *2d Batt. 16th Regt.*—K. 1 Sepoy. W. 4 Sepoys. Total—K. 1 Lieut.; 3 Havildars; 1 Naick; 1 Gunner; 29 Sepoys. W. 1 Major; 5 Lieuts.; 1 Ensign; 4 Subahdars; 2 Jemadars; 2 Tindals; 7 Havildars; 5 Naicks; 1 Gunner; 2 Drummers; 7 Privates; 135 Sepoys; 7 Gun Lascars. M. 1 Havildar; 1 Naick; 13 Sepoys.

*Names of the Officers Killed and Wounded.*

*Artillery*—Lieut. Beagham wounded. *2d Batt. 9th Regt.*—Lieut. Grant killed, Lieut. Whittaker, wounded—since dead. *1st Batt. 12th Regt.*—Lieut. Woolet. wounded. *1st Batt. 14th Regt.*—Major Thomas, Lieut. Rose, Ensign Oliver, wounded. *1st Batt. 15th Regt.*—Lieut. Perry, wounded.

J. GERARD, Adjutant-General.

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## *Return of Ordnance, Ammunition, &c. captured in the Fort of Agra.*

Camp at Agra, October 22, 1803.

*Brass Guns.*—One large gun. This is the famous piece known by the name of the Great Gun at Agra. It is said to be composed of many metals, including all the precious ones. Its ball measures 22 inches: such a one, if of cast-iron, weighs nearly 1500 lbs. One 72-pounder.—This gun is said to be of the same composition as the above one. One 20-pr.; one 10 do.; five 9 do.; one 8 do.; nineteen 6 do.; six 5 do.; seven 4 do.; two 3 do.; two 2 do. five 1 do.; two 18 do. carronades; one 16 do.; oue 8 do. carronade; one 3 do. galloper; two 2 do.; one 1½ do.; three 1 do.; nine wall guns; one 12 inch mortar; one 8 do.; one 6 do. howitzer; one 5½ do.; one 4 2-5ths do. Total, 76 brass guns, of different natures.

*Iron Guns.*—One 32 pounder; one 24 do.; one 18 do.; four 12 do.; one 10 do.; one 8 do.; six 6 do.; four 5 do.; six 4 do.; six 3 do.; six 2 do.; four 1 do.; eleven 2 do. galloper; four 1½ do.; four 1 do.; 26 wall guns. Total, 86 iron guns, of different natures; 33 tumbrils.

*Abstract.*—Brass pieces, of different natures, 76; iron do. 86. Total, 162.

*Remarks.*—The brass pieces are in general of the same manufacture as those taken in the camp and town. Of the iron ones, several are what are termed bar guns.

The whole are mounted, either on travelling carriages with elevating screws,

or on country block carriages turning on a large pivot. Several spare carriages are ready to receive pieces which may be broken down.

In the magazines are large quantities of gunpowder, shot, rockets, &c. but the precise weight and number not yet ascertained.

JOHN HORSFORD, Lieut.-Colonel,
Commanding the Artillery in the Field.

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*Return of the Ordnance, Ammunition, &c. captured at the attack of the enemy's Camp under the walls of the Fort, and in the Town of Agra.*

Camp, October 22, 1803.

Two brass 16 pounders; sixteen do. 6 do.; seven do. 4 do.; one do. 3 do.; all mounted on field carriages with limbers complete. Total, 26 pieces of different natures; 26 tumbrils, laden with ammunition for the above; 29 ammunition carriages, ditto.

*Remarks.*—The above ordnance appear to be perfectly "serviceable," excepting one brass four-pounder which is burst.

The whole of the pieces are of the same manufacture as those captured at Delhi.

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*Return of the Killed and Wounded of His Majesty's and the Honourable Company's Troops, under the command of Lieut.-Col. Harcourt, from the 24th September to 14th October,* 1803.

*Detach. of Bengal Artillery. Wounded*—European, 1 Lieut. *H. M. 22d Reg.* 24th Sept. do. 1 Priv.; 14th Oct. *Killed*—1 Priv. *Wd.*—1 Capt.; 8 Priv. *1st Div. Madras European Reg. Kd.*—1 Priv. *Wd.*—1 Serj.; 4 Privs. *1st Bat. 20th Bengal Reg.* 1st Oct. *Wd.*—Native, 1 Havildar; 1 Priv. *2d ditto 20th ditto,* 1st Oct. *Wd.*—Native, 4 Priv. *Ditto,* 14th Oct. *Kd.*—Native, 3 Priv. *1st Bat. 9th Madras Reg.* Ahmedpoor, 24th Sep. *Wd.*—Native, 1 Hav.; 1 Priv. *Ditto,* Beirpoorshuttumpoor, 1st Oct. *Kd.*—Native, 1 Priv. *Wd.*—1 Subr.; 1 Naigue; 7 Priv. *Ditto,* at the Fort of Barrabutty, 14th Oct. *Wd.*—Native, 1 Priv. *1st Bat. 19th Madras Reg.* Ahmedpoor, 24th Sep. *Wd.*—1 Priv. *Ditto,* 1st Oct. ditto 7 Priv. *Ditto,* 14th Oct. European, 1 Capt.; Native, 2 Jemadars; 1 Havildar; 1 Priv. Total, *Kd.*—European, 2; Native, 4. *Wd.*—European, 17; Native, 30.

*Wd.*—Capt. Hurlstone, of H. M.'s 22d Reg.; Capt. Kenny, of the 1st Batt. 19th Madras Reg.; Lieut. Faithfull, of the Bengal Artillery.

GEORGE HARCOURT, Lieut.-Colonel,
Commanding in Cuttack.

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*Return of the Killed and Wounded of His Majesty's and the Honourable Company's Troops in the Assault of the Fort of Barrabutty on the 14th October, under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Harcourt.*

Laul-Baug Fort, Cuttack, October 15, 1803.

*Detach. of Bengal Art. Wounded*—Europeans, 1 Lieut. *Detach. of H. M. 22d Reg. Killed*—Europeans, 1 Priv. *Wd.*—1 Capt.; 8 Privs. *1st Div. Madras European Reg. Kd.*—1 Priv. *Wd.*—1 Serj.; 4 Privs. *20th Bengal N. Reg. Kd.*—Natives, 3 Privs. *1st Batt. 9th Reg. Madras N. I. Wd.*—1 Priv. *1st Batt. 19th Reg. Madras N. I. Wd.*—European, 1 Capt.; Natives, 2 Jemadars; 1 Havildar; 9 Privs. Total, Europeans, *Kd.* 2; *Wd.* 16. Natives, *Kd.* 3; *Wd.* 13.

*Wd.*—Capt. Hurlstone, of H. M.'s 22d Reg.; Capt. Kenny, of the 1st Batt. 19th Reg. Madras N. I.; Lieut. Faithfull, of the Bengal Artillery.

FRANCIS THOMPSON, Major of Brigrade.

*Return of Killed, Wounded and Missing, in the Corps composing the Subsidiary Force at the Siege of Asseer-ghur.*

*1st Batt. 6th Reg.*—1 Rank and File, killed. 1 Drummer, 4 ditto, wounded.
*Detach. Corps of Pioneers.*—1 Puckally, killed. 1 Pioneer, wounded.

J. COLEBROOKE,
Dep. Adj.-Gen. Subsidiary Force.

Camp, three miles south of Asseer-ghur, Oct. 26, 1803.

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*Return of Officers and Men Killed and Wounded in the Action of Lasswaree, the 1st of November,* 1803.

Comprising General Staff; 8th Regt. Lt. Drag.; 27th Regt. do.; 29th Regt. do. 76th Regt. Foot; Artillery; 1st Regt. N. I.; 2d Regt. do.; 3d Regt. do.; 4th Regt. do.; 6th Regt. do.; 2d Bat. 9th Regt. N. I.; 2d Bat. 8th Regt. do.; 1st Bat. 12th do.; 2d Bat. 12th do.; 1st Bat. 15th do.; 2d Bat. 15th do.; 6 Comps. 16th do.; 1 Comp. 1st Bat. 11th do.

*Killed*—1 Maj.-Gen.; 1 Col.; 2 Majors; 1 Capt.; 4 Lieut.; 2 Qr.-Mast; 2 Cornets; 11 Serj.; 4 Matrosses; 67 Rank and File; 1 Subahdar; 7 Havildars; 6 Naicks; 60 Privates; 3 Lascars.—Total 172.

*Wounded*—1 Col.; 2 Lieut.-Cols.; 2 Majors; 7 Capts.; 12 Lieuts.; 3 Qr.-Masters; 2 Cornets and Ensigns; 27 Serjs.; 6 Matrosses; 248 Rank and File; 1 Drummer; 4 Subahdars; 7 Jemadars; 26 Havildars; 19 Naicks; 279 Privates; 5 Lascars; 1 Beasties.—Total 652.

*Officers Killed in the Action of the 1st of November,* 1803.

Major-Gen. Charles Ware. *General Staff*—Major William Campbell, Dep. Qr.-Mast. Gen.; Lieut. Duval, Aide-de-Camp to the Commander-in-Chief. *H. M. 8th Regt. Lt. Drag.*—Col. T. P. Vandeleur, Capt. Story. *H. M. 29th Regt. Drag.* Major Griffith, Cornet Fitzgerald, Qr.-Mast. Philley, Qr.-Mast. R. MaGoughy. *1st Regt. N. C.*—Cornet Coxwell. *H. M. 76th Regt.*—Lieut. and Adj. Meulh, Lieut. Hurd. *1st Bat. 15th Regt. N. I.*—Lieut. Lambert.

*Officers Wounded in the Action of the 1st of November,* 1803.

*General Staff*—Lieut.-Col. Gerard, Adj.-Gen.; Major G. A. F. Lake, Secretary to the Commander-in-Chief; Capt. J. Campbell, Gram. Agent attached to Head Quarters; Lieut. Ashurst, commanding the Escort with his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief. *H. M. 8th Regt. Lt. Drag.*—Lieut. Lyndon, since dead; Lieut. Wellard. *H. M. 27th Regt. Lt. Drag.*—Capt. White, Capt. Mylne, Capt. Sandys, Lieut. Gore, Major of Brigade. *H. M. 29th Regt. Lt. Drag.*—Lieut. Holstead, since dead; Capt. Sloane; Lieut. Thorne, Qr.-Mast. Tallen. *1st Regt. N. C.*—Lieut. Cornish. *4th Regt. N. C.*—Lieut. Reid. *6th Regt. N. C.*—Cornet Dickson. *H. M. 76th Regt. F.*—Capt. Robertson, Lieut. Marston, Lieut. Wibner, Lieut. Sinclair. *1st Bat. 12th Regt. N. I.*—Ensign Dalton. *2d Bat. 12th N. I.*—Major Gregory, Capt. Fletcher, Lieut. Ryan. *1st Bat. 15th Regt. N. I.*—Col. Macdonald. *2d Bat. 16th Regt. N. I.*—Lieut.-Col. White, Ensign G. Deane Heathcote.

J. GERARD, Adjutant-General.

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*Report of the Ordnance, &c. Captured at Lasswaree on the 1st of November,* 1803.

Camp at Lasswaree, 3d November, 1803.

One Brass 18 Pounder Carronade; six do. 16 do.; twenty-six do. 6 Pounders; four do. 4 do.; sixteen do. 3 do.; one do. 2½ do.; two Iron 16 do.; two do. 2½ do. Gallopers; two do. 1½ do.; two Brass 8-inch Mortars; one Brass 8-inch Howitzer; four do. 6 do. do.; one do. 5, 8 do. do.; one do. 5, 4 do. do.; two do. 5, 2 do. do. The whole mounted on field carriages, with limbers and traces complete.

Seventy-one pieces of cannon of different calibres.
Sixty-four tumbrils complete, laden with ammunition, and 44 stand of colours.
Ditto ditto blown up on the field of battle, the number not ascertained.
The whole of the above-mentioned ordnance appears serviceable, with the exception of eight pieces of small ordnance.

The iron guns are of European manufacture. The brass guns, mortars, and howitzers have been cast in India, one Dutch six-pounder excepted. The dimensions are in general those of the French. The mortars and howitzers are furnished with elevating screws, made by a simple and ingenious adjustment, to give either of them the double capacity of mortar and howitzer. The Ammunition is made up in the same manner as that taken at Delhi.

Fifty-seven carts or hackrees laden with matchlocks, muskets, and stores, also twelve artificers' carts.

J. ROBINSON,
Captain Commanding the Artillery.

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*Abstract of the Killed, Wounded and Missing, of the Troops under the command of Major-General the Honourable Arthur Wellesley, on the 29th November* 1803, *in the Action, on the plains of Argaum, with the United Armies of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and the Rajah of Berar, commanded by the Maharajah, and Munnoo Bappoo, brother to the Rajah of Berar.*

Major-Gen. Wellesley's Division. *Europeans*—killed, 13; wounded, 101. *Natives*—killed, 21; wounded, 93; missing, 4. *Horses*—killed, 6; wounded, 3; missing, 9. The Nizam's Subsidiary Force. *Europeans*—killed, 2; wounded, 44; missing, 2. *Natives*—killed, 10; wounded, 55; missing, 1. *Horses*—killed, 18; wounded, 6; missing, 2.

*Officers Wounded.*—Capt. J. M. Vernon, 2d Batt. 12th Reg. N. I. Lieut. Langlands, H. M.'s 74th Reg.; and Lieut. A. Turner, 1st Batt. 3d Reg. N. I.

*Officers Wounded.*—Captains Burke, and Dalrymple, of the Artillery. Lieut. Barnby, 6th Reg. Cavalry. Lieutenants James Donald, John Robertson, and Frederick Campbell, of H. M.'s 94th Reg.

B. BARCLAY,
Dep. Adj.-Gen. Mysore.

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*Return of the Killed, Wounded and Missing, of the Troops under the command of Major-General the Honourable Arthur Wellesley, from the 6th to the 15th of December* 1803, *inclusive, during the Siege and in the Storming of Gawileghur.*

The Troops composing the Honourable Major-General Wellesley's Division of the Army:

*H. M. 74th Reg.—Wounded,* 1 Corporal.
*H. M. 78th Reg.—Wounded,* 1 Private.
*The 1st Batt. 2d Reg. N. I.—Wounded,* 4 Sepoys.
*The 1st Batt. 3d Reg. N. I.—Wounded,* 2 Sepoys.
*The 1st Batt. 8th Reg. N. I.—Wounded,* 3 Sepoys.
*The 1st Batt. 10th Reg. N. I.—Killed,* 1 Havildar; *Missing,* 1 Sepoy.

The Troops composing the Subsidiary Force serving with His Highness the Soubahdar of the Deccan:

*Artillery.—Killed,* 1 Matross; *Wounded,* 1 Corporal; 1 Mattross, and 2 Gun Lascars.
*H. M. 94th Reg.—Kd.* 3 Rank and File. *Wd.* 2 Serjs. and 51 Rank and File.
*The 2d Batt. 2d Reg. N. I.—Wd.* 2 Sepoys.
*The 1st Batt. 6th Reg. N. I.—Kd.* 1 Sepoy. *Wd.* 5 ditto.
*The 2d Batt. 7th Reg. N. I.—Kd.* 1 Lieut. and 2 Sepoys. *Wd.* 1 Lieut. 1 Havildar and 16 Sepoys.

*The 2d Batt. 9th N. I.—Kd.* 1 Sepoy. *Wd.* 2 ditto.
*The 1st Batt. 11th Reg. N. I.—Kd.* 2 Sepoys. *Wd.* 1 Lieut.-Col. and 6 Sepoys. *Mg.* 1 Sepoy.
*The 2d Batt. 11th Reg. N. I.—Kd.* 1 Sepoy. *Wd.* 1 Havildar, and 6 Sepoys.
*Pioneers.—Wd.* 1 Priv. *Mg.* 1 Priv.
*Officers.—Kd.* Lieut. Young, of the 2d Batt. 7th Reg. N. I. *Wd.* Lieut.-Col. Kenny, Commanding the 1st Batt. 11th Reg. N. I. and Lieut. Parlby, of the 2d Batt. 7th Reg. N. I.

*Abstract of the Killed, Wounded and Missing.*

The Hon. Maj.-Gen. Wellesley's Division. *Europeans*—wounded, 2. *Natives*—killed, 1; wounded, 9; missing, 1. The Troops composing the Sub. Force. *Europeans*—killed, 5; wounded, 57. *Natives*—killed, 7; wounded, 42; missing, 2.

B. BARCLAY,
Dept. Adjt.-Gen. in Mysore.

Camp at Deogaum, 16th December, 1803.

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*Return of Ordnance, &c. found in the Fort of Guyl-ghur.*

Camp near Guyl-ghur, 16th December, 1803.

Ordnance brass Guns, serviceable.—One 18 pounder; two 14 do.; one 12 do.; four 9 do.; two 8 do.; two 6 do.; one 5 do.; nine 4 do.; five 3 do.; one 2½ do.; two 2 do.; two 1½ do.; two 1 do. Ordnance brass Guns, unserviceable.—One 9 pounder; one 4 do.; one 1 do. Ordnance iron Guns, serviceable.—One 9 pounder; one 1 do. Brass Mortars, serviceable.—One 11-inch. Brass Howitzers, serviceable.—One 10-inch; one 8-inch. Malabar Guns of various Calibres found in the place.—Ten. Total number pieces of Ordnance found in the place, 52.

Upwards of 2,000 stand of English Arms, 150 Wall Pieces, carrying from ½ to 1 pound balls, and a variety of country Arms, not yet collected.

W. BURKE,
Capt. Comdg. Arty. Subsidiary Force.

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## APPENDIX Q.

*List of Chiefs and States in Hindostan with whom Treaties have been concluded on the Part of the British Government, by his Excellency General Lake, Commander-in-Chief, &c.*

Rajah Runjeet Sing, Rajah of Bhurtpore. } Treaty Signed 29th September, 1803. Ditto Ratified 22d October, 1803.

DEFENSIVE.

Rajah Bukhtawur Sing, Rajah of Macherry. } Treaty Signed 14th November, 1803. Ditto Ratified 19th December, 1803.

DEFENSIVE.

Rajah Juggut Sing, Rajah of Jynaghur. } Treaty Signed 12th December, 1803. Ditto Ratified 13th January, 1804.

The Rajah engages that he never will entertain in his service any English or Frenchmen, or any Europeans, without the consent of the British Government.

DEFENSIVE.

Rajah Maun Sing, Rajah of Jodepoor. } Treaty Signed 22d December, 1803. Ditto Ratified 13th January, 1804.

The same stipulation with regard to Frenchmen, and other Europeans, as the Rajah of Jynaghur's treaty contains.

DEFENSIVE AND SUBSIDIARY.

Rajah Keerut Sing, Rana of Gohud. } Treaty Signed 17th January, 1804. Ditto Ratified 2d March, 1804.

Engages not to entertain any French or English subjects, or any Europeans in his service without the consent of the British Government.

Three battalions of the honourable Company's Sepoys to be permanently stationed in the Rana's dominions, for the protection of his country, for which the Rana is to pay to the Company, in monthly instalments, 25,000 sicca rupees for each battalion, amounting to the monthly sum of 75,000 rupees, or nine lacs of rupees annually.

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The treaty between Ambajee and the British Government was signed on the 22d December, 1803, and ratified on the 13th January, 1804.

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# APPENDIX R.

*The Marquess Wellesley to the Right Hon. H. Addington, &c. &c.*

(Private and Confidential.)—Extract.

MY DEAR ADDINGTON, Barrackpore, Feb. 12, 1803.

I return you many thanks for your kind letter marked "Secret" of the 28th of September 1802. You will perceive by my despatches to the Court of Directors, and by my "Private" letter of this date to you, that I am entirely satisfied with the measures which you have taken for removing the difficulties which opposed my further continuance in India. Lord Castlereagh's conduct and language are also perfectly satisfactory, and I anticipate an able and successful administration of Indian affairs under his superintendence.

The attack on the recent settlement of the Carnatic proceeds from the Nabob's creditors, who would however have acted more wisely if they had remained quiet, and had trusted their cause to me. At a proper season, after the confirmation of the treaty in England, I should have proposed a just settlement of their demands on the basis once proposed by me to the Nabob Omdut ul Omrah, in a letter dated the 24th April 1799.* The Nabob peremptorily rejected that part of my plan in the same spirit of profligate treachery which marked all his proceedings; and if the treasons of his faithless Highness had escaped with impunity, the creditors would have retained no better security for their claims than the Company for its subsidy. The new settlement affords an opportunity for providing funds for the gradual discharge of such part of the debt as may be deemed just and legal after a full enquiry by a competent authority; and my opinion always has been, that some enquiry of this description ought to precede any arrangement respecting the debts of the Nabob of the Carnatic. The imprudence of the creditors will not induce me to oppose any just and reasonable arrangement, but I will never recommend nor tacitly submit to any general acknowledgment of the legality of the whole debt; many branches of it are certainly usurious, and connected with violent outrages upon the Company's legal authority; others may deserve consideration, and some are entitled to favour. The time is now arrived when it may be proper to institute an enquiry under the authority of Parliament, or of a commission with the aid of the local government of India. I trust that you will tread this ground with caution, since it would be equally unjust to burthen the public (i. e. the Company) with the whole debt, and to preclude all consideration of the claims of the creditors.

The settlement of the Carnatic is, perhaps, the most salutary and useful measure which has been adopted since the acquisition of the Dewanny of Bengal. The justice of the transaction is as unquestionable as its policy; and I confess that I never expected blame for any part of it, excepting the delay of judgment after full

* Vol. I. p. 541.

conviction of the criminal. That delay proceeded from mixed considerations of lenity and policy, and it affords the most incontestible proof of the deliberation with which I proceeded. I am happy to hear that my cause (which is that of Great Britain in India) will be so honourably and ably defended; but I rejoice that so far from entertaining any apprehension of censure (for having saved the interests of my country from the most atrocious of traitors, and for having rendered his treasons a fresh source of wealth and power to the Company) I claim from the public as great a tribute of gratitude, on account of my service in the rescue of the Carnatic, as I received for the conquest and settlement of Mysore. Perhaps, indeed, the advantages secured in the Carnatic may be found, upon accurate examination, to surpass those obtained in Mysore, and the difficulty of conducting the settlement in the Carnatic, was at least equal to that of the negotiations and war with Tippoo Sultaun. With regard to any other meditated attacks, it will be soon enough to think of them when they shall appear in any distinct form. The state of every branch of this government, and the conscious sense of the motives which have governed every measure of my administration, preclude me from anticipating any attack, which has not been distinctly announced.

You will receive by this despatch, and by the *Swallow* packet, the most ample details respecting Oude. My brother Henry will return to Europe in the *Swallow*. I request you to read the documents respecting Oude transmitted by the *Telegraph* at your earliest leisure: for although I trust that the *Swallow* may be despatched soon after the *Telegraph*, it will be a great advantage in your conversations with Mr. Wellesley, that you should previously have considered the correspondence with Oude. You may be assured that I continue to repose the most cordial confidence in your public and private honour, nor have my sentiments of friendship, kindness, and personal respect, ever suffered the slightest abatement. The information which I have received from various quarters, of the zeal, assiduity and firmness which have distinguished your support of my public character and public services in the present crisis, has not been lost upon my mind, but it has not in any degree excited an emotion of surprize. Whatever may be the vicissitudes of public affairs, I think I can rely on the immutable firmness of our friendship. I have suffered the most severe pain from witnessing, even at this distance, the differences which prevail between some of those persons who must ever be the primary objects of my esteem and regard, as well as of my most respectful attachment. I trust in God, that I shall never be called upon to decide upon a choice of political alternatives, which must involve my friendship with one or either of such parties. My greatest ambition, upon my return to Europe, would be, to become the bond of union between them, and to be the instrument of reconciling those who ought never to have been divided. Having no personal objects to pursue, having been removed from the scene of contention, and possessing, I trust, the confidence of all my former friends, my endeavours will be uniformly directed to produce such a co-operation among them as shall present the most formidable obstacle to the success of the enemies of the public safety, and of the established constitution. With these sentiments, I desire neither power, emolument nor honours upon my return to England; my wish is, to preserve the regard of my friends for myself, and to preserve, or rather to restore their union for the preservation of the country. In such a course, office or honours will not engage my attention, but I never will withhold my assistance from the public service, while the cause which has so long united us, shall demand my exertions.

I congratulate you on your prosperous state of finance in England. The finances of India will, I trust, far surpass your most sanguine expectations in the course of another year.

Believe me to be, my dear Addington,
yours most affectionately and sincerely,
WELLESLEY.

*The Marquess Wellesley to the Right Hon. H. Addington, &c. &c.*

(Private.)

MY DEAR SIR, Barrackpore, Feb. 12, 1803.

On the 29th of January I had the satisfaction to receive your letter of the 27th September 1802, together with a despatch from the Court of Directors, under date the 29th September 1802. You will have learnt from my letter to the Court of Directors of the 24th December 1802, that the extraordinary state of affairs in the Mahratta empire had induced me to determine to remain in India for another season; the grounds of this determination, as well as the effects which will probably result from it, will, I trust, be approved by his Majesty's confidential ministers. I entertain a firm hope that the issue of the present crisis at Poonah will prove favourable to the preservation of tranquillity in India, and will furnish considerable additional security to the British interests in this quarter of the globe; and I expect that the commotions which have prevailed among the Mahratta states will subside in the course of a few months, without any interruption of the amicable relations subsisting between the Company and any of the native powers.

His Majesty's ministers will have remarked in my determination to await in India the result of the commotions of the Mahratta empire, that my most anxious solicitude is directed to the faithful discharge of the duties of my arduous trust; and that I am sincerely disposed to sacrifice every subordinate consideration to my sense of the exigency of the public service. With these sentiments, the desire which you have been pleased to convey to me in the name of his Majesty's confidential servants, that I should remain in India until the close of this year, would have claimed my implicit obedience under any circumstances, or in any state of the affairs of this empire. The nature of the charge which I hold absolutely requires my submission to the convenience of his Majesty's counsels in the deliberate choice of my successor, nor can I imagine any consideration which would justify an abrupt dereliction of such a trust, excepting only the impossibility of exercising it with advantage to the great public interests which it involves.

The opinion which his Majesty's ministers are pleased to express of my services, the support which they have afforded to this government in my hands, and the authority and advantage which must be derived from their aid and co-operation, enable me to retain my station with a confidence of success: and I therefore assure you that (unless some unfortunate accident of bad health should compel me to depart,) I will remain in India until the month of January 1804.

I cannot conclude this letter without the additional assurance of the high consideration with which I have received so honourable a testimony of the favourable opinion of his Majesty's present ministers. Nor should I express my personal sentiments with justice or truth, if I omitted my cordial declaration, that it would require a powerful impulse of public duty to induce me to withhold my assistance from any branch of the public service, which appeared to them to demand my exertions.

Believe me to be, with sincere respect and esteem,
my dear Sir,
yours most faithfully and affectionately,
WELLESLEY.

END OF VOLUME III.

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